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LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES

BY

GRAHAM H. STUART, PH.D.



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Vol. 1

To
AGNES WRIGHT STUART

PREFACE

The purpose in writing this book has been to give a brief and accurate survey of the diplomatic and commercial relations between the United States and those Latin American countries with which our interests have been most closely related. The increasingly friendly relations brought about by the World War, the development and expansion of commercial relations, the improved facilities for communication and travel, have made evident the vital importance of our future relations with the nations of this hemisphere. This need has been shown by the demand in our colleges and universities for more courses dealing with Latin American history, geography, institutions, diplomatic policies and commercial possibilities.

This volume, designed primarily as a text for classes in American diplomacy, and for those studying our relations with Latin America, will, it is hoped, also appeal to that part of the general public which is interested in the bases and development of American foreign policy. To make it the more useful for reference, the citation of the documentary sources of much of the material has been considered essential. In addition, supplementary reading lists have been appended to each chapter to give the student opportunity to obtain the background necessary for a complete understanding of the facts presented. The maps have been specially prepared for the volume to give the reader a clearer conception of the general features of Latin American geography, and for that reason have been made as simple as possible.

Every effort has been made to present the facts fairly

and accurately, with particular emphasis upon those phases of American diplomacy which have hitherto received least attention. For example, the diplomatic relations between the United States and Mexico preceding the Mexican War have been sketched very briefly, inasmuch as this material is already available in excellent form. On the other hand, our recent relations with the Caribbean countries and Central America, and our diplomatic relations with Argentina, Brazil, and Chile have been given more detailed attention owing to the greater difficulty of obtaining satisfactory material on these subjects.

The author wishes to express his deep obligation to Professor Frederic A. Ogg, the editor of the series, for his careful reading and revision of the manuscript and for his many helpful suggestions and improvements. Grateful acknowledgment is also given to the librarians of the Wisconsin Historical Society for their constant and invaluable assistance, and in particular to Mrs. R. D. Evans for aid in collecting the documentary materials and to Miss Mary Foster and Miss Marjorie Park for their cooperation in the search for material.

GRAHAM H. STUART.

August 8, 1922.

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**LATIN AMERICA AND
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CHAPTER I

THE NEW PAN-AMERICANISM

JUST as individuals, influenced by their several environments, follow out definite courses of action, so nations, reacting to certain geographical, economic, and strategic stimuli, evolve policies that fix the broad outlines of their world relations. For Great Britain, the control of the seas has been the dominating factor; her whole foreign policy, her great navy, her far-flung empire, are part and parcel of it. For France the eastern frontier has been a perpetual sword of Damocles; the Russian Alliance, the Entente Cordiale, and the Triple Entente were merely rings of defense in a policy of protection against Germany. The Russian giant, hemmed in by the frozen seas of the north, the Siberian wastes on the east, and powerful neighbors on the west, steadily pursued a policy of expansion towards the open water, with Constantinople and control of the Mediterranean arteries as the goal of his ambition.

The key-note of the foreign policy of the United States was sounded by Washington in the memorable proclamation of neutrality of 1793; and its *motif* was outlined in the farewell address of 1796. The new nation must not have part in the political broils of Europe. The great ocean had isolated us—"Why forgo the advantages of so peculiar a situation?"

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The Monroe Doctrine, enunciated a generation later, merely added a corollary to this policy by making it objective as well as subjective. And for fully a century the United States, confronted with what seemed an unlimited field for inland expansion, pushed its frontier westward and maintained its isolation.

The war with Spain, however, brought a new situation. The Monroe Doctrine could easily be stretched to the Spanish West Indies, but could it be made to reach across the Pacific? While still debating the question, the United States became a world power. The Hague conferences, the peace of Portsmouth, relief of the legations endangered by the Boxer Rebellion, the Conference of Algeciras, found the United States participating; and its rôle was not without honor.

Naturally enough, the results of the Spanish war aroused in Europe a feeling of jealousy towards the new world power that had appeared in the west; international society is commonly conservative and prone to frown upon the upstart state. But this feeling was not confined to Europe. Latin America, which might have been expected to acclaim the new-found freedom of the unhappy Cubans, looked instead with regret towards the conquered Spaniard and with fear towards the Yankee victor. *Quis custodiet custodem?* Texas and Mexico were not forgotten, and Cleveland's assertion of the sovereignty of the United States over the western hemisphere still echoed in the Andes. *Cuba libre* had a pleasing sound. But how about Porto Rico?

The events of the next few years were not of such character as to allay Latin-American suspicions. The Platt Amendment was looked upon no more favorably in South America than in Cuba. The policy of President Roosevelt in Santo Domingo, and the "big-stick" policy in general, was viewed with alarm. Again, when Colombia refused to accept the terms of the United States for a canal concession, and as a result lost possession over her province of Panama,

all Latin America looked askance at its powerful neighbor on the north. Washington's policy of isolation seemed to have been thrown overboard; Monroe's doctrine was no longer recognizable.

Fortunately for future Pan-American relations, the peak of American imperialism had been reached. In 1905 Elihu Root became Secretary of State, and in the following year he visited South America. The sincerity and cordiality of his utterances, and the friendly attitude of the United States towards closer American coöperation, opened a new era in Pan-American relations. The Wilson administration, from the outset, favored closer relations with Latin America, and one of the earliest statements of the President thus outlined his policy: "One of the chief objects of the new administration will be to cultivate the friendship and deserve the confidence of our sister republics of Central and South America and to promote in every proper and honorable way the interests which are common to the peoples of the two continents."¹ This attitude was maintained throughout the trying Mexican situation and through the stress of the World War, and one of the last official acts of President Wilson was to send Secretary Colby on an official mission to South America to counteract influences working against the United States. The success of this visit may be gaged by the cordial farewell message of President Irigoyen of Argentina, whose attitude towards the United States throughout the war had been decidedly unsympathetic: "Be assured that the great and elevated qualities that characterize your Excellency leave with us the most profound impression of pleasant and lasting memories. The messages of the great American people and of their illustrious President, which your Excellency so lucidly expressed, and the identity of all the ideas which we have exchanged, produced in me the conviction of the most af-

¹ E. E. Robinson and V. J. West, *The Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson* (N. Y., 1917), p. 179.

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fectionate harmony and of everlasting friendship between our countries.”¹

It is still rather early to judge the attitude of the Harding administration towards a closer relationship with Latin America. The appointment of Senator Fall to a position in the cabinet was widely taken to indicate a rather uncompromising Mexican policy. Yet, with Mr. Hughes at the head of the state department, it would be unwise to lay too much stress upon Mr. Fall's influence on the President. Unquestionably, the successful effort of President Harding to make some reparation to Colombia for her loss of sovereignty over Panama, by insistence upon the immediate passage of the Colombian treaty, was a real contribution to better relations. It may prove the first step leading to a Pan-Americanism based on mutual confidence and respect. Perhaps the President's personal attitude may be fairly gaged by these expressions taken from his address of April 19, 1921, in commemoration of the unveiling of the monument to Bolivar: “I would like this date to be the cornerstone of a new era for South and North America in the mutual trust, in the fellowship of freedom and democracy, and in a new confidence and a new mutuality of purpose in achieving the things which independence and fellowship so naturally inspire. . . . I know I speak the spirit of the United States when I say that no self-consciousness impels, no envy exists, no hatred is actuating . . . Pan-Americanism means sympathetic and generous Americanism.”²

The entrance of the United States into the World War, despite every effort to remain neutral, was conclusive proof that in the present condition of world politics no great nation can withdraw itself from an active participation in international affairs, and yet maintain its position and prestige. This is especially true in the case of a nation that aspires to leadership in the western hemisphere.

¹ *New York Times*, Jan. 28, 1921.

² *Ibid.*, April 20, 1921.

Noblesse oblige must be an important factor in the policy of great nations, just as it has been in the lives of great men; and before undertaking obligations it behooves a nation to understand clearly the responsibility it is assuming. If the policy of non-interference in European affairs permits the United States to pay little attention to European diplomacy,—and surely our participation in the World War has proved the lack of foresight in such a policy,—on the other hand, the Monroe Doctrine, which has rightly been regarded as the backbone of our foreign policy, demands as an absolute condition of its maintenance, not only very careful attention to the affairs of the Latin-American republics, but also a thorough and comprehensive understanding of their problems and their policies.

The most casual study of the relations between the United States and the Latin-American republics will indicate that the great republic in the north has made little effort either to understand the difficulties that have sorely tried her younger and less powerful neighbors or to study their racial characteristics and customs with the friendly appreciation necessary to good relations between states. Nor is it sufficient in a democracy where public opinion plays an important part in foreign affairs to confine knowledge of foreign policies and peoples to the select few who make up the government. Such understanding should be widespread among the peoples themselves, so that public opinion, based upon an intelligent comprehension of the facts, can act as a lever towards more friendly coöperation, rather than as a spur to jealous and rival aspirations. To bring about this better relationship, which can be accomplished only by a better mutual understanding, every possible point of contact and every avenue of approach should be utilized.

The first and most important means of understanding and knowing foreign peoples is to be acquainted with their language. Hitherto this aid to an understanding between ourselves and South America has been almost completely

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overlooked. Only recently have our schools and colleges given Spanish the recognition long accorded German and French, and even to-day Portuguese, the language of the greatest of all the South American states, appears in the curricula of few of our educational institutions. One noteworthy effect of the World War has been to reduce the study of German in American institutions and to stimulate the study of Spanish and French. The reaction against all things German was one of the principal causes of this turn towards the Latin tongue. The aversion of war-time will not, and should not, endure. None the less, the wider study of the Romance languages may be expected to be sustained both by the increased appreciation of the great store of exceptionally worthy French and Spanish literature, and by the practical advantages of a knowledge of Spanish and Portuguese in maintaining and increasing our Latin-American trade.

It is not sufficient to know the language of a foreign country. There must be also some understanding of that country's history, institutions, government, and policies. It must be confessed that the educational institutions of the United States have done very little to stimulate interest in these aspects of Latin America. A glance at the courses of study announced by the various institutions and colleges of the United States in recent bulletins clearly indicates the scant attention paid to Latin-American history and affairs. The University of Chicago, listing more than one hundred courses in history, does not devote one to the study of the Latin-American states. Princeton offers none in either graduate or undergraduate departments. Columbia offers one course on Spanish and Portuguese America out of approximately seventy-five given in its history department. The University of Wisconsin presents a course on the United States and Latin America in its political science department, but no course dealing with Latin-American history. The University of Michigan offers two courses

on Latin-American history and institutions, Yale offers four, while Harvard stands near the top of the list with five. The University of California deserves great credit for recognizing the value of a knowledge of Latin-American history and institutions, as is evidenced by the offering of nine or ten courses of this character. When our great colleges and universities manifest so little interest in bringing Latin-American affairs to the attention of their students, it is not surprising that in the secondary schools even less interest is shown. As a consequence, the ignorance of the ordinary well educated American citizen concerning all things south of Panama is veritably limitless.

The North American press shows the same tendency to confine its attention to that part of the world lying north of the equator. A recent *coup d'état* in Bolivia, which was of such importance as to justify Chile in mobilizing in the north, and which provoked great excitement and warlike preparations in Peru, was given a part column on an inside page of a few of the metropolitan papers. In the press of the smaller cities such an event was not regarded as of sufficient importance to call for space. Yet the foreign policy of the United States was most vitally concerned, because our recognition of the *de facto* government would have the greatest influence upon its success or failure. It may be noted in passing that only since the World War has the press of the United States attempted to concern itself with foreign affairs in anything like the way in which such subjects are treated in foreign newspapers. Even today, in contrast with the press of London, Paris, and Buenos Aires, our metropolitan press, with few exceptions, is most decidedly provincial.

Undoubtedly there has been a remarkable increase in the attention devoted by the average American citizen to European and Asiatic affairs during the past few years; but the affairs of the great nations of South America, with

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whom his real interests are far more closely related, have not yet been brought to his attention for the consideration which they merit. Before we can expect to interest the American public in the problems and policies of its neighbors on the south, an educational campaign must be waged which will give the people some conception of the actual situation in the great Latin-American republics. It can hardly be expected that a proper realization of the importance of maintaining cordial relations between the United States and South America would exist in the mind of the American business man who wrote to the United States legation in Buenos Aires to inquire whether the shops there used glass in their windows.¹ If this Denver merchant had realized that Buenos Aires was approximately seven times as large as his own city, and was the capital of a country that did business to the amount of more than a billion and a quarter dollars in 1918, he would not have wondered whether the South Americans had yet reached the stage of civilization in which they were no longer content to use oil-paper for their windows.

A well known South American commercial authority has declared that the great work of Pan-Americanism can be accomplished only if based upon close commercial relations, which are the proper foundations for continental harmony in America.² The World War gave the United States a marvelous opportunity to seize the position long held by Great Britain as the leading trader with the South American republics, and at the present time she still holds that position. The following figures, reported by the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, show the situation very clearly. In 1913 the United Kingdom exported merchandise to the South American republics to the value

¹ C. H. Sherrill, *Modernizing the Monroe Doctrine* (N. Y., 1916), p. 17.

² N. Pinheiro, "Pan-Americanism and the Commercial Expansion of the United States," in the *Pan-American Magazine*, Vol. XXXI, p. 103 (July, 1920).

of approximately \$280,000,000, and imported goods valued at about the same amount, making a total trade value of approximately \$560,000,000. Germany's exports to South America in the same year were valued at about \$185,000,000, and her imports at \$165,000,000, or a total of \$350,000,000. The United States' exports to South America in 1913 amounted to about \$165,000,000, and her imports to \$205,000,000, a total of approximately \$370,000,000.¹ Now, to contrast these figures with the value of merchandise imported from and exported to the South American countries by the United States during the twelve months ending in June, 1920. The approximate figures are: imports, \$820,831,000; exports, \$575,580,000—a grand total of \$1,396,411,000, or a gain of almost 400 per cent.² Even considering the inflated prices of goods following the war, the increase is stupendous. British trade with South America in 1920 amounted to about \$872,000,000; German, \$107,000,000.³

But the United States can not hope to maintain this supremacy, obtained through Europe's misfortune rather than by her own ability, unless she enlarges her vision to include something more than a mere commercial relationship with her South American neighbors. Sentiment is not so wholly divorced from business by the South American as by the North American. The Monroe Doctrine will continue to be a stumbling-block to our commercial expansion until we realize that South America no longer either needs or desires our protection, except as we may coöperate with her to protect the mutual interests of the two Americas. Furthermore, this coöperation must be upon terms of equality, an equality that will be achieved only when an interchange of ideas, knowledge, and sympathy shall supplement commerce in products and exchange. President Wilson expressed this fact in most happy phraseology in

¹ Quoted from *Report of Second Pan-American Commercial Conference* (Wash., 1919), pp. 400-401.

² *Statistical Abstract of the U. S.*, 1920, pp. 838-839.

³ *Bulletin of the Pan-American Union*, Vol. LIV, pp. 48-49 (Jan., 1922).

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his address before the Southern Commercial Congress at Mobile: "It is a very perilous thing to determine the foreign policy of a nation in the terms of material interest. It is not only unfair to those with whom you are dealing, but it is degrading as regards your own actions. Comprehension must be the soil in which shall grow all the fruits of friendship."¹

Many methods and agencies have been employed to bring about this mutual sympathy and understanding. One of the most effective has been a series of Pan-American conferences and congresses. The idea underlying these conferences was put forth by Bolivar in 1824, when, as the head of the Republic of Peru, he suggested that representatives of the independent states of America meet at Panama, with the object of establishing "certain fixed principles for securing the preservation of peace between the nations of America, and the concurrence of all those nations in defense of their own rights."² This conference took place two years later, but only four governments participated—Peru, Colombia, Central America, and Mexico. Owing to the cordial support of the idea by Henry Clay, then Secretary of State, President John Quincy Adams appointed two plenipotentiaries for the United States. Strong opposition developed in Congress, however, and the necessary appropriations were not made in time to enable our delegates to take part.³ Although a number of excellent agreements and proposals were signed, the times were not yet ripe for employing arbitration and mediation in the settlement of international disputes, and the conference had no tangible results. Another congress was called at Lima in 1847, to formulate proposals regarding mutual protection,

¹ E. E. Robinson and V. J. West, *The Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson* (N. Y., 1917), p. 200.

² *International American Conference*, Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 232, 51st Cong., 1st sess., Part IV, Vol. IV, p. 155.

³ For an interesting discussion of the reasons for the failure of American participation see J. B. Lockey, *Pan-Americanism: Its Beginnings* (N. Y., 1920), pp. 313-316; for the attitude of the United States, *ibid.*, Chap. X.

commercial relations, and consular and postal matters. Chile, Peru, Colombia, Bolivia, and Ecuador sent representatives, but the United States, then at war with Mexico, was not invited to participate.

The next serious attempt to bring about a joint conference of the independent nations of North and South America was initiated by the United States. On November 29, 1881, James G. Blaine, Secretary of State, invited the governments of all the independent states of the two continents to send representatives to Washington to participate in a congress "for the purpose of considering and discussing the methods of preventing war between the nations of America."¹ However, as the War of the Pacific (between Chile and Peru) was still in active progress, the conference did not take place until 1889. President Cleveland had been authorized by Congress in 1888 to issue a call to all the independent Latin-American countries to send representatives to meet at Washington; but President Harrison had the honor of inaugurating the First International American Conference. All the independent republics except the Dominican Republic were represented, and Mr. Blaine, who once more held the office of Secretary of State, was chosen to preside. The program outlined for consideration was an extensive one, and included measures tending to promote peace and prosperity, the establishment of uniform customs regulations, a uniform system of weights and measures, laws for the protection of patents, copyrights, and trademarks, and the formulation of a definite plan of arbitration for the settlement of all disputes among the American nations. One of the noteworthy agreements of this congress was to incorporate into American international law the principle of arbitration as a means of settling disputes among the American nations. But the governments were not yet ready to go so far as their representatives.

Of more practical importance was the establishment of

¹ *Int. Amer. Conf., op. cit., p. 256.*

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the Bureau of American Republics, devoted to the encouragement of Pan-American commerce, friendship, and peace. This international organization, which since 1910 has been known as the Pan-American Union, is maintained by the twenty-one American republics, and is controlled by a governing board composed of the Secretary of State of the United States and the diplomatic representatives in Washington of the twenty other American nations. It is administered by a director-general and an assistant director-general, chosen by this board. It collects, compiles, and distributes information of all sorts regarding the commerce, laws, progress, and general development of all the American republics. Its *Monthly Bulletin*, published in English, Spanish, and Portuguese, and superbly illustrated, is a veritable storehouse of information concerning the conditions, possibilities, and latest developments of the Pan-American republics. The Union also publishes special reports and pamphlets containing information on various subjects of practical value. It has a well equipped library containing more than forty thousand volumes, and is especially rich in official documents of the various republics. It is housed in a magnificent building costing more than a million dollars, the greater part of which was contributed by Andrew Carnegie. Under the able management of its former director-general, John Barrett, who resigned in 1920 after fourteen years of service, the Union did a great work towards Pan-American understanding and peace. In fact, since the Union was reorganized in 1906-07 not a single war between any two American republics has taken place. In its present director-general, Dr. Leo S. Rowe, the Union has a man peculiarly well equipped to continue its work and enlarge the scope of its influence.

In a recent article surveying the Pan-American outlook, Mr. Barrett tells of a great European statesman who, upon entering the Pan-American Building recently, noting the practical work that the Union is doing for Pan-American

solidarity, seeing its governing board room with its great council table, and finally looking at a photograph which showed the Secretary of State of the United States and the diplomatic representatives of the other American republics seated there, said he believed that if there had existed in London or Berlin, in Paris or Vienna, a Pan-European Union organized on the basis of the Pan-American Union in Washington, and having a similar council chamber and council, the World War would never have taken place.¹ If the League of Nations can fill this most vital need for the world at large as adequately as the Pan-American Union has met it for the nations of the western hemisphere, its usefulness and permanence will be assured.

With the success of the First International American Conference so clearly manifested, it was to be expected that other conferences would be called to enlarge upon and follow up its work. The second conference was summoned in October, 1901, at the suggestion of the United States and Mexican governments. Its sessions were held in Mexico City. Perhaps its most important result was that all the American nations became parties to the Hague Convention of 1899 for the pacific settlement of international disputes.² The third conference met at Rio de Janeiro in 1906, and Elihu Root, who as Secretary of State of the United States was making an official tour of South America, represented the United States. His speech at this conference remains one of the greatest expositions of the vital need of a mutual and sympathetic understanding among the American nations. The entire speech is worthy of quotation, but the following sentences indicate his message:

“No nation can live unto itself alone and continue to live. Each nation’s growth is a part of the development of the race. . . . There is not one of all our countries that

¹“The Pan-American Outlook,” reprinted from *The Journal of Race Development*, Vol. IX, No. 2 (Oct., 1918).

²*Second Int. Amer. Conf.*, Sen. Doc. No. 330, 57th Cong., 1st sess.

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can not benefit the others; there is not one that will not gain by the prosperity, the peace, the happiness of all. . . . We wish for no victories but those of peace; for no territory except our own; for no sovereignty except the sovereignty over ourselves. . . . We neither claim nor desire any rights or privileges or powers that we do not freely concede to every American republic. . . . Let us help each other to show that for all the races of men the liberty for which we have fought and labored is the twin sister of justice and peace. Let us unite in creating and maintaining and making effective an all-American public opinion, whose power shall influence international conduct and prevent international wrong and narrow the causes of war . . . and bring us even nearer to the perfection of ordered liberty. So shall come security and prosperity, production and trade, wealth, learning, the arts and happiness for us all."¹

The Fourth International American Conference assembled at Buenos Aires on July 12, 1910. All the American republics were represented except Bolivia, and one of the honorary presidents was Philander C. Knox, Secretary of State of the United States. The conference took up and debated an extensive list of subjects, and adopted a number of important conventions and resolutions. Among the most noteworthy were resolutions relating to patents, trademarks, and copyrights; extending the existence and powers of the Pan-American Railroad Committee; providing for the encouragement of steamship communication between the republics of the American continent; providing for the exchange of professors and students between the universities of the American continent; recommending the uniformity of consular documents and custom-house regulations; and, finally, providing for the establishment of a section of commerce, custom-house, and statistics in the

¹ *Third Int. Amer. Conf.*, Sen. Doc. No. 365, 59th Cong., 2nd sess.; Elihu Root, *Latin America and the United States* (Cambridge, 1917), p. 6.

Bureau of American Republics, which was to be known henceforth as the Pan-American Union.¹

Since the outbreak of the World War a number of important Pan-American conferences and congresses have been held. One of the most important was the First Pan-American Financial Conference, which was called by President Wilson, and to which eighteen American governments sent representatives. The sessions opened May 24, 1915, under the presidency of Mr. William G. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, in the Pan-American Building at Washington. The primary purpose of the conference was to consider the monetary and banking situation, which had become badly deranged by the war, and also to arrange for the prompt establishment of better transportation facilities between the United States and South America, which the conference declared to be "a vital and imperative necessity." For, in the words of Dr. Samuel Hale Pearson of Argentina, chairman of the committee on transportation: "It is a little premature for us to try to establish commercial relations if we find we can not get there; the first thing is to get there, and then business will follow."² In addition to unanimous adoption of the resolution in regard to the imperative need for improved means of ocean transportation, the conference similarly adopted the recommendation of its general committee that uniformity of laws be considered in the following subjects: (1) the establishment of a gold standard of value; (2) legislation in regard to bills of exchange, commercial paper, and bills of lading; (3) classification of merchandise, customs regulations, consular certificates and invoices, port charges; (4) regulations for commercial travelers; (5) further legislation concerning trademarks, patents, and copy-

¹ *Fourth Int. Amer. Conf.*, Sen. Doc. No. 744, 61st Cong., 3d sess.

² *Proceedings of First Pan-American Financial Conference* (Wash., 1915), p. 279.

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rights; (6) the establishment of a low rate of postage and of charges for money orders and parcel post between the American countries; and (7) the extension of the procedure of arbitration for the adjustment of commercial disputes. The conference also recommended the establishment of an International High Commission, to consist of not more than nine members resident in each country, and to be appointed by the Minister of Finance of such country.¹ These recommendations were carried into effect in the various countries, and the United States commission was constituted, with Mr. McAdoo chairman and Mr. John Bassett Moore vice-chairman. The first meeting of the International High Commission was held at Buenos Aires in 1916, and a Central Executive Council was chosen, which has proceeded actively in formulating and submitting drafts of treaties regarded as essential to improve commercial relations between the two Americas.

The excellent results achieved by this permanent body along the lines indicated above were clearly set forth at the Second Pan-American Financial Congress, held in Washington during the week of January 17-24, 1920. Mr. Moore, vice-chairman of the International High Commission, in a speech to the members of the congress pointed out, in particular, that six countries had already taken favorable action in regard to the adoption of a uniform statistical classification of merchandise as recommended by the International High Commission; also that efforts made to advance uniform legislation in regard to bills of exchange, checks, bills of lading, and warehouse receipts were achieving a steady success, and that, as far as bills of exchange were concerned, there would soon be only two systems in use throughout the western hemisphere, based respectively on the Hague Rules of 1912 and the United States Negotiable Instruments Acts of 1916. Furthermore,

¹“Report of the General Committee” in *Proc. of First Pan-Amer. Fin. Conf.* (Wash., 1915), p. 301.

the convention drafted by the Central Executive Council, looking to uniform regulations for commercial travelers by the substitution of a single national fee for varying local taxes, had been signed and ratified by six countries, including the United States, and had been signed by three more, while five others had signified their willingness to sign. Also, the treaty for the establishment of an international gold-clearance fund had been signed by five republics and approved in principle by six others. Finally, noticeable progress had been made in extending the principle of arbitration in the settlement of commercial disputes, and agreements to this effect had been made between the United States Chamber of Commerce and the chambers of commerce of Buenos Aires, Uruguay, Ecuador, Panama, and Guatemala.¹ It was voted at this second conference that the High Commission should continue its work; and, with a view to more definite indication of its sphere of activities, it was thereafter to be known as the Inter-American High Commission.

The transportation problem was also taken up, and Mr. John Burton Payne, chairman of the United States Shipping Board, was able to assure the representatives that a rapid improvement might be looked for, inasmuch as the board planned to put five steamers into passenger service to the east coast of South America, and to increase the freight service; while the service of the W. R. Grace Company to the west coast was to be encouraged and augmented. "The Shipping Board," said Mr. Payne, "has felt and now feels the keenest interest in bringing South America so close to the United States that we may shake hands almost daily, and we keenly realize that this can only be done by ships and more ships."²

The eighteen resolutions adopted by the Second Pan-American Financial Conference advocated a continuance of

¹ *Report of Second Pan-Amer. Fin. Conf.* (Wash., 1921), p. 44.

² *Ibid.*, p. 44.

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efforts along the lines developed by the first conference, and in addition urged, among other things, state legislation permitting the establishment of branches of Latin-American banks, an extension of the system of naming commercial *attachés*, the taking of a simultaneous census in all the American countries every ten years, the universal adoption of the metric system of weights and measures, the restriction of prohibitive duties in order to increase the widest possible distribution of raw materials, and finally "that the Inter-American High Commission be requested to study the question of the creation of an inter-American tribunal for the adjustment of questions of a commercial or financial nature involving two or more American countries, and the determination of such questions by principles of law and equity."¹

Among recent important conferences devoted to an improvement of Pan-American relations, mention must be made of the two Pan-American commercial conferences held under the auspices of the Pan-American Union, the first in February, 1911, and the second in June, 1919. Both were held for the purpose of obtaining an informal but comprehensive exchange of views and information between the official and unofficial commercial representatives, trade experts, business men, and other interested parties of both North and South America, with a view to the improvement of business conditions and the development of trade. Incidentally, mutual appreciation was bound to be stimulated; for, as the ambassador of Chile, Señor Mathieu, declared: "The Latin-American here meets the Anglo-Saxon American for exchange of idea and view-point; here the former is disabused of his distorted illusions concerning the greed and what has come to be called the imperialism of the Yankee, and here the latter learns that unreliableness, incurable indolence, and chronic disorder are not characteristic ailments of the Latin-American republics, as so often

¹ *Report of Second Pan-Amer. Fin. Conf.* (Wash., 1921), p. 56.

represented.”¹ The report of the second conference, a volume of some four hundred pages, is a veritable encyclopedia of information on all phases of Pan-American relations, and should be in the hands of every business man who is, or might become, interested in South American trade.

In concluding this enumeration of the important conferences held for the purpose of drawing the two Americas more closely together, mention must be made of the two Pan-American scientific congresses, the first held in Santiago, Chile, in December and January, 1907-08, and the second held in Washington at the same season eight years later. The primary aim and purpose of these congresses was “to increase the knowledge of things American and to disseminate and make the culture of each American country the heritage of all American republics.” At the Washington congress all of the twenty-one republics of the western hemisphere were represented officially, and virtually all of the leading scientific associations and educational institutions of these republics sent representatives. In all, more than two hundred delegates were in attendance from the Latin-American countries and more than a thousand from the United States, making it one of the greatest international scientific meetings in the world’s history. Some idea of the vast scope of the program may be realized by an enumeration of the nine general subjects discussed, to each of which was allotted a section, these being further divided into forty-five subsections: (1) anthropology, including archæology and ethnology; (2) astronomy, meteorology, and seismology; (3) conservation of natural resources, agriculture, irrigation, and forestry; (4) education; (5) engineering; (6) international law, public law, and jurisprudence; (7) mining, metallurgy, economic geology, and applied chemistry; (8) public health and medical science; (9) transportation, commerce, finance, and taxation.

¹ *Report of Second Pan-Amer. Com. Conf.* (Wash., 1919), p. 4.

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The *Proceedings*, including the Final Act, comprise twelve large volumes which have been published by the United States Government Printing Office.

These conferences and congresses have exerted a most potent influence in spreading the idea of a new Pan-Americanism, whose strength shall rest upon the solid foundation of mutual appreciation and understanding. After all, however, their influence must be confined in large measure to the intelligentsia of the two continents. There remains the even more important task of popularizing this spirit. This can be done only by a campaign of education which shall make the citizens of the two continents of the western hemisphere as familiar with each other's history and achievements as they are with the history and institutions of the countries of Europe and Asia. The schools must give a larger place to Latin America in their curricula, not merely in the teaching of its languages and geography, but also in the teaching of its history, literature, and political science. Increased attention to the study of foreign policy and diplomacy is especially needed in the institutions of higher learning in the United States. The Monroe Doctrine has too long been regarded as a sort of holy of holies in all questions of American foreign policy, perhaps most of all by the people who have the most hazy conceptions of what the doctrine really means. Exchange professorships and scholarships afford a most excellent means of developing a just and accurate perception of mutual values and points of view, and should be given every encouragement. The University of Chile has taken the lead in this matter and has arranged exchanges of professors with the University of Washington and the University of California.¹

The press can play quite as important a part as the schools and colleges. The opportunities are vast and the possibilities limitless. In this connection full credit must be given to the great South American papers, such as *La*

¹S. G. Inman, *Problems in Pan-Americanism* (N. Y., 1921), p. 393.

Prensa and *La Nación* of Buenos Aires, *El Mercurio* of Chile, *O Journal do Commercio* of Brazil, and numerous others, which for some time have maintained special correspondents and representatives in the United States, and since January, 1919, have become members of the Associated Press. Far too little attention has been given in the columns of the daily press of the United States to important events in the countries of Latin America; while, on the other hand, the great dailies of South America have shown their resentment by adopting in many cases an antagonistic and unfriendly tone in discussing items of news from the United States. Now that great journals in the United States like the *New York Times*, *New York Herald*, *New York Sun*, *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, and others, have opened special sections for the presentation of news and feature articles on the republics of Latin America, a great improvement may be looked for. It may also be hoped that some American newspaper will soon establish a South American edition, just as *La Prensa* has already established a United States edition with so much success in New York. For, as Señor Collao, publisher of the New York edition of *La Prensa*, has declared: 'The daily paper is the most able resource that both the government and people can find to express their purposes and needs, and as a promoter of more friendly relations by the abolition of misunderstanding, ignorance, and prejudice.'¹

Some mention should also be made of the periodicals devoted to Pan-American affairs. There are several very excellent ones. In addition to the *Bulletin of the Pan-American Union*, which has already been mentioned, special note should be made of *Inter-America*, a publication issued alternately, one month in Spanish and made up of diversified articles translated from the periodical literature of the

¹ "Latin America in the Press of the United States," in *Report of Second Pan-Amer. Com. Conf.* (Wash., 1919), p. 355.

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United States, and the next month in English and composed of similar articles translated from the periodical literature of the American countries of Spanish or Portuguese speech. This magazine was established at the instance of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The *South American* is a well illustrated monthly journal having the avowed object of disseminating a broader knowledge of all American countries, peoples, and affairs, and of promoting greater amity and confidence between the inhabitants of the United States and Latin-American countries. A Spanish magazine is issued by the same publishers under the name of *El Norte Americano*, with the same purpose in view. The *World's Work* also publishes a Spanish-American edition in abbreviated form under the title, *Revista del Mundo*. The *Pan-American Magazine* is another illustrated monthly, ably edited, with articles of appeal to all interested in Pan-American affairs. A well edited trade journal devoted to the improvement of the commercial relations between the United States and Latin America is the *Grace Log*, published by and in the interests of W. R. Grace & Company.

In conclusion, one further way of bringing about mutual sympathetic understanding between the two Americas may be suggested, namely, increased travel for pleasure and sight-seeing by the people of the Americas in the countries of their neighbors. Let the phrase, "See America First" be changed to "See the Americas First." No better means of increasing transportation facilities can be imagined than a passenger-carrying trade that demands it. Both continents contain natural scenic wonders in profusion, and no traveler in a foreign land returns without a better understanding and appreciation of the customs, life, and aspirations of the peoples with whom he has come into personal contact.

By thus utilizing every avenue to a better understanding, the republics of North and South America can be made to

acquire that mutual respect which is the indispensable foundation of friendship, and will thereby approach a unity of purpose and an effectiveness of coöperation that will translate into a living reality the ideal of the new Pan-Americanism. The great differences in race, religion, temperament, and manner will be bridged by sympathetic friendliness; unjust suspicions of ulterior motives can be explained away. The World War, which has brought the two continents into a closer financial and commercial relation, has united them far more vitally in the struggle for democratic ideals. The United States has proved that she regards the rights of humanity of infinitely more consequence than the rights of property; the republics of Latin America have shown their appreciation of this spirit and have not stood aloof. The time has at last arrived when the republics of the western hemisphere can coöperate effectively on the basis of the principles laid down almost a century ago by John Quincy Adams—"disinterestedness, cordial good will, and fair and equal reciprocity." But they have come to realize that such coöperation can achieve lasting results only when functioning in the spirit of the precepts enunciated by Elihu Root—"with sympathy and understanding, with kindly consideration and honorable obligation."

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CHAPTER II

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

IN any discussion of the relations between the United States and Latin America the Monroe Doctrine must necessarily occupy a prominent place. To the average citizen of the United States the Monroe Doctrine seems to possess almost as important a niche in the structure of American institutions as the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Yet this same normal American, if pressed to give an exact explanation of what is meant by the Monroe Doctrine, would have great difficulty in making himself clear. He would probably define it ultimately in some such general terms as, "America for the Americans," or "Europe must keep her hands off," or some other expression whose meaning would approximate the idea that the United States should mind her own business and take care of the affairs of the western hemisphere, and the nations of the eastern hemisphere should do the same. And the interpretation would not be wholly inaccurate; for, in the words of Professor Hart, the Monroe Doctrine is a national policy based upon "the daily common-sense recognition of the geographical and political fact that the United States of America is by fact and by right more interested in American affairs, both on the northern and southern continents, than any European power can possibly be."¹

If the Monroe Doctrine were merely a question of an understanding between the United States and Europe, it might well be considered as one whose solution had at last

¹ A. B. Hart, *The Monroe Doctrine* (Boston, 1916), p. 2.

been reached. Fifty-one nations of the world have now signed the covenant of the League of Nations, thereby giving their assent to Article XXI, which states: "Nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration, or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace." The same doctrine, which Lord Salisbury declared to be a novel principle which "no statesman, however eminent, and no nation, however powerful, are competent to insert into the code of international law,"¹ was declared by representatives of Great Britain at the Paris Conference to have become an international understanding "consistent with the spirit of the covenant; and, indeed, the principles of the League as expressed in Article X represent the extension to the whole world of the principles of this doctrine."² The same doctrine, which Bismarck declared to be an "international impertinence," and von Bülow "a theory launched venturesomely upon the blue waves of conjectural politics," was recognized to such an extent by Germany at the outbreak of the World War that the German ambassador at Washington assured the United States government that Germany had no intention, in case of victory, to seek expansion in South America. Furthermore, Dr. Dernburg, recognized as representing the German government unofficially, declared that "Germany has not the slightest intention of violating any part or section of the Monroe Doctrine."³ Finally, France, which under the Second Empire committed the grossest violation of the principles of the doctrine by engineering the Maximilian expedition, has now recognized the fact that the Monroe Doctrine is bound up inseparably with the safety of the United States; and, in the words

¹ In his answer to Mr. Olney, Lord Salisbury gives an impartial and judicial interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1895*, Part I, p. 563.

² Quoted by A. B. Hall, *The Monroe Doctrine and the Great War* (Chicago, 1920), p. 153.

³ *New York Times*, Oct. 25, 1914.

of M. Paul Deschanel, "It issued from the vitals of reality, just as the Constitution of the United States itself."¹

But, whether or not we consider the Monroe Doctrine a settled policy as regards the future relations between the United States and Europe, the question remains open as regards our relations with the independent republics of Latin America. However fixed the North American may be in his belief that in the past the Monroe Doctrine has been the sheet-anchor of safety for the storm-tossed republics to the south, he must recognize the fact that there is a strong belief throughout Latin America that at present the Monroe Doctrine has very little value for any country but the United States. Undoubtedly, many men of high position and great authority in the states of Latin America have paid tribute to the doctrine for the very substantial assistance it gave to the Latin-American republics at a time when friendly intercession was most advantageous. At the Fourth Pan-American Conference, Dr. Victoriano de la Plaza, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Argentina, was whole-hearted in his praise. "This condition of precarious autonomy and liberty of action," he said, "and the constant danger of being subjugated or suffering the mutilation of their territory, would have continued among those weak states but for the wise and famous declarations of President Monroe."² That a fine appreciation of the true spirit and meaning of the doctrine may be found in South America the following quotation from the eminent Argentinian authority on international law, Dr. Luis M. Drago, will indicate:

"The Monroe Doctrine is in fact a formula of independence. It imposes no dominion and no superiority. Much less does it establish protectorates or relation of superior to inferior. It creates no obligations and no re-

¹ *Les Questions Actuelles de Politique Etrangère dan l'Amérique du Nord* (Paris, 1911), p. 231.

² *Fourth Amer. Int. Conf.*, Sen. Doc. No. 744, 61st Cong. 3d sess., Vol. I, p. 12.

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sponsibilities between the nations of America, but simply calls upon all of them, with their own means and without aid, to exclude from within their respective frontiers the jurisdiction of European powers. Proclaimed by the United States in the interest of their own peace and security, the other republics of the continent have, in their turn, proceeded to adopt it with an eye alone to their own individual welfare and tranquillity. . . . Thus understood, the Monroe Doctrine, which in the end is nothing more than the expression of the will of the people to maintain their liberty, assures the independence of the states of that continent in respect to one another as well as in relation to the powers of Europe.”¹

On the other hand, there is also a very strong sentiment prevailing among many worthy representatives of Latin-American countries, that, as far as the republics of Latin America are concerned, the Monroe Doctrine has long since outlived its usefulness. The conditions that called into existence the original statement of President Monroe have passed away, never to return. The present policy of the United States, which masks under the doctrine of Monroe, is aimed at Latin America as well as at Europe and Asia. When Secretary Olney declared that “to-day the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition,” and used this interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine to interfere in a dispute in South America, the inference seemed clear that the United States considered itself sovereign on *both continents*. The great republics of South America keenly resent any such attitude. When the United States took over the Panama Canal, on the ground that the act was justified by the interests of civilization, the South American countries could not fail to note that the interests of civilization and those of the United States were very much alike. Dr. Lucio M. Moreno Quintana, an eminent Argentine lawyer and a grandson

¹ A. B. Hart, *The Monroe Doctrine* (Boston, 1916), p. 253.

of a former president of the country, recently expressed what is unquestionably the sentiment of the great majority of Latin-Americans:

“The Monroe Doctrine is not a doctrine of America for the Americans, but of America for the North Americans. It has served as an admirable instrument for the United States to separate Europe from America and to establish its hegemony over the latter. The United States has been at all times preoccupied in obtaining concessions of every kind at the cost of the sovereignty of the rest of the American states. The doctrine is dangerous because it is North American imperialism hidden under a principle of international law.”¹

Just so long as a large number of our Latin-American neighbors feel that the Monroe Doctrine is a selfish policy, based upon the desire of the United States to exclude European powers from interfering with the political interests of the western hemisphere merely in order to have a better opportunity to act in a similar fashion itself, our relations with Latin America will not be established upon a satisfactory basis of mutual confidence. But, before casting aside the Monroe Doctrine as an inseparable barrier to a more friendly *rapprochement* between the United States and the Latin-American republics, let us consider the doctrine from two standpoints: First, has the Monroe Doctrine of the past been a policy that, while safeguarding the interests of the United States, has been a menace as well as a benefit to the great powers of Latin America? Second, can the Monroe Doctrine of the future be so interpreted that it will become a real Pan-American doctrine, a policy whose maintenance will be the bulwark of defense for the other twenty American republics as well as for the United States?

In order to answer the first question, it is necessary to outline briefly both the circumstances that called forth

¹ *New York Times*, Oct. 13, 1920.

the doctrine, and the manner in which it has been extended by the various presidents who have had occasion to interpret it.

The Spanish dependencies in the New World had very little reason to cherish a keen spirit of loyalty to the mother country. Spain had ever looked upon them as a fruitful field of exploitation, and had considered no regulations too severe to accomplish this result. Therefore, when Napoleon placed his brother Joseph upon the throne at Madrid in 1808, the slight thread of allegiance that still bound the Spanish colonies to the Old World snapped, and a series of revolutions in South America followed. By the end of the year 1810 virtually all of the Spanish colonies in South America had declared their independence, although they still acknowledged a half-hearted allegiance to the deposed Ferdinand VII. As long as the Peninsular War raged in Europe, the colonies were left mostly to their own devices. Upon the restoration of Ferdinand, an attempt was made to bring them once more under his selfish and autocratic rule. But, having enjoyed the benefits of freedom, the colonies were unwilling to go again under the yoke; and the real struggle for independence began.

From the outset the United States viewed the contest with close attention, and in 1815, by issuing what virtually amounted to a proclamation of neutrality, she accorded the struggling colonies the status of belligerent states.¹ Monroe, then Secretary of State, while unwilling to recognize them outright, declared in a despatch in December, 1815, that the colonies would probably gain their independence, and that it was to the interest of the United States that they should do so. Henry Clay was outspoken in his demands for recognition, and upon several occasions introduced bills authorizing the necessary appropriation for ministers to those governments in South America that had really established their independence. In 1820 such a resolution

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, Vol. IV, p. 1.

passed the House. President Monroe was not yet ready to act;¹ but when, in 1822, the victories of San Martin in the south and Bolivar in the north had virtually wiped out all chance of Spanish control, he felt that he need delay no longer, and in a special message to Congress on March 8, 1822, he declared that the time for recognition had come.² This recognition did not come any too soon, for in the autumn of this same year, at the Congress of Verona, the three powers of the Holy Alliance, with France in their leading-strings, declared that the system of representative government was incompatible with monarchical principles, and mutually engaged not only to put an end to representative government in Europe, but to prevent its being introduced in those countries where it was not yet known.

Although Great Britain had never joined the so-called Holy Alliance, she was an equal partner in the Quadruple Alliance, whose duty also it was to safeguard Europe from further dangers of revolution. She took part in the conference at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, but, unable to back the reactionary policies of Metternich, did not participate in those that followed at Troppau or Laybach. A state with the democratic tendencies already shown by Great Britain could not join whole-heartedly in the suppression of constitutional government, and Castlereagh preferred to follow his allies hesitantly and at a distance.³ When, at the Congress of Verona, Prince Metternich won over Czar Alexander I to his policy of using the concert of powers to crush out democracy wherever it should be found, the Duke of Wellington, representing Great Britain, was instructed to withdraw. George Canning, who now held the portfolio of foreign affairs in the place of Castlereagh,

¹ *Annals of Congress*, 16th Cong., 1st sess., p. 2223 ff.

² *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, Vol. IV, p. 818.

³ Viscount Castlereagh, *Correspondence, Despatches, etc.* (12 vols., London, 1853), Vol. XII, pp. 311-318.

realized only too well that if the Quintuple Alliance aided Ferdinand to recover his possessions in the New World, Great Britain would see the large and profitable trade which she was now carrying on with the South American states restricted once more to Spanish merchants and Spanish ships. In a despatch to the Duke of Wellington, the English representative at Verona, he pointed out that now that American questions were more important than European ones to the British, the opportunity was afforded to turn the situation to their advantage.¹

Canning thereupon protested against the reactionary policy of the allies, and, with that as an excuse for withdrawing from the European concert, he turned towards the United States. He was justified in expecting the United States to support Great Britain in any program based upon the recognition of the independence of the South American colonies, since the United States in 1819 had proposed the recognition of Buenos Aires, intimating that if Great Britain should adopt similar measures it would be highly satisfactory to the United States. Nor could he afford the time for diplomatic soundings, for the success of the French troops in restoring Ferdinand showed that if the allies' further plans of bringing back the Spanish colonies were to be checked there must be haste.

On August 16, 1823, Canning approached Richard Rush, the American minister, suggesting a joint diplomatic action against European intervention in America, and four days later he put his ideas into a formal proposal. The substance of the proposition was somewhat as follows: Assuming the recovery of the colonies by Spain to be hopeless, the question of recognition was one of time and circumstances; under these conditions, would it not be an act of wisdom for the two powers to announce publicly that they neither aimed at taking any portion of the colonies themselves,

¹ Duke of Wellington, *Despatches, Correspondence, etc.* (8 vols., 2nd ser., London, 1867), Vol. I, p. 511.

nor were willing to see any portion of them transferred to any other power with indifference?¹ However, when Rush suggested that Great Britain recognize the colonies forthwith, Canning admitted that such a move was not feasible at the time. The American ambassador thereupon reported the situation to his home government and awaited instructions.

Before considering the great step which the United States was now about to take in the development of her foreign policy, one other factor that entered into the situation must be noted. In 1821 the Czar of Russia had issued a ukase claiming the Pacific coast down to the fifty-first degree, and at the same time declaring that Bering Sea and the North Pacific were closed seas and subject to his exclusive jurisdiction. Adams protested vigorously both against the establishment of new colonial possessions on this continent and at the exorbitant pretensions to exclusive jurisdiction over territory whose title was in dispute.² Both Monroe and Adams felt that the time had come when it must be decided whether the United States should join with Great Britain in a strong stand for the independence of the Latin-American states against further encroachments of the powers of Europe, or whether it would be better for the United States to take the stand alone, as the foremost republic in the western hemisphere. At first the sentiment of virtually all the statesmen whom Monroe consulted—Jefferson, Madison, Calhoun, and Rush—seemed to favor a joint declaration, and the President himself inclined in that direction. John Quincy Adams alone vehemently opposed a joint declaration, pointing out that Canning's object seemed to be to obtain a public pledge from the government of the United States against its own acquisition of any part of the Spanish-American possessions as much as against the forcible interference of the Holy Alliance.

¹ For text see J. B. Moore, *Digest of International Law*, Vol. VI, p. 389.

² *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, Vol. IV, p. 861.

He also made it clear that the United States would be safer in disclaiming all intention of interfering with European concerns, and in issuing a declaration made solely by the United States for an American cause.¹ His views finally prevailed, and it was at length agreed that inasmuch as the South American states were free and independent, they, and not Great Britain and the United States, had the right to dispose of their condition.

President Monroe issued his famous message on December 2, 1823, and although considerable space was given to the expression of the policy of the United States in regard to the attitude and intentions of Europe, the gist of the doctrine may be summed up in two sentences. The first concerned colonization, and was in answer to the Russian ukase of 1821. It declared that "the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers." The second answered the threat of the Holy Alliance, and asserted that "the political system of the allied powers is essentially different . . . from that of America. . . . We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we shall consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety."²

As was to have been expected, a message that so simply and so completely phrased a true American policy based upon the firm foundation of self-protection, was received enthusiastically in both North and South America. Speaking in behalf of the Panama Mission, April 14, 1826, in the House of Representatives, Daniel Webster declared that "one general glow of exultation, one universal feeling of

¹ J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs* (Phil., 1874-77), Vol. VI, pp. 177 ff.

² For full text see J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. II, p. 209.

the gratified love of liberty, . . . pervaded all bosoms.”¹ In the words of Señor de Manos Albas, “It [the pronouncement] rang through the world like a peal of thunder; it paralyzed the Holy Alliance, and defined, once and for all time, as far as Europe is concerned, the international status of the newly constituted American republics.”² Even though its enunciation was due primarily to the realization upon the part of the United States that the preservation of the independence and democratic systems in the South American countries was closely bound up with the protection of her own independence, nevertheless the nations of South America realized clearly that such a policy, maintained by their more firmly established neighbor on the north, was precisely the bulwark needed until they could strengthen themselves sufficiently to stand entirely alone. It is not surprising that Colombia proposed that this doctrine be ratified at the projected Congress of Panama as one of the bases of Pan-Americanism; for such a policy well represented “the gospel of the new continent.”³

If the American doctrine as laid down by President Monroe could have been forever confined to the two fundamental concepts just outlined, perhaps to-day this policy would be the unanimously accepted basis of a true Pan-American policy. But the doctrine as laid down by Monroe was merely an attempt to meet the situation that confronted him by a policy whose aim was safety for the United States. It contradicted two principles of international law generally accepted at the time: the right of intervention, and the right of taking possession of unoccupied territory. The statesmen of Europe were not slow in expressing their dis-

¹ *The Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster*, J. W. McIntyre [ed.], (Boston, 1903), Vol. V, p. 203.

² Joseph Wheless, “Monroe Doctrine and Latin America,” in *Annals of Amer. Acad.*, Vol. LIV, p. 66 (July, 1914).

³ For an excellent account of contemporary opinion of the doctrine in Hispanic America see J. B. Lockey, *Pan-Americanism: Its Beginnings* (N. Y., 1920), Chap. VI; see also W. S. Robertson, “South America and the Monroe Doctrine,” *Polit. Sci. Quar.*, Vol. XXX, p. 82 (Mar., 1915).

dain and contempt for these new and presumptuous principles. Châteaubriand declared that such a doctrine "ought to be resisted by all the powers possessing either territorial or commercial interest in that hemisphere"; while Canning, who boasted publicly that he had called into existence the New World to redress the balance of the Old, in his private correspondence expressed himself in an entirely different vein.¹ Even Congress was unwilling to commit itself unreservedly to the new principles, especially as Henry Clay, who introduced a joint resolution doing so, interpreted the doctrine to mean that the United States was ready to insure the independence of the South American republics.² Therefore, although the doctrine was to remain the basis of our foreign policy henceforth, it was not recognized as a principle of international law.

Nor, on the other hand, was its interpretation to be rigidly circumscribed by the original limits laid down by Monroe. Rather, it was to be shaped in accordance with the conditions that successive presidents were called upon to confront. As a result, the original doctrine has been expanded as circumstances demanded, and this expansion has been the result of two forces, "American interest and American power." A brief consideration of the important occasions when the doctrine has been invoked will give evidence of its changing character.

In 1827 the Argentine Republic, which was then at war with the Empire of Brazil, sent an inquiry to Henry Clay, asking that he outline the scope of the declarations made by President Monroe. Clay replied that the war between the two states could in no way be considered analogous to the conditions that provoked President Monroe's message, since it was a war "strictly American in its origin and its objects."³ A few years later, in 1833, when Great Brit-

¹ W. S. Robertson, "The Monroe Doctrine Abroad, 1823-1824," in *Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev.*, Vol. VI, p. 546 (Nov., 1912).

² For text of resolution see J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. VI, p. 404.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 434.

ain resumed occupation of the Falkland Islands, Buenos Aires protested that the action of Great Britain was a clear violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Inasmuch as the United States had already been forced to take action against the treatment accorded American fishermen by the Argentinians during their brief possession of the islands, and as the British could lay title to a claim antedating the seizure by Buenos Aires, the United States acknowledged the British sovereignty.¹

The first enlargement of the doctrine so as to preclude the transfer of American territory from one foreign country to another seems to have been made in connection with Cuba. In 1825 Mr. Clay, in a letter to the American minister to France, declared that the United States could not consent to the occupation of Cuba or Porto Rico "by any other European power than Spain under any contingency whatever,"² and the same sentiments were repeated by Mr. Van Buren in 1829 and 1830 in notes to the American minister to Spain.³ Mr. Forsythe, in 1840, declared that the United States would prevent at all hazards any voluntary transfer on the part of Spain of her title to Cuba, whether it be temporary or permanent, just as she would assist Spain with both military and naval resources in preserving it or recovering it.⁴ This enlargement of the doctrine was just as advantageous to the free republics of Latin America as to the United States, for any transfer of colonies would most likely be from a weak power, such as Spain, to one of the stronger and more dreaded European states, and therefore an event to be feared equally by the United States and Latin America.

The earliest enlargement of the doctrine that seemed to be aimed at the Latin-American nations as well as at Europe

¹ J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. VI, p. 435. See also *infra*, Chap. XIV.

² *Ibid.*, p. 447.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 448-449.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 450. For a more detailed discussion of the Cuban question see *infra*, pp. 141-151.

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came with the first message of President Polk. Up to 1845, the United States, when insisting upon a maintenance of the *status quo* in the western hemisphere, had, it is true, alluded only to Europe. But there was no reason to believe that the inhibition was not equally applicable to the United States herself. Directly after the annexation of Texas, however, Polk declared that "the people of this continent alone have the right to decide their own destiny"; and that "should any portion of them, constituting an independent state, propose to unite themselves with our confederacy, this will be a question for them and us to determine without any foreign interposition";¹ and the declaration was followed by the annexation of New Mexico and California. Well might the Latin-American states now begin to wonder whether the Monroe Doctrine was an unmixed blessing. In his message of April 29, 1848, President Polk went even farther in his free interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine by urging the annexation of Yucatan, which at that time was so upset by an Indian insurrection that the authorities offered to transfer the "dominion and sovereignty of the peninsula" in return for immediate aid. Inasmuch as similar proposals had been made to Great Britain and Spain, President Polk seized the occasion to assert that the United States could not consent to a transfer of this colony to any European power.² Under the circumstances, Polk's assertion could mean nothing else than that the United States interpreted the Monroe Doctrine to prevent a Latin-American state from accepting the dominion of a European nation, even if the Latin-American state desired such a transfer of sovereignty. However, Yucatan soon withdrew its offer, so that Polk was not forced to put his interpretation to the test.

Following Polk's administration, the doctrine to a certain

¹ J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. IV, p. 398.

² *Ibid.*, p. 582.

extent disappeared from view. Mr. Clayton, Secretary of State through President Taylor's short presidency, struggled against admitting British rights in Central America, but he was finally forced by circumstances to give Great Britain joint rights in any inter-oceanic canal that might be constructed on the isthmus. It may be conceded that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty did not constitute an infringement of the Monroe Doctrine.¹ But a situation was soon to arise in Mexico which was to provoke a serious violation of the doctrine on the very borders of the United States.

After the disastrous war with the United States, the rival factions struggling for power in Mexico brought the unfortunate country into bankruptcy and anarchy, and the attention of the United States was finally called to the fact that Spain, Great Britain, and France were about to employ strong measures to protect the interests of their citizens on Mexican soil. In a despatch to our minister to Mexico, dated September 20, 1860, Secretary Cass thus indicated the general position of the United States: "While we do not deny the right of any other power to carry on hostile operations against Mexico, for the redress of its grievances, we firmly object to its holding possession of any part of that country, or endeavoring by force to control its political destiny. This opposition to foreign interference is known to France, England, and Spain, as well as the determination of the United States to resist any such attempt by all means in its power."² President Buchanan, who had already recognized the Juarez government in Mexico in 1859, intimated in his annual message of 1860 that his position was the same, to the point "of resisting, even by force should this become necessary, any attempt by these governments to deprive our neighboring

¹ For a discussion of the Monroe Doctrine in its relation to the Panama Canal see Chap. III; also Sen. Doc. No. 194, 47th Cong., 1st sess.

² J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. VI, p. 481.

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republic of portions of her territory—a duty from which we could not shirk without abandoning the traditional and established policy of the American people.”¹

When the European powers decided upon armed intervention in Mexico, the United States was, unfortunately for the maintenance of this traditional policy, at the very brink of the war for the Union. A convention was signed October 31, 1861, by Great Britain, France, and Spain, outlining their plan of action. The United States was invited to accede to it, but it was made very clear that operations would be begun regardless of our adherence. Secretary Seward realized the difficulty of the situation, and, while refusing to depart from our traditional policy by entering into a European alliance, he was unable to protest very vigorously against the joint intervention.² The British and Spanish, however, whether because they were desirous of respecting our wishes after their claims had been met, or whether because they were dissatisfied with the attitude of the French, withdrew their forces early in 1862. The French, while disclaiming any ulterior motives, pushed forward their forces, seized the city of Mexico, took control of the government, and had the assembly change the government to a monarchy and offer the crown to Archduke Maximilian of Austria. Even when Maximilian had been persuaded to accept, Mr. Seward was unable to do more than declare that the permanent establishment of a foreign and monarchical government in Mexico would be found neither easy nor desirable.³ The House of Representatives was not so diplomatic, and voiced a vigorous protest by a resolution unanimously carried April 4, 1864. But Mr. Seward informed the French ambassador that the President had not departed in any way from his previous policy.⁴

¹ J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. V, p. 646.

² For text of the note and Secretary Seward's reply see House Ex. Doc. No. 100, 37th Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 185-187.

³ J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. VI, p. 495.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 496-497.

However, with the close of the Civil War the tone of the Secretary's protests changed, and his note of December 16, 1865, boldly asserted that the sincere friendship between the two nations would be brought into imminent jeopardy unless France desisted from "the prosecution of armed intervention in Mexico to overthrow the domestic republican government existing there."¹ Louis Napoleon was now more interested in the European situation arising out of the growing dispute between Austria and Prussia than in his Mexican enterprise, and in the spring of 1866 he decided to withdraw his troops. With the withdrawal of the French the power of Maximilian began to crumble, and, in less than a year after the departure of the first detachment of French troops, the unfortunate prince paid for his ill-fated Mexican expedition with his life.

The principles of the Monroe Doctrine were vindicated once more in the most serious attempt that had yet been made to impose European domination upon the independent republics of the western hemisphere, although nowhere in the diplomatic correspondence is the doctrine mentioned by name. From the standpoint of Latin America, no objection could possibly be raised to the Seward doctrine in regard to Mexico. The United States, torn by the Civil War, could not protest effectively against European intervention, but the United States, reunited, could and did make her protest effective.

Secretary Seward's well considered policy had to some extent lulled the latent fear in the Latin-American states that the United States was preserving their independence for its own advantage, but the ill considered expressions of President Johnson again aroused their resentment. In his fourth annual message, dated December 9, 1868, Johnson delivered himself of these astonishing sentiments: "Comprehensive national policy would seem to sanction the acquisition and incorporation into our Federal Union of the

¹ J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. VI, p. 501.

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several adjacent continental and insular communities as speedily as it can be done peacefully, lawfully, and without violation of national justice, faith, or honor. . . . The conviction is rapidly gaining ground in the American mind that, with the increased facilities for intercommunication between all portions of the earth, the principles of free government as embraced in our Constitution would prove of sufficient strength and breadth to comprehend within their sphere and influence the civilized nations of the world.”¹ This was either a most extraordinary extension of the Monroe Doctrine, or else the promulgation of a new and all-embracing Pan-American doctrine, with the United States as the chief beneficiary. Fortunately for future Pan-American relations, President Johnson was at the close of his term, and, in view of the fact that he had been estranged from Congress throughout the greater part of it, his statements did not receive the attention which they would otherwise have demanded.

President Grant and his Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, returned to the common interpretation of the doctrine, as aiming to protect the feeble powers of America against European intervention, but in such a way as to secure and maintain their confidence. Secretary Fish was careful to make it clear to the neighboring states that the United States did not covet their territories and was ready to aid them to the fullest extent in any steps which they might take to protect themselves against anarchy. But, while emphasizing the unselfish attitude of the United States in offering its protection against Europe, he was careful to safeguard the interests of his country in regard to the proposed isthmian canal. It was his expressed opinion that the canal was an American enterprise, to be undertaken under American auspices.² Secretary Evarts took the same stand, declaring that the paramount interest of the

¹ J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. VI, p. 688.

² *For. Rel. of the U. S.*, 1870, pp. 254 ff.; see also Sen. Exec. Doc. No. 112, 46th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 48.

United States in the project of interoceanic communication seemed indisputable.¹ When the French company under the direction of de Lesseps indicated its intention to start construction of a canal, President Hayes pointed out that "the policy of this country is a canal under American control; . . . it will be the great ocean thoroughfare between our Atlantic and Pacific shores, and virtually a part of the coast-line of the United States."²

Secretary Blaine, in Garfield's administration, opposed the idea of a joint guaranty and control of an interoceanic canal by the European powers as a direct infringement of the Monroe Doctrine, but when communicating his views to Great Britain he put himself in a very weak position by omitting to mention the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850.³ When the British Foreign Minister called his attention to this *lapsus memoriæ*, Mr. Blaine attempted to prove that the situation had so changed that the treaty was no longer of value.⁴ Needless to say, Great Britain disagreed with this doctrine, and had little difficulty in supporting her position. Unsuccessful here, Blaine turned his attention to strengthening the bonds of friendship between the republics of the two Americas by a Pan-American conference, though before he could bring his plans to fruition he was no longer Secretary of State.

Up to this point the Monroe Doctrine had been interpreted, with very few exceptions, as protective of American institutions and territory against Europe. Now a new and disturbing extension of the doctrine was at hand. It was preceded by a period of strained relations between the United States and Chile. The protection accorded President Balmaceda and refugees of his party by the United States minister, and the unfortunate *Baltimore* incident, provoked feelings of bitterness on both sides. President

¹ Sen. Exec. Doc. No. 112, 46th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 18.

² J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. VII, p. 585.

³ *For. Rel. of the U. S.*, 1881, p. 537.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 554.

Harrison expressed in no uncertain terms the intention of the United States to protect her citizens in those states whose governments were too weak to do it. But it remained for President Cleveland, through his Secretary of State, Mr. Olney, to declare that: "To-day the United States is practically sovereign upon this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why? . . . It is because, in addition to all other grounds, its infinite resource combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other powers."¹

The occasion that provoked this expression, it is true, was brought about by Venezuela, who wished to use the power of the United States to protect her against British encroachments. Nevertheless the Latin-American republics might well look with perturbation upon this new extension of the Monroe Doctrine. As Señor Alvarez has pointed out, such an interpretation does not properly come under the Monroe Doctrine, but under a policy whose basis is the safety of the United States through its hegemony on this continent.² Even such a policy might well have as an essential corollary the protection of the Latin-American republics. But such a bold statement of overweening power was pregnant with sinister possibilities, and the influences hostile to the closer relations between the United States and its Latin-American neighbors were not slow to avail themselves of the opening. This doctrine as announced by President Cleveland has been termed the doctrine of paramount interest, and the President put himself on record as willing to go to war, if necessary, to enforce it. In spite of Lord Salisbury's protestations that international law could never sanction any such novel principle, President Cleveland maintained his point, and Great Britain finally accepted American intervention. In the Venezuela con-

¹ J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. VI, p. 553.

² Alejandro Alvarez, "Latin America and International Law," in *Amer. Jour. of Int. Law*, Vol. III, p. 269 (April, 1909).

troversy President Cleveland stood upon a doctrine whose observance was necessary "to our peace and safety as a nation and to the integrity of our free institutions." But it is essential to note that his stand was also useful to Venezuela in supporting her claims.¹

After the Spanish-American War had extended our territories to certain of the Spanish colonies, it became a matter of even greater interest to Latin-Americans to know just how far our peace and safety would lead us in intervening in their destinies. President Roosevelt's action in regard to Colombia and the Panama Canal, and the passage of the Platt Amendment by Congress, were events that cast shadows of a most dubious sort before the eyes of all Latin-American countries. Neither were the utterances of President Roosevelt of such a character as to dissipate apprehension. In the annual message of 1904 he enunciated what is generally known as the "big-stick" policy, as follows:

"Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrong-doing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the western hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrong-doing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power."²

This statement of policy was merely the prologue to the taking over and administration of the finances of the

¹ For a discussion of the Venezuela affair see J. H. Latané, *The United States and Latin America* (N. Y., 1920), pp. 238-49; also Raúl de Cardenas, *La Política de los Estados Unidos en el Continente Americano* (La Habana, 1921), pp. 123-32.

² A. H. Lewis, *Messages and Speeches of Theodore Roosevelt* (Wash., 1906), Vol. II, p. 857.

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Dominican Republic. Although the Senate refused to ratify the protocol, the President, under the guise of an executive agreement, carried out his plan, and the Senate later gave its sanction. When President Taft followed the same course in his dealings with Nicaragua and Honduras, and President Wilson in his action in Haiti, well might the states of Latin America believe that the Monroe Doctrine, in its new interpretation, meant intervention by the United States to prevent intervention by Europe.

One other recent extension of the Monroe Doctrine which is based primarily upon the principle of self-defense occurred in 1912, when an American company attempted to sell out certain concessions in Lower California around Magdalena Bay to a Japanese concern. The result was the following Lodge resolution, which received the indorsement of the Senate:

Resolved, That when any harbor or other place in the American continents is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or the safety of the United States, the government of the United States could not see without grave concern the possession of such harbor or other place by any corporation or association which has such a relation to another government, not American, as to give that government practical power of control for naval or military purposes.¹

Although this particular phase of an American doctrine was aimed at Japan, it seems reasonable to suppose that the same policy would be invoked by the United States as against any other interests or concessionaires who might be supposed to have the support of their government.

If the recent extensions of the Monroe Doctrine were uniformly of a nature tending to protect the United States, regardless of the rights of the other republics of the New World, the hostility with which the doctrine is generally re-

¹ For text see *Amer. Jour. of Int. Law*, Vol. VI, p. 937 (Oct., 1912).

garded in South America would be easy to understand. But other phases of the doctrine have been brought out which show that the United States, in its insistence upon self-protection, has not wholly lost sight of the rights of its Latin-American neighbors. In numerous addresses delivered during his memorable visit to South America in 1906 Elihu Root gave an interpretation of the doctrine that all South America was only too glad to accept. In Uruguay he asserted that the declaration of Monroe was "an assertion to all the world of the competency of Latin-Americans to govern themselves."¹ We have already quoted a portion of his eloquent address at the Pan-American Conference in Rio de Janeiro in which he outlined an all-American policy for the United States. Some years later Mr. Root, in an address welcoming Dr. Lauro Müller, Foreign Minister of Brazil, declared that "there is neither to the Monroe Doctrine nor any other doctrine or purpose of the American government any corollary of dominion or aggression, or aught but equal friendship."² In fact, in an address before the American Society of International Law on April 22, 1914, Mr. Root went so far as to assert that, outside of the one apparent extension of the doctrine by President Polk, there has been no other change or enlargement of the Monroe Doctrine since it was first promulgated.³

President Wilson was particularly successful both in enunciating and in maintaining this friendly policy towards Latin America. On March 11, 1913, very shortly after his inauguration, he declared: "The United States has nothing to seek in Central and South America except the lasting interests of the peoples of the two continents."⁴ And a little later he was more definite: "The United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by con-

¹ Elihu Root, *Latin America and the United States* (Cambridge, 1917), p. 58.

² *Ibid.*, p. 243.

³ Elihu Root, *Addresses on International Subjects* (Cambridge, 1916), p. 112.

⁴ E. E. Robinson and V. J. West, *The Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson* (N. Y., 1917), p. 180.

quest.”¹ Yet even President Wilson was forced to follow the Roosevelt doctrine in the case of Haiti; nor has American administration there been so satisfactory as to escape very serious criticism. But in the Caribbean, particularly, the United States can not brook European intervention, and to act as policeman in the region seems to be regarded as essential to our peace and safety.

Now to answer our question as to whether the Monroe Doctrine has been a menace as well as a benefit to the Latin-American republics. Let us briefly summarize the interpretations from the viewpoint of Latin America. Undoubtedly the idea of no transfer by one European nation to another of its territory in the New World is satisfactory to the Latin-Americans; but when this interpretation is extended to prevent voluntary transfer of allegiance, it becomes an arbitrary interference with sovereign rights. When, on the other hand, transfer of territory to the United States is regarded as permissible, from the Latin-American viewpoint the doctrine becomes dangerous. President Johnson's ill considered words as to American expansion merely aroused antagonism, but President Hayes' carefully considered statement of the United States coast-line extending to Panama inspired fear. Finally, the Cleveland-Olney doctrine of American supremacy on this continent, followed by the Roosevelt doctrine of responsibility for the behavior of badly governed republics, provoked openly manifested hostility. Although Mr. Root and President Wilson have done much to allay this antagonism, the judgment of the average Latin-American undoubtedly is that the Monroe Doctrine of the past and present has been a menace, as well as a benefit, to the Latin-American countries.

This brings us to our second question: Can the Monroe Doctrine of the future be so interpreted that it will be regarded as a true Pan-American doctrine? If the doc-

¹ E. E. Robinson and V. J. West, *The Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson* (N. Y., 1917), p. 201.

trine of the present could be restored to the original formula, there would be little question of its acceptance by South America. But such a doctrine would be entirely unnecessary; the conditions no longer demand such a policy. The Americas no longer possess uncolonized territory, nor do the Latin-American countries need to rely upon the United States to prevent European intervention. Hence a return to the original doctrine of Monroe would render the doctrine obsolete, and therefore futile as a Pan-American doctrine. On the other hand, to continue the Monroe Doctrine as a policy which conforms itself to the new problems that arise, and whose interpretation may be based upon selfish advantage as well as upon self-preservation by the United States, will never be acceptable to the Latin-American nations as a true Pan-American policy.

Several solutions of this *impasse* have been suggested. Would it not be possible for the United States to enter into a close working arrangement with Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, and thereafter let a conference of these four powers decide all questions which might arise under the Monroe Doctrine? Such a solution would do away with the fear, so prevalent in Latin America, of ulterior motives of imperialistic expansion upon the part of the United States; and to this extent, at any rate, the doctrine might be regarded as an American doctrine. But such a concert of powers would have many unsatisfactory features. Could the United States afford to put itself upon an equality with these three powers in questions regarding Mexico and the Caribbean region, where through geographical proximity the interests of the United States must necessarily be more vital than theirs? On the other hand, would the A B C powers see any advantage in participation by the United States in the settlement of any purely South American question? Furthermore, could it be expected that the other seventeen republics of the two Americas would willingly abide by all the decisions of a super-authority in whose

councils they had no voice? Finally, such an entente or alliance might well tend to bring about a new balance of power between the Old World and the New, and be pregnant with the same seeds of future wars as such arrangements have possessed heretofore.

Another more practical suggestion has been to enlarge gradually the powers of the Pan-American Union so that it shall come to have jurisdiction over all questions that might arise to disturb the peace of the western hemisphere. In a special memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine and the League of Nations which Mr. Barrett prepared for the American representatives at the Paris Peace Conference, he pointed out that in the Pan-American Union we already had "a practical, peace-preserving, and successfully working, although limited and voluntary, American league of nations." He also declared that in the Fifth Pan-American Conference (which will meet at Santiago, Chile, in March, 1923) the most important question to be discussed will be the enlargement of the scope and responsibility of the Pan-American Union and of its governing board in relation to the peace and progress of the western hemisphere, and to Pan-American solidarity and the Monroe Doctrine. It is further suggested that the American governments give the supreme council of the Pan-American Union, or some similar body to be created, authority not only to initiate and effect mediation, adjudication, and arbitration, but to enforce its conclusions without the interference of the Old World powers. This solution, which is based upon the practical results already achieved by an established organization, seems well within the bounds of possibility, and that such a solution would be accepted by the republics of Latin America might well be taken for granted. In the words of Señor Calderon, minister from Bolivia: "If the Monroe Doctrine is the proud determination of the United States to keep the whole American continent free from any contamination of foreign autocrats, the Pan-American Union is

the agreement of all the republics to live together, linked by the great ideals of democracy, not looking down upon the weaker or the less advanced ones, but determined to help them and to forge ahead in a united and free effort to reach the goal of popular welfare, free and peaceful development, and the elimination of pauperism and anarchy.”¹

Another solution, and the one that has received the most attention of all, is based upon the address made by President Wilson to Congress on January 22, 1917, in which he proposed that “the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world; that no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.”² This idea was later incorporated into the covenant of the League of Nations as Article X, stating that “the members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external oppression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League.”

This proposal has been bitterly opposed on the ground that such a doctrine would withdraw us from our isolation and involve us in all the disputes of Europe. It has also been asserted that by extending the Monroe Doctrine to the world its value as an American doctrine would be completely lost. Space prevents even the barest consideration of this controversy, other than to point out that a policy of isolation for the United States is neither possible nor desirable, and that the extension of the Monroe Doctrine to the world would mean not only that the world would recognize the doctrine, but that it would join with the United States in guaranteeing its observance. However,

¹ *Jour. of Int. Relations*, Vol. X, p. 133 (Oct., 1919).

² E. E. Robinson and V. J. West, *Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson* (N. Y., 1917), p. 369.

Article X, by fixing a definite guaranty mutually enforceable by and binding upon the member states, pledges more in relation to the world than the Monroe Doctrine ever did in relation to the western hemisphere. To obviate this objection, and to secure the adherence of the United States to the League, Article XXI was added, which declares that such regional understandings as the Monroe Doctrine are not incompatible with the covenant of the League. Whether these two principles, a Monroe Doctrine that guarantees nothing except the safety of the United States, and Article X, which guarantees the territory and independence of the member nations of a world league, are mutually sympathetic or antagonistic, remains to be seen.¹ But—as was pointed out by Señor Paredes, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Salvador, in a communication to our State Department early in 1920—even if the League of Nations becomes a permanent institution, and with the United States a member, it will still be necessary to interpret the Monroe Doctrine. For, as Señor Paredes says, “since the doctrine will be forthwith transformed into a principle of universal public law, *juris et de jure*, . . . the necessity of an interpretation of the genesis and scope of the Monroe Doctrine not only in the development of the lofty purpose of Pan-Americanism but in order that that doctrine may maintain its original purity and prestige, is rendered all the more urgent.”²

It is therefore evident that if the Monroe Doctrine is to be maintained by the United States as a policy essential to its peace and safety, and at the same time accepted by the Latin-American countries as a policy in no way inimical to their rights and interests, some such interpretation as that voiced by President Wilson must be adopted. The interests of North and South America are certain to become in-

¹ The recent interpretation of Article X, adopted by the League Assembly at Geneva, has weakened it to such an extent that it is now hardly more than a Monroe Doctrine for the signatory nations.

² *New York Times*, Feb. 8, 1921. See also S. G. Inman, *Problems in Pan-Americanism* (N. Y., 1921), pp. 179-194.

creasingly kindred and solidified. The rapid progress of democratic systems in the world will tend more and more to eliminate imperialistic ambitions. Does it, then, seem a vain aspiration to hope that the great republics of the western hemisphere may adopt as the basis of their future action a policy that, while it recognizes the primary interests of the Americas as set off from those of Europe, is equally observant of the inalienable and sovereign rights of the smallest and weakest member of the Pan-American family of nations? Such a doctrine, in which the peace and safety of one envisages the support and protection of all, would effect a coöperation and solidarity among the nations of the western hemisphere which might well make the Monroe Doctrine a truly Pan-American doctrine.

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CHAPTER III

ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY

FROM the time when Columbus started on his famous quest of a new route to an old world, a shorter waterway from Europe to farther Asia has been the dream of navigators. Columbus believed that he had found a new route to India, but he realized that there remained the task of finding a passage by which he could cross between the great land masses and circle the globe. With the discovery of the Pacific by Balboa, the search for the secret of the strait was prosecuted with increased diligence, but in vain. Magellan finally discovered the secret, but his solution *via* the Straits of Magellan or Cape Horn was too long to be satisfactory, and the quest continued. When Cortez, by numerous expeditions, became virtually certain that no natural waterway connected the two great oceans, he proposed to construct one. Charles V took much interest in the project; and, according to the historian Gomara, four routes were considered practicable, *i.e.*, those of Darien, Panama, Nicaragua, and Tehuantepec.¹ Thus not only was an interoceanic canal regarded from the earliest times as feasible, but the four routes considered most practicable up to our own time were among the first to be considered.

Early in the nineteenth century new interest in the idea was provoked by the interesting surveys and reports of the great scientist Alexander von Humboldt. After five years of exploration in Central and South America, he urged the construction of an artificial waterway, and he went so far as to discuss the possibilities of nine different

¹ See Report of J. T. Sullivan on *Problem of Interoceanic Communication*, House Ex. Doc. No. 107, 47th Cong., 2nd sess., Chaps. I and II.

routes, although he, too, regarded the four routes already mentioned as particularly worthy of investigation.¹ Spain was finally aroused once more to the advantage that would accrue to her through the possession of such a waterway, and in 1814 the project was authorized by the Cortes. With the outbreak of the revolutions throughout Latin America the project lapsed, and it remained for the newly liberated republics to resume its consideration. As early as 1823 the matter came before the congress of Central America, and in the following year Señor Cañas, the diplomatic representative of this federation at Washington, drew the attention of the United States to the importance of a canal linking the two oceans and urged that the United States coöperate with his country in the construction of such a waterway. Henry Clay, Secretary of State, was interested in the project and promised to instruct the American representative to investigate and make a report.²

At approximately the same time the United States was invited to send representatives to the Panama Congress, called at the instance of Bolívar, at which the canal question was one of several subjects to be considered. Owing to strong opposition in Congress, the American representatives were not sent until it was too late to participate in the congress, but in their instructions the canal project was considered a proper subject for consideration. The sole limitation was that such a canal should not be under the control of any one nation, "but its benefits be extended to all parts of the globe upon the payment of a just compensation or reasonable tolls."³ Although nothing substantial came of the Panama Congress, the importance and need of a trans-isthmian canal persisted, and in the next few years various projects were launched. An American

¹ For complete citations see House Report No. 145, 30th Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 169-204.

² House Report No. 322, 25th Cong., 3d sess., pp. 15, 16.

³ J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. III, p. 2, or *Report of Int. Amer. Conf.*, Vol. IV, Hist. Index, p. 143 ff.

company obtained the concession for a canal in Nicaragua; but, although the cost was estimated at only five million dollars, that sum could not be raised. The King of Holland, who had been represented by General Werweer at the Congress of Panama, also obtained a contract to construct a canal by the Nicaragua route; a company was formed, and the United States was sufficiently interested to consider the desirability of obtaining a majority of the shares. The revolution in the Netherlands, resulting in the separation of Belgium from Holland, forced an indefinite postponement of the project.¹

The Panama route was also being seriously considered at this time, and Bolivar went so far as to have the route surveyed. But the engineers reported that there was a difference of three feet between the levels of the two oceans, a factor that enormously increased the difficulty of the project. Nicaragua realized the particular interest that the United States had in an interoceanic canal, and on June 16, 1825, the congress of the Central American Confederation passed a decree offering liberal concessions to stimulate the construction of a canal. Bids were received and the contract was awarded to an American financial group; whereupon a company, capitalized at five million dollars, was formed under the name of the "Central American and United States Atlantic and Pacific Canal Company." Sufficient funds, however, were never subscribed.² About a decade later, in reply to another decree of the Central American congress offering the United States prior rights, a Senate resolution authorized the President to open negotiations with the governments of both Central America and New Granada in regard to protecting the rights of such companies as should undertake to open communication between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and to secure forever "the free and equal right of navigation of such canal

¹ House Report No. 322, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-33.

² *Ibid.*, p. 125.

to all nations, on the payment of such reasonable tolls as may be established.”¹ President Jackson appointed Mr. Charles Biddle to undertake the necessary negotiations. But Biddle did not carry out his instructions in the proper fashion, and in his next message to Congress the President declared it inexpedient to enter into negotiations with foreign governments upon the subject.² President Van Buren sent Mr. John L. Stephens upon a similar mission in 1839, but after surveying the route and estimating the cost at twenty-five millions, he declared that in his opinion the country was too unsettled to risk the undertaking.³

Among the most interesting of the early projects for a canal was the one launched by Prince Louis Napoleon while he was a prisoner in the fortress of Ham. In 1845 he secured a concession from the Nicaraguan government for the construction of a canal, and when he finally escaped, he published a brochure on the subject, pointing out the possibilities of the Nicaragua route and emphasizing the great political interest of England in the execution of this project to create a new center of enterprise in Central America, which would prevent any further encroachments from the north. With the fall of the July monarchy, Louis Napoleon found more interesting and vital matters to engage his attention.⁴

It was about this time that the United States took the first important step to secure control of the trans-isthmian route in Panama. On December 12, 1846, the American *chargé* signed a treaty with the Republic of New Granada, which, among other things, guaranteed to the United States “that the right of way or transit across the Isthmus of Panama upon any modes of communication that now exist,

¹ J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. III, p. 3.

² *Senate Journal*, 24th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 100; for Biddle's report see House Report No. 322, 25th Cong., 3d sess., pp. 38-44.

³ House Report No. 145, 30th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 236.

⁴ See B. Jerrold, *The Life of Napoleon III* (London, 1874), Vol. II, pp. 320-330.

or that may be hereafter constructed, shall be open and free to the government and citizens of the United States''; and in return the United States guaranteed to New Granada "the perfect neutrality of the before-mentioned isthmus, with the view that the free transit from the one to the other sea may not be interrupted or embarrassed in any future time while this treaty exists." As a natural corollary, the United States also guaranteed the sovereignty of New Granada over this territory.¹ In other words,—although "perfect neutrality" clearly meant that all nations should have equal right to free passage across the isthmus, and was so interpreted by Polk in his message to Congress, February 10, 1847,² it was understood both by the President and the Senate that by guaranteeing this neutrality the United States accepted a responsibility that was justified only because of the fundamental importance which the trans-isthmian route already possessed for the United States. This treaty was ratified unanimously by the United States Senate.

Owing to the discovery of gold in the recently acquired California, the importance of the treaty was speedily demonstrated. The difficulties of overland travel were such that the sea route, with the short passage across Panama, became the most practicable avenue for the great horde of gold-seekers and settlers. Relying upon the terms of the new treaty, an American company constructed a railway across the isthmus from what is now Colon to Panama—a road that, since its completion in 1855, has been one of the most profitable short lines ever laid down. Another American company established a second interoceanic route through Nicaragua, by means of the lakes and short stretches of land travel, but it never attained the success of the Panama Railroad route.³ It was in connection with

¹ W. M. Malloy, *Treaties, Conventions, etc., of the U. S.* (Wash., 1910) Vol. I, p. 302.

² J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. IV, p. 512.

³ For a more complete account of this undertaking see Chap. XII.

the rights to construct a canal by the Nicaragua route that the United States came into conflict with Great Britain, a conflict that was settled only by the much criticized and wholly unsatisfactory Clayton-Bulwer treaty.

The attempts of Great Britain to obtain territory in Central America dated back to the seventeenth century, and, although her claims rested upon very uncertain grounds, by the middle of the nineteenth century she had practically established her sovereignty over the Mosquito Coast, the Bay Islands, and Belize. When, however, in 1848 that power forced the withdrawal of the Nicaraguans from San Juan del Norte (Greytown)—a certain terminus of any interoceanic canal through Nicaragua—the United States deemed it necessary to act. Secretary Buchanan sent Mr. Hise as a special agent to Nicaragua in 1849, but with very indefinite instructions as to what action he should take, other than a vague implication that the Monroe Doctrine should be maintained. Hise succeeded in signing a convention giving the United States rights virtually equivalent to those acquired in the treaty of 1846 with New Granada. But, as this directly contravened the British claims, our government was not ready to back up his negotiations.¹

The administration of President Taylor, which had come into office the same year, despatched a new emissary, Mr. Squier, to negotiate with Nicaragua, with the admonition that he should not involve the United States in any unnecessary controversy. He not only signed a treaty with Nicaragua obtaining the concession for the canal, but also another with Honduras, whereby the United States virtually obtained control of Tigre Island in the Gulf of Fonseca. When the British government answered this action by sending a squadron which took possession of the island, the United States found itself in an awkward predicament.²

¹ For text see Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 112, 46th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 92.

² For text and correspondence see *British and Foreign State Papers*, Vol. XL, pp. 997-1002; also Chap. XII.

It was necessary to come to an agreement with Great Britain, and Mr. Lawrence, the American minister at London, entered into negotiations. When, however, he demanded that as a preliminary to the settlement of the question Great Britain should withdraw her protectorate from the Mosquito territory, Lord Palmerston was unwilling to continue. In his anxiety to settle the dispute, Mr. Clayton, the American Secretary of State, decided to go over the head of his representative and come to a settlement, if possible, with Sir Henry Bulwer, the British minister at Washington. The British representative saw the advantage of coming to an agreement at a time when the United States was willing to compromise, and the famous Clayton-Bulwer treaty was negotiated.¹

The principal provisions of this treaty may be summarized as follows: Great Britain and the United States promised never to obtain or maintain any exclusive control over the proposed Nicaragua canal; they would neither erect fortifications commanding the canal, nor occupy, colonize, or exercise dominion over any part of Central America; the two powers agreed to guard the safety and neutrality of the canal and to invite other nations to join with them in doing the same; they promised to support any company that would construct the canal in accordance with the spirit of the convention; and finally, in order to establish a general principle, they agreed to extend their protection to any other practicable communication, whether by canal or railway, across the isthmus, and particularly to the proposed interoceanic communication by way of Tehuantepec or Panama.²

Hardly had the treaty been signed before difficulties arose concerning its interpretation. Great Britain regarded the treaty as definitely establishing her rights in the regions to which she had already laid claim, future settlements only

¹ For Corr. see Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 194, 47th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 55-82.

² Text, *ibid.*, p. 82, also Moore's *Digest*, Vol. III, p. 130.

being prohibited, while the United States confidently expected that the British would immediately withdraw from the Mosquito Coast and the Bay Islands. When Great Britain continued to maintain her position on the east coast of Nicaragua, and when in 1852 she formally annexed the Bay Islands by proclamation, her interpretation of the treaty seemed to be receiving *de facto* recognition. However, the United States continued to protest, and by a supplementary agreement, known as the Dallas-Clarendon treaty of 1856, an attempt was made to settle the question by the withdrawal of the British protectorate from the Mosquito Indians in return for obtaining a protectorate over the Bay Islands under the nominal sovereignty of Honduras.¹ When this convention failed of ratification, another attempt was made the following year, but with similar results; so that President Buchanan, in his message of December 8, 1857, declared that the wisest course would be to abrogate the treaty by mutual consent.² Great Britain was willing, provided that the United States would accept the *status quo ante* as the basis of the abrogation. But, as this was the last thing that the United States desired, the President did not press the matter. When, in 1860, the British signed a treaty with Nicaragua restoring a nominal sovereignty over the Mosquito Coast, the United States was forced to accept this solution.³ A treaty of amity and commerce between the United States and Nicaragua, signed at Washington, November 6, 1857, known as the Cass-Yrisarri treaty, gave the United States equal rights with Nicaragua over any interoceanic route, in return for a guaranty of neutrality. This treaty, however, was never ratified by the Nicaraguan congress.⁴

During the Civil War period the United States was forced to lay on the table both the Monroe Doctrine and all proj-

¹ Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 194, 47th Cong., 1st sess., p. 138.

² *Ibid.*, p. 126.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

ects for the construction of an interoceanic waterway. Hardly, however, had the war come to an end before interest in a trans-isthmian canal revived, and at the same time feeling grew stronger that the waterway must be under American control. In 1867 the United States and Nicaragua ratified the Dickinson-Ayon treaty, which gave the United States the right to construct a canal in return for guaranteeing Nicaragua's neutrality.¹ About the same time Mr. Seward entered into negotiations with Colombia to obtain exclusive rights for an isthmian canal, and a treaty to this effect was signed in 1869, but was not ratified either by the Senate of the United States or by the Colombian congress. An even more advantageous treaty, signed by the representatives of the two countries in 1870, met a similar fate.² In the same year President Grant appointed an Interoceanic Canal Commission, which conducted a number of important surveys, including the Darien, Nicaragua, Tehuantepec, and Panama routes, and after very careful consideration of the data obtained reported unanimously, in 1876, in favor of the Nicaragua route, from Greytown to Lake Nicaragua by the San Juan River and thence to Brito on the Pacific coast.³

In the meantime an adventurer, Gorgorza, appeared in Paris with a canal concession obtained from Colombia, and succeeded in interesting certain of the imperialists in the scheme.⁴ A company was promoted to push the project, and Ferdinand de Lesseps, justly famous as the builder of the Suez Canal, became interested in it. Surveys were made, and an International Engineering Congress was held at Paris in 1879, under the presidency of de Lesseps, to consider the execution of the project. Various routes were considered, but de Lesseps favored the Panama route and his advice was ultimately taken. The Universal Oceanic

¹ Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 112, 46th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 130.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 34-84; also see House Report No. 224, 46th Cong., 3d sess., p. 24.

³ Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 15, 46th Cong., 1st sess., p. 1.

⁴ *Foreign Relations of the U. S., 1876*, pp. 87-93.

Canal Company purchased a concession for \$10,000,000; its president, de Lesseps, went to Panama; and early in 1880 he announced that plans had been completed for a tide-level canal whose cost was estimated at \$168,000,000 by the International Technical Commission.¹

The prospect of early construction of an interoceanic canal under European control aroused the United States, and President Hayes took occasion to present his views of such an undertaking in a special message to Congress, March 8, 1880. "The policy of this country," he said, "is a canal under American control. The United States can not consent to the surrender of this control to any European powers. If existing treaties between the United States and other nations, or if the rights of sovereignty or property of other nations, stand in the way of this policy, . . . suitable steps should be taken by just and liberal negotiations to promote and establish the American policy on this subject, consistently with the rights of the nations to be affected by it. . . . An interoceanic canal across the American isthmus will essentially change the geographical relations between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States and between the United States and the rest of the world. It will be the great ocean thoroughfare between our Atlantic and Pacific shores and virtually a part of the coast-line of the United States. Our mere commercial interest in it is larger than that of all other countries, while its relation to our power and our prosperity as a nation, to our means of defense, our unity, peace, and safety, are matters of paramount concern to the people of the United States."²

Congress also became concerned about the matter, and passed a resolution declaring it to be in the interest of the people of the United States that its government should insist that its consent be a necessary condition precedent to the

¹ For text of Salgar-Wyse concession see Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 112, 46th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 84.

² J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. VII, p. 585.

construction of any ship-canal across the isthmus.¹ Urged on by similar sentiments, Mr. Evarts attempted to make a treaty with Colombia whereby any concession for an inter-oceanic canal hitherto made, or to be made in the future, by Colombia should be subject to the rights of the United States, as guarantor of the neutrality of the isthmus and of the sovereignty of Colombia, over isthmian territory.² The Colombian government, however, was unwilling to concede any such rights to the United States; so that our government was forced to rest content with such powers as the treaty of 1846 guaranteed. At the same time, renewed interest was manifested in other trans-isthmian routes, particularly that by way of Tehuantepec, where Captain James B. Eads proposed to construct a great ship-railway, by which the largest ships could be transported from one ocean to the other by rail. The House Committee reported favorably but no guaranties from the government could be obtained.³

The idea grew that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was hampering the legitimate aspirations of the United States for a canal under its own control, and President Garfield, who came into office in 1881, directed his Secretary of State to take measures looking to the abrogation of the treaty. Instead of taking up the matter directly with the British government, Mr. Blaine sent a circular despatch to the United States ministers in Europe, outlining the American attitude towards the proposal to establish a trans-isthmian canal under European guaranty. He pointed out that such a guaranty was entirely unnecessary, because by the treaty of 1846 the United States had already guaranteed the neutrality of the isthmus, and this guaranty required reinforcement, accession, or assent by no other power. Furthermore, he said that the proposed European guaranty would

¹ Sen. Mis. Doc. No. 42, 46th Cong., 3d sess.

² Sen. Doc. No. 237, 56th Cong., 1st sess.; pp. 473-499.

³ For the favorable report on this scheme see House Report No. 322, 46th Cong., 3d sess.

be offensive to the United States, since the proposed canal would be the chief means of transportation between the Atlantic and Pacific states and would be, to all intents and purposes, a part of our coast-line. This being the case, the passage of armed vessels of a hostile power during any war to which the United States or Colombia might be a party would be no more admissible than over the railway lines joining the Atlantic and Pacific shores of the United States or of Colombia.¹

The remarkable feature of this communication was not so much its expression of principles, which showed, after all, no radical departure from former statements on the subject, but the fact that, although a copy of it was sent to the British Foreign Office as well as to the other European chancelleries, no mention was made, even in the British copy, of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. This was the more surprising in that the statement on the passage of armed ships was in direct violation of the second article of that treaty. At first, Great Britain ignored the despatch. But at length, about four months after it was received, Lord Granville pointed out that the position of the United States and Great Britain with reference to the canal was determined by the convention commonly known as the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and that her Majesty's government relied with confidence upon the observance of all the engagements of that instrument.²

Shortly before this reply was received, Mr. Blaine, apparently realizing that a formal treaty could not be disposed of in this cavalier fashion, sent a special despatch to the British government through Mr. Lowell, dated November 19, 1881, in which he attempted to show that the conditions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty were no longer existent. In the first place, the treaty had been drawn up more than thirty years before, when the position of the United States

¹ *Foreign Relations of the U. S., 1881*, pp. 537-540.

² *Ibid.*, p. 549.

on the Pacific coast was entirely different. Again, whereas the intention of the treaty was to put Great Britain and the United States on an equal basis in respect to the canal, the present arrangements insured control by Great Britain, on account of her superior naval strength, unless the United States should be allowed to fortify the canal. In the third place, now that other nations had become interested in a canal project, the United States, by the terms of this treaty, was prohibited from asserting the rights acquired by the treaty with Colombia signed earlier than the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Finally, the treaty had been made on the implied understanding that both nations would immediately subscribe funds for undertaking the work; now that nothing had been done, and the United States no longer needed outside aid, there was no reason for either side to regard itself as bound by the treaty's terms.¹

Lord Granville had little difficulty in exposing the weakness of Mr. Blaine's arguments, both in this despatch and in one of November 29 which followed it. The British possessions in North America had also shown considerable development, and it could hardly be supposed that the statesmen who were parties to the treaty had not envisaged certain changes of condition.² Neither was Mr. Frelinghuysen, who followed Mr. Blaine as Secretary of State, more successful than his predecessor, although he was on more familiar ground when he based his objections on the Monroe Doctrine and the traditional policy of the United States in opposing European intervention in American political affairs.³ The weak point, of course, was the fact that the Monroe Doctrine had not been regarded as a bar to making the treaty; therefore it could hardly be advanced as a reason for abrogating it. Needless to say, the diplomatic correspondence of the United States during this period did

¹ *Foreign Relations of the U. S., 1881*, pp. 554-559.

² *British and Foreign State Papers*, Vol. LXXIII, p. 873.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 892; or see Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 194, 47th Cong., 1st sess., for correspondence.

very little to improve the country's position; in fact, so easily and completely were its arguments refuted that its position diplomatically was even weaker than before. Nor did Great Britain confine her activities to the exchange of notes with the United States. At the first intimation of American action against the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, the British government protested that Nicaragua had never paid the indemnity promised to the Mosquito Indians by the treaty of 1860, and forced the case to arbitration before the Emperor of Austria. The award was wholly favorable to the British, not only in that it was declared that Mosquitia was not subject to the regulations of Nicaragua, but in that it gave Great Britain the right, in case the terms of the treaty were not strictly observed, to intervene to protect her own interests.¹

Mr. Frelinghuysen also attempted direct action by negotiating a treaty with Nicaragua in December, 1884, which provided for the construction of a canal by the United States under the joint protection of the United States and Nicaragua, the United States agreeing to guarantee the territorial integrity of Nicaragua.² But when Grover Cleveland became President in 1885, he recalled this treaty from the Senate, and declared in his first annual message that whatever highway should be constructed joining the two oceans "must be for the world's benefit, a trust for mankind."³ There was no change in this attitude until 1899, when John Hay undertook to obtain the abrogation of the troublesome Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and succeeded quite as brilliantly as his predecessors had ignominiously failed.

In the meantime de Lesseps had made a spectacular beginning upon his stupendous undertaking. The actual work of construction was started February 1, 1881, and a veri-

¹ *British and Foreign State Papers*, Vol. LXXII, p. 1212.

² J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. VIII, pp. 256-260.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 324.

table army of engineers and laborers was employed. Unfortunately for the success of the enterprise, de Lesseps remained in France, apparently failing to realize the prodigal and extravagant methods that were being employed. Useless and expensive equipment was purchased; the officers and directors were housed magnificently; an expensive campaign of propaganda was maintained to stimulate enthusiasm for the undertaking; and no matter how rapidly money flowed in, it was used up even more rapidly. The Engineering Congress at Paris had originally estimated the cost of the canal at \$114,000,000 and had figured that it could be built in seven or eight years. At the end of eight years almost \$400,000,000 had been spent and the work was not one third completed. The company went into bankruptcy, and the investigation that followed showed that the undertaking had been managed in a most corrupt and wasteful manner. The scandal was so great that all hope of ever constructing the canal by private means seemed eliminated.¹

In the United States, where the Nicaragua route still seemed preferable, various attempts to organize companies to construct a canal by this route met with varied success. In 1890 the Maritime Canal Company, which held a concession from Nicaragua, was chartered by Congress and began work at Greytown. After three years' work, its capital was used up and the company went into the hands of a receiver. In 1895 Congress authorized a commission to report on the cost of completing the abandoned canal, and the original estimate of \$67,000,000 was raised to \$133,000,000. Under these conditions, the government was not willing to back a resumption of work.² Various proposals were made in Congress to purchase the Maritime Company's franchise and property, but nothing came of them.

¹ For an excellent summary of the reasons for the French failure see W. F. Johnson, *Four Centuries of the Panama Canal* (N. Y., 1907), Chap. VII; see also *Foreign Relations of the U. S., 1884*, p. 119, for report on difficulties encountered.

² For complete report see House Report No. 2126, 54th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 122-129.

Upon the outbreak of the war with Spain, all projects were dropped. Nevertheless, the fact that the battle-ship *Oregon* had to travel 13,400 miles, instead of 4,600 by the canal route, to arrive at the West Indies, where she was needed, from San Francisco, where she was stationed, showed conclusively the vital need of a trans-isthmian waterway.

At the close of the war, agitation was renewed; and this time Congress made the generous appropriation, March 3, 1899, of \$1,000,000 for a commission to make an exhaustive investigation of the relative merits of the Nicaragua and Panama routes. Moreover, since it was realized that no satisfactory solution could be arrived at until the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was out of the way, the Senate authorized the President to secure its abrogation, if possible. Somewhat isolated in Europe on account of the unpopularity of the Boer War, Great Britain had shown herself quite friendly towards the United States during the Spanish-American War, and the conditions were now exceedingly favorable for opening up negotiations on the subject. In fact, as early as December 7, 1898, Mr. Hay had made overtures through our representative, Mr. White, who was instructed to approach the British authorities in a "frank and friendly spirit of mutual accommodation, and ask whether it may not be possible to secure such modification of the provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty as to admit such action by the government of the United States as may render possible the accomplishment of a work which will be for the benefit of the entire civilized world."¹

Both Lord Salisbury and Mr. Balfour were willing to consider the suggestion favorably, and Lord Pauncefote, the British ambassador to the United States, was forthwith instructed to enter into negotiations on the subject. A treaty was signed by Mr. Hay and Lord Pauncefote on February 5, 1900, which provided that an Isthmian canal

¹ *Diplomatic History of the Panama Canal*, Sen. Doc. No. 474, 63d Cong., 2d sess., p. 1.

might be constructed and operated by the United States, but that it must be neutralized in accordance with the principles of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.¹ This convention was not satisfactory to the American Senate, which had expected a complete abrogation of the treaty. Accordingly, it proposed a number of alterations. One of these authorized the United States to take such measures as should be necessary to secure the defense of the canal and the maintenance of public order by its own forces; Article III, providing for the adherence of other powers, was stricken out; and provision was made for the express abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.

These amendments were not satisfactory to Lord Lansdowne, the new British Minister of Foreign Affairs, who, in a lengthy communication, set forth his objections to them.² After conferring with Lord Pauncefoot and with leading senators, Mr. Hay accordingly proceeded to secure a fresh convention. In the course of several months of friendly negotiations all differences were ironed out, and on November 18, 1901, the second Hay-Pauncefoot treaty was signed. This instrument the Senate ratified the following month by a vote of 72 to 6.

Article I of the new treaty expressly abrogated the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Article II provided that the canal might be constructed directly or indirectly under the auspices of the United States government, which should have the exclusive right to regulate and manage it. Article III provided for the neutralization of the canal under substantially the same rules as those governing the Suez Canal. The most important of these rules was the first, which declared that the canal should be free and open, on terms of entire equality, to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations observing these rules, with no discrimination in respect to traffic charges or otherwise, and that the

¹ *Dip. Hist.*, *op. cit.*, p. 289.

² *Ibid.*, p. 11.

conditions and charges should be just and equitable. Although no provision regarding fortification was laid down, the United States was given the right to establish such military police as would protect the canal from lawlessness; and since the canal was to be completely immune in time of war, the logical inference was that the United States, which was charged with its defense, would not be prevented from erecting such fortifications as would insure its protection. The fourth article stipulated that no change of territorial sovereignty or of international relations of the country or countries traversed by the canal should affect the general principle of neutralization or the obligations assumed under the treaty.¹

As far as Great Britain was concerned, the United States was now free to proceed with the construction of a canal over whatever route should appear most practicable. A source of constant friction between the two great Anglo-Saxon countries had been removed, amicably and to the ultimate advantage of each. Great Britain had made the greater concession; it remained to be seen whether the United States would be duly appreciative of this fact when questions should arise involving the new treaty's interpretation.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 292.

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CHAPTER IV

COLOMBIA, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE PANAMA CANAL

JUST two days before the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was signed, the Walker Commission, after a thorough investigation of both the Nicaragua and Panama routes, reported in favor of the Nicaragua route. It estimated that the interests of the French company were not worth more than \$40,000,000; and inasmuch as the French had estimated their holdings at \$109,141,500, there was no need to consider the Panama route farther.¹ When, however, the Hepburn bill, providing for the construction of the canal by the Nicaragua route, passed the lower house almost unanimously, the French company became panic-stricken and offered to sell out to the United States at the figure fixed by the commission. As a result of this offer, the commission filed a supplementary report recommending the adoption of the Panama route.² Each route had its strong advocates in Congress, but the offer of the French company to sell at the very low figure set by the American commission gave the advantage to those favoring the Panama route. An amendment to the Hepburn bill was introduced by Senator Spooner, authorizing the President to purchase the rights and property of the Panama company for not more than \$40,000,000, and to secure the necessary rights from Colombia for the construction of the canal, with the proviso that, if a satisfactory arrangement could not be made with both the French company and Colombia within a reasonable time, he should proceed with the construction by the Nicaragua route.³ The adoption of this amendment virtually

¹ Sen. Doc. No. 54, 57th Cong., 1st sess.

² Sen. Doc. No. 123, 57th Cong., 1st sess.

³ *U. S. Stat. at Large*, Vol. XXXII, Part I, p. 481.

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spelled defeat for the proponents of the Nicaragua route, although without a vigorous campaign by M. Philippe Bunau-Varilla, the former chief engineer of the Panama Company, which did much to make the American congressmen realize the superior advantages of the Panama project, the fight for the Panama route might not have been won.¹

The Spooner amendment became law with the President's signature, June 28, 1902, and shortly afterwards Attorney-General Knox, after an investigation in Paris, declared that the French company could give a clear title. There remained the task of acquiring the right of way from Colombia. Negotiations were immediately begun with Señor Concha, the Colombian minister to the United States. But, now that the United States was willing to proceed by the Colombian route, Colombia seemed disposed to drive a very stiff bargain. So unsatisfactory were the Colombian replies that Mr. Hay finally called the attention of the Colombian minister to the fact that if a satisfactory treaty could not be arranged with Colombia, the President was authorized to proceed with the construction of a canal by another route.² When, on December 1, the Colombian minister left Washington unexpectedly, without giving the reasons for his departure, the negotiations were put in the hands of Señor Herran, the Colombian *chargé d'affaires*, who proceeded with them in a far more conciliatory manner. As a result, a compromise was soon arranged, and the Hay-Herran treaty was signed on January 22, 1903, and approved by the Senate on March 17 of the same year. This treaty authorized the French company to transfer its properties and concessions to the United States; it also gave the United States exclusive right to construct and operate

¹ For the detailed story of the various influences working for and against the choice of the Panama route see P. Bunau-Varilla, *Panama, the Creation, Destruction, and Resurrection* (N. Y., 1914), especially Chap. XXII; also see *The Story of Panama*, hearings on the Rainey resolution before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Wash., 1913).

² *Diplomatic History of the Panama Canal*, Sen. Doc. No. 474, 63d Cong., 2nd sess., p. 256.

the canal for one hundred years, with full option to continue the arrangement for similar periods, and the full control over a strip of land three miles wide on each side of the canal, not including the cities of Colon and Panama. Colombia was to maintain her sovereignty over the territory, and was to have the right to transport over the canal at all times her vessels, troops, and munitions of war without payment of any charges. As a price for these concessions, the United States promised to pay Colombia \$10,000,000 in cash and an annuity of \$250,000.¹

To complete the transaction, there remained only the ratification by the Colombian senate. But this was never obtained. The Colombian government was determined to profit to the uttermost, and, now that it appeared that the Panama route was definitely decided upon, the terms that the United States offered were no longer deemed satisfactory. A perusal of the correspondence between the American representative at Bogotá, Mr. Beaupré, and Mr. Hay shows that from the moment the opportunity was given to Colombia to obtain what had hitherto been considered favorable terms, public sentiment turned against the treaty. When a circular was issued by the government to the press, inviting discussion, it was quickly discovered that public opinion towards the treaty had changed "from approbation to suspicion and from suspicion to decided opposition."² The attitude of President Marroquin towards the treaty had at first seemed most favorable, but in his message to congress, which convened on June 20, he was completely non-committal. He pointed out that the government was in a dilemma—it must either ratify the treaty and suffer a loss to its sovereignty, or refuse and sacrifice a great financial opportunity. It is doubtful, however, whether the second horn of the dilemma was not interpreted in a double sense by both the president and congress. It would un-

¹ *Dip. Hist., op. cit.*, p. 277.

² *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1903*, p. 134.

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doubtedly be a real sacrifice financially if the United States should turn once more to Nicaragua. But would it not be also a sacrifice if the present offer should be accepted when there was a possibility of obtaining better terms? In fact, it soon developed that the treaty would never pass unless better terms were secured. General Reyes finally suggested to Mr. Beaupré that two amendments were necessary to obtain the ratification of the treaty: first, that the French company pay \$10,000,000 for the right to transfer its concessions; and second, that the United States raise its cash payment from \$10,000,000 to \$15,000,000.¹ When the Colombian government learned that the United States would not even consider these changes, the treaty came up for a vote in the senate on August 12, and was unanimously rejected.

From the viewpoint of international law, the Colombian government was wholly within its rights in rejecting the treaty, and from a business viewpoint, if better terms could be obtained from the United States, this was the time to get them. The situation, however, presented other angles than these. The United States was the only nation that was prepared to carry out the stupendous task from which not merely the United States and Colombia, but the whole world, would profit. It had made what seemed to be a fair offer, and the Colombian representative had accepted it. Then the Colombian senate rejected the offer, after intimating that certain increased indemnities would make the ratification possible. Somewhat later, a senatorial committee drafted a new report in which the indemnity was again increased and the terms were made still more difficult.² If the United States should accept this draft, there was nothing to prevent the Colombian senate from rejecting the new proposition and again raising the terms.

In the meantime the people of the province of Panama, who were vitally interested in the acceptance of the treaty,

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1903*, p. 163.

² *Ibid.* (No. 139, Inclosure).

saw their interests jeopardized by a government acting, as it seemed, in entire disregard of everything except its own interests. On the other hand, the French company, whose concession would lapse in October, 1904, saw its last opportunity to recoup a part of its great loss.¹ The Colombian government should have realized that the hostility of the United States was not so much to be feared as the desperate ventures of those people whose immediate interests were far more closely involved. It was a combination of these interests that ultimately resulted in the undoing of the Colombian plans.

There is an abundance of evidence to show that the Colombian government was not ignorant of the dangerous game that it was playing. Early in June, 1903, M. Bunau-Varilla, the former chief engineer of the Panama company, in a cablegram to President Marroquin pointed out that, if the Hay-Herran treaty were not ratified, either the Nicaragua route would be chosen or the Isthmus of Panama would revolt and receive the protection of the United States.² It was also reported that Senator Obaldia, the newly appointed governor of Panama, had stated to the Colombian president, in accepting the position, that in case the department found it necessary to revolt to secure the canal he would stand by Panama.³ However, the Colombian government was determined to stand upon its rights and exact the terms that it considered proper to demand under the circumstances.

The story of how M. Bunau-Varilla engineered the revolution in Panama reads more like an Arabian Nights' tale than the narrative of an actual series of events occurring in the matter-of-fact twentieth century. The inhabitants of the isthmus had sent a Dr. Amador to the United States

¹ By the payment of \$1,000,000 the company had secured a six-year extension from the government; but there was the possibility of the decree being declared null and void.

² P. Bunau-Varilla, *op. cit.*, p. 267.

³ *Foreign Relations of the U. S., 1903*, p. 193.

to see what chance there was of obtaining the aid of that country in bringing about a revolution, if no satisfactory arrangement could be reached with Colombia. After having approached various officials in Washington, the representative from Panama was convinced that no aid could be expected from the United States, and was about to return, when M. Bunau-Varilla appeared. When the latter learned that Panama was ripe for revolution if financial backing and military protection from the United States could be secured, he promised to do what he could to obtain them. The first step was to ascertain, if possible, what the intentions of the United States were, and what attitude would be taken if a revolution should break out. M. Bunau-Varilla was fortunate enough to secure an interview with President Roosevelt, and, although the Panama question came up only in the most casual way, it was apparent that the President still favored the Panama route. The other factor that M. Bunau-Varilla counted upon was the clause in the treaty of 1846 whereby the United States guaranteed to New Granada that the free transit of the isthmus from the one sea to the other should never be interrupted or obstructed. An interview with Mr. Hay confirmed his belief that, in case of trouble on the isthmus, the United States naval forces would be on hand to maintain open communications across the isthmus, as they had already done on several earlier occasions.

Basing his plan upon these rather frail supports, M. Bunau-Varilla promised Dr. Amador \$100,000 in cash from his own funds and the protection of the United States navy within forty-eight hours after a revolution should be declared. The only conditions were that the Panamanians should stage their own revolution, and that they should appoint M. Bunau-Varilla as their official representative in Washington, with plenary powers. Dr. Amador accepted the terms and promised that the revolution would take place within one week of his return home. When he arrived at

Panama, the emissary found that his confederates needed more definite assurance of American protection. He therefore sent a cipher cablegram to M. Bunau-Varilla asking for the immediate despatch of an American cruiser. His confederate was equal to the occasion. Various press despatches had already reported that the *Nashville* had left Kingston on October 31, with sealed orders. Taking it for granted that its destination was Colon, M. Bunau-Varilla computed the time of its arrival, and cabled the Panamanians that an American cruiser would arrive in two and a half days. The conspirators were satisfied, and when the *Nashville* sailed into the bay, they immediately proclaimed the independent Republic of Panama, and, confiding in the assistance of the great American republic, proceeded to arrest Colombian officers and troops who had already landed.¹

The part that the United States played in the Panama Revolution has been much criticized, but evidence showing that this country started the revolution or gave it encouragement in advance, other than by the interpretation which the Panamanians put upon the appearance of the *Nashville* in the harbor, must be open to suspicion unless the whole account of M. Bunau-Varilla is to be regarded as deliberately misleading.² However, after the revolution was started, the Colombians may be considered as having just grounds for complaint at the American action. The treaty of 1846, it is true, gave the United States the right to protect the neutrality of the isthmus and to keep the transit open. But it could hardly be interpreted to mean that, to

¹ M. Bunau-Varilla gives a most vivid account of the whole affair in his book, *Panama*, pp. 284-366.

² J. C. Freehof in his book, *America and the Canal Title* (N. Y., 1916), discounts the truth of M. Bunau-Varilla's statements and upon circumstantial evidence asserts collusion between President Roosevelt and M. Bunau-Varilla. Mr. Hall, in his statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in the hearings on the Rainey resolution, also implicates President Roosevelt, but he is inclined to attribute the revolution to the machinations of Mr. William Nelson Cromwell, the American legal adviser of the Panama Canal Company.

carry out these provisions, the United States was given the right to prohibit Colombia from maintaining its sovereignty upon the isthmus against revolutionary uprisings. In fact, since the United States was expected to assist New Granada in maintaining her sovereignty against foreign nations, might it not even be expected that the same guaranty would hold in the case of revolutionary uprisings? Certainly the following orders, given to the commanders of the *Nashville* and the *Dixie* by the Navy Department, can hardly be justified under the broadest interpretation of the treaty:

Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption threatened by armed force, occupy the line of railroad. Prevent landing of any armed force with hostile intent, either government or insurgent, either at Colon, Porto Bello, or other point.¹

This message was sent on November 2, 1903. On the following day our government went even farther, when orders were given to prevent Colombian troops at Colon from proceeding to Panama.²

The *Nashville* arrived at Colon on the evening of November 2, but Commander Hubbard did not prevent the disembarkment of Colombian troops which arrived that night on the *Cartagena*. These troops remained in Colon under Colonel Torres, while the superior officers left for Panama. That same day the revolution started in Panama, and these officers were seized by the revolutionary forces; and when Colonel Torres attempted to transport his troops to Panama by the railway, he was prohibited from doing so by the orders of Commander Hubbard of the *Nashville*. When Colonel Torres threatened to kill every American citizen in Colon unless the Colombian generals in Panama were released, Commander Hubbard landed his marines and prevented bloodshed. In the meantime, the revolutionists gained com-

¹ *Dip. Hist., op. cit.*, p. 362.

² *Ibid.*, p. 363.

plete control in Panama, a declaration of independence was drawn up, a provisional government was formed, and notice of the separation from Colombia was sent to Vice-Consul Ehrman of the United States. A part of the Colombian forces threw in their lot with the Panamanians; the rest were allowed to depart, and the revolution was over. M. Bunau-Varilla was appointed official confidential agent of the Republic of Panama at Washington, and on November 6, 1903, Secretary Hay cabled the American consul that he was to enter into relations with the new state of Panama as the responsible government of the territory. The independence of the new republic was assured when the United States refused to permit the landing of Colombian troops on the isthmus, on the ground that the act would precipitate civil war and disturb the free transit that the United States was pledged to protect.

With the new Republic of Panama recognized and its independence guaranteed by the United States, and with M. Bunau-Varilla representing it at Washington, the construction of the canal by the Panama route was assured. On November 18, 1903, the Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty was signed at Washington; it was ratified by Panama in December, and by the Senate of the United States in February of the following year. By the terms of this treaty the United States promised to maintain the independence of the Republic of Panama. In return for the sum of \$10,000,000 in gold, and an annual subsidy of \$250,000, beginning nine years after the ratification of the treaty, the Republic of Panama granted to the United States the use, occupation, and control of a zone of land ten miles wide, extending across the isthmus from Colon to Panama. Provision was made also for the use and occupation of any other lands and waters outside of the zone necessary to the canal's construction, operation, or protection. The canal was to be neutral in perpetuity, and the Republic of Panama was to have the right to transport over the canal its vessels, troops, and

munitions of war at all times without paying charges of any kind. The treaty, in effect, made the United States sovereign over as much of the isthmus as was necessary for the exercise of full control over the canal.¹ The pathway was now clear of all diplomatic obstacles, and it remained for the United States only to begin the work of construction.

Inasmuch as all Latin America nourished very bitter resentment towards the United States for its part in the Panama Revolution, and since the United States has upon several occasions offered to make reparation, and has finally settled the controversy by a convention signed by both parties in 1921,² it is pertinent at this point to examine the affair in a judicial manner from the viewpoint of the various participants, and to determine, if possible, precisely how much blame the United States should assume. As to fomenting the revolution, the evidence seems to prove conclusively that the United States was guiltless. We have already shown that M. Bunau-Varilla has voluntarily assumed all of the credit or discredit for engineering the affair. Upon numerous occasions President Roosevelt publicly and privately denied categorically that he was implicated in the slightest degree in the plottings that went on in the United States. In a letter to Dr. Albert Shaw, editor of the *Review of Reviews*, dated October 10, 1903, he declared: "I cast aside the proposition made at this time to foment the secession of Panama. Whatever other governments can do, the United States cannot go into the securing, by such underhand means, the cession. Privately, I freely say to you that I should be delighted if Panama were an independent state, or if it made itself so at this moment, but for me to say so publicly would amount to an instigation of a revolt, and therefore I can not say it."³

¹ *Dip. Hist.*, *op. cit.*, p. 295.

² See p. 90.

³ J. B. Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and His Time* (N. Y., 1920), Vol. I, p. 279.

In a special message to Congress, on January 4, 1904, the President declared the injurious insinuations of complicity by this government in the revolutionary movement in Panama to be "as destitute of foundation as of propriety." "No one connected with this government," he said, "had any part in preparing, inciting, or encouraging the late revolution on the Isthmus of Panama"; and he added that, "save from the reports of our military and naval officers, . . . no one connected with this government had any previous knowledge of the revolution."¹ Finally, John Hay, whose reputation for straightforward integrity is unimpeachable, in an official reply to General Reyes, the Colombian representative, declared that "any charge that this government, or any responsible member of it, held intercourse, whether official or unofficial, with agents of revolution in Colombia, is utterly without justification."²

Of the more substantial grievances of Colombia, as summed up by General Reyes in a statement of grievances presented to the United States, the following seem to be the most important: (1) American cruisers were sent into Colombian waters with orders to prevent Colombian troops from landing to suppress any revolutionary uprising that might occur; (2) A military officer of the United States prevented the railway from carrying Colombian troops from Colon to Panama at the very time when their arrival would have impeded any revolutionary attempt; (3) In a time of peace between the two countries the United States prevented by force the landing of troops where they were necessary to reëstablish order; (4) Two days after the revolutionary movement began, Panama was recognized by the United States as a sovereign and independent republic; (5) Fourteen days later the American government signed a treaty with the Republic of Panama, which not only recog-

¹ J. B. Bishop, *op. cit.*, p. 292.

² *Dip. Hist.*, *op. cit.*, p. 492.

nized and guaranteed its independence but agreed to open a canal.¹

In replying to these charges, Mr. Hay pointed out that, while Colombia manifestly sought to deal fairly with the United States as long as the Nicaragua route was being considered favorably, after an agreement was made with the duly accredited Colombian representative and with the French company, a very different attitude was taken. As a result of this shift of policy, trouble was threatened by the inhabitants of Panama, whose vital interests were being menaced. Advice to this effect came to the United States through its officials and the press, and in order to maintain order on the transit route the government took steps, as it had on previous occasions, to be ready for any emergency. The treaty of 1846 was signed with the implied obligation that an interoceanic passage was to be constructed, and the guaranty of the sovereignty of New Granada by the United States was given for this purpose. But the great design of the treaty of 1846 remained unfulfilled, and it finally became apparent that it could be fulfilled only by the construction of a canal by the government of the United States; yet by the repudiation of the Hay-Herran convention the Colombian government showed its intention to violate the spirit of the treaty. The declaration of independence of the Republic of Panama created a new situation. Another civil war threatened not merely the rights of the United States but the interests of the whole civilized world. The Republic of Panama stood for those interests; the government of Colombia opposed them. Compelled to cast her influence into the scale, the United States, in no wise responsible for the situation, recognized the independence of Panama.²

From these statements it would seem that, although the United States did not foment the revolution, her protection

¹ *Dip. Hist., op. cit.*, p. 481.

² *Ibid.*, p. 491.

of the revolutionists made the movement successful; that, while the United States had the right to keep the transit across the isthmus open, she could scarcely claim the right to prevent the landing of soldiers to put down a rebellion against the sovereign state that granted this right; that, even if the United States had the right to recognize the independence of Panama any time after such independence was won, she hardly had the right to guarantee this independence against Colombia by forbidding the disembarkation of its troops. On the other hand, it was not merely for the benefit of the United States that the canal was to be built, but for the benefit of the whole world. Nor would any country profit more from its construction than Colombia herself. Finally, the people in the province of Panama were exceedingly desirous of seeing the canal constructed, as is shown by the prompt ratification of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty by the municipal councils of Panama, and it seems that the government at Bogotá should have shown some consideration for their wishes. Therefore, even though extenuating circumstances could be found to justify the action of the United States, the fact remained that Colombia was wronged, and it was only fitting that a settlement be made of such a character not merely that Colombia would cease to feel bitter but that she would come to realize that her great neighbor on the north desired her friendship upon a basis of equality and justice.

Various attempts to this end were made before a successful compromise was effected. On October 21, 1905, the Colombian government suggested that a just, equitable, and complete diplomatic adjustment of the differences between the two nations be arrived at, and failing that, the question be submitted to arbitration.¹ Elihu Root, then Secretary of State, pointed out in his reply that an arbitration tribunal could not pass upon the question without passing upon the justice of Panama's stand in declaring her inde-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 576

pendence, whereas the United States had already taken an affirmative stand upon that question.¹ Further negotiations were carried on, and, owing to the friendly attitude of General Reyes, the Colombian president, and to the favorable impression made by Secretary Root's visit to South America in the summer of 1906, an agreement was finally embodied in a tripartite protocol, signed in Washington, August 17, 1907, by the representatives of Colombia, Panama, and the United States. The tripartite treaties resulting were known as the Root-Cortes-Arosema treaties, one between Colombia and the United States, a second between Panama and the United States, and the third between Panama and Colombia. Colombia was to have the liberty at all times to transport war-ships and troops through the canal without paying duty; its agricultural and manufactured products were to be admitted to the canal zone on the same basis as those of the United States; its mails were to receive similar treatment; Panama was to transfer the first ten annual rental payments of \$250,000 advanced by the United States to Colombia as her share of the Colombian foreign debt; finally, Panama was to be recognized by Colombia, and boundaries were to be definitely drawn.² The United States ratified these treaties early in 1909. But, despite the earnest support of President Reyes, public opinion ran so strong against them in Colombia that their mere presentation to Congress caused the downfall of the administration backing them, and the exile of the Colombian minister who negotiated them.

Another serious effort to adjust the situation was made during the Taft administration, when the American minister to Bogotá was authorized to make further proposals to Colombia. The tripartite treaties were to be ratified, and in addition the United States offered to pay \$10,000,000 for a concession to build a canal by the Atrato route and for

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 583.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 314-325.

the lease of two small islands in the Caribbean as coaling stations. Once more the Colombian congress rejected the proposals and demanded arbitration of the whole question or compensation for all the moral, physical, and financial losses that Colombia had sustained as a result of the separation of Panama. Mr. du Bois, the American minister to Colombia, made several further attempts, but they were unavailing, and it remained for the Wilson administration to try its hand. Mr. Bryan, as Secretary of State, was very desirous of arriving at a settlement, and suggested that Colombia make a proposition. Colombia consented and its proposal carried three main clauses: first, the United States should express regret for what had happened; second, Colombian merchant-ships, war-ships, troops, products, and mails should pass through without paying duties, and the products of Colombia for consumption in the canal zone should have the same treatment as the goods of the United States; third, the United States should pay \$50,000,000 as indemnity.¹

In its counter-proposal the United States offered to express sincere regret that anything should have occurred to mar the relations of cordial friendship between the two countries; to permit Colombian war-ships and troops to pass through the canal free of duty, and the products of its soil and industry, its citizens and its mails, to pass through and be admitted on the same basis as those of the United States; and to pay an indemnity of \$20,000,000.² Our government finally raised the indemnity to \$25,000,000. But when the treaty came before the Senate and its terms were published, Mr. Roosevelt denounced it bitterly as the "Colombia blackmail treaty," calling it "an attack upon the honor of the United States, which, if justified, would convict the United States of infamy."³ The opposition to the

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913*, p. 324.

² *Ibid.*, p. 328.

³ Theo. Roosevelt, *Fear God and Take Your Own Part* (N. Y., 1916), pp. 305-342.

treaty became so great, and the new problems raised by the World War had become so urgent, that farther consideration of the agreement did not take place till 1919. At this time the committee on foreign relations reported the treaty out, amending it by eliminating the expression of regret on the part of the United States; but, even with this change, the Senate refused to ratify it.

Hardly had President Harding been inaugurated before he indicated in no uncertain manner that he desired an early settlement with Colombia. In a message to the Senate, dated March 9, 1921, he called attention to the impending treaty and suggested that "the early and favorable consideration of this treaty would be very helpful at the present time in promoting our friendly relationships."¹ Yielding to the request of the new President, the Senate began discussion of the treaty in open session on April 24. When Senator Lodge, chairman of the committee on foreign relations, not only spoke in favor of ratification but indicated that Colonel Roosevelt before his death had also signified his approval of coming to a settlement, it was evident that the treaty would have little difficulty in securing the necessary two-thirds majority. The question came to a decision on April 20, 1921, and was approved by a vote of 69 to 19;² and ratifications were exchanged at Bogotá on March 1, 1922. At last this affair, which, according to a former United States minister to Colombia, was felt by the people of Latin America to be "the only real injustice committed by the United States against Latin-American people," has been settled in a manner acceptable to both.

One other difficulty of a diplomatic nature must be mentioned here, although not strictly within the scope of our Latin-American relations. The Hay-Pauncefote treaty provided that the canal should be open to vessels of all nations

¹ *Congressional Record*, Vol. LXI, No. 2, p. 81.

² For text see *Treaty Series*, No. 661 (Wash., 1922), or *Cong. Rec.*, Vol. LXI, No. 2, p. 378.

on terms of entire equality; but the Panama Canal Act of August 24, 1912, provided that no tolls should be levied on the coastwise vessels of the United States.¹ The British government protested against this exemption and suggested that the question be submitted to arbitration. The United States claimed that "all nations" meant all nations except the United States, since the remission of tolls was merely a subsidy to our shipping and therefore not a discrimination against foreign shipping.² Neither was the United States willing to submit the question to arbitration. However, upon the advent of the Democratic administration, President Wilson took the position that a great nation like the United States was hardly justified in quibbling about the interpretation of a clause in order to advance its financial interests, and hence he asked Congress that the tolls-exemption clause be repealed. After a spirited debate, Congress granted his request, carefully stipulating, however, that such action should not be construed as a relinquishment of the right of the United States to discriminate in favor of its vessels by exempting them from the payment of tolls for passage through the canal.³

This act held throughout the Wilson administration. But inasmuch as its repeal was demanded in the Republican platform of 1920 and in President Harding's speech of acceptance, the question was again raised in Congress in 1921. There seems to be little doubt that when the treaty was drawn the phrase "all vessels" was meant to be taken literally, and, considering our general attitude towards nations that hold treaties to be mere "scraps of paper," it would seem both politic and just to maintain the treaty in its spirit rather than to seek profit through the loop-hole of legal technicalities. However, party pledges had to be redeemed, and the Senate, after a heated discussion, finally

¹ *Dip. Hist., op. cit.*, p. 328.

² *For. Relations of the U. S., 1913*, p. 540.

³ *U. S. Stat. at Large*, XXXVIII, p. 385.

passed the tolls-exemption clause.¹ Although not openly recanting his stand as a candidate, the President was apparently not very desirous of having the bill come to him for his signature, particularly at a time when the United States was planning to receive Great Britain and her allies as guests in a conference looking towards disarmament—a meeting whose sole chance of success lay in the implicit confidence of the participants in the inviolability of their pledged agreements. The bill was therefore sent to the House, where, as a former President once remarked, it was “relegated to innocuous desuetude,” and without any noticeable grief on the part of its friends.

It would not be proper to conclude this chapter without a word concerning the canal itself. As an engineering feat it stands unparalleled—in the words of a former British ambassador, Lord Bryce, “it is the greatest liberty man has ever taken with nature.” Culebra Cut, a nine-mile channel, nowhere less than 300 feet in width and averaging 120 feet in depth, was hewn through a mountain. This great ditch, which necessitated the excavation of more than 100,000,000 cubic yards of material, or about twenty-five times as much as was used in the largest of the Egyptian pyramids, was perhaps the greatest feat. Yet the Gatun Dam, a mile and a half long, half a mile wide at its base, and containing more than 20,000,000 cubic yards of material, or more than five times as much as is found in the Cheops pyramid, ranks well with it. The problem of obtaining sufficient labor, the question of health, and the task of stamping out yellow fever and malaria were difficulties almost commensurate with the engineering problems. Work on the canal was started in 1904 and completed within a decade, at a cost of \$375,000,000. With the fortifications added, the total cost of construction has been about \$400,000,000, and the cost of maintenance is approximately four millions annually. From the beginning, the canal has demonstrated

¹ *Cong. Rec.*, Vol. LXI, No. 125, p. 6893 ff.

its necessity, and during the first thirteen months of its operation, in spite of the European war, six and one half million tons of merchandise were carried through it. In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1920, 2,478 commercial vessels, carrying almost nine and one half million tons of cargo, went through the waterway, and in addition 267 government vessels were towed through. The total revenues for this period were \$8,900,000 and the total expenses \$6,550,000; but there was no profit in a commercial sense, because interest charges and depreciation were not counted.¹ But a route which cuts off 7,873 miles in traveling by water from New York to San Francisco, and 8,868 miles between New Orleans and San Francisco, which brings the United States 3,000 miles nearer the Chilean nitrate fields, and the western grain markets of the United States 5,000 miles nearer to Europe, has a value to humanity that can never be measured in dollars and cents alone.

¹ *Annual Report of the Governor of the Panama Canal* (1920), p. 2.

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CHAPTER V

MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES

IF one were to form one's impressions of Mexico solely from the reports of some of the numerous organizations and committees in the United States engaged in investigating Mexican affairs, one might well believe that Mexico, like all Gaul, is divided into three parts—first and most important, the foreign oil interests; second and largest, the country given over to bandits and outrages; third and of little consequence, the Mexican government. But Mexico is a land that does not disclose itself to the casual observer. Where the representative of big business would see nothing but rich deposits of mineral and oil, the archæologist would discover prehistoric temples, monoliths, painted caves, and picture-writing, all giving evidence of a marvelous prehistoric civilization. Where the politician would find nothing but revolution and anarchy, the historian would note the traces of the Toltecs, the great civilized race that came and went before Columbus, and the Aztecs, who, under the glorious rule of the Montezumas, made Mexico City the Venice of America. Mexico is indeed, as a recent writer has described it, a land of contrasts: "It is a land of mystery and a land of commonplace dirt and existence. Areas of fabulously rich soil contrast with arid desert regions. . . . On the one hand, romance, adventure, chivalry, sacrifice, lofty ideals; on the other, oppression, cruelty, sordid ambition, pestilence. Great wealth confronts the direst poverty. The lights are always strong, the shadows always dark."¹ There are no tales in the world's history more

¹ E. D. Trowbridge, *Mexico To-day and To-morrow* (N. Y., 1919), p. 1.



- 1 LOWER CALIFORNIA
- 2 SONORA
- 3 CHIHUAHUA
- 4 COahuila
- 5 NUEVO LEON
- 6 TAMAUlipas
- 7 SAN LUIS POTOSI
- 8 AGUASCALIENTES
- 9 ZACATECAS
- 10 DURANGO
- 11 SINALOA
- 12 TEPIC
- 13 JALISCO
- 14 GUANAJUATO
- 15 QUERETARO
- 16 HIDALGO
- 17 VERA CRUZ
- 18 PUEBLA
- 19 TLAXCALA
- 20 MEXICO
- 21 MICHOACAN
- 22 COLIMA
- 23 GUERRERO
- 24 MORELOS
- 25 OAXACA
- 26 TABASCO
- 27 CHIAPAS
- 28 CAMPECHE
- 29 YUCATAN
- 30 QUINTANA ROO

MEXICO

SCALE OF MILES
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thrilling than the conquest of Mexico by Cortez and his little band of adventurers; nor can one find more striking examples of the ruthless exploitation of helpless natives than are recorded of the Spanish taskmasters during the centuries following the conquest. From Montezuma to Diaz the fabric of Mexican history has been shot through with the "cursed love of gold."

The diplomatic relations of the United States with Mexico may be said to have begun January 27, 1823, when by the appointment of Mr. Joel R. Poinsett as minister, the republic's independence was recognized. From that time to the present, there has been no period when our state department has not been vitally interested, directly or indirectly, in our nearest Latin-American neighbor. Our first treaty with Mexico was negotiated in 1826, but was not satisfactory to the Senate and was withdrawn. Two years later a treaty of limits was concluded, and in 1831 a treaty of amity and commerce was signed, which is still in force.¹ Despite the friendly attitude of the United States and the exceptional ability of its first minister, both the country and its representative were from the first suspected and antagonized; and in 1829 Mr. Poinsett's recall was demanded. The new minister, Anthony Butler, was a most unfortunate choice. An American historian has well observed that his sole qualifications for the post were "an acquaintance with Texas and a strong desire to see the United States obtain it."²

When, early in 1836, Texas declared its independence, Mexican hostility towards the United States became very bitter, on the grounds that this country was the chief backer of the rebellion. There was even thought of breaking off diplomatic relations. However, there is little evidence to show that our government failed in its duties of neutrality, although the occupation of the Nacogdoches region as a pro-

¹ J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. V, p. 778. For text see Malloy, *Treaties, Conventions, Etc.*, Vol. I, p. 1085.

² J. H. Smith, *The War with Mexico* (N. Y., 1919), Vol. I, p. 62.

tection against raiding Indians might be proved an exception. But whether justified or not, this incident fanned the flames of Mexican hatred, and our recognition of Texas early in 1837 added fuel. In 1842 President Santa Anna, "worthy son of the father of lies," as his Mexican opponents termed him, began his war for the reconquest of Texas, and at the same time the Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations accused the United States of permitting its citizens to give aid to the Texans.¹ Daniel Webster, then Secretary of State, denied the allegations promptly and categorically.² On the other hand, the government of the United States had serious grounds for provocation, in that upon several occasions American citizens had been mistreated, and even shot, by agents of the Mexican government. Furthermore, a large number of private claims for whose payment the American government had long been demanding action were ignored as long as possible; and when a settlement was finally reached, evasion of full payment was attempted.³

The annexation of Texas in 1845 by joint resolution of Congress made a conflict between the two countries inevitable. The Mexican minister at Washington was recalled and a deaf ear was turned to all efforts of the United States to resume friendly relations. A brief ray of hope appeared when a confidential agent sent by President Polk succeeded in obtaining the promise of a resumption of diplomatic relations; but when Mr. Slidell, the newly appointed American minister, arrived, the Mexican government would not receive him. Although ordered by Polk to remain in Mexico, he was unable to accomplish anything, since almost immediately after his arrival the war faction got control of the government.⁴

It seems necessary to say a word here about the almost

¹ *British and Foreign State Papers*, Vol. XXXI, p. 801.

² House Ex. Doc. No. 266, 27th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 7-15.

³ J. B. Moore, *International Arbitrations*, Vol. II, p. 1209.

⁴ For the correspondence of Mr. Slidell see Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 337, 29th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 18-67.

universally accepted tradition that Polk was eager for war with Mexico and forced it upon her. In reality, his diary, his private correspondence, and even his actions, show that he was most unwilling to force the issue. When we take into consideration the delicate situation that the Oregon question had brought about between this country and Great Britain, it would seem incredible that Polk should have deliberately engaged the country in war with Mexico. As to the sending of a large force of troops to Texas, it must be remembered that Mexico had broken off diplomatic relations and had been threatening to begin war at any moment. If it be conceded that the United States had the right to annex the sovereign state of Texas, it must surely be conceded that it had the right to protect its newly acquired territory from an attack momentarily expected. The only justifiable objection to Polk's conduct is the order sending Taylor and his forces forward to the east bank of the Rio Grande opposite Matamoros into territory claimed by Mexico. Yet this order was not given until January 13, 1846, when the diplomatic outlook seemed hopeless. With this advance, war was almost certain to come, and the first engagement—an attack upon an American reconnoitering expedition—took place virtually a month after the arrival at the Rio Grande. Polk might have postponed the war; but when we find, on the one hand, the American minister, who did all in his power to bring about a peaceful settlement, declaring, "We shall never be able to treat with her [Mexico] on fair terms until she has been taught to respect us,"¹ and, on the other, a Mexican editor writing, "The American forces did not advance to the Rio Grande until after the war became inevitable, and then only as an army of observation,"² we can hardly lay all the blame for the Mexican War at the door of President Polk. If the United States must be held guilty of instigat-

¹ Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 337, 29th Cong., 1st sess., p. 57.

² Quoted by J. H. Smith, *The War with Mexico*, Vol. I, p. 155.

ing the war, as many historians have asserted, it would be more just to fix the blame upon the same internal causes that were to bring about the Civil War—the demand for territory which should be open to slavery, and the struggle for supremacy between the North and the South.¹

Fortunately, the war was too one-sided to be very long drawn out. The first real engagement was fought at Palo Alto May 8, 1846, and with Scott's entrance into Mexico City, September 14, 1847, after the brilliant capture of the heights of Chapultepec, the fighting was virtually over. The United States never had as many as fifty thousand men in the field at one time, and the total casualties in the field, including sickness, probably did not run as high as fifteen thousand. Peace was concluded by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, signed February 2, 1848. The United States commissioner, Nicholas P. Trist, having already been recalled, was really without power to conclude the treaty. But he realized that his country was sufficiently anxious to conclude peace to waive technicalities.² The treaty's terms, although increasing the territory of the United States by more than half a million square miles, including New Mexico and Upper California, were not wholly unfair to Mexico. As the treaty itself stated, a great part of the territory was occupied by savage Indian tribes, and most of it was under only nominal control of the Mexican government. Furthermore, the United States engaged itself to pay \$15,000,000 for this territory, besides assuming and paying all claims against Mexico to an amount not exceeding \$3,250,000.³ Even conceding that this amount in no way represented the actual value of the territory, it must be remembered that this sum was greater than that paid for Louisiana, a much larger and more valuable region. Besides, the United States

¹ For a detailed and authoritative treatment of this period see G. L. Rives, *The United States and Mexico, 1821-1848* (2 vols., N. Y., 1913).

² See J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. V, p. 780 ff.

³ Text in W. M. Malloy, *Treaties, Conventions, etc.* (Wash., 1910), Vol. I, p. 1107.

was in the position of a conqueror who had to pay all the expenses of its conquest. The boundaries and certain other provisions proved not entirely satisfactory to the United States, but a new convention was signed December 30, 1853—the so-called Gadsden purchase—whereby Mexico, for the sum of \$10,000,000, ceded the Mesilla Valley and released the United States from liability imposed by certain stipulations of the former treaty.¹

The decade following the war with the United States was a time of revolution and anarchy.² Nevertheless, real progress was made by the overthrow of the clerical party, which resulted in the passage of laws bringing the army and the clergy within jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of justice and forcing the sale of church lands and property. The exceedingly democratic constitution of 1857 was also a product of this period, though to put its principles into practice required an electorate more experienced in democratic government than Mexico possessed or could hope to possess for many years.³ On the other hand, the public finances were in a deplorable state. Such a situation in a weak state that has borrowed heavily from foreign powers is always dangerous, and Mexico was no exception to the rule. Large sums had been obtained from Great Britain, France, and Spain, and the recurring changes of government had prevented regular payments. When in 1858 the full-blooded Indian, Benito Juarez, ex-officio vice-president, became president *de jure* through a revolutionary uprising against the constitutional president, the United States, unable to maintain diplomatic relations with the faction in control, withdrew its minister. In the following year President Buchanan, relying upon the ultimate success of the

¹ Malloy, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 1121.

² Five successive revolutionary governments had been recognized by the United States in the course of a few months. See special message of President Pierce of May 15, 1856, J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. V, p. 368.

³ For the text of this interesting document see House Ex. Doc. No. 100, 37th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 140.

Juarez government, which had been maintaining itself successfully at Vera Cruz, sent a minister, thereby recognizing Juarez as the "only existing government." The forecast proved correct, and in December, 1860, the Juarez government gained complete control and entered the city of Mexico in triumph. As might be expected, the treasury was empty; hence the new government was forced to issue an order suspending payments for two years on its national and foreign obligations.¹

This decree brought a strong protest from the British and French ministers, who demanded its immediate repeal. When the Mexican government failed to comply, diplomatic relations were severed. As the Spanish representative had previously been given his passport, owing to his open support of the church party, Spain was already prepared to act. A convention for joint action was therefore signed in London, providing for seizure of the ports and customs as guarantees of payment, and the United States was invited to participate.² With the Civil War already begun, our government was not able to protest effectively;³ nor did Seward feel that we should depart from our traditional policy of abstaining from alliances with foreign nations. The three powers therefore proceeded to send fleets and seize Vera Cruz. It was soon perceived, however, that the French had disembarked with an entirely different purpose from that of their allies. Napoleon III, *rêveur et conspirateur*, felt the need of accomplishing some brilliant exploit to shed luster upon his weakening régime, and Mexico offered the opportunity. The leader of the French expedition was therefore instructed to advance upon the Mexican capital and establish a stable government, if the situation so warranted. The British and Spanish governments

¹ *British and Foreign State Papers*, Vol. LII, p. 294.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. LI, p. 63, or House Ex. Doc. No. 100, 37th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 134.

³ Seward did, however, protest; see House Ex. Doc., *op. cit.*, p. 217, for his notice to France.

refused to follow the French lead, and the plan for joint action came to an end. Soon afterwards the British and Spanish withdrew, while the French finally pressed on and occupied the capital. In order that the imperialistic design of Napoleon III might not be too apparent, a junta and assembly of Mexican citizens were selected, who, after deliberation, adopted a limited monarchy as the new form of government, with a sovereign bearing the title of Emperor of Mexico. The imperial crown was offered to Prince Maximilian, archduke of Austria. If he should not accept, Napoleon III was to indicate another Catholic prince.¹ Unfortunately for Maximilian, he was prevailed upon to accept, and with much pomp and ceremony he entered the Mexican capital on June 12, 1864. In order to maintain the expensive requirements of an imperial court, to satisfy the more pressing claims, and to keep in the field an army strong enough to sustain the government against Juarez and his followers, new loans were floated in Paris, plunging the country still more hopelessly in debt.

Another difficulty that confronted Maximilian was the American attitude. While bending all effort to maintain the Union, the United States could do little more than look askance at the French intervention. Yet its hostile attitude was very apparent, and at no time would it consider the recognition of the imperial government. On April 7, 1864, it was resolved by the House of Representatives that "the Congress of the United States are unwilling by silence to have the nations of the world under the impression that they are indifferent spectators of the deplorable events now transpiring in the Republic of Mexico, and that they think fit to declare that it does not accord with the policy of the United States to acknowledge any monarchical government erected on the ruins of any republican government in America under the auspices of any European power."² Al-

¹ A very interesting collection of documents regarding the intervention has been collected in Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 11, 38th Cong., 2nd sess.

² J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. VI, p. 496.

though Seward did not think it expedient at the time to accept this as a statement of the government's policy, he conceded that it was the unanimous sentiment of the American people.

After the end of the Civil War the United States firmly but courteously demanded that the French forces be withdrawn, and Napoleon III, already worried by the European situation, thought it best to comply.¹ Maximilian was not able to resist long after the French forces were reëmbarked, and on May 16, 1867, he was compelled to surrender to the republican forces under General Diaz. In spite of protests from Europe and the United States, he was court-martialed and shot. Napoleon's dream of a great western empire dominated by France, and assuring him the support of Austria, proved equally vain with Plombières and the pact with Cavour, similarly intended to assure him the enthusiastic support of a united Italy.²

Following the short-lived imperial régime, Juarez once more reëstablished himself, and although he was forced to maintain a constant struggle against sectional uprisings, he retained control of the government until his untimely death in 1871. He is still regarded as the father of constitutional government in Mexico, for it was due principally to his efforts that the liberal constitution of 1857 was established and maintained.

The political history of Mexico has been scarred by many revolutions, uprisings, and rapid changes of government, but the period from 1876 to 1911 will always remain a notable exception. On November 26, 1876, Porfirio Diaz, a pure-blooded Indian, gained control of the government. He had himself elected president in 1877, and thereafter, with the exception of a single term, he ruled Mexico during the

¹ J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. VI, pp. 498-503. See also House Ex. Doc. No. 73, 39th Cong., 1st sess., Part II, and Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 6, 39th Cong., 1st sess.

² For a concise, well documented account of the French intervention in Mexico see J. H. Latané, *The United States and Latin America* (N. Y., 1920), Chap. V.

next thirty-four years. There has been much dispute as to the real advantages to Mexico of the Diaz régime. From the viewpoint of law and order, nothing better could have been desired. By means of an efficient rural police, well paid and well mounted, bandits were pursued relentlessly. A bandit soon discovered that but two opportunities were left for him: to continue his trade, with the certainty of an early demise at the hands of a firing squad, or to enlist in the *rurales*. "It takes a thief to catch a thief," was never better illustrated.

In its relations with foreign powers, the government of Diaz was very successful. To establish financial credit, the president recognized the need of foreign capital, and he determined to encourage it. But although his government was quickly recognized by foreign governments—the United States alone delayed till 1878—yet, owing to the danger of civil strife, capital was very loath to enter. Railways were especially needed. But, in order to get them built, extremely liberal inducements and concessions had to be offered; and these had to be strengthened by onerous guarantees. In some cases, even a share of the custom-house revenues was demanded. But, with the realization that Diaz was in earnest, governments encouraged their citizens to invest in Mexico. The following passage in a communication to our minister from Mr. Blaine, the Secretary of State, dated June 1, 1881, shows the excellent impression already made at that time:

"It is a source of profound satisfaction to the government of the United States that the political situation of Mexico is so apparently and assuredly in the path of stability, and the administration of its constitutional government so regular, that it can offer to foreign capital that just and certain protection without which the prospect even of extravagant profit will fail to tempt the extension of safe and enduring commercial and industrial enterprise. It is still more gratifying that, with a full comprehension of the great political and social advantages of such a mode

of developing the material resources of the country, the government of Mexico cordially lends its influence to the spirit of welcome and encouragement with which the Mexican people seem disposed to greet the importation of wealth and enterprise in their midst.”¹

In a report made to the House of Representatives in the session of 1883-84 on the trade between Mexico and the United States, it was shown that most liberal concessions had been made to corporations of the United States for the construction of railroads in Mexico. The subventions alone amounted to some \$90,000,000, and Mr. Thomas Nickerson of Boston, president of the Mexican Central Railroad, stated that about \$30,000,000 of American capital had been invested in railroads in Mexico in the past two years. It was also pointed out that already about eighteen hundred miles of railroad had been constructed in Mexico by citizens of the United States. The results of these improvements were shown in the growing volume of commerce. The total value of the commerce of the United States with Mexico in 1877 was about \$11,000,000. In 1882 it had more than doubled, while the revenues of Mexico had increased from \$17,800,000 to \$34,000,000. Well might the report say, in concluding, that “the line of policy adopted by the Mexican government since the restoration of the republic, of aid and promoting the construction of railroads to connect that country with the United States, and the persistency with which that policy has ever since been pursued, commends Mexico to the favorable consideration of the more advanced nations of the globe.”²

To carry out such a policy in a country that had so long been unused to political restraint required a strong executive. It was not enough to check robbery on the highways: it must also be abolished in the government. Diaz himself was honest, and he intended that his subordinates should

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1881*, p. 761.

² House Ex. Doc. No. 85, 48th Cong., 1st sess.

be the same. Hardly had he come into power before the first payment on claims amounting to more than four million dollars owing the United States came due, and he proposed to meet it. He cut officials' salaries, including his own, and weeded out large numbers of superfluous public servants. Real reforms could, however, hardly be introduced and firmly established within a four-year term. Yet a law forbade reelection until a term had intervened. Diaz showed his respect for law by refusing to run again at the end of his first term, although unquestionably Congress would have repealed the law preventing it. One of his own followers, Gonzalez, was elected, and Diaz was given control of the department of public works. But, becoming convinced that his presence cast a shadow over the administration, he resigned and withdrew from national politics. The Gonzalez administration, which had started under the most favorable auspices, came to an end under a cloud of odium and distrust. More subventions were granted than the government could meet and still pay its officials. The foreign capitalists received their instalments and the government officers went without pay, unless they resorted to corrupt methods. The foreign debt rolled up to huge proportions. A nickel currency was introduced which had most unfortunate results, and when the Gonzalez administration came to an end the country turned to Diaz unanimously.

For the next twenty-seven years Diaz was reelected with unfailing regularity, and with no opposition until 1910. He felt that he was best fitted to govern Mexico, and in order to do it effectively he needed full power. The result was a despotism, benevolent perhaps, but unquestionably a one-man government. He laid down a program embracing peace at home and credit abroad, and he put it through, regardless of obstacles. Banditry was virtually abolished; railway mileage was increased from 400 to 15,000; the national

income was increased from \$20,000,000 to over \$100,000,000 annually; government bonds were raised to par from 10 cents on the dollar, and at the same time interest rates were reduced from 10 or 12 per cent. to 4 per cent.; imports were increased eightfold and exports sixfold; silver mines raised their output from \$21,000,000 to \$125,000,000; even education was not entirely overlooked, and at the close of the Diaz régime there were three times as many schools as at the beginning. Finally, to the president's credit it must be observed, that at the end of his administration, with unlimited opportunities for self-aggrandizement, his total fortune amounted to about a quarter of a million dollars.¹

If we could leave the Diaz régime with a mere statement of the many material benefits which it conferred upon Mexico, Porfirio Diaz would rank as one of the world's great statesmen. But, unfortunately, there is a reverse side to the picture. A scientific form of government which functioned very effectively, which kept peace at home and friendship abroad, had been established, but almost wholly in the interest of the *Científicos* who controlled it. The financiers, the large land-owners, and the government officials found the system most satisfactory. But how did it meet the needs of the great mass of Indians who constituted about three fourths of the population? It must be conceded that it did nothing for the peon except to exploit him. The land was held in great estates, some containing as high as half a million acres. There the peon and his family had to live in a condition bordering upon slavery; there he must give his service to the farmer at a starvation wage, and often take out all his pay in trade at the *hacienda*, or plantation store. It has been estimated that almost 80 per cent. of all the farm and plantation laborers in Mexico are slaves, or peons. The Diaz government must be held responsi-

¹For complete statistics on Mexican finances during the Diaz government see the Mexican Year Books, 1908-14 (London, 1908-14). For a well written, unbiased account of the Diaz régime see David Hannay, *Diaz* (N. Y., 1917).

ble for encouraging, rather than frowning upon, the peonage system. A still greater blot upon it was the inhuman treatment of the Yaqui Indians. With full cognizance of the government, these unfortunates, among the highest type of Indians found in the western hemisphere, were unjustly dispossessed of their lands and then sold into virtual slavery in Yucatan to work in the henequen plantations. Therefore, even if we concede that Diaz was "the master builder of a great commonwealth," as one of his biographers has termed him,¹ in the last analysis his building could not endure because the foundation was laid upon special privilege. He was a great administrator, and he raised Mexico to a higher level, economically and politically, than it had ever attained before. But he accomplished this result as a benevolent tyrant rather than as a democratic ruler, and at the expense of the most numerous class of the Mexican people.

The very fact that the whole Mexican political system depended upon the vigor of the man in control was the cause of its utter collapse when that prop was withdrawn. The system was extremely centralized, very much like France under Napoleon I. The executive power counted for everything in the state, and that rested in the president's hands. The governors in the various states were nominated by the president and responsible to him, although the formalities of popular elections in accordance with constitutional formulæ were regularly carried out. Although on paper the legislative bodies, both federal and state, appeared quite as representative as the corresponding bodies in the United States, they were, in reality, wholly dominated by the executive. As long as Diaz was vigorous enough to direct the state in person, the system worked. But gradually he was forced, through weakness arising from advanced age, to allow his ministers more and more power. The result was

¹ José F. Godoy, *Porfirio Diaz, The Master Builder of a Great Commonwealth* (N. Y., 1910).

an apparent sacrifice of Mexican natural resources of every sort through the *científicos* to various foreign interests, particularly English and American.

In 1910 President Diaz, at the age of eighty years, once more stood for reëlection, although he had declared publicly in 1908 that he was serving his last term. The opposition, long repressed, might have endured Diaz,—he could not live forever,—but it refused to accept his choice for the vice-presidency, Señor Corral, one of the leaders of the hated *científicos*. A leader appeared in the person of Francisco Madero, a weak but impassioned theorist, who gained added prestige from the fact that he was fighting for democratic principles in spite of being a member of the wealthy land-owning class. At first his campaign for a democratic election was ridiculed; but at length, taking alarm, the government had him seized and imprisoned at San Luis Potosí. It was from this place that he issued his famous plan, declaring the recent elections illegal because the public had been excluded by violent means from participating, and assuming provisionally the presidency of Mexico. The plan further fixed November 20, 1910, as the day for the armed protest to begin. However, the most important feature of the plan was the clause of Section 3, promising a revision of the decrees dispossessing small proprietors of their land, which was to result in restitution to the former owners.¹

After issuing the plan, Madero fled across the border to San Antonio; but, returning in November, he soon had a large following. Other outbreaks were led by Orozco in the north and Zapata in the south, and in February, 1911, Gonzalez, governor of Chihuahua, joined his state troops to the revolutionists. The government seemed wholly unable to stem the fast rising revolutionary tide, and although Diaz, in his message to Congress on April 1, 1911, promised a correction of local abuses, electoral reform, division of the

¹ For the text of the plan and an excellent summary of the events leading up to it see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1911*, pp. 348-354.

large estates, and a reform in the judicial system, it was too late.¹ To prevent further bloodshed, he resigned, May 25, and early on the following day he left for Europe. A provisional government was set up, and Madero entered Mexico City in triumph on June 8. In the election held in October of the same year he was elected president by an overwhelming majority.

Even if the new executive had possessed the organizing ability and the will to achieve of Diaz, it would have been very difficult to put into effect the socialistic clauses of the San Luis manifesto. To expect such action from the visionary theorist who now held the reins of government was futile. It was not sufficient that Madero honestly desired to give Mexico a truly democratic government, since he lacked every attribute that would have rendered the accomplishment of his program possible. Before the inauguration, Zapata was stirring up trouble against the new administration, and Orozco quickly followed suit. The situation soon became so critical that the United States was forced to send a warning to the Madero government that American property must be protected, and to make the warning doubly sure a similar warning was sent to General Orozco.² The situation of Americans in Mexico throughout the period when Madero held office was so critical that the United States was forced to keep extra troops on the border constantly, in anticipation of emergencies, and an American transport was sent to bring back Americans desiring to leave.

Madero's inability to keep in check the revolutionary movements was not so detrimental to his success as his failure to remain popular. He soon fell under the control of a set of politicians with members of his own family at their head. He was accused of lending more than half a million dollars to his brother Gustavo from the funds of the

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 445.

² *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1912*, p. 787.

public treasury; of failing to comply with the promises made to the working classes; of filling all the important public offices with members of his own family; finally, of permitting the same exploitation of the nation's natural resources by foreign capitalists that had gone on under Diaz, save that now the chief operator was the Standard Oil Company rather than the Pearson Syndicate.¹ In a long despatch dated August 28, 1912, Mr. Henry Lane Wilson, the American ambassador, thus summed up the situation, after noting the wide area given over to devastation and slaughter:

"In the midst of this appalling situation in the north and in the south, the federal government sits apathetic, ineffective, and either cynically indifferent or stupidly optimistic. This peculiar phase of the situation I believe to be largely due to the character of the president, who is one day a Diaz come again and the next day an apostle of peace, the apologist for important bandits and criminals and the enemy of monopolies, land-holders, and privileged characters and classes. To such an extent has this wavering and unsettled policy been carried that it has lost the president the confidence and support of all classes, and to-day he stands practically alone, sustained only by the sympathy of his numerous family, the administration office-holders, and the useful and established apprehension that the evils which exist are less than those which might be anticipated with his downfall."²

A brief period of respite was obtained by the Madero government through the recapture, with little difficulty, of Vera Cruz, which Felix Diaz, nephew of the former president, had seized. But the day of settlement was merely postponed. On February 8, 1913, the younger Diaz started a revolt in Mexico City, and throughout the next ten days—the *decena trágica*—the capital was the scene of continuous

¹ For a critical account of this period see E. I. Bell, *The Political Shame of Mexico* (N. Y., 1914).

² *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1912*, p. 830.

fighting. Civilians were in constant danger, and the situation finally appeared so hopeless that Ambassador Wilson called a conference of the foreign ministers, and it was unanimously decided that President Madero be asked to resign to avert further bloodshed. But the president was firm in his resolve to maintain his position, and replied that if necessary he would die in defense of his rights as legally elected president.¹ On February 18, General Huerta, in command of the government forces, suddenly turned against the president and ordered his arrest. A truce was patched up, and on February 20 a provisional government was established, with General Huerta in control. The American ambassador urged immediate recognition of this government. But before the negotiations were completed the situation was altered by the murder of both President Madero and Vice-President Suarez while being conducted from the National Palace to the penitentiary. The official version of the affair as given out by the Huerta government was that two groups of armed men attempted to release the prisoners, and in the fight that ensued both the president and vice-president lost their lives.² Other accounts, however, indicated that the two prisoners were placed against a wall and shot. Whatever the truth may be, a strong reaction immediately set in against the provisional government, particularly in the states of Sonora and Coahuila. Foreign recognition was also delayed, notably that of the United States and Great Britain, although Ambassador Wilson urged the Taft administration to grant recognition to prevent worse confusion.³ But President Taft, at the end of his term, was unwilling to bring possible embarrassment upon his successor by inaugurating a policy that the latter would not be able to carry out. Hence the matter was turned over intact to the Wilson administration.

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913*, p. 711.

² *Ibid.*, p. 732.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 741.

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CHAPTER VI

OUR RECENT RELATIONS WITH MEXICO

THE advent of the Wilson administration found the situation virtually unchanged. In Sonora, opposition to the Huerta régime continued strong; while in Coahuila, Governor Venustiano Carranza declared his intention of inflicting summary vengeance upon the usurping government. His "Constitutionalist" movement was soon supported by other well known leaders, among whom were two destined to play very important parts, Francisco Villa and Alvaro Obregon. However, as General Huerta continued to strengthen his authority, the European governments, Spain and Great Britain taking the lead, extended recognition. In a long despatch to Washington, dated May 15, 1913, the American ambassador, Mr. Henry Lane Wilson, strongly urged that the United States also extend recognition to the established Mexican government. On June 9 he wrote that, "at the risk of being considered intrusive and insistent, I must again urge upon the President that on the highest grounds of policy—which in this case I understand to be the conserving and the extension of our material interests in Mexico, the restoration of peace, and the cultivation of sentiments of friendship and respect with a neighboring and friendly nation—we should, without further delay, follow the example of all governments accredited here but two, and accord official recognition to the present provisional government."¹

President Wilson preferred to follow a policy of "watchful waiting," but, in order to show his friendly intentions

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913*, p. 807.

towards the Mexican people, he sent John Lind, ex-governor of Minnesota, as his personal representative to offer the good offices of the United States in an attempt to establish peace upon a satisfactory basis. His instructions to Mr. Lind made it clear that such a settlement was conditioned upon (1) an immediate cessation of fighting; (2) an early and free election; (3) General Huerta's consent not to be a candidate for president; (4) an agreement by all parties to abide by the results of the election.¹ Although the envoy was received courteously enough by the Mexican government, it categorically refused to treat with him on the basis outlined, and the only result of his mission was to inspire in Huerta and his party a more bitter hatred towards the United States.

This feeling showed results in a number of incidents. On April 9, 1914, a paymaster of the U. S. S. *Dolphin*, landing at Tampico with a crew to obtain supplies, was arrested by an officer and squad of General Huerta's army. Two American sailors who had remained in the boat were forced to land, although the American flags at the bow and stern should have protected them. General Huerta ordered their release and expressed his regret, but refused to meet Admiral Mayo's demand that he salute the flag of the United States. A few days later an orderly from U. S. S. *Minnesota* was arrested at Vera Cruz while ashore in uniform, and was forced to spend some time in jail. President Wilson upheld Admiral Mayo, and when it was finally seen that Huerta would not comply, the American fleets were ordered to establish a pacific blockade of the Mexican coasts.

In his review of the situation before Congress, President Wilson pointed out that "a series of incidents have recently occurred which can not but create the impression that the representatives of General Huerta were willing to go out of their way to show disregard for the dignity and rights of this government, and felt perfectly safe in doing

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913*, p. 822.

what they pleased, making free to show in many ways their irritation and contempt.”¹ On April 21, in order to prevent the German steamer *Ypirango* from landing a consignment of arms, the American forces shelled Vera Cruz and then landed and seized the custom-house; after rather sharp fighting, they occupied the city completely.² When this was followed by an embargo on the shipment of arms into Mexico, and a complete severance of diplomatic relations, it was believed, both in the United States and in Mexico, that armed intervention was at hand. At this critical juncture Argentina, Brazil, and Chile tendered their good offices to effect a settlement of the difficulties, and their proffer was accepted. General Huerta, now almost at the end of his financial resources, and worried by the continued successes of the Constitutionalists under Villa and Carranza, could hardly afford to refuse. Carranza also was invited to suspend hostilities and send representatives to Niagara Falls, though it was hardly to be expected that, with success so near at hand, he would do so. Torreon had fallen to Villa early in April, and the Constitutionalists had captured Tampico on May 13, a week before the conference opened. The deliberations lasted six weeks, but with no practical results other than allaying South American fears in regard to the Mexican policy of the United States.³ A fortnight after the adjournment of the conference, General Huerta, realizing the hopelessness of his cause without American recognition, turned over the government to Señor Carbajal and left the country.

President Wilson has been much criticized for his failure to recognize Huerta, and it has been asserted that much of the subsequent bloodshed and anarchy which ulti-

¹ *Congressional Record*, Vol. LI, p. 6908.

² For the details of the Vera Cruz affair, see J. P. Tumulty, *Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him* (N. Y., 1921), p. 150.

³ The protocols of the conference may be found in the publications of the World Peace Foundation, Vol. VI, No. 1 (February, 1916).

mately forced American intervention could have been averted by a prompt recognition of the latter's *de facto* government. Such speculation *a posteriori* seems rather futile, considering the fact that at no time during his control of the Mexican government was Huerta able to put down the various factions that refused to recognize his authority. More proper complaint may be lodged against the grounds on which the President refused recognition, namely, that Huerta had employed unconstitutional methods to gain the presidency. Was not such an attitude in reality intervention in the domestic concerns of a foreign country? Were the methods employed by Carranza to gain control of the government any more constitutional?

Whatever may be said for or against the policy of watchful waiting, it soon became decidedly unpopular in the United States. Hardly had Carranza entered Mexico City before Villa raised a new revolt in the north, while Zapata continued his depredations in the south. The government was finally compelled to take refuge at Vera Cruz, and Mexico City became the plaything of all factions—the Constitutionalists occupying and reoccupying the city four different times. On June 2, 1915, President Wilson addressed a strong plea to the leaders of the various factions to act together for the relief of their prostrate country, declaring that, while the United States did not desire or claim the right to settle the affairs of Mexico for her, yet she could not stand indifferently by and do nothing to serve her neighbor.¹ When this produced no results, our government held a conference with the six ranking Latin-American representatives, and a joint note, signed by the United States and the ministers from Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Guatemala, was despatched, August 11, 1915, to Carranza and Villa. The two leaders were asked to meet at some neutral place to exchange ideas on the crea-

¹ E. E. Robinson and V. J. West, *The Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson* (N. Y., 1917), p. 268.

tion of a provisional government which should take the first steps necessary to the constitutional reconstruction of the country.¹ General Villa accepted forthwith, but General Carranza declared that he could not consent to the discussion of the domestic affairs of the republic by mediation or on the initiative of any foreign government. Nevertheless, when Carranza gave pledges that his government would guarantee that the lives and property of foreigners in Mexico would be respected, and that damages caused by the revolution would be settled, President Wilson, on October 19, 1915, authorized his *de facto* government to be recognized by the United States.

Enraged by this triumph of his rival, Villa swore vengeance upon the United States, and on January 10, 1916, eighteen Americans holding passports of safe conduct issued by the *de facto* government were taken from a train at Santa Ysabel and shot in cold blood. On March 9 Villa raided the little town of Columbus, New Mexico, killing seventeen Americans and carrying away horses. The American government thereupon ordered General Pershing to pursue the bandits across the border, with orders to capture them or destroy their band. Instead of coöperating, the Carranza government seemed desirous of thwarting the purpose of the expedition, and, as American troops continued their vain quest farther and farther inland, it showed itself openly hostile. Finally General Jacinto Trevino issued a pronunciamiento informing General Pershing that if he moved his troops farther south, east, or west he would be attacked.

President Wilson had been patient, but his forbearance had a limit, and he immediately ordered 150,000 militia under arms and despatched them to the border. In a long despatch to the Mexican government, dated June 20, 1916, Secretary Lansing reviewed the whole situation and made it clear that the American troops were in Mexico to accom-

¹ *Amer. Jour. of Int. Law*, Vol. X, p. 364 (April, 1916).

plish a duty that had been forced upon it through the impotence of the Mexican authorities. Therefore the demand of the Mexican government for "the immediate withdrawal of the American troops" could not be entertained.¹ The day after the despatch of this note the situation was rendered still more grave by an attack upon the American troops at Carrizal, in which some soldiers on each side were killed and seventeen American soldiers were taken captive. The United States government notified American citizens to leave Mexico, and, with American troops massed on the border, war seemed inevitable. A demand for the immediate release of the prisoners and a definite statement of the Mexican government's purposes finally aroused Carranza to the danger of his position. The captives were released, and Carranza proposed that an offer of mediation on the part of Spain and several Latin-American countries be accepted. The United States thereupon suggested a joint conference, with three commissioners from each side, to arrange a settlement. This solution was accepted by the Mexican government, which named as its delegates Luis Cabrera, Minister of Finance, Alberto Pani, president of the Mexican International Railways, and Ignacio Bonillas. The United States was represented by Franklin K. Lane, Judge George Gray, and John R. Mott.

The conference convened September 6 at New London, Connecticut, and continued, with several recesses, until November 24. The Americans were especially insistent on the protection of foreigners and their interests in Mexico, while the Mexicans urged the immediate withdrawal of American troops from Mexican soil. A protocol was finally signed providing for the withdrawal of General Pershing's army within forty days, provided no new raids should occur in the meantime, the United States reserving the right to send an army into Mexico to capture bandits who had

¹ This correspondence may be found in the *Amer. Jour. of Int. Law*, Vol. X, Supp. pp. 179-225.

invaded American territory. Claims for damages and plans for economic development were left to future negotiations.¹ Although the Carranza government did not ratify the protocol, in accordance with the recommendation of the American commissioners the American troops were ordered withdrawn, and on January 2, 1917, diplomatic relations were resumed with the appointment of Henry P. Fletcher as American ambassador to Mexico. Villa remained at large, and Carranza gained added prestige for his successful baiting of the United States; but President Wilson had the satisfaction of preventing intervention from becoming war at a time when there was a greater need for American troops and resources in Europe than in Mexico.

In the meantime, Carranza had been making a valiant and fairly successful effort to put into effect a domestic policy that should reestablish credit, relieve the industrial depression, and crush civil opposition. On account of the vast amount of paper money that had been issued by the various régimes, the financial situation constituted the most difficult problem. The peso, normally worth about fifty cents, at one time reached a level of less than half a cent. The paper-money problem, with its attendant abuses, finally became so urgent that in October, 1916, the government passed a decree declaring that all wages and salaries must be paid either in gold or silver, or in paper on a gold basis. A valuation of the paper currency on a gold basis was made every ten days, and payment was made upon this basis. The decree further provided that wages must be at least 60 per cent. of normal and a gradual increase maintained until a normal basis should be reached. The results were very beneficial. Strikes and lockouts due to payments being made in depreciated currency came to an end, and employers found it quite as profitable to pay in hard currency as in paper, so that within a month the government was able to

¹ Text of protocol, *ibid.*, Vol. XI, p. 403 (April, 1917).

declare a moratorium upon paper and establish all financial relations on a gold basis.¹

Another very important problem that the government had to solve was the devising of some means whereby the dictatorship could be resolved, with the least possible friction, into a constitutional régime. To this end, a constitutional convention was called to adopt a new constitution in place of the one of 1857, and the delegates assembled at Queretaro in February, 1917. As it was hoped in 1857 to make Mexico a democratic state by giving her a democratic constitution modeled upon the constitution of the United States, so now, sixty years later, it was hoped to solve the various social and economic problems by incorporating their remedies in a constitutional formula.² In the framework of government the new constitution followed the constitution of 1857, providing for a president elected for a single four-year term, with duties very similar to the duties of the President of the United States, and a bicameral congress, the senate consisting of two members from each state and two from the federal district, chosen directly for a four-year term, and the house elected directly for a two-year term. The federal system was maintained, such powers as were not granted to the national government being reserved to the states. The constitution began with a very elaborate bill of rights and ended with a series of temporary articles regulating the procedure in the first election to be held under it.

The remarkable features of the new instrument, however, were the elaborate and drastic provisions in regard to the church, ownership of land and natural resources, the protection of labor, and various questions of social welfare. An eight-hour day and a seven-hour night were established; night work in factories was forbidden for

¹ For an excellent survey of this period see E. D. Trowbridge, *Mexico To-day and To-morrow* (N. Y., 1919), pp. 167-201.

² The text of the constitution of 1917 may be found in *Investigation of Mexican Affairs*, Sen. Doc. No. 285, 66th Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. II, p. 3123.

women and children under sixteen; women were protected before and after parturition; minimum-wage scales were established, providing the same compensation for the same work without regard to sex; employers were required to observe measures of sanitation and hygiene and those designed to prevent accidents; strikes were permitted, but differences between capital and labor were to be submitted for settlement to a board of arbitration, consisting of an equal number of representatives of the workmen and employers, and of one representative of the government; insurance in many forms—old-age, sickness, life, unemployment—was to be encouraged, and even coöperative associations for the construction of cheap and sanitary dwelling-houses for workmen were indicated in the constitution as being of social utility. All church buildings, rectories, seminaries, convents, and schools were declared to belong to the nation, and likewise all places of public worship erected in the future. Furthermore, neither charitable nor scientific institutions should be under “the patronage, direction, administration, charge, or supervision of religious corporations or institutions.”

The new provisions of most interest to the United States were those concerning the ownership of land and natural resources. Article XXVII declared the ownership of lands and waters to be vested originally in the nation, which has the right to transmit title thereof to private persons. Necessary measures were to be taken to divide large landed estates and to develop small holdings. The ownership of all minerals, phosphates, petroleum, and hydrocarbons is vested directly in the state, is inalienable, and may not be lost by prescription. As to the legal capacity to acquire ownership of lands, it was provided that “only Mexicans by birth or naturalization, and Mexican companies, have the right to acquire ownership in lands, waters, and their appurtenances, or to obtain concessions to develop mines, waters, or mineral fuels in the Republic of Mexico. The

nation may grant the same right to foreigners, provided they agree before the department of foreign affairs to be considered Mexicans in respect to such property, and accordingly not to invoke the protection of their governments in respect to the same, under penalty in case of breach, of forfeiture to the nation of property so acquired. Within a zone of 100 kilometers from the frontiers and 50 kilometers from the sea-coast, no foreigner shall under any conditions acquire direct ownership of lands and waters."

It can be easily seen that the provisions of this article, especially when it is realized that most of the oil-producing property lies within the 50-kilometer zone, are almost completely prohibitive of further foreign exploitation of Mexican oil resources. However, the more immediate question was in regard to the effect it would have on property already acquired. Article XIV of the constitution seemed to answer this in declaring: "No law shall be given retroactive effect to the injury of any person whatsoever." But another provision in Article XXVII (Sec. IV) declared that commercial stock companies may not acquire, hold, or administer rural properties, but only lands in an area absolutely necessary for their establishments, which the executive of the union or of the state in each case shall determine. This seemed like a dangerous exercise of the executive power, and even before the constitution was signed and promulgated, Secretary Lansing, in a despatch to Charles Parker, representing American interests at Quere-taro, protested against this paragraph, pointing out that "the objection to a provision so capable of capricious application appears evident. The precise conditions under which the power vested in the executive may be exercised are not defined. No safeguards are afforded against unwise or arbitrary executive acts."¹ After considerable correspondence on the subject, it was apparent that, while the new constitution did not interfere with any wells already

¹ *Investigation of Mexican Affairs, op. cit.*, p. 3121.

drilled, it did prevent foreign companies from sinking new wells unless they waived their nationality and organized as Mexican corporations.

The opposition to Article XXVII upon the part of the American oil interests, particularly as to the interpretation placed upon it by Carranza in a series of executive decrees promulgated at different times during the year 1918, formed the bone of diplomatic contention during the remaining part of the Carranza régime. A decree of February 19, 1918, imposing certain taxes on the surface of oil lands, as well as on the rents and royalties derived from their exploitation, seemed to indicate an intention to separate the ownership of the surface from that of the mineral deposits of the sub-surface, thereby confiscating private property under the guise of taxation without just compensation. Both the American government¹ and the oil companies protested, but with little apparent effect upon the intentions of the Mexican government. The Mexican authorities contended that the decrees were merely fiscal legislation, which operated similarly upon its own citizens and upon foreigners, and that therefore Mexico, in the exercise of its sovereign rights, could not admit the interference of foreign governments in the matter. If the foreigners felt themselves prejudiced by the decree, the Mexican courts were open to afford them legal remedies.² Mr. Frank L. Polk summed up the American case in an emphatic but friendly fashion in a long note to Mr. Fletcher, the American ambassador, on December 13, 1918. He pointed out that the Mexican attitude regarding the decrees—namely, that merely because they applied equally to Mexican citizens and foreigners the question was one of internal sovereignty, and afforded no rightful basis for interposition by the governments of interested foreigners whose property rights were jeopardized—was not in accordance with international

¹ See note of Ambassador Fletcher dated April 2, 1918, *ibid.*, p. 3157.

² For a full statement of the Mexican case see the note of E. Garza Perez, Aug. 17, 1918, to Henry P. Fletcher, *op. cit.*, p. 3161.

law. "While the Mexican government may see fit to confiscate vested property rights of its own citizens, such action is in equity no justification for the confiscation of such rights of American citizens, and does not estop the government of the United States from protesting on behalf of its citizens against confiscation of their property." Mr. Polk then went on to show that Mexican citizens had, by their participation in molding governmental policies, a weapon in addition to judicial remedies which foreigners did not possess; therefore, he argued, friendly representations were not out of place.¹ President Carranza finally turned the matter over to the Mexican congress; but no "organic act" on the subject was ever passed.

It is impossible to find an absolutely impartial account of the oil question under the Carranza régime, but a few statements on both sides will afford a basis for a fair approximation. Mr. Frederic R. Kellogg, general counsel of the Pan-American Petroleum and Transport Company, sums up the complaints of the oil interests somewhat as follows: Many regulations of a harassing nature to prevent development were adopted; the government allowed the filing of claims against the oil properties by persons claiming to be entitled to acquire them under the Carranza decrees; concessions to drill upon lands comprised within titles held by petroleum companies were granted to Carranza's favorites; no company was allowed to drill on its own land unless it had a drilling permit, and no permit would be granted unless the company agreed to abide by the terms of any petroleum law that might be enacted in the future; Carranza sent his armed forces into the oil regions, resulting in a series of murders and assaults upon the employees of the companies; finally, a campaign of vilification against the companies was conducted in Mexico and the United States, accusing them of being tax-dodgers, fomenting rebellion against the Carranza administration, and even

¹ *Investigation of Mexican Affairs, op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 3163.

seeking to bring about armed intervention by the United States to subserve their own greed and financial ambitions.¹

On the other side, Mr. Joseph F. Guffey, president of the Atlantic Gulf Oil Corporation, declared that the chief offenders in respect to propaganda were the so-called associations ostensibly formed for the protection of American rights in Mexico. As to confiscation, he asserted that "the Mexican government is not attempting to confiscate oil properties developed and operated by American companies. If such were its purpose, it could easily double or treble the export tax of eleven cents per barrel which was collected on all oil exported from Mexico in 1919. . . . All these companies have to do to conform to Mexican requirements is to recognize the constitution, renounce all oil concessions and leases obtained prior to its promulgation, and take out new permits. This process does not invalidate the occupancy of these properties by oil companies, but simply recognizes the government's right to levy taxes or collect a royalty on oil production. . . . President Carranza I regard as an intelligent, constructive, and honest statesman; he has done more for Mexico and the Mexican people than any other president in its history." ²

Mr. B. Preston Clark, an official of the United States Smelting, Refining, and Mining Company, a corporation employing some seven thousand men in Mexico, in a statement made to the Episcopal Church Congress in New York, painted a very glowing picture of the success of his company in dealing with the Mexicans.³ Mr. L. J. de Bekker, sent to Mexico by the New York *Tribune* to find out the truth about the situation, "found peace and prosperity in the greater part of Mexico controlled by the Mexican government, but devastation and anarchy in the oil region, where one Palaez, 'king of the oil fields,' a bandit employed

¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 3270.

² *New York Times*, Feb. 26, 1920.

³ J. F. Moors, *Shall We Intervene in Mexico?* Leaflet No. 11, League of Free Nations Association, p. 3.

by the oil producers, was in their interest forcibly defying the Mexican government.”¹ As to propaganda, in behalf of the oil interests Mr. J. F. Moors, a well known banker of Boston, and president of the Boston Associated Charities, gives the following interesting information: “On January 21, 1919, a financial news sheet announced modestly the formation of the National Association for the Protection of American Rights in Mexico. The leading interests in this association were then reported to be the Rockefeller companies, American Smelting and Refining Company, Anaconda Company, and Mexican Petroleum Company. This association is now said to have a press bureau in most competent hands at 347 Fifth Avenue, New York, and others elsewhere. Its name appears with great frequency in the press, notably in connection with the attacks in Mexico on unknown American citizens, in whom it purports to take a deep interest. The large corporations which organized it are usually no longer mentioned, but the bureau chief has testified that he receives a salary of \$20,000.”²

But without question one of the best sources of information upon Mexican conditions during the Carranza régime is the voluminous testimony offered before the Fall subcommittee on the investigation of Mexican affairs, which lasted from August 8, 1919, until May 28, 1920.³ Hearings were held in Washington, New York, and in various cities and towns along the border, and, in all, more than two hundred and fifty witnesses were examined. Various members of the League of Free Nations Association were called in, including Mr. de Bekker, and also representatives of the Association for the Protection of American Rights in Mexico. Mr. Edward L. Doheny's account of his long

¹ J. F. Moors, *Shall We Intervene in Mexico?* Leaflet No. 11, League of Free Nations Association, p. 9.

² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

³ By a Senate resolution the committee was directed to investigate the matter of damages and outrages suffered by citizens of the United States in Mexico, the proper indemnities, and what measures should be taken to prevent a recurrence of such outrages.

struggle against climatic conditions, governmental interference, and discouragement on the part of stockholders is a story of success against odds which rivals the epic tales of the forty-niners. Incidentally, Mr. Doheny brought out the fact that the oil companies, instead of hiring Palaez to protect them against the Carranza régime, were paying him under duress with the connivance of the Carranza authorities, who themselves were wholly unable to give adequate protection. The payments had also been advised by the American state department.¹

Whether or not one is in favor of intervention, an unbiased perusal of this report indicates clearly that Mexico under the Carranza régime was not a safe place for an American citizen, whether he be mine-owner, oil-producer, or the proprietor of a ranch. The report farther made it clear not only that there is a vast amount of American capital in Mexico,² but that it went there under the protection of, and in many cases at the urgent solicitation of, the Mexican government. It would also seem that until the Carranza government came into power the Mexicans were, for the most part, very well disposed towards Americans and often preferred to work for them rather than for their own countrymen. Finally, despite a good deal of popular suspicion of Senator Fall's Mexican policy, it must be conceded that every effort was made to get at the entire truth of the situation, and that the attempts to prove that a plot existed in the United States to force armed intervention in Mexico failed because no substantial facts were brought forth to substantiate the assertions.

While the Fall sub-committee was at work, a new revolution was started which carried Carranza out of power and down to his death. Like Diaz, Carranza was unable to resign himself to letting the supreme power slip from his fingers. Inasmuch as the constitution prevented a second

¹ *Investigation of Mexican Affairs, op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 285.

² The report gives \$1,057,770,000 as the exact figure, p. 3322.

term, his only chance of retaining control lay in procuring the election of some one who would be subservient to him. The two strongest candidates, General Alvaro Obregon and General Pablo Gonzalez, were not men of this sort. Hence Señor Bonillas, the Mexican ambassador to the United States, was picked; the point was pressed that the country ought to have a civilian president; and Bonillas was pledged the support of a civilian party. Whatever may have been his qualifications, Señor Bonillas was handicapped by his long absence from the country and by his lack of a strong personal following.

President Carranza had signified his intention to allow the elections to be held without any governmental interference. Nevertheless, it was not long before Candido Aguilar, the president's son-in-law, came out for Bonillas, and soon it was manifest that government dictation was again to be reckoned with. The power of the government to bring about the election of its own candidate in Mexico is notorious. The only hope for Obregon and Gonzalez was a revolution, and on April 23, 1920, General Obregon and a number of influential leaders raised a revolt in the state of Sonora. The so-called Agua Prieta plan had been adopted, which declared that the sovereignty of Mexico rested in the people; Carranza, it was contended, had violated it; therefore he must give over his power to a provisional president, namely, Governor de la Huerta of Sonora, who should be supreme commander of the state until the elections were to be held. The plan farther decreed that the constitution of 1917 should continue to be the fundamental law of the republic.

The revolution spread very rapidly, particularly after leaders like Generals Alvarado, Gomez, and Palaez went over to Obregon, and Gonzalez withdrew his candidacy in Obregon's favor. Early in May, Carranza was forced to flee from the capital, and the revolutionists entered it the same day. Unfortunately for Carranza, he fell in with a

small band supposed to be a part of the forces of Palaez, but under the command of Carrera. These men offered to act as guides. But during the night an attack was made upon the sleeping-quarters of General Carranza, and he was shot, presumably by the pretended escort. In the meantime, Congress had chosen Adolfo de la Huerta provisional president, and he postponed the elections from July to September, in order that the provisional government might have time to pacify the country. The delay was necessary, for Gonzalez, apparently repenting his self-effacement, had started a new revolution. But even Mexico was war weary; the revolt was speedily put down, and Gonzalez captured and tried for treason. He was acquitted with the understanding that he would leave the country. Pancho Villa, who also had promised to be good, soon grew tired of inaction and raised a revolt. Realizing the difficulty of capturing him, the government finally got an agreement under which he was to lay down his arms, provided each of his eight hundred followers should receive a tract of land and Pancho himself be given a large estate, with the privilege of keeping fifty retainers at government expense.

On September 5, 1920, Alvaro Obregon was elected president; and his party, the Liberal Constitutionalist, gained control of both houses of congress. Before taking office, he made a tour of the Mexican states, in the course of which he crossed the boundary and spent some ten days on the American side. He was enthusiastically received, and at El Paso he declared that he felt sure that Mexico was already recognized by the American people, if not by their government. In a speech at Dallas, October 17, he assured his hearers that Mexico would recognize all legal foreign debts and all legal rights of Mexicans and foreigners alike. On December 1, 1920, he was inaugurated. But, although the new government was recognized the same month by Japan, Brazil, Holland, and Germany, the Wilson administration, whose term was soon to expire, thought it best to

allow the question of recognition on our own part to be handled by the incoming administration. President Obregon called a special session of congress to meet February 7, 1921, and in his address to the body he stressed the need of legislation to institute a modern banking system, the establishment of an agrarian policy that would encourage the restoration of the land to the people, and the solution of the problem arising from the application of Article XXVII to the nation's petroleum resources.¹

With men like Señor Calles as Secretary of Interior and Premier, and Señor de la Huerta as Secretary of Treasury to assist him, President Obregon was enabled in a very short time to establish peace and order in Mexico. His attitude towards American investors was firm in maintaining the rights of the Mexican nation, but fair in respecting rights honestly acquired. However, the Harding administration refused to consider the question of recognition until certain preliminary questions were settled. Shortly before being invited to take the portfolio of the Interior in President Harding's cabinet, Senator Fall outlined these issues as follows: A written agreement, later to be embodied in a formal treaty, must be signed guaranteeing the appointment of commissions to ascertain the damage done to Americans and American properties in Mexico and to settle outstanding boundary disputes; Article XXVII, or any law under it, should not operate to deprive American citizens of their property rights legally acquired; finally, protection of Americans and their property rights in Mexico in the future must be assured.²

Secretary Hughes outlined his policy in a general way on June 7, 1921. He insisted that the fundamental question was the safeguarding of American property rights against confiscation. "This question is vital," he declared,

¹ Text may be found in the *Mexican Review*, Vol. IV, No. 8, p. 4 (March, 1921).

² *New York Times*, March 3, 1921.

“because of the provisions inserted in the Mexican Constitution promulgated in 1917. If these provisions are to be put into effect retroactively, the properties of American citizens will be confiscated on a great scale. This would constitute an international wrong of the gravest character, and this government could not submit to its accomplishment. If it be said that this wrong is not intended, and that the Constitution of 1917 will not be construed to permit, or enforced so as to effect, confiscation, then it is important that this should be made clear by guaranties in proper form.”¹

More than a year later (July, 1922) the policy of the administration remains substantially unchanged. Unofficial and informal conversations have been held. But President Obregon has refused to commit himself more definitely to the recognition of the policy of non-retroactivity of the mineral clause in the Mexican constitution than has the highest Mexican court. Considering that this tribunal's decision was favorable to American interests, and that in other respects the Obregon régime has been far more effective in protecting property interests than many governments recognized by the United States, it is to be hoped that some solution will soon be found to bring the two neighboring states into officially friendly relations.²

In concluding this chapter, a few facts must be given indicating the great importance of Mexico both in its natural resources and in its trade possibilities. In size, Mexico ranks fourth among the twenty-one American republics, having an area of approximately 767,000 square miles, which means a territory almost as large as the United States east of the Mississippi. In natural resources, Mexico is one of the richest countries in the world in proportion to its area. Its mineral resources easily take first place, and

¹ *New York Times*, June 8, 1921.

² For the Mexican embassy's official statement regarding the ruling of the Mexican Supreme Court, see *New York Times*, July 8, 1922.

silver, gold, copper, lead, and mineral oils are found in almost unlimited quantities. Taxes were paid on more than 30,000 mining properties in 1910, and the mineral output for the year 1909-10 was between \$80,000,000 and \$90,000,000. Mexico has long been renowned for her famous silver mines; in 1803 Humboldt calculated that Mexico had produced, even at that time, silver valued at more than \$1,750,000,000. During the period from 1788 to 1810 the Valencia mine in Guanajuato produced annually almost \$1,500,000 worth of silver, while from 1800 to 1804 the Catorce mine in San Luis Potosí produced more than \$10,000,000 worth of bullion. Recent figures show a greatly increasing output. The highest production seems to have been in 1919, when it reached a value of approximately \$84,000,000. The gold output for the same year was valued at about \$31,000,000.

It is, however, the oil deposits that have been Mexico's most prolific source of wealth during the past decade. In 1910, about 3,300,000 barrels of petroleum were exported; in 1915 this rose to almost 33,000,000 barrels, and in 1920 to about 155,000,000 barrels. In 1915 Mexico produced less than 8 per cent. of the world's petroleum; in 1920, more than 25 per cent. Although at the present time the United States is producing 60 per cent. of the world's petroleum, it is estimated that in twenty years our supplies will be exhausted, and, as the superiority of petroleum over coal as a fuel is becoming increasingly evident, the Mexican oil-wells take on an added significance in the future economic and political history of the world.

Mexico and the United States are very good customers of each other, and before the war about 50 per cent. of Mexico's imports and about 75 per cent. of its exports were from and to the United States. Since the war there has been a large increase in the percentage of imports from the United States, while exports to the United States have remained approximately the same. The figures for the total trade between the United States and Mexico in the years

1919 and 1920, as reported by the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, are as follows:


MEXICAN TRADE WITH THE UNITED STATES

	1919	1920
Imports from U. S.	\$131,455,101	\$207,854,197
Exports to U. S.	148,926,376	180,191,075
Total trade with U. S.	<u>\$280,381,477</u>	<u>\$388,045,272</u>

Compared with the total world trade of the United States, these figures are not very imposing; in fact, less than 3 per cent. of the trade of the United States is with Mexico. Considering, however, the internal conditions existing in Mexico during the past decade, which have been detrimental both to the country's purchasing power and to the utilization of its national wealth and resources, it is manifest that an immense commercial increase would be possible if a government could be established that would be stable and that, while carefully protecting the sovereign rights of Mexico and safeguarding the interests of its citizens, could, by encouraging the legitimate investment of foreign capital, utilize a greater part of the vast riches of the country for the benefit of its citizens. But although Mexico realizes well enough that foreign capital alone has the magic power to open up the fabled riches of her mineral wealth, this genius, once summoned, is very difficult to control; and it is at this point that the United States can aid both Mexico and herself by adopting and maintaining a generous, broad-minded policy towards her weaker neighbor to the south. Such a policy must be based upon an attitude of friendly coöperation, rather than upon selfish exploitation; and it is to be hoped that American statesmen may be sufficiently far-seeing to realize that it can be ultimately successful only when based upon justice and fair dealing.

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CHAPTER VII

CUBA AND ITS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THE American colonies had hardly gained their independence before the new republic stretching along the Atlantic seaboard felt the growing pains of expansion. With a vast expanse of desirable territory spreading westward, ever beckoning to the adventurous hunter and farmer, it is not strange that the newly established nation should continue to look westward for remoter frontiers. The opening up of the great Northwest Territory and its early division into states gave added stimulus. When, furthermore, Napoleon succeeded in gaining control of the extensive Louisiana territory for France, the eyes of the American statesmen were turned south as well as west. In 1802 President Jefferson declared that the day that France takes possession of New Orleans "we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation";¹ and when General Le Clerc's disastrous campaign in Haiti forced Napoleon's hand, the President was quick to seize the opportunity. Strict constructionist though he was in domestic policies, he realized that he must be an opportunist abroad. If Paris was worth a mass, surely Louisiana justified straining the constitution.

The Floridas were regarded as of even greater importance to the United States than the Louisiana territory, and it was with the purpose of obtaining the Floridas that Livingston set out on his memorable mission in 1801. After Louisiana was obtained, including west Florida according

¹ P. L. Ford [ed.], *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (10 vols., N. Y., 1892-99), Vol. VIII, p. 145.

to the interpretation of the purchasers, it was merely a question of time before east Florida would fall into the orbit of the rapidly expanding republic. In fact, in 1811 Congress authorized President Madison to use the army and navy to seize and occupy all or any part of east Florida.¹ But the need was hardly sufficient to proceed to this extremity, and in 1819 Spain was finally persuaded to cede the Floridas and all title to lands that the United States claimed as a part of the Louisiana purchase.

A mere glance at the map of the Caribbean shows the strategic importance of Cuba to the country that possesses New Orleans and Florida. It also shows the interest which a nation possessing the Bahamas and Jamaica would have in seeing to it that Cuba should not fall into the hands of a dangerous rival. Therefore, from the beginning of the nineteenth century the United States and Great Britain continued to cast watchful eyes upon each other, lest the Pearl of the Antilles should slip from the ever-weakening grasp of Spain into the outstretched arms of a more dangerous rival.

The importance of the island of Cuba to the United States in the formative period of American foreign policy is perhaps best expressed by Secretary J. Q. Adams in a note dated April 28, 1823, to the American minister in Spain: "These islands [Cuba and Porto Rico] from their local position are natural appendages to the North American continent, and one of them (Cuba) almost in sight of our shores, from a multitude of considerations has become an object of transcendent importance to the commercial and political interests of our Union. Its commanding position, with reference to the Gulf of Mexico and the West Indian Seas; the character of its population; its situation midway between our southern coast and the island of St. Domingo; its safe and capacious harbor of Havana, fronting a long line of our shores destitute of the same advantage; the

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, Vol. III, p. 571.

nature of its productions and its wants furnishing the supplies and needing the returns of a commerce immensely profitable and mutually beneficial, give it an importance in the sum of our national interests with which that of no other country can be compared. Such indeed are between the interests of that island and of this country, the geographical, commercial, moral, and political relations, . . . that in looking forward to the probable course of events for the short period of half a century it is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself.”¹

In the same despatch Mr. Adams pointed out that if the control of Spain was terminated Cuba must look either to the United States or Great Britain. The government of the United States had been confidentially informed that Great Britain was so eager to obtain Cuba that she had offered Gibraltar in exchange. Whether or not this was true, “the transfer of Cuba to Great Britain would be an event unpropitious to the interests of the Union.”² That Great Britain was not ignorant of the American attitude is shown by a sentence from the diary of Lord Ellenborough, a member of Wellington’s cabinet, dated February 8, 1830: “The Americans declared they could not see with indifference any state other than Spain in possession of Cuba.”³ In fact, as early as 1819, when there was some talk in London of the British taking over Cuba, Mr. Rush, the American minister, asked Lord Castlereagh about these reports, but the latter denied any knowledge of such developments.⁴ In 1823, when Canning was specially interested in obtaining the coöperation of the United States, he denied emphatically that England desired Cuba.⁵ He

¹ J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. VI, p. 380.

² *Ibid.*, p. 383.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

⁴ J. M. Callahan, *Cuba and International Relations* (Balt., 1899), p. 196.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

by no means implied, however, that his government would look with equanimity upon such a desire on the part of the United States.

France also still had certain interests in the Caribbean region; for, though Guadeloupe and Martinique were very small relics of her once glorious trans-Atlantic empire, the nation that had so recently disposed of Louisiana, and that, during her long occupation of Haiti, had been Cuba's nearest island neighbor, could not be expected to lose all interest in this region of buried hopes. The *London Times* in 1825 accurately characterized Cuba as "the Turkey of trans-Atlantic politics, tottering to its fall, and kept from falling only by the struggles of those who are contending for the right of catching her in her descent."

Although the United States' real interest in Cuba dates from her possession of Florida, the earlier history of the island was associated with that of the mainland closely enough to warrant a brief sketch of Cuban history. Discovered by Columbus on his first voyage in 1492, the island was taken possession of in the name of the King of Spain, and named Maria. But its Indian name, Cuba, persisted, and the Spaniards finally adopted it. The Indians themselves were speedily exterminated by merciless treatment of the Spanish *conquistadores*.

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the island was of little importance to Spain except as a naval base. In fact, it was a liability rather than an asset, owing to its use as a rendezvous by pirates and freebooters, and also the great difficulty that Spain found in protecting it against the English, French, and Dutch bucaniers. The French burned Havana in 1538, and again partially destroyed the city in 1554. The English navigator Drake threatened the island in 1585; but, although his thirty ships passed close to the harbor, and all Havana was prepared to resist the attack, no attempt at landing was made. In the following year the French fired upon Santiago, landed their forces,

and looted the town. Philip II finally realized that Cuba deserved more consideration than merely to be utilized as a strategic base for the exploitation of Mexico, and he constructed the great forts of Punta and Morro to protect his "bulwark of the Indies, key to the New World" against the "corsair-caked Caribbean."¹

But even the famous Morro Castle was not strong enough to save Cuba from the intrepid British in the Seven Years' War. In 1762 the Earl of Albermarle with 10,000 troops from England and 4,000 from the North American colonies, laid siege to the stronghold, and after more than a month of mining and sapping took it by assault. Although the capture came in the "sun-setting time of the age of plunder," it was estimated that treasure and property to the value of about \$16,000,000 were obtained. It was of even greater importance to Great Britain since she now held the key to both Mexico and Louisiana. Yet, in spite of Cuba's manifest value, by the treaty of Paris, signed February 10, 1763, England returned the island to Spain and received in exchange Florida, which, as Pitt declared at the time, was certainly no equivalent. As one imaginative writer put it, "But for that, Washington and his associates might have failed—the French Revolution might have been postponed—and the House of Hanover at this moment have been ruling over the present United States."²

If Spain made a good bargain with her enemy England, she made an even better one with her ally France, whose king out of his generous heart unconditionally ceded to Spain the Louisiana territory. Cuba was now of the greatest strategic and economic importance to Spain, and Havana, which during the short British occupation was opened to the trade routes of the world, was once more closed. Nevertheless, in the short period of English control Cuba

¹ For an interesting and authoritative narrative of this period of Cuban history see I. A. Wright, *The Early History of Cuba, 1492-1586* (N. Y., 1916).

² Anon., "The Conquest of Cuba," *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. XII, pp. 462-475 (Oct., 1863).

had tasted of the forbidden fruit of free trade, and the experience was never forgotten.

During the American war of independence Spain was drawn in by France against England, but her interest in the American colonies was purely selfish, as is shown by the instructions given by the governor-general of Cuba to an agent, urging upon Congress the capture of St. Augustine, Florida, in order that it might be restored to Spain.¹ Later, when Jay appeared at Madrid seeking a treaty granting free navigation of the Mississippi, he was not even granted official recognition. However, before peace was signed, in 1783, Spain showed herself more liberal towards her West Indian possessions than Great Britain, for both Havana and Santiago were opened to foreign commerce. In fact, the commercial code of 1778, which opened nine ports of entry in Spain and twenty-four in her colonies, was a model of liberality for the time.

The French Revolution made the trade between the West Indies and the American colonies exceedingly brisk, but Cuba was not to pass unscathed through the period that followed. A French squadron blockaded the island in 1794 and caused much hardship to the inhabitants. During the Napoleonic era Cuba was threatened alternately by Great Britain and France, and when by the treaty of San Ildefonso, signed October 1, 1800, Napoleon recovered Louisiana and then sent an expedition to Santo Domingo, well might Jefferson feel that France could no longer remain our "natural friend." Spain had equal cause for alarm. Napoleon could hardly confine his operations to Santo Domingo, with Cuba at his mercy, nor be content with Louisiana, when the wealth of Mexico lay at his feet. Both the United States and Spain had reason to feel thankful over his forced change in plans, for the failure of the expedition against Santo Domingo, and the prospect of an immediate

¹ Francis Wharton, *Dip. Corr. of the American Revolution* (Wash., 1889), Vol. III, pp. 412-415.

rupture with England, gave Louisiana to the United States and gave Spain a new lease on her colonies. But, as Mr. Slidell declared in 1859, "From the day we acquired Louisiana the attention of our able statesmen was fixed on Cuba. What the possession of the mouth of the Mississippi had been to the people of the west, that of Cuba became to the nation."¹

We have noted the increasing interest that the United States felt in Cuba after being assured of the possession of the Floridas, as shown by the instructions given by John Quincy Adams to our minister in Spain. Jefferson also, in a note to President Monroe dated October 24, 1823, indicated his feeling on the subject: "I candidly confess that I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of states. The control which, with Florida Point, this island would give us over the Gulf of Mexico, and the countries and isthmus bordering on it, would fill up the measure of our political well being."² Therefore at this period, when the Spanish colonies in Mexico and South America had virtually established their independence, and when the United States had received trustworthy information that Cuba also was planning a revolt with the purpose of seeking admission to the Union, American statesmen saw the need of great diplomatic caution. When Calhoun urged the acceptance of the Cuban proposal, Adams wisely opposed on the ground that it might mean war with England. It would be wiser, he thought, to say "that our relations with Spain would not allow us to encourage such a proposal."³ In fact, at a cabinet meeting March 17, 1823, when President Monroe proposed to offer to Great Britain a mutual promise not to take Cuba, both Adams and Calhoun opposed.⁴

¹ Sen. Rep. No. 351, 35th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 1.

² P. L. Ford [ed.], *Writings of Thos. Jefferson* (N. Y., 1892-99), Vol. X, p. 278.

³ J. M. Callahan, *Cuba and International Relations*, p. 125.

⁴ *Memors of John Quincy Adams*, Vol. VI, p. 138.

The European situation soon worked itself out in such a way that both Great Britain and France were forced to declare themselves in regard to Spanish possessions in America. Although by the fall of 1823 French armies were in full control of Spain, Canning had already notified them "that, as England disclaimed all intention of appropriating to herself the smallest portion of the late Spanish possessions in America, she also felt satisfied that no attempt would be made by France to bring any of them under her dominion either by conquest or by cession from Spain."¹ Great Britain was apparently as anxious concerning the ultimate fate of the Spanish colonies as was the United States. In August of the same year Canning made his famous proposal to the American minister concerning a joint declaration looking towards recognition, to include a definite statement that neither nation aimed at the acquisition of any portion of the Spanish possessions itself, and that neither could see any portion of those possessions transferred to any other power with indifference. Although Adams was unwilling to join with Great Britain in exactly the manner specified, the message of President Monroe, dated December 2, 1823, showed clearly enough our stand in regard to European intervention. Cuba and Porto Rico were saved to Spain, but, by the same token, her other possessions were irretrievably lost.

When, in 1825, Mexico and Colombia proposed a joint action against Cuba, the United States did all in her power to save the island for Spain. Clay gave Poinsett, our minister to Mexico, instructions indicating clearly that, while the United States was not looking to the acquisition of Cuba, yet if the island was to become a dependency of any one of the American states, its geographical position proclaimed that it should be attached to the United States.²

¹ F. E. Chadwick, *The Relations of the United States and Spain, Diplomacy* (N. Y., 1909), p. 178.

² W. R. Manning, *Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico* (Balt., 1916), p. 105.

Mr. Everett, the new minister to Spain, was also instructed to point out to the government at Madrid the danger of continuing a hopeless war against the revolted colonies if it desired to keep possession of Cuba and Porto Rico.¹ Clay even went so far as to instruct Mr. Middleton, our minister to Russia, to urge the Czar to use his influence with Ferdinand VII to the end that Spain might sacrifice her pride and make peace, thereby saving these valuable islands.

A large French fleet touched at Havana in August, 1825, and caused much anxiety among the powers, which were particularly interested in maintaining the *status quo* in the West Indies. Canning wrote to the British minister at Paris that "as to Cuba you cannot too soon, or too amicably, of course, represent to Villèle the impossibility of our allowing France (or France us, I presume) to meddle in the internal affairs of that colony. We sincerely wish it to remain with the mother country. . . . The Americans (Yankees, I mean) think of this matter just as I do."² Clay wrote in a similar vein to Mr. Brown, the American minister at Paris, that the United States "could not consent to the occupation of those islands by any other European power than Spain under any contingency whatever."³ Canning once more tried to inveigle the United States into coöperating with Europe by proposing a tripartite agreement between Great Britain, France and the United States, disclaiming any intention of occupying Cuba. But Clay felt that the proposal might encourage Spain to continue her hopeless struggle.⁴ Inasmuch as France also refused to participate, the matter was dropped.

It was during this same year (1825) that the question arose of the participation of the United States in the

¹ W. R. Manning, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

² E. J. Stapleton, *Official Correspondence of George Canning* (London, 1887), Vol. I, p. 275.

³ Amer. State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. V, p. 855.

⁴ A. G. Stapleton, *Political Life of Canning* (London, 1831), Vol. III, p. 154.

Congress of Panama. Although President Adams and Secretary Clay heartily supported the project, the Senate was not so enthusiastic, and the arguments of its members against "this new and untried experiment of a congress of nations" shows a marked resemblance to more recent diatribes on a similar subject. Among other objections raised was the possibility that a discussion of the probable destiny of the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico might be forced upon the United States. As long as the war between Spain and the colonies continued, the United States must preserve its independence of action; the mere participation in such a congress would interfere with the influence that the United States now possessed as an interested but impartial third party.¹ In fact, one of the objects of the Congress as indicated by the government of Colombia was: "To consider the conditions of the islands of Porto Rico and Cuba; the expediency of a combined force to free them from the Spanish yoke; and the proportion of troops which each state should contribute for that purpose; and to determine whether the islands shall be united to either of the confederated states or be left at liberty to choose their own government."²

The slavery question also entered prominently into the discussion, for if Cuba and Porto Rico were freed, slavery would be abolished there, as it had been in the other liberated colonies, and such a prospect was unendurable to representatives from the southern states. In fact, during the next twenty-five years the American policy of maintaining the *status quo* in the West Indies, and of guaranteeing the sovereignty of Spain over the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, was based upon the fear of independence for the islands—including, as it would, the freeing of the slaves—

¹ See Report of the Sen. Com. on For. Affairs. This report, with other diplomatic documents, may be found in the *Historical Appendix, International American Conference*, Vol. IV, p. 53 ff.

² *British and Foreign State Papers*, Vol. XII, p. 894.

almost as much as upon the fear of aggression on the part of Great Britain or France.

The annexation of Texas in 1845 increased the interest of the United States in Cuba, and in December of that year a resolution was introduced in the Senate, authorizing the President to negotiate with Spain for the cession of Cuba to the United States. Early in the following year a similar resolution came up in the House. The war with Mexico and the resulting increase of territory to the United States kindled Polk's ardor for expansion, and Cuba offered an excellent outlet. In a long despatch (June 17, 1848) to Mr. Saunders, our minister to Spain, Secretary Buchanan enumerated the manifest advantages that would accrue to the United States from the possession of Cuba: possession of a naval station at Havana would enable us to command the Gulf of Mexico; under American control the island would become exceedingly prosperous and serve as a most profitable market; it would increase the strength and security of the Union, and it would give the United States "a free trade on a more extended scale than any which the world had ever witnessed." Nor would the advantages come solely to the United States. Cuba, appreciating the advantage of annexation, was ready to rush into our arms. Spain must realize the distracted condition of the island and the danger of a successful revolution; else the island might be wrested from her by Great Britain. Under these circumstances, "the President has arrived at the conclusion that Spain might be willing to transfer the island to the United States for a fair and full consideration." The maximum price stipulated was \$100,000,000.¹ Mr. Saunders was, however, given to understand that Spain, "sooner than see the island transferred to any power, would prefer to see it sunk in the ocean."

Failing to acquire the Queen of the Antilles by peaceful

¹ J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. I, pp. 584-587.

means, certain ardent spirits in the United States were willing to compass it by a mode less justifiable. The discovery of gold in California showed the value of the isthmus in giving an almost all-water route to the west. But the ultimate possession of such a route made the possession of Cuba all the more necessary to protect it. The slave states were more than ever desirous of securing additional territory open to slavery. Therefore it is not surprising that when a Cuban patriot, Narcisco Lopez, attempted to recruit an expedition on American soil to free Cuba, he found much assistance in high quarters. A Venezuelan by birth, Lopez had served in the Spanish army, had played a considerable part in Spanish politics, and had finally been made governor of Trinidad. Losing office through a turn of the political wheel, he engaged in business in Cuba, but with little success. In 1848 he attempted to stage a revolt near Cienfuegos, but the plot was disclosed and Lopez was forced to flee the country. He went to New York and started the preparation of an expedition which should have the prestige of a great name at the head. Both Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee were approached, and when they refused Lopez decided to lead the expedition himself. He had little difficulty in collecting the nucleus of a force, but a proclamation by President Taylor, issued August 11, 1849, warning all American citizens against participation in such enterprises, had a deterrent effect. The two vessels in which the expedition planned to leave New York were seized by the authorities, though the filibusters themselves were not held.

Lopez' next expedition was in the beginning somewhat more successful. Some seven hundred and fifty men were collected, and in the spring of 1850, they succeeded in sailing from New Orleans in three vessels, making a landing at Cardenas. Receiving no assistance from the natives, and faced with an openly mutinous crew, Lopez was forced

to return to Key West. Upon information lodged by a Spanish war-ship which had followed the expedition, the boat was seized and Lopez was arrested. Sufficient evidence to convict the leader of violating the neutrality laws was not forthcoming.

A third (and last) expedition, which left New Orleans the following year, was even less fortunate, and its results were far more serious. A proclamation by President Fillmore on April 25, 1851, stating that persons who violated our neutrality laws not only would be subject to the penalties of our own laws, but would forfeit all claims to protection, had no effect.¹ The expedition, consisting of about four hundred eager adventurers, sailed from New Orleans without clearance, August 3, 1851. A landing was made at Bahia Honda, whence Lopez, with most of the troops, advanced to Las Pozas, where it was hoped an uprising would take place. Meanwhile, Colonel Crittenden, a former American army officer who had served creditably in the Mexican War, was left with a small force in command of the baggage. Attacked by an overwhelming force, Crittenden attempted to escape by sea, but, with fifty of his followers, he was captured by the Spanish and carried to Havana. Here the unfortunate filibusters were given a quick military trial and shot as pirates. Lopez and his force withstood several serious attacks, but, obtaining no assistance from the natives, they were finally routed and dispersed. Some were shot on the spot, others were taken prisoners; Lopez himself was publicly garroted. It was apparent enough that Cuba was not yet ready to fight for independence. Nevertheless, the execution of Crittenden and his men aroused such a wave of hostility towards Spain and Spanish rule in Cuba that riots broke out in New Orleans and Key West, and throughout the United States the feeling was born that Cuba must be freed, even

¹ J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. III, p. 788.

though it should take all the forces of the United States to accomplish it.¹

Expeditions of this sort were looked upon with warm disapproval by Great Britain and France, as well as Spain, and there were rumors, in the autumn of 1851, that a treaty had been entered into between France, Spain, and Great Britain to guarantee Cuba to Spain.² On April 23, 1852, at the request of Spain, Great Britain and France again invited the United States to enter into a triple agreement disclaiming all intentions of obtaining possession of Cuba.³ Webster replied that not only did the United States have no designs upon Cuba itself, but it was willing to assist Spain in preserving it. At the same time, the United States could not acquiesce in its cession to a European power.⁴ In July the matter was again brought forward by the British and French governments, but Webster's death intervened, and the duty of answering fell to Edward Everett, the new Secretary of State. He replied in an able fashion. He pointed out that Cuba was mainly an American question. It commanded the approach to the Gulf of Mexico; it barred the entrance of the Mississippi; and it stood at the doorway of our intercourse with California by the isthmus route. The United States could not bind herself indefinitely as to her future relations with the island—"it would be as easy to throw a dam from Cape Florida to Cuba in hope of stopping the flow of the Gulf Stream as to attempt by a compact like this to fix the fortunes of Cuba now and hereafter."⁵ The invitation was respectfully declined.

Such an answer did not mean that the United States

¹ For an authoritative and detailed account of the Lopez expedition see Robert G. Caldwell, *The Lopez Expedition to Cuba* (Princeton, 1915).

² J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. VI, p. 458.

³ Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 13, 32d Cong, 2d sess., p. 7.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁵ J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. VI, p. 469. The correspondence has been published in pamphlet form by Little, Brown & Co. (1853) under the title, *Correspondence on the Proposed Tripartite Convention*.

looked favorably upon filibustering expeditions. In fact, the note stated that the President had thrown the whole force of his constitutional power against all illegal attacks upon the island. But were there not justifiable means? The Pierce administration, which came into power in 1853, was expected to find and use them. It was "our manifest destiny to move on with the world of progress," and if Cuba impeded our march, acquisition presented no terrors. The appointment as our minister to Spain of Pierre Soulé—a man who had openly lauded Lopez, and had urged the government not to delay too long in plucking the Cuban fruit from the Spanish tree—showed that not even diplomatic amenities were to be preserved in our methods.

Hardly had Soulé arrived at his post before he was forced to demand redress for the unfriendly treatment accorded the *Black Warrior*, an American steamship calling at Havana. For some time relations between the United States and Spain had been strained by the autocratic and hostile methods employed by the captain-general of Cuba towards American merchantmen. In 1852 the *Crescent City* was refused a landing, on the ground that its purser had written an article derogatory to the government of the island. In the following year, on a flimsy excuse, the *Ohio* was refused the landing privilege. In the case of the *Black Warrior* the entire cargo of cotton was confiscated because the ship's manifest had the cotton entered as "ballast." This had been done regularly, in accordance with the instructions of the collector, on previous occasions, since the cargo was merely in transit. On this particular occasion the authorities declared the method illegal, and when the captain refused to discharge his cargo, the Spanish authorities took over the boat and did it for him. The United States was aroused, and Soulé was authorized to demand a prompt disavowal of the act and an indemnity of \$300,000 for damages done to the owners. Soulé presented the demand, and when several days passed without an an-

swer, he put his demands in a more forcible manner, giving the Spanish government forty-eight hours in which to comply. This note provoked a curt rejoinder on the part of the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs. Before the situation became more serious, however, a settlement was patched up between the owners of the vessel and the Cuban authorities.¹

In the United States the whole affair was closely bound up with the question of slavery. The southern states were anxious to obtain Cuba, and were willing to go so far, if necessary, as to make the affair a pretext for war with Spain. Although Pierce was not disposed to proceed to extremities, he was desirous of obtaining Cuba, and he had already sent Soulé confidential instructions giving him full power to negotiate for its purchase. Spain apparently would make no reparation for the insult to the American flag. But Marcy, the Secretary of State, considered it "less important to settle an account with Spain as to the past than to make satisfactory arrangements for the future."² As the best means of making such arrangements, he suggested that Soulé confer with the American representatives in Paris and London. This proposal resulted in a conference at Ostend, Belgium, participated in by the three ambassadors, who embodied the results of their deliberations in the famous "Ostend manifesto."

This document is one of the curiosities of American diplomacy. In its fervid style, its astonishing proposals, and its naïve excuses it stands unrivaled. Not merely does it point out the value of the island to the United States, and reasons why it should be obtained, but it indicates the advantages that would accrue to Spain through its sale, even going so far as to suggest to her

¹For the correspondence concerning the *Black Warrior* affair see House Ex. Doc. No. 93, 33d Cong., 2d sess., Vol. 10, pp. 30-120.

²*Ibid.*, p. 123.

ways of spending the money received. "But if Spain, dead to the voice of her own interests, and actuated by stubborn pride and a false sense of honor, should refuse to sell Cuba to the United States, . . . then by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain, if we possess the power."¹ Naturally, Pierce was forced to ignore an invitation to become a party to any such international hold-up game as this, and Soulé, who undoubtedly was chiefly responsible for the document, threw up his position in disgust. An American diplomatic official at Paris aptly remarked that Soulé sought Cuba for manifest destiny, Mason for the Southern Confederacy, and Buchanan for the presidency. Despite the fact that Buchanan obtained the presidency and continued to urge the purchase of Cuba, the slavery question was now too closely tied up with the Cuban problem to permit of the island's purchase, even though Spain were willing. "Manifest destiny" was shackled by the growing opposition to slavery.

In the following decade, as Cuba became of steadily diminishing importance in American affairs, its relations with the mother country grew more serious. When Napoleon seized control of the government in Spain, the Cuban provincial council showed its fidelity by taking an oath to preserve the island for its legitimate sovereign. Instead of rewarding the "ever-faithful isle" for its devotion, the restored Bourbons in 1825 gave the governor-general "all the powers which by the royal ordinances are granted to the governors of besieged cities"—in other words, full autocratic powers over the persons, property, and administration of the island. Not many men could be intrusted with such despotic authority without abusing it, and the governors-general of Cuba were no exception. So that, despite the fact that Cuba remained, after the Latin-American revolutions, almost the sole relic of Spain's

¹ House Ex. Doc. No. 93, 33d Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 127-132.

once vast trans-Atlantic empire, the desire for independence was not wholly dormant even in Cuba. Between 1823 and 1830 a number of revolutionary schemes were hatched, though all proved abortive. In 1844 a threatened insurrection of slaves was stamped out in a savage fashion. We have already noted the failure of the Lopez expedition. Not until 1868 did the first serious revolt on the island break out.

The causes of the so-called Ten Years' War—the insurrection dragged along in a desultory fashion for about that length of time—are not hard to discover. In the first place, Spain regarded the island merely as a source of revenue. In the year 1868 the revenue from the island approximated \$26,000,000, and virtually none of it was used for Cuba's benefit. The public offices in the island carried very good salaries, but all were in the hands of Spaniards. The corruption among officials was notorious, the "perquisites" in some cases reaching as high as 70 per cent. of the total receipts. In the second place, Spain virtually monopolized not only Cuba's exports but also its imports, and the duties were laid just as heavily upon necessities as upon luxuries. Flour was taxed so heavily that wheat bread almost ceased to be an article of food for the common people. Finally, representation in the Cortes, which at one time had been granted, only to be withdrawn later, was felt to be essential to any permanent improvement in the government of the island.

When Isabella II was driven from the throne of Spain by the revolution of 1868, the Cubans seized the opportunity to declare their independence and to organize to maintain it. Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, a wealthy planter and an ardent patriot, raised a body of some 15,000 men, and at the outset the patriots were generally successful. A constitution was promulgated April 10, 1869, and the legislature, which met in accordance with its provisions, elected Céspedes president. But without assistance the

patriots could not hope to withstand the well equipped troops that Spain continued to send against them; and finally, upon promises of a general amnesty, representation in the Spanish Cortes, and a few other reforms, peace was brought about by the treaty of El Zanjón, February 10, 1878.¹

From the beginning, the United States took a keen interest in the war. On March 27 the captain-general of the island, Domingo Dolce, issued a proclamation declaring that any vessels carrying men, arms, or ammunition found in the waters near the island, whatever their destination, should be seized, and persons on board immediately executed.² The United States protested immediately and emphatically. On April 4 the Count of Valmaseda, in command at Bayamo, issued a proclamation to the effect that every man above fifteen found away from his home without a reason would be shot and that unoccupied habitations and those not floating a white flag would be burned.³ Mr. Fish, Secretary of State under President Grant, wrote the Spanish plenipotentiary: "In the interest of Christian civilization and common humanity, I hope that this document is a forgery. If it be indeed genuine, the President instructs me in the most forcible manner to protest against such mode of warfare."⁴

President Grant, who from the beginning of his term of office showed a decided friendliness to the Cubans, authorized General Sickles, the American minister to Spain, to tender the good offices of the United States to bring to a close the civil war ravaging the island. The bases suggested were: the independence of Cuba; an indemnity to Spain; the abolition of slavery in the island; an armistice pending the negotiations for the settlement.⁵ Al-

¹ Text may be found in Sen. Doc. No. 79, 45th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 16.

² Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 7, 41st Cong., 2nd sess., p. 12.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁵ House Ex. Doc. No. 160, 41st Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 13-16.

though some of the leaders of the Spanish government were willing to accept, public opinion opposed and the proffer was withdrawn.

The affair, however, which most aroused the United States against Spain, bringing the two nations to the brink of war, was the seizure of the steamer *Virginus* and the execution of her captain and crew. The *Virginus* was a merchant-vessel sailing under the American flag and registered in New York as an American-owned vessel. However, her cargoes consisted principally of contraband of war destined for Cuba; and for several years she had been successful in landing them, despite the vigilance of the Spanish cruisers. On October 23, 1873, she cleared from Kingston, Jamaica, for Puerto Limón, Costa Rica, though her actual intention was to land men and arms in Cuba. On October 31 she was captured on the high seas by a Spanish cruiser and taken into Santiago de Cuba. The Spanish commandant, General Burriel, summoned a court-martial, and within a week's time fifty-three of the passengers and crew were summarily condemned and shot, despite strong protests upon the part of the American and British consuls. Such a performance was not merely "a dreadful, a savage act," but it was directly contrary to international law, because the vessel was a neutral lawfully provided with papers; even if she were engaged in blockade-running or in carrying contraband, the maximum penalty should have been confiscation of the ship and cargo.

General Sickles, the American minister at Madrid, was instructed to demand the restoration of the *Virginus* with the survivors, a salute to the flag of the United States, and punishment of the guilty officials. At first Spain seemed inclined to support the United States in its stand, but later Castilian pride came to the front, and a curt and most unsatisfactory reply was returned. Spain could not consent to be thus addressed by the representatives of a foreign nation, and if reparations were to be made

it would be only after a thorough investigation had been carried out by her representatives.¹ Recriminations became mutual, and it was only after General Sickles had asked for his passports that Spain agreed to consider the American demands. Owing either to the uncompromising attitude of General Sickles, or to the Spanish government's fear of a popular uprising, the negotiations were transferred to Washington. A protocol was finally reached, whereby Spain agreed to restore the *Virginus*, together with the surviving passengers and crew, and to salute the flag of the United States, unless she could prove before December 25, 1873, that the *Virginus* was not entitled to carry the American flag. The Madrid government actually succeeded in furnishing proof that the vessel was both owned and controlled by Cubans; therefore the salute was waived. The vessel and survivors were turned over to the United States. But on its way north, under convoy, the ship foundered off Cape Hatteras. Spain also admitted the illegality of the capture and the summary execution of the crew, and finally paid an indemnity of \$80,000 to the families of those executed. But the Spanish commandant guilty of the execution not only escaped punishment, but was later promoted to a higher grade.²

Meanwhile the Cuban insurrection dragged along, and the United States continued to look for means of putting an end to the devastating struggle. The whole situation, as far as the United States was concerned, was summed up in a long, carefully worded despatch from Secretary Fish to Caleb Cushing, the new American representative at Madrid, on November 5, 1875. In this state paper Mr. Fish enumerated the cases of arbitrary seizure, confiscation of American property, and arrest and execution of

¹ The complete diplomatic correspondence regarding this incident may be found in the *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1874*, pp. 922-1117; *1875, Part II*, pp. 1144-1256.

² For the trial of General Burriel see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1876*, pp. 486-535.

American citizens without trial, and protested vigorously against the continuance of a struggle on the very borders of the United States, disturbing to its tranquillity and commerce and conducted in a most barbarous fashion. "It will be apparent that such a state of things can not continue. . . . In the opinion of the President, the time has arrived when the interests of this country, the preservation of its commerce, and the instincts of humanity alike demand that some speedy and satisfactory ending be made of the strife that is devastating Cuba. . . . The President hopes that Spain may spontaneously adopt measures looking to a reconciliation and to the speedy restoration of peace and the organization of a stable and satisfactory system of government in the island of Cuba. In the absence of any prospect of a termination of war or of any change in the manner in which it has been conducted on either side, he feels that the time is at hand when it may be the duty of other governments to intervene, solely with a view of bringing to an end a disastrous conflict, and of restoring peace in the island of Cuba.¹

A copy of this note was sent to the American representatives in Europe, and when its content became known it provoked considerable discussion, which was increased by President Grant's message of December 7, 1875. Great Britain, whose coöperation was particularly desired, decided, in the words of Lord Derby, that "if nothing were contemplated beyond an amicable interposition having peace for its object, the time was ill chosen and the move premature."² The other powers were no more willing to intervene than Great Britain, particularly at a time when the young Alfonso was struggling manfully against the revolution of Don Carlos. Owing to the superlative ability of Mr. Cushing and the high esteem in which he was held,

¹ Report of Sen. Com. on For. Relations Relative to Affairs in Cuba, No. 885, 55th Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 44-52.

² *Ibid.*, p. 162.

Mr. Fish's communication was received by Spain in the friendly spirit in which it was sent, and in his reply Señor Calderon, the Spanish Foreign Minister, emphasized the recent satisfactory progress in putting down the revolution, and promised the abolition of slavery and the introduction of administrative reforms leading to representation of the inhabitants in the Spanish Cortes. In conclusion, he asked for a frank statement concerning the precise things which the United States would wish Spain to do.¹

After emphatically disclaiming any intention on the part of the government of the United States to annex Cuba, Mr. Fish summed up the President's desires under four heads: first, mutual and reciprocal observance of the treaty obligations, with a friendly interpretation of the doubtful provisions; second, the establishment of peace, order, and a liberal government in Cuba; third, gradual but effectual emancipation of the slaves; fourth, improvement of commercial facilities and the removal of the obstructions now existing in the way of trade and commerce.² Spain's acceptance of these proposals eliminated, for the time being, any further discussion of intervention. However, the Madrid government urged that before there could be any hope of improvement the revolution must be put down, and a new general and additional troops were forthwith despatched to the island. In October, 1877, a number of the Cuban leaders surrendered, and early in February, 1878, the Ten Years' War came to an end. The terms of peace gave promise of a real improvement in the situation of the Cubans. Yet the habits of centuries can not be broken up by the good intentions of a day. The Spanish system of exploitation had become part and parcel of the island's administration, and Spanish officials were still employed to look out for Spanish interests. But two results of the revolution were manifest to the world: the

¹ Report of Sen. Com., *op. cit.*, pp. 96-99.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 102-106.

germ of independence had taken firm root in the island of Cuba, and the United States could not remain an impartial witness to any attempts to prevent its growth.

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CHAPTER VIII

THE INDEPENDENCE OF CUBA

AS a result of the Ten Years' War, there was some improvement in the attitude of Spain towards Cuba, but little change in the actual conditions. The island was granted representation in the Spanish Cortes, but, owing to the limited suffrage, the majority of the delegates represented the Peninsulares, or Spanish element. Even when, in 1892, the tax qualification for the suffrage was reduced from twenty-five dollars to five dollars, the Spanish authorities who controlled the elections saw to it that the results were virtually the same. Seventeen years of comparative peace followed; yet it was the apathy of exhaustion rather than the tranquillity of satisfied hopes. In fact, the promises held out by the Spanish government were never realized. The sole noteworthy reform was the gradual abolition of slavery. In summing up the situation, Estrada Palma declared that the parliamentary representation was illusory, all officials of the island were Spaniards, taxes were levied upon everything conceivable, and about 95 per cent. of the amount collected was devoted to the maintenance of the army and navy in Cuba, to the interest of the public debt, and to the salaries of the Spanish office-holders. The Cubans had no security of person or property; nor was there freedom of speech, press, or religion.¹

These were the underlying causes of the outbreak of the revolution in 1895. The passage of the Abarzuza law in February, 1895, by the Spanish Cortes, creating a farcical council of administration, seemed to bring matters to a

¹Sen. Rep. No. 885, 55th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 1 ff.

head.¹ The economic crisis engendered by the termination of reciprocity relations with the United States in 1894, thus closing Cuba's principal market for sugar, undoubtedly aided materially in strengthening the discontent. The revolutionists were under the general command of Maximo Gomez, and they were financially supported by the juntas organized in the United States. The revolution spread rapidly, and from the outset the insurgents ruthlessly destroyed all property and plantations that might be useful to the enemy. Spain spared no effort to check the revolution, and when Governor-General Campos failed to put down the insurgents, General Weyler was placed in command. The struggle on the Cubans' part soon degenerated into guerrilla warfare. They gave notice that they would destroy all the resources of the island rather than surrender. General Weyler retaliated by forcing all the inhabitants of certain provinces to concentrate in the towns held by the Spanish troops or be considered rebels.² Great numbers of non-combatants were thus brought together, and, as no adequate provision for feeding and housing them had been made, the brutal nature of the decree was soon apparent. The innocent women and children were forced to starve in the towns, while the able-bodied men largely escaped and joined revolutionary bands.

On June 12, 1895, President Cleveland issued a proclamation recognizing that a state of insurgency existed in Cuba, and insisting upon the maintenance of American neutrality.³ However, as the horrors of the struggle increased and the American press took up the campaign in Cuba's behalf, Congress also was drawn into the affair, and early in 1896 a resolution passed both houses urging that the President recognize Cuban belligerency. This, Cleveland refused to do. But public opinion steadily grew more

¹ Hannis Taylor, "A Review of the Cuban Question," *North Amer. Rev.*, Vol. CLXV, pp. 610-635 (Nov. 1897).

² Text of decree in Sen. Rep., *op. cit.*, p. 549.

³ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1895*, p. 1195.

hostile towards Spain; and the destruction of American property on the island, together with the great falling off of American trade, added fuel to the flames. Although the President refused to recognize Cuban belligerency, he authorized Secretary Olney to give the Spanish ambassador some words of admonition. In this way, Spain was given to understand that the United States could not contemplate with complacency another ten years of Cuban insurrection; and the good offices of the United States were tendered, with all assurance that the offer was prompted only by the friendliest feeling towards Spain. "The United States," it was specifically asserted, "has no designs upon Cuba and no design against the sovereignty of Spain."¹ The Spanish reply was a courteous refusal of the offer, and the United States was forced to let the matter drop temporarily, although, in his message to Congress in December of the same year, Cleveland declared that future American action would be determined when Spain's inability to deal successfully with the insurrection had become manifest, and that, although American conduct would be guarded by right and not by might, a situation might be presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain would be superseded by higher obligations.²

Hardly had the McKinley administration assumed office before it was compelled to take action; for the situation was growing steadily worse. In May, 1897, the President asked Congress to appropriate \$50,000 for the relief of destitute Americans in Cuba, and in December he issued a public appeal for funds to aid in combating the Cuban famine. A slight gleam of hope for better conditions appeared when the new Sagasta ministry recalled General Weyler and promised Cuba a new constitution, with a local parliament and a fair share of autonomy. In his annual

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1897*, p. 540.

² *Ibid.*, 1896, p. xxix.

message of December, 1897, McKinley noted the new policy of Spain, and declared that it was honestly due to Spain that she should be given a reasonable chance to realize her expectations. Unfortunately for Spain, her policy of reform was given no opportunity to materialize. General Blanco could not undo the terrible results of the reconcentration policy of General Weyler, although he made very earnest efforts to do so. Not only were the insurgents wholly averse to acceptance of semi-autonomy in the place of independence, but the Spanish party in Cuba was equally indignant at the liberality of the new program. Rioting against the newspapers backing autonomy became so serious that on January 13, 1898, the American consul-general, Mr. Lee, telegraphed that he was uncertain whether Blanco could control the situation, and that if it should be demonstrated that Americans were in danger, ships should be promptly sent.¹ The next day all was quiet; but the idea of sending a war-ship struck root, and on January 24 the President ordered the *Maine* sent to Havana on a "friendly visit." Even the American consul-general realized that the times were not propitious for a friendly visit and advised that the step be postponed six or seven days. But the battle-ship was already on its way, and on January 25 it anchored in Havana harbor.

The struggle between the Cuban insurgents and the Spaniards was soon to be merged in a direct conflict between Spain and the United States. On February 9, 1898, a New York newspaper published a private letter written by Señor Dupuy de Lome, the Spanish minister, to a friend in Cuba, in which he characterized President McKinley as a "weak . . . would-be politician who tries to leave a door open behind himself while keeping on good terms with the jingoes of his party."² Although it was a questionable piece of journalism to publish a letter of this character

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898*, p. 1025.

² For the full content of the letter see J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. VI, pp. 176-177.

that had been purloined from the mails, the Spanish minister showed an inexcusable lack of diplomatic discretion in expressing his opinions so frankly. The United States immediately demanded his recall—although not until after the discredited diplomat, realizing that his position had become impossible at Washington, had sent in his resignation. But public opinion, already aroused against Spain through her dilatory attitude in ameliorating the condition of Cuba, became increasingly hostile. And, as if other circumstances were not sufficiently irritating in the relations between the two countries, on the night of February 15 the *Maine* was blown up at its anchorage in Havana harbor, with the loss of two hundred and sixty men, including two officers. A wave of indignation swept over the United States, and the demand for war was virtually unanimous. The few who counseled delay until a court of inquiry could fix the blame were scarcely heard in the popular clamor. Fortunately, democratic governments are so constituted that they function slowly; and the utter unpreparedness of the United States for war was an added incentive to move with deliberation.

An American court of inquiry was immediately constituted to determine the cause of the disaster. After twenty-three days of careful investigation it reported that the *Maine* was destroyed by a submarine mine, but that no evidence could be obtained sufficient to fix the responsibility upon any person or persons. A Spanish board of inquiry, making a separate investigation, reported that the explosion was due to internal causes.¹ The real cause will probably never be known.

Even before the publication of the report on March 28, there was every indication that, no matter what the finding might be, the United States and Spain had reached an *impasse* in regard to Cuba. Spain found Consul-General

¹ For the American report see Sen. Doc. No. 207, 55th Cong., 2nd sess. The Spanish report is in Sen. Rep. 885, 55th Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 566 ff.

Lee in sympathy with the insurgents and suggested his recall. The United States rejected the suggestion. Buoyed up by the virtual certainty of American intervention the Cubans would accept nothing less than independence. Proposals for the purchase of the island by the United States were tentatively raised in both Spain and the United States; but neither party was anxious for such a solution. From the American point of view, the one condition upon which a peaceful adjustment was possible was an immediate armistice to be granted by Spain to the Cubans. Instructions from Washington to General Woodford, the American minister at Madrid, declared, under date of March 26, that the President desired peace, but that there was no hope for peace through the Spanish arms. The United States did not want the island, but wanted peace to prevail in it. The suggestion was made that if Spain would revoke the reconcentration order and maintain the people until they could support themselves, and also offer the Cubans full self-government, with reasonable indemnity, the President would gladly assist in the consummation of the plan.¹ On the following day the same proposals were renewed, in somewhat more specific form, asking (1) an armistice for six months, during which negotiations for peace between Spain and the insurgents might be undertaken through the friendly offices of the United States; (2) immediate revocation of the *reconcentrado* order; (3) agreement that, if peace were not arranged by October 1, the President of the United States should be accepted as final arbitrator between Spain and the insurgents.² The report on the *Maine* made to Congress, March 28, was bound to bring speedy action. Therefore, if the President was to succeed in obtaining a peaceful settlement, Spain must give him an immediate assurance that his offer was accepted.

Madrid's reply, on March 31, was not satisfactory, in

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898*, p. 704.

² *Ibid.*, p. 712.

that, instead of granting an immediate armistice, its offer conditioned a truce upon the insurgents asking for it, a proposal that they were most unlikely to make. On April 5, through the intervention of the Pope, the Queen, indeed, conceded an unconditional suspension of hostilities for six months, thus meeting the President's demand. But the latter had already prepared his message and had decided to place the responsibility for future action upon Congress. Undoubtedly he realized that to surrender control of the situation meant war. But who can say that, even if he had accepted the eleventh-hour promise of Spain, war would ultimately have been averted? Perhaps a Roosevelt or a Wilson could have dominated Congress; but there still remained the question of Spain's ability to placate the Cubans.

In his message delivered to Congress on April 11, 1898, President McKinley reviewed the situation in a judicial manner, describing conditions in the island and recounting the offers of mediation made by the United States. Since this method of settlement had failed, only forcible intervention was left, and he justified this course of action upon four grounds: first, in the cause of humanity, i.e., it would put an end to the bloodshed and misery at our door; second, it would protect American citizens and their property in Cuba; third, it would put an end to the wanton destruction and devastation of the island; fourth, and most important, "the present condition of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace." The destruction of the *Maine* was mentioned merely as impressive proof of the intolerable state of things in the island.¹

Congress was only too willing to grant the President the powers that he asked for. After stormy debates in both houses, a joint resolution was passed, recognizing the independence of Cuba, demanding the immediate withdrawal of the Spanish forces from the island, granting the Presi-

¹ J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. X, p. 147; or *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1898, p. 750.

dent power to use the entire land and naval forces to carry the resolution into effect, and, finally, disclaiming any intention on the part of the United States to exercise sovereignty over the island except to establish peace, and, that accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people.¹

As soon as the President signed the resolution, the Spanish minister at Washington asked for his passports, and his action was approved by the Spanish Foreign Minister. On April 25, 1898, Congress passed the declaration of war, dating the outbreak as of April 21. Admiral Sampson had already received orders to blockade Cuba with the South Atlantic Squadron, and Commodore Dewey had left Hong-Kong to engage the Spanish squadron at Manila. Forseeing the outcome, the Navy Department had more than a month earlier ordered the battle-ship *Oregon*, lying at Puget Sound, to join the Atlantic Squadron. Her 15,000-mile journey around Cape Horn dramatically demonstrated to the United States the need strategically of an isthmian canal.

Both sides realized that the issue lay upon the sea; and it was fortunate for the United States that such was the case. But there is no necessity to tell the story of the conflict here. Dewey's overwhelming victory at Manila Bay, followed by the complete destruction of Cervera's fleet at Santiago, virtually sealed the defeat of Spain. The mechanistic era of warfare had come, and America had made the greater progress. "Spanish dominion in America, in which there had been much both of glory and of shame, with splendid episodes of heroic endeavor, noble self-abnegation, and great attainment, was to end in the final sacrifice, nobly met, on the sea which through generations witnessed so many conflicts of the two races."²

¹ *U. S. Stat. at Large*, Vol. XXX, p. 738.

² F. E. Chadwick, *The Relations of the United States and Spain, Diplomacy* (N. Y., 1909), p. 587.

On July 22, 1898, through M. Jules Cambon, the French ambassador at Washington, Spain asked of the President upon what basis the conflict could be ended and a satisfactory political status in Cuba established. President McKinley outlined his terms, which were later incorporated in the protocol of August 12. In brief, the agreement provided (1) the relinquishment by Spain of all sovereignty over Cuba; (2) the cession of Porto Rico and other Spanish West Indies, together with an island in the Ladrões, to the United States; (3) the occupation by the United States of Manila pending the signing of a treaty of peace which should determine the disposition of the Philippines; (4) the immediate evacuation by Spain of Cuba, Porto Rico, and the other islands of the West Indies under her sovereignty; (5) the appointment by Spain and the United States of not more than five commissioners each, to meet in Paris not later than October 1, 1898, to negotiate a treaty of peace; (6) the suspension of hostilities upon the signing of the protocol.¹

In the peace negotiations which followed, Spain made every effort to turn over the Cuban debt, either to the Cubans or to the United States, along with the sovereignty of the island. But the American commissioners stood fast against the proposal, on the ground that the debt was created by Spain for its own purposes and through its own agents and not for the benefit of Cuba. The treaty signed December 10, 1898, was almost identical with the terms of the protocol, except for the clauses regarding the Philippines.² The United States at last had the opportunity to pacify Cuba and then withdraw as it had promised—a quixotic proceeding most highly incredible to a skeptic world.

The official transfer of the island took place January 1, 1898, and thereupon the trusteeship of the United States

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898*, p. 828.

² *Ibid.*, p. 831.

began. The task assumed was truly stupendous. Disease and starvation were prevalent; civil government had disappeared; even the public buildings were unfit for occupancy. Major-General John R. Brooke, the first military governor, began a general program of rehabilitation, including the distribution of more than 5,000,000 rations, the supplying of medicine, the reorganization of civil government, particularly in the cities—all with the avowed purpose, as announced in a proclamation of January 1, 1899, "to give protection to the people, security to persons and property, to restore confidence, to build up waste plantations, to resume commercial traffic, and to afford full protection in the exercise of all civil and religious rights."¹ Major-General Leonard Wood took over the work in 1899, and in his three years as governor-general made a record of administrative efficiency which still sheds luster upon his name. Undoubtedly his methods were at times autocratic, and necessarily he made some enemies; but when, on May 20, 1902, the government was transferred to the duly elected president and congress of Cuba, with a system of civil government established and successfully functioning, with a public-school system completely reorganized, with sanitary conditions thoroughly regulated and controlled, and with the plague of yellow fever virtually stamped out, well might President Palma declare to the retiring governor-general, in accepting the transfer: "I take this solemn occasion, which marks the fulfilment of the honored promise of the government and people of the United States in regard to the island of Cuba, and in which our country is made a ruling nation, to express to you, the worthy representative of that grand people, the immense gratitude which the people feel towards the American nation, towards its illustrious President, Theodore Roosevelt, and toward you for the efforts you have put forth for

¹ House Doc. No. 2, 56th Cong., 1st sess., p. 7.

the successful accomplishment of such an ideal.”¹

From the outset of the intervention, the United States had not forgotten that by the terms of the joint resolution of April 20, 1898, the government and control of the island were to be left to its people as soon as pacification was accomplished. As an evidence of good faith, on July 25, 1900, the military governor ordered that a general election be held on September 15 to put into effect the following program: (1) to elect delegates to a convention to frame and adopt a constitution; (2) as a part thereof, to provide for and agree with the government of the United States upon the relations to exist between Cuba and the United States; and (3) to provide for the election by the people of officers under this constitution and the transfer of the government to these officers.² As an indication of what the United States considered essential under the second heading, on February 9, 1901, while the convention was in session, instructions were sent to Major-General Wood by the Secretary of War, Mr. Root, outlining the following provisions: (1) no government organized under the constitution should make any treaty impairing the independence of Cuba or grant any right to any foreign power without the consent of the United States; (2) no such government should contract any debt in excess of the capacity of the ordinary revenues to pay the interest; (3) the government should consent that the United States reserve the right of intervention in order to preserve independence and a stable government; (4) the acts of the military government should be validated and maintained; and (5) the United States should be given the right to acquire and maintain a naval station.³

While appreciating the decisive help rendered by the United States, and grateful for it, the delegates to the con-

¹ House Doc. No. 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 124.

² For text of the order see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1902*, p. 358.

³ House Doc. No. 2, 57th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 43-47.

vention would not concede the right of the United States to impose conditions clearly violating that independence which it had guaranteed to maintain. They realized that the United States had some claims to special consideration, and they made counter-proposals to this effect.¹ But undoubtedly they also feared too close a relationship with a powerful neighbor whose appetite had just been whetted by conquest. *L'appétit vient en mangeant*, and Cuba was a particularly toothsome morsel. Therefore the convention drew up a constitution which completely ignored the question of relations between the two countries. However, Senator Platt, chairman of the Senate Committee on Relations with Cuba, while conceding that Cuba was privileged to establish her own government without let or hindrance, held that the United States, by virtue of its intervention, had certain rights in the island which ought to be safeguarded. The result was the Platt Amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill, which passed both houses and received the President's signature. The terms of this amendment have become such an important factor in the relations between the two countries that the most salient clauses deserve quotation in full:

“(1) That the Government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign Power or Powers which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or permit any foreign Power or Powers to obtain by colonization or for military or naval purposes, or otherwise, lodgment in or control over any portion of said Island.

“(2) That said Government shall not assume or contract any public debt to pay the interest upon which, and to make reasonable sinking-fund provision for discharge of which, the ordinary revenues of the Island, after defraying the current expenses of the Government, shall be inadequate.

“(3) That the Government of Cuba consents that the

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1902*, p. 360.

United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the Government of Cuba.

“(4) That all acts of the United States in Cuba during its military occupation thereof are ratified and validated, and all lawful right acquired thereunder shall be maintained and protected.

“(5) That the Government of Cuba will execute, and as far as necessary extend, the plans already devised or other plans to be mutually agreed upon, for the sanitation of the cities of the Island to the end that a recurrence of epidemic and infectious diseases may be prevented, thereby assuring protection to the people and commerce of Cuba, as well as to the commerce of the Southern ports of the United States and the people residing therein.

“(6) That the Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the proposed constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereto left to future adjustments by treaty.

“(7) That to enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense, the Government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the United States.

“(8) That by way of further assurance the Government of Cuba will embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent treaty with the United States.”¹

Needless to say, this benevolent protectorate thrust in so unceremonious a fashion upon the Cubans was welcomed neither by the convention nor by the people. A delegation of five members of the convention was sent to Washington to protest. But, although they were received in a most friendly fashion by President McKinley and Secretary Root, they were given to understand that the

¹ *U. S. Stat. at Large*, Vol. XXXI, p. 897, or House Doc. No. 2, 57th Cong., 1st sess., p. 47. The treaty embodying these provisions was ratified July 1, 1904; see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1904*, p. 243.

Platt Amendment could not be modified. After considerable discussion, the convention finally accepted the Platt Amendment on June 12, 1901, and it became an appendix to the constitution.¹ The assurance of Secretary Root that intervention was not synonymous with intermeddling or interference with the Cuban government, but a formal action based upon just grounds for the preservation of Cuban independence or the maintenance of an adequate government, gave the Cubans somewhat more confidence in the attitude of this country.²

As provided for by the constitution, the elections were held in December of the same year. Tomas Estrada Palma was elected president, and on May 20, 1902, Governor-General Wood turned over the government of the island to him. With a cash balance of more than \$600,000 in her treasury, with her independence guaranteed, and assured of the good wishes of the government and the people of the United States, Cuba was ushered into the family of nations.³

The United States had given the insular republic an excellent start, but there remained the problem of the country's economic rehabilitation. This was dependent principally upon the immediate recovery of two industries, sugar and tobacco, and in the case of sugar it was vitally necessary that the United States make a reduction in her tariff. General Wood, Secretary Root, and President Roosevelt recognized the need, and the President, in his message to Congress, December 3, 1901, declared that "in the case of Cuba, however, there are weighty reasons of morality and national interest why the policy [of reciprocity] should be held to have a peculiar application, and I most earnestly ask your attention to the wisdom, indeed

¹ For a full treatment of the Cuban attitude during this period see A. G. Robinson, *Cuba and the Intervention* (N. Y., 1905), pp. 207-277.

² House Doc. No. 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 48; text of the Cuban constitution, *ibid.*, p. 102.

³ For an account of the turning over of the government see *ibid.*, pp. 69 *et seq.*

to the vital need, of providing for a substantial reduction in the tariff duties on Cuban imports into the United States.”¹ Congress, however, seemed more inclined to listen to the selfish arguments of the beet-sugar growers’ lobby, and not until two years later did President Roosevelt force his reciprocity measure through. This commercial convention, proclaimed December 17, 1903, gave Cuba the advantage of a 20 per cent. reduction on sugar, and on other products of the soil imported into the United States, over the tariff act of 1897 or any tariff law that might subsequently be enacted.² The advantage to Cuba was speedily shown. The trade of the United States with Cuba during the fiscal year 1905 (the first full year under the reciprocity treaty) showed an increase of approximately \$10,000,000 worth of Cuban imports into the United States, namely, \$86,304,259 in 1905 as against \$76,983,418 in 1904.³ The percentage of increase in our exports to Cuba was even greater, showing that fair commercial treatment of our island neighbor was a very profitable investment.

These early figures, however, gave no indication of the tremendous increase that was to come when Cuba should be completely rehabilitated. In 1910 the value of our imports from Cuba was \$122,528,037, and our exports were valued at \$52,858,758.⁴ In 1920 our imports from Cuba amounted to the remarkable figure of \$721,693,880, while our exports had increased to \$515,208,731—a total trade value of more than \$1,250,000,000, or almost one tenth of our total world trade.⁵

The political relations between the two governments remained uneventful until 1906. The election of 1905 produced a bitter struggle between the Liberals and the Moderates, and President Palma, reëlected by the Moderates,

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1901*, p. xxxi.

² *Ibid.*, 1903, p. 375.

³ *Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States, 1905*, p. 33.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1910, p. 30.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1920, p. x.

was accused by the Liberals of resorting to violence, intimidation, and bribery to retain his position. Early in 1906 an armed uprising against the government started in the provinces of Pinar del Rio and Havana. On August 27 President Palma issued a proclamation granting amnesty to all insurgents who would lay down their arms,¹ but when this failed of its purpose he secretly requested the American consul-general at Havana to ask President Roosevelt to despatch two vessels at once, since the government forces were unable to quell the rebellion.² The American government was loath to intervene and pointed out the dangers of this course. But when President Palma threatened to resign, President Roosevelt sent the Secretary of War, Mr. Taft, and the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Bacon, to Havana to attempt to reconcile the difficulties.

Upon the arrival of the commissioners in Havana, September 19, 1906, they interviewed the leaders of the various factions, and finally urged as a solution that President Palma remain in office with a coalition cabinet, while the members of congress stand for reëlection. When the Moderates refused and the President insisted upon resigning, the commissioners established a provisional government under the authority of the President of the United States, and issued a proclamation to the Cuban people setting forth the causes for this action and defining afresh the position of the United States towards Cuba.³

On October 10 Governor Taft announced that active organized hostilities had ceased and issued a proclamation of full and complete amnesty to all who had participated in the uprising. Three days later he turned the government over to Charles Magoon, who, as events proved, to act as provisional governor for the next three years.

One of the most useful acts of the provisional govern-

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1906, Part I, p. 459.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 473.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 489.

ment was the taking of a complete census as the basis for the new electoral lists, and the returns showed the total population of Cuba in 1908 to be 2,048,980, an increase of 25 per cent. as compared with the returns of the census of 1899. A new electoral law was promulgated on April 1, 1908, and the provincial and municipal elections were held on August 1 in an orderly fashion, and the results were quietly accepted. The general elections were equally peaceful, and the Liberal candidate, General José Miguel Gomez, defeated the Conservative candidate, General Mario Menocal, by a majority of more than 70,000 votes.¹ The provisional government thereupon convoked congress, and President Gomez was inaugurated, on January 28, 1909, at which time Governor Magoon relinquished the administration to the duly elected representatives of the Cuban people. A number of much-needed public improvements, particularly in the matter of sanitation, had been carried out; necessary legislative decrees had been promulgated, among the most noteworthy being the new electoral law (decree 899 of 1908); and after paying all contracts and other obligations as far as practicable, \$2,860,000 in cash was turned over to the new government.²

Once more the people of Cuba were put in full command of their ship of state, with the best wishes of the United States for a long and prosperous voyage. General Gomez proved himself a strong-minded leader, and he appeased the more restless spirits by appointing them to political office, thus materially strengthening his position. However, before his term of office expired, serious charges of corruption were brought against his government. It was claimed that the public offices were being sold to the highest bidder, that concession-hunters were finding lucrative

¹For an excellent summary of the period of the American occupation see *Republic of Cuba, Reports of Provisional Administration*, Vol. II (Havana, 1908-09).

²See *Supplemental Report of the Provisional Governor*, Sen. Doc. No. 80, 61st Cong., 1st sess.

opportunities at the people's expense, and that the government was even going so far as to buy off the newspapers to avoid unpleasant publicity. The government was also threatened by the veterans of the war of independence, who proscribed all office-holders of Spanish sympathies and forced the suspension of the civil service rules. Fearing that with the elections approaching the disorder might get beyond control, the Secretary of State, Mr. Knox, sent a warning to the Cuban government, early in 1912, that intervention might be forced upon the United States if the disorders were allowed to develop.¹ For a time, the warning had a tranquillizing effect. But when, in the summer, a negro revolt broke out in the eastern end of the island, the United States felt it necessary to land marines and to concentrate a number of naval vessels at Key West. The government now rose to the occasion and put down the revolt, and the American troops were forthwith withdrawn.

President Gomez had agreed not to stand for reëlection, and the two leading candidates were Vice-President Zayas, the principal Liberal candidate, and General Menocal, the choice of the Conservatives. The election proved to be unexpectedly peaceful, and, owing to the split in the Liberal ranks, General Menocal was elected. The new president was a native Cuban and a veteran of the war with Spain. A civil engineer by profession (he had studied at Cornell University), he was, at the time of his election, the managing director of the Cuban American Sugar Company. He had already shown remarkable administrative ability and was reputed to be one of the wealthiest planters on the island. Financially disinterested, he made a valiant effort to eliminate graft in the administration, and under his leadership the island made substantial economic progress. Imports, valued at approximately \$120,000,000 in 1912, rose to over \$200,000,000 in 1916; while exports increased from \$146,000,000 to \$336,000,000. During his administra-

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1912*, p. 240.

tion the production of sugar increased from 1,750,000 tons to more than 3,000,000 tons.

Notwithstanding the excellent results of his administration, Menocal was strongly opposed when he sought reelection in 1916. The Liberal factions united on Dr. Zayas, and the results were so close that both sides claimed the victory. In certain cases second elections were ordered; but the Liberals, with ex-President Gomez as their leader, revolted before they were held. On February 10, 1917, Secretary Lansing appealed to the Cubans not to plunge the country into civil war,¹ and on February 13 he warned them that the United States would not recognize any government set up by violence.² The rebels, however, refused to lay down their arms, and early in March American marines were landed. At the same time the American government promised its aid to the Cuban government to reestablish order and put down the rebellion. The revolution subsided as quickly as it had flared up, and in May, 1917, President Menocal again took the oath of office.³

Despite the fact that Cuba now entered the World War as the ally of the United States, the second Menocal administration was even more successful than the first. In fact, by depriving the world of German beet-sugar the war stimulated to an extraordinary degree the production of Cuban cane-sugar. The crop for 1918 amounted to somewhat more than 4,000,000 tons, or about a million tons increase over the production for the preceding year, while the 1919 crop was even greater. As an indication of the tremendous wave of prosperity that had suddenly engulfed the island, President Menocal, in an interview with an American press correspondent in December, 1919, pointed out that the volume of deposits in banks and savings insti-

¹ *New York Times*, Feb. 13, 1917.

² *Ibid.*, Feb. 15, 1917.

³ For a sprightly account of the American intervention see the article by George Marvin, "Keeping Cuba Libre," *World's Work*, Vol. XXXIV, pp. 553-567 (Sept., 1917).

tutions had increased 1,000 per cent. in the preceding six years, land values had increased 500 per cent., and the volume of foreign commerce for 1919 would pass the billion-dollar mark.¹ Unfortunately, these values were considerably inflated, and towards the close of 1920, when the whole world began to experience the troubles of financial readjustment, the situation became very critical. A moratorium declared in October, 1920, was extended to June 15, 1921. A foreign loan seemed essential, and at the request of the Cuban government the state department of the United States sent a financial adviser to consider the possibilities of a loan by American bankers. When this solution failed, a bill was put through the insular congress providing for a sliding scale of liquidation of obligations, and this measure went into effect on February 1, 1921.

For several reasons, the elections of 1920 were particularly important. They were to be held under the 1919 census and the electoral laws as newly revised by General Crowder; President Menocal was ineligible for a third term and had promised that they would be conducted with absolute impartiality; and General Gomez, the former Liberal leader, was now opposed by Dr. Zayas, whom he had supported against Menocal. When the results came in, Dr. Zayas was found to be elected by a considerable majority. But the Gomez faction, alleging fraud and intimidation, refused to accept the results. General Crowder was again sent for, and finally he persuaded the opponents to abide by secondary elections in the districts where fraud was charged. These were held on March 15, 1921, and, as the Gomez adherents remained away, Zayas was again declared elected. The Liberals made a final protest through the abstention of their representatives when Congress convened on April 3. At the same time, General Gomez appealed personally to President Harding to set up a pro-

¹ L. J. de Bekker, "Cuba and Her President," *The Nation*, Vol. CX, p. 230 (Feb. 21, 1920).

visional government. But when the United States formally recognized Dr. Zayas as the duly elected president, General Gomez gave up the contest.

Except for the nominal protection accorded by the Platt Amendment, Cuba has been free and independent, for about twenty years, and on the whole she has prospered mightily. Commercially and economically, she is bound up very closely with the United States; in fact, 75 per cent. of her business is now done with us. For this reason, the Cubans are justified in expecting some consideration in our tariff measures. Politically, she is wholly independent; and, although the Platt Amendment permits intervention, the United States has shown more hesitation to exercise the power than the Cubans to ask for its employment. Her complete freedom in foreign affairs is shown by her acceptance of the covenant of the League of Nations, in contrast with the decision of the United States. That the powers recognize her completely sovereign status is shown by the selection of one of her jurists as a member of the Court of International Justice. Electoral campaigns are still periods of uncertainty, and questionable methods are undoubtedly still practised. But our own political history has hardly been such that we should see too clearly the mote in our neighbor's eye.

If we were to try to predict the future relations between the two countries on the basis of those of the past two decades, it would seem that the whole situation would depend, first upon the policy of the United States as shown in its interpretation and execution of the terms of the Platt Amendment, and, second, the attitude of the Cubans in accepting this policy. If we consider merely the geographical location of Cuba, it is apparent that its political and economic relations with the United States must be very close. But proximity does not always make for friendship. The Platt Amendment is not all that can be desired as a political bond of union from the standpoint of Cuban

pride, though as a practical working agreement the Cubans concede that it has not been wholly unsatisfactory. The clauses concerning sanitation and debts have been wholly beneficial to the island. The section granting to the United States the privilege of acquiring naval bases has surely not been abused. Although stations were at first leased at Bahia Honda and Guantanamo, in 1912 our government decided to retain only the latter, and at present this is the only station in Cuba which we hold. In the question of the Isle of Pines also the United States has given evidence of its desire to deal fairly with the Cubans. In spite of the protests of many American citizens who had established themselves there, the United States has given the Cuban government complete jurisdiction over the island, and a treaty relinquishing all American claim to it has long been before the Senate.

The United States, it is true, retains the right to intervene in Cuba. But it has exerted its right only as a last resort, and there is no reason why, in the relations of the future, this clause of the amendment should not become obsolete through the lack of need for its application. Here, however, lies the crux of the problem. Should it be the policy of the United States to intervene to establish a government based clearly upon the will of the majority? Or should Cuba work that problem out for herself, with the United States a passive observer except under conditions that make intervention imperative? Hitherto our government has followed the latter course; and we have sufficient confidence in the awakened spirit of democracy of the Cuban people to believe that this policy will prove to have been entirely justified.

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CHAPTER IX

PORTO RICO—A STUDY IN AMERICAN TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT

IN the foreign relations of the United States previous to the war with Spain, Porto Rico had generally been regarded as a sort of natural appendage to Cuba. In the public statements made by American statesmen regarding Cuba, mention was sometimes made of Porto Rico; but, even when nothing was said, it was generally understood that Porto Rico would follow in the wake of Cuba if that island should ever transfer its allegiance from Spain. Perhaps that is one of the reasons why, in the *Foreign Relations of the United States*, Cuba plays such a prominent part, while Porto Rico is virtually unmentioned. Undoubtedly another reason is the uneventfulness of the island's history as compared with that of Cuba. Not having the importance which Cuba derived from its size and its proximity to the mainland, and possessing no mineral resources to incite the cupidity of the early Spanish adventurers, Porto Rico, from the time of its discovery by Columbus until its surrender to the United States, probably received as generous treatment from the Madrid government as obtained anywhere in the great Spanish colonial dominion.

So long as Spain held most of the Americas south of the Rio Grande, she could hardly be expected to pay much attention to such an insignificant possession as Porto Rico. However, during the wars for independence Spain came to the realization of the importance of attaching her colonies to herself through fair dealing; and a royal decree of 1815 was very generous. The result was a heavy influx of

whites, many of them Spanish sympathizers, driven from the revolting countries of the empire. Although the governor-general of Porto Rico had powers as despotic as those of the governor-general of Cuba, there was considerably less complaint of their abuse. In 1870 the island was made a province of Spain with representation in the Spanish Cortes. A little later, in 1874, the provincial constitution was abrogated. But the provincial deputations were re-established in 1877; only now they were partially dependent upon the governors-general. The next step towards self-government did not come till 1897, when Spain granted a form of autonomous government similar to that offered to Cuba. But the troops of the United States took over the island before its organization under the new system was completed.¹

From October 18, 1898, when the Spanish troops withdrew, until May 1, 1900, when the Foraker act establishing civil government went into effect, the island was under military rule. The guiding principle under the three military governors, Generals Brooke, Henry, and Davis, was to interfere as little as possible with the existing native institutions. The greatest difficulty was the complete lack of knowledge, on the part of the Americans, of the methods of administration under the local laws. As General Davis writes: "Judicial procedure was strange, and the temperament, mode of life, and manners of the inhabitants differed greatly from those with which Americans are conversant. . . . At the time of my arrival not a page of the voluminous laws of the island, all of Spanish origin, had been translated into English. Those laws, upon which the whole fabric of society was based, were as a sealed book and had been so to my predecessors."²

The problems of the military government included polic-

¹ For a description of the government preceding 1897 and the proposed reforms, see the *Report of Brig.-Gen. G. W. Davis*, House Doc. No. 2, 56th Cong., 1st sess., p. 484.

² *Ibid.*, p. 483.

ing the island, remedying the lack of sanitation, reorganizing the judicial system, and introducing financial reforms. There was much disorder and murder; pillage and arson were common offenses of the natives against the Spaniards. The sanitary conditions of the cities was impossible according to American standards, and an immediate and thorough cleaning up was essential. In the first six months of American control, more than 750,000 of Porto Ricans were vaccinated, smallpox was stamped out, and steps were taken to isolate lepers. The reorganization of the courts and legal procedure was the most difficult problem, for, as General Davis reported: "The system of laws that prevail here is the outgrowth of quite a thousand years of human experience, and can not be struck down or radically changed in a day nor yet in a year."¹ For instance, proceedings under the writ of habeas corpus were authorized; but through inability to understand the purpose of the writ it remained virtually a dead letter. The district insular courts were reduced from fifteen to six; and each of the sixty-nine towns retained its municipal court, though upon a modified and improved basis. The insular supreme court of appeals was retained; while for the trial of offenders violating United States law a provisional court under the authority of the president was created, consisting of one law judge and two army officers.² The stamp taxes placed upon all deeds, notes, and bills of exchange, and the *consumo* tax upon necessities of life, such as bread and rice, were immediately abolished by the military government, and an excise tax was substituted.

The military government was faced with new and difficult problems, and it solved them in a highly creditable manner. In fact, Dr. Rowe is of the opinion "that during the early stages of our occupation of Porto Rico military govern-

¹ House Doc., *op. cit.*, p. 502.

² *Ibid.*, p. 504. See also Leo S. Rowe, *The United States and Porto Rico* (London, 1904), Chap. XII, for an excellent survey of the reorganization of the judicial system.

ment was not only desirable, but the only means of solving the immediate problems of government.”¹ But, as he says farther, a military régime could not be continued, because such a system is repugnant to the political standards of the American people. The principal reason why civil government was not sooner established was the fear of Congress that, on this basis, legislation in regard to the insular possessions might be subject to the restrictions of the constitution. To avoid misunderstanding on this point, the Foraker act provided that native inhabitants should be deemed citizens of Porto Rico instead of citizens of the United States, and tariff duties of 15 per cent. of the Dingley tariff were placed upon goods imported into the United States from Porto Rico, which was possible only if the island was regarded as foreign territory.² There was considerable uncertainty as to whether such territory as Porto Rico, once incorporated into the United States, could be considered “foreign.” But the insular cases, particularly *Downes v. Bidwell*, determined that Porto Rico had not become a part of the United States for purposes of the constitutional provision “that all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.” The court’s ruling is often summarized by the phrase, “the constitution does not follow the flag.” Justice White reasoned in the concurring opinion: “To concede to the government of the United States the right to acquire, and to strip it of all power to protect the birthright of its own citizens and to provide for the well-being of the acquired territory by such enactments as may in view of its conditions be essential, is in effect to say that the United States is helpless in the family of nations. . . . Although the House of Representatives might be unwilling to agree to the incorporation of alien races, it would be impotent to prevent its accomplishment, and the express provisions con-

¹ L. S. Rowe, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

² U. S. Stat. at Large, Vol. XXXI, Chap. 191, Sects. 2 and 7.

ferring upon Congress the power to regulate commerce, the right to raise revenue, and the authority to prescribe uniform naturalization laws would be in effect set at naught by the treaty-making power."¹

As established by the Foraker act, the government of the island included, first, a governor appointed by the President for a four-year term, who had the powers generally conferred upon governors of organized territories, such as to grant pardons and reprieves, appoint certain officials, veto laws, and see that the laws are executed. He was to be assisted by an executive council consisting of a secretary, attorney-general, treasurer, auditor, commissioner of the interior, and commissioner of education, also appointed by the President for four years, and by five others who were required to be native inhabitants. This executive council was also to act as the upper branch of the legislative assembly, the lower branch being a house of delegates consisting of thirty-five members elected biennially by the qualified voters. The council was to prescribe the regulations and date for the first election. The courts already established by General Davis were continued, except that a United States district court was provided to take the place of the provisional court.²

Perhaps the most noteworthy feature of this system of government was the executive council, which had both administrative and legislative powers; although a somewhat similar organ was found in the American colonies previous to independence. It was to be expected that this body, whose members were for the most part experienced in parliamentary practice, would take ascendancy over the lower house, whose members were uniformly devoid of par-

¹ 182 U. S. 288. See also the analysis by Dr. Rowe in *The United States and Porto Rico*, Chap. III, and that by P. Capo Rodriguez, *American Journal of Int. Law*, Vol. X, p. 317 ff., and Vol. XIII, p. 483 ff.

² *U. S. Stat. at Large*, Vol. XXXI, Chap. 191. For an analysis of the workings of the government see W. F. Willoughby, *Territories and Dependencies of the United States* (N. Y., 1905), Chap. IV.

liamentary training. In fact, nearly two thirds of all the bills passed in the first session originated in the upper chamber. As summarized by Charles H. Allen, the first governor, the results of this first session consisted not so much in what the body did as in what it refrained from doing, for among the thirty-six acts passed "not one foolish expression of the legislative will is to be found, and not one of these acts will be speedily repealed."¹

Governor Allen's conclusions on the success of the new plan of government are worthy of consideration. In the first place, he pointed out that American occupation found the island inhabited by a race of people of different language, religion, customs, and habits, with virtually no acquaintance with American methods, and with the commerce and trade in the hands of the Spaniards. Therefore, with the people wholly unfitted, without careful training and preparation, to assume the management of their own affairs, he felt that "Congress went quite as far as it could safely venture in the form of government already existing in the island, . . . and with good men devoted to the work, the island will develop faster under such form, its people through experience and education will advance more rapidly in their knowledge of the civic virtues under a guidance of present methods than could be gained in any other way."²

That the Porto Ricans were not entirely satisfied with the system of government is evidenced in the successive reports of the governors. In the third annual report (for 1902-03) Governor William H. Hunt declared that the majority of all the people wanted territorial government, but that, in his opinion, a change in the government at that time would be a mistake. The creation of a house of delegates had already conferred much power upon the people, con-

¹ *First Annual Report of Charles H. Allen, Governor of Porto Rico* (Wash., 1901), p. 76.

² *Ibid.*, p. 98.

sidering their autocratic government in the past. The inhabitants were justified in looking forward to full incorporation within the political body of the United States, but such a transition could not be successfully consummated without relying heavily upon the young people still in the schools, who would not be able to take their share of responsibility for some years to come.¹ The complaint sometimes raised that the Porto Ricans were not given a full share of the appointments seems hardly just, for a summary found in the fifth annual report indicates that of the total number of government employees 2,548 were Porto Ricans, as compared with 313 Americans; while in salaries the Porto Ricans were getting \$1,220,567 as against \$355,200 received by Americans.²

One complaint of the Porto Ricans, however, was fully justified, namely, that based on the uncertainty of their status as citizens. Governor Winthrop, in 1905, made it clear that this situation was creating a spirit of discontent and unrest prejudicial to the American administration. As he pointed out, under the Spanish régime Porto Ricans were classed as citizens of Spain, and it was naturally difficult for them to understand why citizenship of the sovereign country should be denied to them under the more free and liberal government of the United States. He urged very strongly the granting of citizenship by Congress, on the ground that it would greatly improve the feeling of loyalty with which the Porto Ricans regarded the United States, and would instil in them a healthy feeling of patriotism as being citizens of the country and not merely citizens of the dependency of the country.³

Another serious cause of discontent was the fact that the governors were, for the most part, political appointees of the President, and had neither experience nor interest

¹ *Third Annual Report of the Governor of Porto Rico* (1903), p. 13.

² *Fifth Annual Report* (1905), p. 41.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

in the problems of colonial government. Ignorant as they were—and still are—of the Spanish language, rarely holding the office more than a year or two (Governor Yager's seven-year term is the notable exception), it could hardly be expected that the governors would be qualified to appreciate the Porto Rican point of view. Mr. Frank H. Richmond, who served as Assistant Attorney-General of Porto Rico, and later as associate judge of the district court of San Juan, characterized the Porto Rican appointees as "noted for the seriousness with which they take themselves and the amateurish pettiness of their activities; the calmness with which they assume that they are doing these people good and that the little they know of business and administration is superior to methods in vogue on the island for three centuries."¹ The bitter opposition on the part of the Porto Ricans to Governor E. Mont Reily, President Harding's appointee, and the serious charges brought against him, would seem to indicate that stalwart political henchmen do not furnish the best material for satisfactory governors of our colonial possessions.²

Almost from the beginning of the island's administration under the Foraker act, a marked antagonism was manifested on the part of the House of Delegates towards the executive council, and on several occasions serious deadlocks occurred. In 1909 the situation was brought to a head when the lower house refused to vote the appropriation bills for the ensuing year unless the upper house would accept certain legislative measures which were generally conceded to be very radical in their scope, and in one case in direct violation of the Foraker act. The executive council refused to recede, and the session terminated with the appropriation measures unpassed. The governor immediately called a special session, which merely resulted in an-

¹ *The Eclectic Magazine*, Vol. CXLVII, p. 487 (Dec., 1906).

² See the interesting characterization of Mr. Reily by Mr. Davila, the Porto Rican representative at Washington in Congress, *Cong. Rec.*, March 2, 1922.

other deadlock. He then cabled to Washington a full statement of the situation,¹ and President Taft, in a special message, laid the matter before Congress, then in extra session. Pointing out the advantages already secured by the Porto Ricans under American control, the President recommended an amendment to the Foraker act providing that, when the assembly should adjourn without making the necessary appropriations, sums equal to the appropriations of the previous year should be available from the current revenues.² Congress immediately took up the subject, and the so-called Olmsted Amendment was passed, which provided that "if at the termination of any fiscal year the appropriations necessary for the support of government for the ensuing fiscal year shall not have been made, an amount equal to the sums appropriated in the last appropriation bills for such purpose shall be deemed to be appropriated. This amendment brought the organic act into agreement, in this matter, with the organic acts of Hawaii and the Philippines."³

In order to obtain further information President Taft directed the Secretary of War, Mr. Dickinson, to visit the island and investigate the situation. The emissary was accompanied by General Edwards, chief of the Insular Bureau, whose bureau now had jurisdiction over the island by virtue of the second paragraph of the amendment of 1909; also by Colonel Kean of the medical department. Secretary Dickinson's report made it clear that on two subjects Porto Rican sentiment was unanimous, namely, citizenship and the organization and selection of the upper house. On the first the inhabitants demanded the granting of American citizenship to all Porto Rican citizens collectively, and on the second they asked the substitution of an elective senate for the existing executive council,

¹ Sen. Doc. No. 40, 61st Cong., 1st sess., p. 7.

² *Ibid.*, p. 1.

³ *U. S. Stat. at Large*, Vol. XXXVI, Part I, p. 11.

thus separating the executive from the legislative functions. Secretary Dickinson advised that American citizenship should in some way be conferred upon the Porto Ricans, but not collectively, as there were many of Spanish descent who did not wish to become citizens. In regard to the senate, he recommended that a senate be created, to consist of thirteen members, all citizens of Porto Rico or of the United States and resident for not less than one year in Porto Rico, eight to be appointed by the President and the remainder to be elected by the Porto Ricans. The separation of the executive and legislative departments was also recommended. Other suggestions were that elections for all insular offices be held only once in four years instead of biennially; that a department of health be created, with jurisdiction over matters of health, sanitation, and charities; and that a department of agriculture, commerce, and labor also be added. In conclusion, the secretary gave it as his opinion that the people of Porto Rico had, on the whole, an excellent government, and that the people of the United States could look with just pride upon the administration of affairs they had given there. The island was peaceable and generally prosperous; health conditions had improved; and the people were, in the main, contented. There were many criticisms as to the judgment, ability, sense, and industry of various officials who had been there since American occupation. But the universal testimony was that the administration had been honest and free from favoritism.¹

As a result of this investigation, a bill was introduced in Congress by Mr. Olmsted, chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs, embodying substantially the recommendations enumerated. In a well documented and comprehensive speech the author of the measure pointed out the conditions and needs of the island, and urged the passage

¹ House Doc. No. 615, 61st Cong., 2nd sess. Text of a proposed bill included.

of the bill as a means of ending the unsatisfactory status of the island—that of “a disembodied shade in an intermediate state of ambiguous existence,” as Chief Justice Fuller expressed it.¹ The lower house finally passed the bill, amended in several matters. But it was by no means satisfactory to the Porto Ricans. In a message to Congress dated February 23, 1910, the House of Delegates protested vigorously against its passage, on the ground that it curtailed, rather than increased, the liberties granted by the Foraker act. Incidentally they also indicated in no uncertain language their dissatisfaction with the latter act, declaring that “the regimen by the Foraker act is absurd and despotic, installing the higher house by presidential appointment without the intervention of the people, mingling and confusing the legislative and executive powers, and leaving the Porto Ricans without a definite and recognized personality in the law of nations.” Inasmuch as the minority report of the Committee on Insular Affairs very strongly upheld the Porto Rican contention, the Olmsted bill never became a law.²

The next attempt to remedy the political situation in Porto Rico came in March, 1914, when Mr. Jones, chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs, reported out a bill to supersede the Foraker act. No action, however, was taken at this time. Early in 1916 another bill of similar character was introduced and unanimously recommended for passage by the Committee on Insular Affairs. This time the sentiment in Congress was very favorable, and a brilliant speech made by the commissioner from Porto Rico, Mr. Rivera, in behalf of the bill was received with applause.³ This measure, commonly known as the Jones Act, passed both houses after considerable debate

¹ *Cong. Record*, Vol. XLV, pp. 6862-6876 (May 25, 1910).

² House Rep. No. 750, 61st Cong., 2nd sess., Pt. 2.

³ *Cong. Record*, Vol. LIII, p. 7470 (May 5, 1916).

and became the organic law of Porto Rico on March 2, 1917.¹

Although this act did not go quite so far as some of the Porto Ricans wished, it did attempt to meet the demands of the majority, and it successfully remedied the chief defects of the Foraker act. In the first place, a bill of rights guaranteed the individual rights and liberties of the Porto Ricans in exactly the same manner that these rights are guaranteed by the federal constitution and the constitutions of the various states. American citizenship was granted collectively, but provision was made that those who did not wish to become American citizens could avoid it by making a declaration to this effect. The executive department was made to consist of a governor appointed by the President, and the heads of the following departments: justice, finance, interior, education, health, and agriculture and labor. Of these executive heads, the Attorney-General and the Commissioner of Education were to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate of the United States, while the other four were to be appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate of Porto Rico. These departmental heads were to constitute an executive council; but all legislative duties were withdrawn. Another important executive officer was the auditor (also appointed by the President), whose duty it was to examine, audit, and settle all financial accounts of the central and municipal governments of the island.

The legislative department was to consist of two houses, a senate of nineteen members elected for terms of four years, two each from the seven senatorial districts and five at large, and a house of thirty-nine members, also elected quadrennially, one from each of the thirty-five representative districts and four at large. The executive council was given the power to arrange the districts; and, with

¹ *U. S. Stat. at Large*, Vol. XXXIX, p. 951.

a view to preventing gerrymandering, the districts were required to be contiguous and compact and of approximately equal population. Future redistricting was given over to the legislature of Porto Rico. The legislature was to meet biennially, and the governor was authorized to call special sessions if, in his opinion, the public interest required it. Bills were to be passed by a majority vote, except in case of a veto by the governor; if vetoed, repassed by a two-thirds vote, and still refused approval by the governor, a bill must be transmitted to the President of the United States, who by signing it would make it law. Furthermore, all laws enacted by the insular legislature must be reported to the Congress of the United States, which reserved full power of annulment.

The qualifications for voters were to be prescribed by the legislature, except that American citizenship and age of twenty-one or over must be requirements, and property qualifications must not be imposed. The electors of Porto Rico were authorized to choose a resident commissioner to the United States for a four-year term, whose salary of \$7,500 was to be paid by the United States, and who was granted approximately the same privileges (except voting) possessed by members of the House of Representatives.

The courts already organized were to be maintained, but jurisdiction over their organization and procedure was given to the legislature, except in the case of the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico. The judge of this tribunal was to be appointed by the President, and the range of its jurisdiction was defined in the organic act.

The government under the new act was promptly put into effect, and in his report for 1917 Governor Yager declared that the measure was received everywhere with satisfaction. Celebrations were held in various municipalities of the island manifesting the gratification of the people. Under the provision for the renunciation of citizenship, only

about 290 in the whole island made application, while more than 800 persons born in Porto Rico of alien parents made a voluntary declaration of allegiance, thus accepting American citizenship.¹ The first elections under the act were conducted in an orderly fashion in spite of many spirited contests. In the first legislative session some friction arose between the governor and the senate, principally over the senate's slowness to confirm the governor's appointments, and it culminated in an attempt of the legislature to take a recess of two and one half months instead of *sine die*. The governor refused to accept this interpretation of the organic law. But a compromise was agreed upon whereby the legislature reassembled pursuant to adjournment, adjourned immediately, and then reconvened at the call of the governor for a special session.²

Upon the entrance of the United States into the World War, the Porto Ricans found themselves shouldered with the obligations and duties of citizenship before they had fairly begun to enjoy its benefits. The selective service act was extended to Porto Rico, and more than 120,000 men were registered under its provisions. Officers' training camps were established and some 425 men received commissions. Liberty Loan campaigns were carried on and the total amount subscribed amounted to more than \$12,250,000. Campaigns for food conservation and production were undertaken, branches of the Red Cross and Y. M. C. A. were organized. As an example of the people's generosity, in a campaign for new Red Cross headquarters in San Juan \$10,000 was raised within twenty-four hours by the subscriptions of forty-five merchants.³ That Porto Rico appreciated the fundamental reasons for the entrance of the United States into the war is evidenced by the words of Don Luis Sanchez Morales, for seven years president of

¹ *Report of the Governor of Porto Rico, 1917*, p. 1.

² *Ibid.*, 1918, p. 4.

³ Clarence Ferguson, "The People of Porto Rico and the War," *Overland Monthly*, Vol. LXXIII, p. 300 (April, 1919).

the executive council, to the representative men of the island: "The action of President Wilson, leading the American people to intervene in the world conflict on principles of the highest ideals, means much more than the defeat of autocracy; it means the evangelization of international law, the Golden Rule as a basis for the relations among the peoples. It is not one more war, won or lost. It is the government of the world which is won by the doctrines of Christ."¹

The ideals of the World War so nobly maintained while the nations were actively participating, so sadly distorted in the period of settlement, are still vitally a part of the world's imponderables. World peace and good will can not obtain until the peoples of the various nations and states shall adopt such principles and practices in their international relations as have proved effective and satisfactory in their domestic intercourse. Nor can the exercise of these principles be confined merely to the relations between the so-called sovereign states. The relationships between sovereign states and their colonies, dependencies, protectorates, spheres of influence, and territorial possessions must be an important factor in the world politics of the future. In a world made safe for democracy the obligations of the great powers, the states whose importance and prestige are such that they are made mandatory or protecting powers, must be fulfilled in the broad spirit of world humanity. Areas of exploitation will always be breeding-places for international jealousies and disputes, and the United States has publicly proclaimed its adherence to a policy of unselfish guardianship of the rights of minorities and backward peoples. Does its policy, as exemplified in the control of Porto Rico, square with these doctrines?

As far as physical and economic improvements are concerned—and these phases are worthy of much attention in

¹ *Overland Monthly*, Vol. LXXIII, p. 292 (April, 1919).

attempting to strike a fair balance—it must be said that American rule in Porto Rico has been remarkably successful. In concluding his report of 1919, Governor Yager summarized the results of twenty years of American possession of the island as “Twenty Years of Progress in Porto Rico,” and gave some very interesting facts to substantiate his claims. In 1899 there were but 267 kilometers of completed roads; in 1919 there were 1,189 kilometers. In 1899 there were practically no public-school buildings worthy of the name; in 1919 there were 529, built at a cost of more than \$2,500,000. More than \$2,000,000 had been spent for other public buildings and almost \$5,000,000 on irrigation systems. Agencies of guarding public health had been introduced, such as quarantine, hospitals, and sanitary systems; some diseases, such as yellow fever and smallpox, were almost completely eliminated, and others were being brought under control. A more modern and just taxation system had been put into operation, and a strict auditing system provided. The exports of agricultural products had multiplied ten times since 1901, and foreign commerce had risen from \$17,502,103 to \$141,896,400. And as an indication of the full share of the Porto Ricans in the administration of their own affairs, of the 5,953 positions in the government service, only 208 were held by non-natives. In conclusion, Governor Yager gave due credit to the Porto Ricans for the excellent results: “It is a record creditable alike to the Porto Ricans themselves and to the great free republic to which they owe allegiance. Much of it is due to the liberality and generous aid of the great American government and people, but most of the credit is due to the splendid coöperation of the Porto Ricans themselves.”¹

This table, prepared from statistics found in the report for 1920, shows graphically the commercial progress of the island:

¹ *Report of the Governor of Porto Rico, 1919*, p. 53.

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	1901	1920
Merchandise from Porto Rico to the United States	\$5,581,288	\$150,811,449
Merchandise from Porto Rico to foreign countries	3,002,679	17,603,941
Total trade with the United States.....	12,546,696	223,931,767
Total trade with foreign countries.....	4,955,407	23,268,216
Sugar exports (value).....	4,715,611	98,923,750
Coffee exports (value).....	1,678,765	9,034,028
Fruit exports (value).....	109,801	3,890,930

We have already outlined the political development; from an autocratic but efficient military government the Porto Ricans have now, by successive stages, reached a point where they have almost complete autonomy. Yet, in spite of this progress, the Porto Ricans are not satisfied. Perhaps it is even because of this development that they are not contented. As Señor Rodriguez, one of their best known publicists, states it: "By the guidance, help, and example of the American people, we have already attained that condition of social, economical, and political development which entitles us to manage at least our own internal affairs. We feel, therefore, that we have already attained our political majority; and just as any normal boy, upon becoming of age, wishes to go out into the world to face and solve by himself his own problems of life without parental dictation or interference, we too, as a normal people, strongly feel that we ought to be permitted to face and solve our own Porto Rican problems in our own Porto Rican way without governmental dictation or interference from the United States.¹

This sounds plausible. Señor Rodriguez makes it clear that complete independence is not essential. A system such as Great Britain gives to her self-governing colonies might prove satisfactory; or a nominal protectorate such as the United States maintains over Cuba might be preferable. Is there any reason why the United States, a nation entirely alien to the Porto Ricans in customs, habits, and language,

¹ P. C. Rodriguez, "Porto Rico as a National Problem"; G. H. Blakeslee [ed.], *Mexico and the Caribbean* (N. Y., 1920), p. 338.

should have the veto power over all Porto Rican legislation and appoint an American governor and his assistants to see to it that such laws as we permit to be passed are executed in accordance with our ideas and precedents? Surely we must concede that the Porto Ricans have reached a state of civilization such that they are competent to govern themselves in a fairly satisfactory manner. We might well concede that they could do it in a far abler fashion than some of the Caribbean states that are now independent. If this is true, is the United States justified in determining how efficient, or of what type, their government should be? Are we, for example, willing to accept for ourselves the more efficient methods of an autocracy? If the United States intends merely to hold Porto Rico in leading-strings until clearer proof has been given that complete self-government would work, a goal at least would have been set towards which the Porto Ricans might strive. But so long as no policy whatsoever is laid down, and the Porto Ricans are compelled to receive governors whose appointment is based principally upon political grounds, and to accept laws in whose making they have had no voice, we can hardly expect them to be entirely satisfied. Nor can we truthfully say that our conduct and policies conform completely to the highest ideals and traditions of American political life.

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CHAPTER X

AMERICAN INTERESTS IN HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO

THE influence of geography upon history can hardly be overestimated. In ancient times, when nature's highways, the seas and great navigable rivers, furnished the principal arteries of communication, this influence was unquestionably more important than to-day, when man's ingenuity and effort have so largely overcome the obstructive barriers of nature. But even now, although the effects of physical factors are less evident, they play an important rôle in national and international policies. No nation can ignore the consideration of geography in evaluating the bases of its historical development.

A mere glance at a map of the Caribbean Sea gives the key to the history of the island of Santo Domingo. Lying almost directly between Cuba and Porto Rico, it would undoubtedly be discovered by Spain; like Cuba, it would probably be the sport of English and French buccaneers during the seventeenth century; and at the present time, commanding as it does both of the important routes between northern Europe and the Panama Canal, *i.e.*, the Windward passage and the Mona passage, it would necessarily be affected in some way by the influence of the United States. This is the general setting of its history, no less than that of its neighbors. But, although the historic background of the Caribbean islands is similar, each island has had a decidedly individual foreground; and in the case of Santo Domingo it must be sketched in rather somber colors.

Santo Domingo was discovered by Columbus on his first voyage, shortly after he had discovered Cuba. The natives

called the island Haiti, but Columbus named it la Española, or, as it is now generally written, Hispaniola. A small colony of Spaniards was left by the discoverer at Cape Haitien, on the northwest coast of the island. But on his return, in 1493, he found that all had been massacred by the natives. The Spaniards exacted bloody vengeance later, and it was estimated that within twenty years of the discovery of the island the population was reduced from 1,000,000 to about 14,000.¹ To repopulate the island the slave trade was resorted to; and ultimately the blacks became the preponderant population.

The island remained under the unchallenged domination of the Spaniards until the middle of the seventeenth century, when the French established settlements in the western extremity. The Spaniards made various efforts to oust their unwelcome neighbors, but to no avail, and the treaty of Ryswick in 1697 definitely ceded the western section of the island to France. The French colonists soon made Saint-Domingue one of the most prosperous islands of the West Indies, although their great sugar, coffee, and tobacco plantations were worked entirely with slave labor. When the French Revolution broke out, in 1789, it was estimated that the population of Saint-Domingue consisted of about 40,000 whites, 28,000 *affranchis*, or freedmen, and about 452,000 slaves.²

The principles of the Revolution quickly became known in Santo Domingo, and at the earnest solicitation of the *affranchis*, the National Assembly, in 1791, granted full civil and political rights to free-born colored men in French possessions. This decree was resisted vigorously by the whites in Haiti, and the result was one of the most horrible servile wars in the world's history. The blacks, whose treatment at the hands of the whites had been barbarous

¹ Justin Placide, *Histoire politique et statistique d'Hayti, Saint-Domingue* (Paris, 1826), p. 40.

² J. N. Léger, *Haiti: Her History and Her Detractors* (N. Y., 1907), p. 41.

in the extreme,¹ massacred the whites in veritable orgies of slaughter. In the wars that followed, the one bright spot was the brilliant achievements of the black leader, Toussaint l'Ouverture. Fighting, in turn, with the Spanish against the French, then with the English and Spanish, sometimes with the mulattoes, sometimes against them, but always sturdily defending the interests of his black comrades, by 1799 Toussaint had control of virtually the entire island.²

It was at this period that the island came within the diplomatic horizon of the United States. In December, 1798, Rufus King, the American ambassador to Great Britain, heard rumors that a commercial agreement had been signed by a British officer and Toussaint.³ King immediately approached Grenville, the British Foreign Minister, who admitted that the report was true and explained that, although General Maitland had signed the agreement wholly without authority, his government felt that in order to protect Jamaica it was wise to ratify the convention.⁴ Owing to the fact that French sovereignty was still recognized in the island, and that the United States had prohibited all trade with French territories, such an agreement would be inimical to American trade interests. Therefore, early in January, 1799, King again approached Grenville, this time suggesting that if the island should become independent, concerted action between the two powers would be the most advantageous line of action. Grenville agreed, and proposed the formation of an exclusive company, composed jointly of British and American nationals, to trade with Santo Domingo. King was dubious about the power of Congress to create such a company, and he suggested

¹ J. N. Léger, *op. cit.*, p. 50 (note).

² For detailed accounts of this period see T. G. Stewart, *The Haitian Revolution, 1791-1804* (N. Y., 1914), and T. Lothrop Stoddard, *The French Revolution in San Domingo* (Bost., 1914).

³ For a full account of this agreement see Thos. Southey, *Chronological History of the West Indies* (London, 1827), Vol. III, pp. 155-159.

⁴ *Life and Correspondence of Rufus King* (N. Y., 1895), Vol. II, p. 476.

as a more feasible scheme that each nation make treaties with Toussaint, confining trade to the citizens of the two countries.¹ Grenville, however, seemed to prefer the plan of a joint company, and in a communication to King he outlined a definite proposal in which all trade should be confined to Port au Prince.²

These proposals were laid before President Adams, who, however, feared that the independence of Santo Domingo would not be an unmixed blessing for the United States, and also objected to the idea of a joint company. He accordingly declared it to be the policy of the United States not to meddle.³ Hamilton was more outspoken in his advice. In a letter to Pickering, the Secretary of State, dated February 9, 1799, he proposed that there be no committal regarding the independence of Santo Domingo, that there be no guaranty, no formal treaty, merely a verbal assurance to Toussaint that upon a declaration of independence commercial intercourse would be opened.⁴ The whole American position was well summed up in a confidential note from Pickering to King, dated March 12, 1799, in which the Secretary of State declared: "We shall never receive from the French Republic indemnification for the injuries she has done us. The commerce of Santo Domingo presents the only means of compensation, and this I have no doubt we shall obtain. Toussaint respects the British, he is attached to us; he knows our position, but a few days' sail from Santo Domingo, and the promptitude with which we can supply his wants. . . . Nothing is more clear than, if left to themselves, the blacks of Santo Domingo will be less dangerous than if they remain the subjects of France. . . . We therefore reckon confidently upon the independence of Santo Domingo."⁵

¹ *Life and Correspondence of Rufus King*, Vol. II, p. 499.

² *Ibid.*, p. 504.

³ *Works of John Adams* (Boston, 1853), Vol. VIII, p. 635.

⁴ *Works of Alexander Hamilton* (N. Y., 1850), Vol. VI, p. 395.

⁵ *Life and Correspondence of Rufus King*, Vol. II, p. 557.

Joint action with Great Britain seemed essential, and in April an agreement was signed, based upon the common interest of the two countries, to prevent dissemination of dangerous principles among slaves held in territories belonging to the respective countries, and to open up intercourse with the island.¹ The result was the appointment of Mr. Edward Stevens as consul to Santo Domingo, and a proclamation by the President, dated June 26, 1799, opening up Santo Domingo to American trade, though only through the two ports of Cape François and Port au Prince.² By this decree Toussaint's position was both recognized and strengthened, inasmuch as Rigaud, his principal rival, had to depend upon the southern ports for his provisions and war material. As shown by his letter of August 14, 1799, to President Adams,³ Toussaint was not entirely satisfied. But in the following year the United States gave him further support by sending war-ships to blockade the southern ports.⁴

By the opening of 1801 Toussaint was in complete control of the island, including the Spanish part; and a constitution adopted May 9, 1801, made him governor-general for life. His success was to be transient. Napoleon, who now had a breathing-spell in Europe, organized an expedition under his brother-in-law, General Le Clerc, to recover Santo Domingo. For a time Toussaint resisted, but finally, realizing the futility of continuing the struggle against overwhelming odds, he surrendered and withdrew to one of his plantations. The French, however, feared his influence, and by an act of base treachery they seized him and sent him to France. Broken in health but not in spirit, he died, less than a year afterwards, in the prison at de Joux. The French paid dearly for their action. Finding a new leader in Dessalines, the blacks renewed the struggle

¹ For text see *Works of John Adams*, Vol. VIII, p. 639.

² *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, Vol. II, p. 240.

³ J. N. Léger, *Haiti*, p. 99 (note).

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

for independence with astonishing vigor. The death of Le Clerc aided their cause, as did also the ravages of yellow fever. When the peace of Amiens was broken, Napoleon could no longer afford to dissipate his energy in the New World to such little advantage. Santo Domingo became merely a stepping-stone to a great French empire west of the Mississippi. Yet it was also the corner-stone, without whose possession the structure would be exceedingly insecure. Jefferson had already intimated that the United States would not look with pleasure upon French ownership of Louisiana, and Monroe had already been sent to negotiate for New Orleans and the Floridas. America's star was in the ascendant; and Napoleon, who did not do things by halves, suddenly ordered Marbois to sell the whole of the Louisiana territory to the United States, and at the same time instructed Rochambeau, who now commanded in place of Le Clerc, to withdraw from Santo Domingo. On December 20, 1803, the United States took formal possession of New Orleans, and on January 1, 1804, Saint-Domingue was declared forever independent of French domination. Even the French name was discarded—the island resuming its original name of Haiti.¹ The United States will always be grateful to Jefferson for his vision, and to Livingston for his prompt action. But it must be conceded that no small share in the happy result was contributed by the fight for the independence of Santo Domingo so indefatigably carried on by Toussaint l'Ouverture.

It does not come within our province to consider the internal history of the island during the next few decades, except as it concerns the United States. The island's independence was not recognized by the United States when recognition was accorded to the rest of Latin America, although Great Britain officially gave recognition in 1826, and even France followed suit in 1838. The unstable character of the government was hardly a reason for our in-

¹ J. N. Léger, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

action, considering that one president, Jean Boyer, remained in office from 1818 to 1843. The real reason was rather the dangerous slavery question; for undoubtedly the abolition of slavery in the island was viewed by an important element in the United States as a most undesirable precedent. Even Bolivar, who had been received most cordially by the Haitians during his struggle for the independence of South America, and had been given generous supplies of ammunition and provisions, did not dare include Haiti in his invitation to the Congress of Panama.

The first official diplomatic relations that the United States had with the island were established in 1844. After the resignation of Boyer in 1843, the Spanish part of the island revolted and set up a separate government under the name of the Dominican Republic. Desirous of strengthening itself against the blacks, this republic immediately despatched an envoy to the United States to obtain recognition and, if possible, to sign a treaty of friendship and commerce. In order to obtain unbiased information concerning resources and conditions in the island, President Polk despatched a special agent, John Hogan, on February 22, 1845, to investigate and make a report. Mr. Hogan spent about five months in the island, and ran up a heavy expense account which the government later refused to pay. But his report remained buried until 1871, when the House asked for the information.¹

In the meantime the Dominicans, not obtaining satisfaction from the United States, and constantly harassed by the guerrilla warfare on the Haitian border, approached both France and Spain. President Souloque, of Haiti, prepared a large expedition with the purpose of forcing the Dominicans back under the control of Haiti; whereupon the threatened republic, in a circular note dated Feb-

¹ Report published in House Ex. Doc. No. 42, 41st Cong., 3d sess.

ruary 22, 1850, and addressed to the consuls of the United States, France, and Great Britain, urgently solicited the mediation of the governments of those countries.¹ Through the British minister at Washington, France and Great Britain proposed that the United States coöperate with them in a joint plan of action. Mr. Webster, who had succeeded Mr. Clayton as secretary of state, nominated Mr. Robert M. Walsh as special agent to Haiti, with a view to obtaining fuller information before announcing his policy.

Mr. Walsh sailed for Haiti, January 25, 1851, and upon arriving at Port au Prince immediately got in touch with the British and French consuls. He then informed the Haitian Minister for Foreign Affairs that the government of the United States had determined to coöperate with the governments of England and France to secure the pacification of the island, and that the most feasible way to accomplish it was for the government of Haiti to acknowledge the independence of the Republic of Santo Domingo.² At the same time, a joint note, signed by the representatives of the three powers, demanded a definite treaty of peace, or, in lieu of that, a truce of ten years between the Empire of Haiti and the Dominican Republic. After a series of interviews and *pourparlers*, the Haitian government refused to subscribe to either proposition, but promised to continue the truce that then existed. Unable to obtain anything better, Mr. Walsh left, and in summing up his report he declared that the only way to obtain the recognition of the Dominican Republic by Haiti was by the use of force. The United States government, however, might well be content with the result achieved; for this statement not only allowed it to escape from an entangling alliance of dubious value, but was in direct accord with the American policy

¹ Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 12, p. 19, 33d Cong., 1st sess.

² The complete correspondence of the Walsh Mission is found in Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 113, 32nd Cong., 1st sess.

of looking with disfavor upon European intervention in the western hemisphere.

During the next decade America's relations with the island were based chiefly upon the Dominican Republic's need of protection against Haiti, and upon the means that she employed to obtain it. A protectorate under a strong power seemed the safest plan, and from 1843 onwards the Dominicans made a series of proposals to both France and Spain suggesting such a measure; but, as one authority puts it, "neither France nor Spain was anxious to annex a hornets' nest."¹ In 1855 a proposal was made to General William L. Cazneau, the United States commissioner to the Dominican Republic, that Samana Bay be leased to the United States at a nominal rent for a naval base; but when the negotiations leaked out, France and Great Britain protested, and nothing farther was done.²

In 1861 President Santana was successful in his efforts to obtain a Spanish protectorate; and in a fervid letter to the Queen of Spain he assured her that "The Dominican people, giving a free course to those sentiments of affection and loyalty which have been so long repressed, have unanimously and spontaneously proclaimed you as their Queen and Sovereign, and I, who have now the exalted and undeserved honor of being the organ of those sincere sentiments, lay at your Majesty's feet the keys of this lovely island."³ By a royal decree dated May 19, 1861, the Queen accepted the offer, and Santana was made governor-general of the colony. If the Monroe Doctrine covered voluntary transfer of sovereignty, here was a clear-cut violation. But, as in the contemporary French intervention in Mexico, Seward's hands were tied by the Civil War, and he

¹ Otto Schoenrich, *Santo Domingo* (N. Y., 1918), p. 55.

² See Moore, *Digest of Int. Law.*, Vol. I, p. 598; treaty also mentioned by Hamilton Fish, Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 17, 41st Cong., 3d sess. Mrs. W. L. Cazneau gives an interesting side-light on these negotiations in an appendix entitled "The Seward Samana Mystery" in her book, *Our Winter Eden* (N. Y., 1878).

³ *British Parl. Papers, 1861*, Vol. LXV. Papers rel. to Annex. of St. Domingo, p. 28.

could only protest in very general terms. Although on April 2, 1861, he wrote the Spanish minister at Washington that Spanish interference in the Dominican Republic would be regarded as manifesting an unfriendly spirit towards the United States and would be met with a prompt resistance, when the news of annexation was received, and Carl Schurz, our minister to Spain, asked him for an explicit statement of policy, Seward replied that too many other subjects were occupying his attention to permit him to give full consideration to this one.¹ The Dominicans, however, were not long content with the Spanish rule. In 1863 a revolution, known as the War of the Restoration, broke out, and two years later, coincident with the termination of the Civil War in the United States, the Spanish Cortes passed a law relinquishing the colony.²

An excellent opportunity was given to Seward to indicate the post-bellum attitude of the United States towards the island when the British minister proposed, on July 25, 1865, that the United States concur with Great Britain in guaranteeing the neutrality of the peninsula of Samana.³ Replying on August 15, the secretary declared that the United States was "sincerely desirous that the entire island of Haiti may now and henceforth remain subject exclusively to the government and jurisdiction of the people who are the dwellers and occupants thereof, and that they may never be dispossessed or disturbed by any foreign state or nation whatever."⁴ He further pointed out that, while the United States was gratified at the proposal, its policy regarding political alliances with foreign states prevented its participation.

¹ Frederic Bancroft, *The Life of Wm. H. Seward* (N. Y., 1900), Vol. II, p. 157.

² A full account of this period from the Spanish standpoint is given by General Gandara y Navarro, *Anexion y Guerra de Santo Domingo* (Madrid, 1884).

³ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1865*, Part II, p. 184; see also Seward's notes to Perry, pp. 522-534.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 191; see also J. N. Léger, *La Politique Extérieure d'Haiti*, pp. 145-157.

After the emancipation of slaves in the United States there was no further reason to refuse to recognize Haiti. In fact, ever since 1838 Congress had been bombarded with petitions and memorials from citizens and organizations of different states asking for such recognition. In his messages of December 3, 1861, President Lincoln expressed the opinion that the independence of Haiti should be recognized; and by the act of June 5, 1862, the President was authorized to appoint a diplomatic representative. On July 12, 1862, Mr. Benjamin F. Whidden was empowered to act as a commissioner and consul-general to Haiti.¹ Two years later a treaty of amity and commerce was concluded between the two countries, and its proclamation followed on July 6, 1865.² Owing to the Spanish protectorate and the resulting disorder, the Dominican Republic was not recognized by us until September 17, 1866. A treaty similar to that made with Haiti was signed in the following year.³

In 1866 the question of Samana once more came up, and this time the Dominican Foreign Secretary proposed to lease certain keys and coal mines in Samana Bay, provided the United States would advance the republic \$1,000,000 in the form of a loan. Secretary Seward thereupon sent the Assistant Secretary of State and Rear-Admiral Porter, with power to conclude a convention for the lease or cession of the peninsula and bay of Samana for the sum of \$2,000,000, one half in cash and the other half payable in munitions of war. The Dominican government was willing to give certain concessions, but declared that the national constitution prevented absolute sale of territory. By the end of 1867, however, conditions were such that the island government decided to accede to the terms of the United States, and the negotiations were rapidly progressing when a revolution brought the downfall of the ruling authorities.⁴

¹ J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. I, p. 107.

² W. M. Malloy, *Treaties, Conventions, etc., of the U. S.*, Vol. I, p. 921.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 403.

⁴ See Seward's account in Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 17, 41st Cong., 3d sess., p. 5.

The new government, under General Baez, was even more friendly to the United States; it proposed, indeed, to Mr. Smith, the commercial agent at Santo Domingo City, that the United States assume a protectorate over the republic and take possession of Samana Bay as a first step towards annexation.¹ This went beyond the ideas of even Seward; although he was soon won over to the proposal, subject to the favorable outcome of a popular referendum in the insular state. President Johnson's ill considered message of December 9, 1868, indicated the direction of the wind.² In a letter to General Banks on January 29, 1869, Seward indicated that the stage was all set for annexation, and a joint resolution was introduced by Mr. Orth, of Indiana, providing for the admission of Santo Domingo, on the application of the people and government of that republic, into the Union as a territory of the United States, with a view to the ultimate establishment of a state government.³ Congress, possessing neither the information nor the imagination of Seward, promptly laid the resolution on the table.

The Grant administration next took over the problem, and Hamilton Fish, the new Secretary of State, despatched General Babcock as a special agent to obtain full information regarding the island, particularly in regard to the disposition of the government and people towards the United States.⁴ Incidentally, the new agent signed a protocol with the Dominican government in which Seward's proposal was virtually repeated, but which also provided that President Grant should use his utmost influence to make the idea of annexation more popular with members of Congress.⁵ With this as a basis, General Babcock and Mr. R. H. Perry were authorized to sign a treaty of annexa-

¹ J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. I, p. 590.

² See p. 43.

³ Frederic Bancroft, *The Life of W. H. Seward* (N. Y., 1900), Vol. II, p. 488.

⁴ For instructions see Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 17, 41st Cong., 3d sess., p. 79.

⁵ For text of protocol see Sen. Report No. 234, 41st Cong., 2nd sess., p. 188.

tion incorporating the republic as a territory of the United States, and also a convention giving the United States immediate possession of the Samana peninsula and bay. The cash payment to be made by the United States was \$1,500,000. The treaty farther provided that in case of its rejection the United States should still have the right to acquire the peninsula and bay of Samana within fifty years upon the payment of \$2,000,000.¹ The treaties were signed November 29, 1869, and communicated to the Senate in the following January.

The debate that followed brought about a serious controversy between President Grant and Charles Sumner, who was at that time chairman of the Senate committee on foreign relations. The report of the committee was adverse to the treaties, and Sumner led the opposition. A vote was taken on June 30, 1870, resulting in a tie (28-28); and as a two-thirds vote was required for ratification, the opponents had won. In his second annual message, December 5, 1870, President Grant again brought up the question and strongly urged that Congress reconsider the matter on the ground that possession of the territory would be of incalculable advantage to the United States strategically, economically, and commercially, and would be "a rapid stride towards that greatness which the intelligence, industry, and enterprise of the citizens of the United States entitle this country to assume among nations."² Although the opposition to annexation remained as strong as ever out of deference to the President's views it was proposed that three commissioners be appointed to inquire once more into the political and economic condition of the island. In a powerful speech, teeming with invective and heated charges, Sumner resisted this proposal.³ The resolution

¹Text of treaty and convention, Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 17, 41st Cong., 3d sess., pp. 98-102.

²J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. VII, p. 99 ff.

³*Works of Charles Sumner*, Vol. XIV, pp. 89-131 (15 vols. Boston, 1875-83).

passed; and the result was that Fish joined Grant in open opposition to Sumner, who was ultimately ousted from his committee chairmanship.¹

In accordance with the congressional resolution, President Grant appointed a very eminent investigating commission, consisting of Benjamin F. Wade, Andrew D. White, and Samuel G. Howe. The three men visited the island and made an elaborate and painstaking report, which is even to-day a very valuable source of information.² They unanimously approved of the annexation, and President Grant once more, in a special message prefacing the report (April 5, 1871), indicated that his own opinion regarding the desirability of annexation had not changed. But the sentiment of Congress was similarly unchanged; so that, although the President, in his last annual message, recurred to the subject, it was merely to vindicate his attitude rather than to renew the proposal.

One of the chief arguments made by Sumner, Schurz, and their followers was the alleged overbearing attitude of the United States towards Haiti. It was asserted that, in order to prevent extraneous influences from interfering with the negotiations, our government had sent war-ships to the island, not only to sustain President Baez against internal difficulties, but also to intimidate Haiti. The instructions given by the Secretary of the Navy to Admiral Poor were, indeed, couched in no uncertain terms: "Proceed at once with the *Severn* and *Dictator* to Port au Prince, communicate with our consul there, and inform the present Haitian authorities that this government is determined to protect the present Dominican government with all its power. . . . If the Haitians attack the Dominicans with their ships, destroy or capture them."³ Admiral Poor did not think it necessary to mask his orders by diplomatic

¹For a detailed account of this famous controversy see Ed. L. Pierce, *Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner* (Boston, 1894), Vol. IV, pp. 426 ff.

²Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 9, 42nd Cong., 1st sess.

³Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 34, 41st Cong., 3d sess., p. 11.

formulae, and he bluntly informed President Saget of Haiti that "any interference or attack by vessels under Haitian or any other flag upon the Dominicans during the pendency of said negotiations will be considered an act of hostility to the flag of the United States, and will provoke hostility in return."¹ Sumner offered a resolution in the Senate condemning these orders as involving an unlawful assumption by the President of the war-making power; but the proposal was laid on the table.² Secretary Fish also gave instructions during this period to Mr. Bassett, our minister to Haiti, warning the Haitian government against any interference with the Dominican Republic.³

For a period following the Grant administration the United States seemed to lose interest in farther expansion in the Caribbean region. When, in 1882, President Salomon, of Haiti, offered to cede to the United States the island of La Fortue, Secretary Frelinghuysen said that "the policy of this government, as declared on many occasions in the past, has tended towards avoidance of possessions disconnected from the main continent."⁴ Two years later a similar observation was called out from him by a proposal to cede the peninsula or bay of Le Mole or the island of Tortuga.

During this period the diplomatic relations between the United States and Haiti were exceedingly friendly, and in the case of the Pelletier and Lazare claims the United States acted in a manner above reproach. Pelletier, a naturalized American, had been seized and imprisoned while cruising off the coast of Haiti in 1861, on evidence of being a slaver. Escaping, he demanded damages from the Haitian government, and his claim was brought up on various occasions until finally, in 1884, Haiti agreed upon arbitration. Mr. William Strong, a former justice of the

¹ Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 34, 41st Cong., 3d sess., p. 13.

² See *Cong. Globe*, 42nd Cong., 1st sess. (1871), Part I, pp. 232 *et seq.*

³ J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. I, p. 279.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 432.

United States Supreme Court, was appointed sole arbiter, and he awarded Pelletier \$57,250 instead of the two and one half millions that he demanded. Haiti protested against making any payment, and when the case was brought before Mr. T. F. Bayard, Secretary of State, he declared the claim of Pelletier against Haiti on the facts exhibited "must be dropped, and dropped peremptorily and immediately, by the government of the United States, . . . first because Haiti had jurisdiction to inflict on him the very punishment of which he complains, and secondly because his cause is of itself so saturated with turpitude and infamy that on it no action, judicial or diplomatic, can be based."¹

The Lazare claim was for a breach of contract in the establishment of a national bank in Haiti. Here again the award of \$117,500 rendered by Mr. Strong was set aside on the ground that new evidence showed the claim to be invalid, and that "the moment the government of the United States discovers that a claim it makes on a foreign government can not be honorably and honestly pressed, that moment, no matter what may be the period of the procedure, that claim should be dropped."² In his message to Congress on May 12, 1887, President Salomon declared that such sentiments did honor to the statesman who had so well expressed them.³

Friendly relations between the United States and Haiti were suddenly interrupted in 1888 by the seizure of an American steamship, the *Haitian Republic*, as she was leaving Saint Mare, on the ground that an effective blockade was being maintained. The reasons for the blockade were as follows: President Salomon's seven-year term ended in 1887. But he had been so successful that the constitution was modified and he was reëlected for another seven years. This brought about a revolution leading to his

¹ Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 64, 49th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 20, or *For. Rel. of U. S.*, 1887, pp. 593 ff.

² *Ibid.*, p. 33.

³ *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1887, p. 629.

withdrawal in August, 1888, followed by a period of anarchy, in which one faction controlled the north and another the south. The *Haitian Republic* had, it was claimed, transported various armed members of the Hyppolite, or northern, faction while touching at the ports of the north and northwest, and on this ground it was seized while in waters patrolled by the *Légitime*, or southern, faction. The United States protested vigorously against the seizure, saying that, since no notice of blockade had been given, the blockade was not effective; that the prize tribunal was irregularly constituted; and that the carrying of passengers who might have been armed between the vessel's ports of call did not constitute complicity in Haitian disorders. When the Haitian authorities refused to give up the ship, the United States sent two war-ships to Port au Prince; whereupon the disputed vessel was surrendered to the American commander.¹

The *Légitime* faction, which had been hostile to the United States, was finally overthrown, and Hyppolite was elected president. Whether the United States had ever done more than manifest sympathy for the Hyppolite side the published records do not show. But about a year after the inauguration of President Hyppolite (January 26, 1891), Rear-Admiral Gherardi arrived at Port au Prince as special commissioner to obtain the *Môle St. Nicholas* as a coaling station for the United States, and used as one of his arguments the services rendered by the United States to the Hyppolite revolution.² Popular opinion, aroused by the sight of an American fleet in the harbor, was so strongly opposed that after several months of fruitless negotiations, in which such technicalities as the form of the commissioner's credentials played a leading part, the United States gave up the idea. Secretary Blaine then turned towards

¹ For details see Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 69, 50th Cong., 2nd sess., particularly pp. 171-176; also *For. Rel. of U. S., 1888*, pp. 932-1006; and 1889, pp. 487-494.

² Fred. Douglass, "Haiti and the United States," *North Amer. Rev.*, Vol. CLIII, p. 343 (Sept., 1891). See also J. B. Moore, *Digest*, Vol. I, p. 610.

the Dominican Republic and proposed to lease Samana Bay. But at the mere disclosure of the proposal the Dominican Secretary of State, General Gonzales, was forced to seek safety in exile. This was the last attempt made by the United States to obtain a naval station in the Caribbean until the war with Spain created new conditions and raised new problems.

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CHAPTER XI

AMERICAN IMPERIALISM IN HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO

BEFORE considering the next and more serious intervention of the United States in the affairs of Haiti and Santo Domingo, it is necessary to say a word regarding the internal history of the two island republics. Sir Spencer St. John, British minister to Haiti for a period of years, called its government "a despotism tempered by revolution and exile and occasionally by death."¹ Beginning with Dessalines in 1804, and surveying the political history of Haiti for a century, we find some twenty different presidents, of whom two were shot, one committed suicide, six were exiled, and several others were overthrown or forced to resign. The Dominican Republic can hardly boast of a better record than its unstable neighbor. In fact, in its checkered history of revolution and counter-revolution, in its unending procession of presidents *de jure* and *de facto*, the Spanish end of the island stands well towards the top in any list of revolution-tossed republics. From 1844 to 1904 we find more than twenty different presidents, in spite of the fact that Heureaux served as president for fourteen years and Baez held office on five different occasions.²

No nation can maintain its credit under such conditions, and when Carlos Morales was inaugurated president of the Dominican Republic in 1904 the government was hopelessly bankrupt. The claims against the government were estimated at anywhere from thirty to forty million dollars.

¹ Spencer St. John, *Haiti* (London, 1889), p. 272.

² See the "Chronology of Political Events in Santo Domingo," prepared by Minister T. C. Dawson, *For. Rel. of U. S.*, 1906, pp. 572-600.

Inasmuch as many of the creditors were Europeans, who constantly urged their governments to intervene, the United States was compelled to keep in close touch with the situation. Furthermore, the United States was virtually forced to intervene in the case of the San Domingo Improvement Company. This American corporation had taken over the holdings of a Holland corporation in 1892, and was authorized by the Dominican government to take over certain custom-houses, with the understanding that a stipulated amount should be paid to the government and the rest devoted to the payment of interest and sinking fund of the loan. In 1901 the Dominican government became dissatisfied with the arrangement and repudiated it. The company appealed to the United States, but the state department urged a settlement by private negotiations. After much haggling, the Dominican government finally offered \$4,500,000 for the company's interests; and the proposal was accepted.¹ Representatives of the two governments signed a protocol on January 31, 1903, providing for the settlement, and for a board of arbitrators to fix the details of payment.² The board fixed the interest rate at 4 per cent., designated the monthly payments, and secured them by the customs, revenues, and port dues of the ports on the northern coast. In case of failure to pay, a financial agent of the United States was authorized to take over certain custom-houses and carry out the award.³

The Dominican government never made any payments, and in compliance with the terms of the award an American financial agent took over the custom-house of Puerto Plata, October 21, 1904. This move aroused the foreign creditors, and in December of this year the French threat-

¹ President Roosevelt in a message to the Senate Feb. 15, 1905, gives a complete summary of the financial and political difficulties of the republic, *For. Rel. of U. S., 1905*, p. 334; see also the more detailed report of J. B. Moore, p. 344.

² For text of the protocol see *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1904*, p. 270.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 274.

ened to seize the custom-house of Santo Domingo City; the Italian interests also demanded the payment of their claims. Secretary Hay thereupon instructed the American minister to Santo Domingo, Mr. T. C. Dawson, to sound out the insular president as to whether the Dominican government would be willing to request the United States to take charge of the collection of duties, with a view to an equitable distribution of the proceeds among the claimants and the Dominican government.¹ President Morales was by no means adverse to such a solution, and on February 4, 1905, a protocol was signed which provided that the United States should take over all the custom-houses, turn over to the Dominican government 45 per cent. of the amount collected for its expenses, and use the other 55 per cent. to liquidate the republic's foreign and domestic debt. The United States further agreed to grant the little republic any assistance deemed necessary "to restore the credit, preserve the order, increase the efficiency of the civil administration, and advance the material progress and welfare of the Dominican Republic."²

When the protocol came before the Senate, President Roosevelt urged that assent be given to its ratification; on the ground that "those who profit by the Monroe Doctrine must accept certain responsibilities along with the rights which it confers."³ The Senate did not seem to appreciate these responsibilities and gave no indication of an intention to give its consent. The President thereupon sent another special message, dated March 6, appealing for immediate action. The Senate adjourned, however, without acting, and the situation in Santo Domingo became so alarming that President Roosevelt decided to carry out the arrangement as an executive agreement. Mr. J. H. Hollander was appointed as confidential agent to examine

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1905*, p. 298.

² *Ibid.*, p. 342.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 334.

and report on the financial conditions in the republic, and the Secretary of War, Mr. Taft, was authorized to nominate the necessary officials to collect the customs.¹ Santo Domingo accepted the *modus vivendi*, and in his message to Congress on December 5, 1905, the President declared that a temporary arrangement had been made which would last until the Senate should take action on the treaty. He also asserted that under the course taken "stability and order and all the benefits of peace are at last coming to Santo Domingo, danger of foreign intervention has been suspended, and there is at last a prospect that all creditors will get justice."² The Senate did not take very kindly to this alleged executive usurpation, and Senator Tillman violently arraigned the President for his unconstitutional abuse of authority.³ The *modus operandi*, however, brought order out of chaos, and the Dominican government received more money from the 45 per cent. turned over by the American officials than they had previously obtained when collecting 100 per cent. for themselves.⁴

After a careful investigation, Professor Hollander found that the claims pending against the Dominican Republic on June 1, 1905, amounted to more than \$40,000,000.⁵ Of this amount, the government recognized about three fourths as valid. But a plan was finally evolved for scaling down this amount to about \$17,000,000, based upon a cash payment. The funds were to be obtained by the flotation of an issue of fifty-year 5 per cent. bonds to the amount of \$20,000,000. An American receiver of customs appointed by the President of the United States was to collect all customs duties until the bond issue should be redeemed;

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1905*, p. 360.

² *Ibid.*, p. xxxvi.

³ See speech of Jan. 17, 1906, *Cong. Rec.*, Vol. XL, Part II, pp. 1173 ff.

⁴ Minister Dawson's memorandum of July 1, 1905, gives an excellent account of the events preceding and the results following the application of the arrangement; *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1905*, p. 378.

⁵ See Report of J. H. Hollander (Wash., 1907), or *Quar. Jour. of Economics*, Vol. XXI, p. 405 (July, 1907).

and the Dominican Republic was not to increase its public debt until full payment should be made. A convention to this effect was signed on February 8, 1907. This time, the Senate was willing to assent; and the convention went into effect on July 25.¹

The Dominican officials themselves could not fail to realize the immediate benefits of American control, and in his annual report for 1906, Señor Velasquez, the Dominican Minister of Finance and Commerce, bore witness to the advantages gained: "The items of revenue during 1905 and those of 1906 speak clearly, with renewed eloquence of figures, that for some time past we have been living in the public posts a life of order and honesty, where but a few years ago life with few exceptions within and without the national palace was one of shamelessness, dilapidation, cupidity, and permanent disgrace for the Republic, being the principal cause, if not the only one, why our weak state has felt itself more than once trembling on the brink of the abyss, and that for a long time we have found ourselves lacking economic autonomy, overweighed by debts, unjustifiable for the greater part, suffering insults and humiliations."²

The convention of 1907 is still in operation: and if the "eloquence of figures" is a fair basis of judgment, the effect of the arrangement has been all that could be desired. The table on page 224, made up from figures submitted in the annual reports of the general receiver of Dominican customs to the bureau of insular affairs in the War Department, summarizes the results.

Despite the remarkable financial and commercial improvement due to American control of the customs, the internal history of the Dominican Republic failed to show much improvement. General Ramón Caceres, who was elected president in 1908, and whose administration was

¹ Text in *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1907*, p. 307.

² *Ibid.*, p. 357.

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FOREIGN TRADE AND CUSTOMS COLLECTION OF THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC¹

YEAR	IMPORTS	EXPORTS	COLLECTIONS BY GENERAL RECEIVERS	VALUE OF TRADE WITH U. S.
1907	\$ 4,948,961	\$ 7,628,356	\$3,181,763.48	\$ 6,192,727
1908	4,767,775	9,396,487	3,469,110.69	7,104,171
1909	4,425,913	8,113,690	3,359,389.71	7,083,000
1910	6,257,691	10,849,623	2,876,976.17	11,400,000
1911	6,949,662	10,995,546	3,433,738.92	9,871,947
1912	8,217,898	12,385,248	3,645,974.79	12,374,607
1913	9,272,278	10,469,947	4,109,294.12	11,369,829
1914	6,729,007	10,558,787	3,462,163.66	13,024,909
1915	9,118,514	15,209,061	3,882,048.40	19,405,530
1916	11,664,430	21,527,873	4,035,355.43	27,574,786
1917	17,581,814	22,444,580	5,329,574.20	32,367,138
1918	20,168,952	22,376,574	4,318,815.48	35,207,332
1919	22,019,127	39,601,892	4,457,393.48	42,153,363
1920	46,525,876	58,731,241	6,273,741.24	86,962,781

¹ The collections by the general receiver were by convention years from Aug. 1, 1914, but starting with Jan. 1, 1915, they have been by calendar years. For the 5-month period Aug. 1, 1914, to Dec. 31, 1914, receipts were \$1,209,555.54. The imports and exports are by calendar years.

eminently successful, was shot down in cold blood by a group of political enemies in November, 1911. A provisional government was immediately established, but it could scarcely maintain itself against the revolutionary outbreaks. In the fall of 1912 President Taft appointed two special commissioners to investigate the situation and recommend measures calculated to put an end to the difficulties. They were to make the trip on an American gunboat, accompanied by 750 marines, who were to be at hand to protect the custom-houses.¹ In accordance with the suggestions of these commissioners, the insular president resigned, and the Dominican congress elected as new president Archbishop Nouel, a man loved and respected throughout the country. He did his best to bring order to the distracted land; but his health could not stand the strain, and on March 31, 1913, after serving exactly four months, he resigned.

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1912, p. 366.*

Another period of revolutionary activity followed, and in a note dated September 9, 1913, Secretary Bryan declared that the influence of the United States would be exerted for the support of lawful authorities and for the discouragement of any and all insurrectionary methods, and that President Wilson had no sympathy with those who sought to seize the power of government to advance their own personal interests.¹ The American minister finally prevailed upon the revolutionary forces to lay down their arms, upon the promise of a fair election in the near future. But when the United States government appointed three commissioners to observe the elections, the Dominican government in power protested vigorously. The commissioners were properly received. But their presence did not prevent the government from arresting six leaders of the opposition on the grounds of conspiracy.² Except for this incident, which completely demoralized the power of the opposition, the elections were very peaceably conducted. In 1914 there was a repetition of the same conditions, and again the United States sent commissioners and the elections were held. Ex-President Jiménez was successful, and for a little more than a year he maintained the peace. In April, 1916, a new insurrection took place, and this time the United States, with the consent of the insular president, landed marines to maintain order. Shortly afterwards President Jiménez resigned and the Dominican congress elected Dr. Henríquez y Carvajal as temporary president.³

On the ground that the terms of the convention of 1907 had been repeatedly violated, the United States, however, refused to recognize the new president unless he would sign a new treaty, which should provide for the collection of

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1913*, p. 425.

² See report of the commission, *ibid.*, p. 449.

³ A brief accurate sketch of these events is found in Judge Schoenrich's *Santo Domingo* (N. Y., 1918), Chap. VI; see also report of Rear-Admiral Snowden, *Conditions in Santo Domingo*, in report of Sec. of Navy, 1920, pp. 321-342.

customs under American auspices, the appointment of an American financial adviser, and the establishment of a constabulary force under American officers. President Henríquez refused to accept recognition on these terms, and the United States declined to pay over any revenue to an unrecognized government. Rear-Admiral Knapp finally broke the deadlock by issuing a proclamation, on November 29, 1916, declaring the Dominican Republic under the military administration of the United States. The proclamation recited that there was no intention to destroy Dominican sovereignty, but merely to restore and maintain order and carry out the terms of the convention of 1907.¹ To accomplish this, Rear-Admiral Knapp suspended the Dominican congress and, in the capacity of governor-general, appointed American naval officers to the various cabinet positions.

Colonel George C. Thorpe, who for almost two years acted as chief of staff of the brigade of marines in the occupation of the republic, thus sums up the mission of the military government: "(1) to promote education, primary and vocational; (2) to build roads; (3) to create an effective police force; (4) to cultivate a regard for law and order; (5) to place property rights on a firmer basis, particularly as to land titles; (6) to stabilize the finances of the country; (7) and at the same time to respect Dominican institutions and sentiments as far as might be."²

Unquestionably such a program, if carried out, would be of inestimable value to the Dominicans; and the Americans have endeavored to carry out the program, in so far as has been possible. In his excellent report of October 23, 1920, to the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Snowden gives conclusive evidence of the benefits of American rule. For

¹For text of the proclamation and American version of the situation leading up to it see *Hearings before a Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo*, U. S. Senate, Part I, pp. 90-94; the Dominican version is given by President Henríquez, *ibid.*, pp. 51-60.

²G. H. Blakeslee [ed.], *Mexico and the Caribbean* (N. Y., 1920), p. 233.

instance, the average amount collected by the internal revenue department before the occupation was \$700,000, with 14 per cent. charged against cost of collection. The receipts for 1920 reached almost \$4,500,000, with the cost of collection reduced to 5 per cent. It is estimated that under the occupation the \$20,000,000 loan will be paid off by 1925, or thirty-three years before it is due. In four years of occupation more than 400 miles of roads were constructed, about one fourth of them macadam. More than a score of bridges were built, and of them seven were large steel bridges and eight were concrete. New piers, a new custom-house at Santo Domingo City, new wharves, and other port improvements were built. In fact, a summary of amounts used by the department of public works from 1909 to 1916 shows an average annual expenditure of about \$400,000; while the average expenditure annually from July, 1917, to June 30, 1920, was more than \$1,250,000. Reforms in other directions were equally noteworthy. The railroads for the year 1916-17 hauled 27,866,635 kilos of freight, and the net earnings were \$49,750.63. In the year 1919-20 50,272,506 kilos of freight were hauled, and the net earnings were \$217,039.74. Before the military administration there were about 18,000 pupils in all schools; in 1920 there were more than 100,000. The reforms instituted in sanitary methods and public health conditions were of particular value to the people.¹

Yet, in spite of the tremendous improvements due to American rule, the Dominicans were by no means content under it, and in many respects they had serious grounds for complaint. Their civil and political liberties were completely taken away by the American military government; numerous cases of unjust imprisonment were proved against the American provost courts; the water torture and other more horrible methods were employed at times

¹ *Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1920*, pp. 321-342; see also memorandum prepared for Sen. Com. Hearings, *op. cit.*, Part I, pp. 96-104.

by the marines; and a strict and humiliating censorship of the press was maintained during the greater part of the American occupation.¹ When, finally, even the economical and financial program of the military administration was suspended through lack of funds, the discontent became so pronounced that during Secretary Colby's visit to South America the Wilson administration on December 23, 1920, authorized Rear-Admiral Snowden to issue a proclamation announcing that "the United States believes the time has arrived when it may, with a due sense of its responsibility to the people of the Dominican Republic, inaugurate the simple processes of its rapid withdrawal from the responsibilities assumed in connection with Dominican affairs."² The only conditions attached were that a commission of Dominican citizens should be appointed, with an American technical adviser who should formulate certain amendments to the constitution and a general revision of the laws. The Dominicans, however, protested vigorously against these conditions, and the situation was turned over to the Harding administration virtually unchanged.

As a candidate, President Harding had promised to take action, and he did not delay. On June 14, 1921, Admiral Robison, who had been appointed military governor to succeed Admiral Snowden, issued a proclamation promising withdrawal within eight months, providing the Dominicans would coöperate with the Americans in establishing a government able to maintain independence and public order and to assure security of life and property. The principal conditions of the convention of evacuation were: (1) the acts of the military government should be ratified; (2) a new loan of \$2,400,000 to complete the public works should be validated; (3) the duties of the general

¹ See summary of abuses in the letter of Archbishop Nouel to Minister Russell, dated December 29, 1919. (*Nation*, July 17, 1920, gives excerpts); see also the protest of President Henríquez, *Current History*, Vol. XIV, p. 397 (June, 1921).

² Text *Hearings*, *op. cit.*, Part III, p. 934.

receiver of Dominican customs should be extended to apply to this loan, and also to the collection and disbursement of a part of the internal revenues if the customs were insufficient to meet the service of the foreign debt; and (4) an efficient *Guardia Nacional* should be organized under the direction of an American military commission.¹ Again the Dominicans protested, and certain of the objections were met by a new statement issued by Secretary Hughes on June 28. The military government thereupon promulgated an electoral law, and the elections were set for August 13. The Dominicans were not yet satisfied; and they organized a "Junta of Electoral Abstention," which prevented the elections from being held.

In the meantime the question had come before Congress, and a Senatorial investigating commission was appointed, with Senator McCormick as chairman. The commission spent about a fortnight in the island, and in a preliminary report Senator McCormick declared that inasmuch as the political leaders in the Dominican Republic had rejected the proposals for the withdrawal of the American forces, and since at the present time it was impossible to advise a substantial modification of the terms of the proclamation, the American troops should not be removed.²

Early in 1922, however, numerous conferences were held in Washington between Secretary Hughes and Señors Velasquez, Vasquez, Brache, and Peynado, the first three representing the different political parties in the Dominican Republic, the latter being the former Dominican minister at Washington. The following program was finally agreed upon:

(1) A Provisional Government of Dominican citizens selected by Dominicans will be installed to carry out such legislative and constitutional reforms as they may deem appropriate, and to hold general elections for the installa-

¹ *Hearings, op. cit.*, Part I, p. 102.

² *New York Times*, Dec. 26, 1921.

tion of a subsequent permanent government without the intervention of the authorities of the United States.

(2) Upon the inauguration of the Provisional Government, the executive departments of the Dominican Republic will be turned over to the cabinet ministers appointed by the Provisional President; the Military Government will also turn over the National Palace, and at the same time the United States military forces will be concentrated in one, two, or three places as the Military Governor may determine. From that time peace and order will be maintained by the Dominican national police under the orders of the Provisional Government.

(3) Dominican plenipotentiaries will be designated by the Provisional Government to negotiate a convention with the United States containing the following provisions: (a) Recognition by the Dominican government of all executive and department orders promulgated by the Military Government, contracts entered into in accordance with these orders, and specific recognition of the bond issues authorized in 1918 and in 1922; (b) the convention of February 8, 1907, shall remain in force so long as any bonds of the issues of 1918 and 1922 shall remain unpaid, and the duties of the general receiver shall be extended to include the collection and application of the revenues pledged for the service of these issues.

(4) Upon this convention being approved by the national congress and constitutional president duly elected, the American military forces will immediately leave the Dominican Republic.

In order that the United States might be advised without delay whether this agreement met with the approval of a majority of the Dominican people, the President appointed Mr. Sumner Welles of New York as commissioner, with the rank of envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, to represent him in the Dominican Republic, for the purpose of investigating and reporting upon conditions

there, and to obtain the views of the Dominican people respecting an appropriate agreement with the United States as a result of which the military forces of the United States might be withdrawn.¹

Perhaps as fair and unbiased a survey of the whole situation as has yet been made is found in the report of Dr. Carl Kelsey, of the University of Pennsylvania, who was selected by the board of directors of the American Academy of Political and Social Science to undertake a survey of the economic, social, and political conditions in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. He spent nine months in the island, and his report contains a wealth of valuable material on the present conditions on the island. In his conclusions regarding the Dominican Republic he finds that, although the Dominicans are not antagonistic to Americans, they are critical of the policy of our government. They feel that the troops were sent either under false pretenses or through error. They recognize their economic dependence upon the United States, and they would welcome better trade relations. But the United States has promised to withdraw under certain conditions, and the pledge must be kept if the conditions are accepted. Dr. Kelsey thinks that an agreement will be reached, but that if it is not, the United States should replace a military by a civil government, select competent men, and maintain and support them. And finally—and this opinion covers the situation both in Haiti and Santo Domingo—Dr. Kelsey writes: “Unless we are prepared to surrender the Monroe Doctrine, and of this I see no sign, the time has come for us to assume definitely the responsibilities it entails and to work out some definite policy. Unless we do this it might be better for us to get out and stay out.”²

¹ *New York Times*, July 12, 1922.

² “The American Intervention in Haiti and the Dominican Republic,” *Annals of the American Academy*, Vol. C, No. 189 (March, 1922), pp. 109-200, found also in *Hearings, op. cit.*, Part 4, pp. 1279-1341; see also Dr. Kelsey's statement before the Senate Committee, *ibid.*, pp. 1238-1277.

The recent relations of the United States with Haiti have been very similar to our relations with the Dominican Republic. After a protracted series of revolutionary outbreaks, the financial situation became so bad in 1914 that Great Britain, tired of being put off, sent an ultimatum demanding payment of an indemnity of \$62,000; and shortly afterwards Germany and France demanded the control of the customs.¹ The European war averted European interference for the time being. But, with a view to preventing it permanently, Mr. Bailly-Blanchard, the American minister, presented to the Haitian government on December 10, 1914, a project for a convention similar to the agreement of 1907 with Santo Domingo, *i. e.*, providing for a customs receiver who should put the finances in order.² Fearing popular disapproval, the Haitian government refused, and the United States did not insist. In May, 1915, Mr. Paul Fuller, Jr., was sent as a special agent to Haiti with a new proposal. The United States now asked to protect Haiti against foreign attack and to aid in suppressing insurrection within, provided that Haiti would covenant that no rights or privileges concerning the occupation of Môle Saint Nicholas would be granted to any foreign government, and would agree to settle by arbitration the claims of American citizens.³ Haiti accepted this proposal as a basis of negotiations, and early in June made a counter-proposal.

Meanwhile the internal conditions became so serious that Rear-Admiral Caperton was ordered to proceed to Cape Haitien with his cruiser. President Theodore had been killed, and President Guillaume-Sam was maintaining himself with difficulty. To secure himself, the latter had ar-

¹For a sketch of the history of this period see Chester Lloyd Jones, *Caribbean Interests of the United States* (N. Y., 1919), pp. 137 ff.; see also Mr. Lansing's letter to Secretary Hughes regarding Germany's intentions in the Caribbean, Sen. Rep. No. 794, 67th Cong., 2nd sess., Appendix B.

²*Hearings, op. cit.*, Part I, p. 6; text, p. 33.

³*Ibid.*, p. 7.

rested a large number of influential citizens and political opponents, and when, in spite of this, an attack was made on his palace, he had them put to death. This so enraged the populace that they broke into the French legation, whither he had fled for refuge, shot him, cut his body into pieces, and dragged it about the town.¹ On the same day (July 28, 1915) Admiral Caperton landed marines at Port au Prince to protect the legation, and later he took over the custom-houses and other public services. In order to secure the coöperation of the Haitians, a presidential election was held on August 12 under American protection, and M. Dartiguenave was elected. Conditions continuing turbulent, on September 3 Admiral Caperton proclaimed martial law; and on September 16 a treaty was signed whereby the United States established a virtual protectorate.² At first there was strong opposition on the part of the Haitian government to approving the treaty. But on November 11, 1915, the insular senate agreed to it. Considering the fact that Admiral Caperton, under Secretary Daniels' instructions, announced to the insular President and his cabinet that the United States would remain in control until the treaty was ratified, and that the funds collected at the customs would be available for the payment of salaries only after ratification, it is not surprising that the Haitian senate accepted the convention.³

The principal provisions of the convention are as follows: (1) the establishment of a Haitian receivership of customs under American control; (2) the appointment of an American financial adviser to assist in the settlement of the foreign debt and in other financial and commercial matters; (3) the organization of a native Haitian constabulary under the command of American officers; (4) the

¹ *Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1915*, pp. 15-17; or the more detailed report of Brig.-Gen. George Barnett in the *Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1920*, pp. 245 ff.

² *Hearings, op. cit.*, pp. 336, 344, 348.

³ *Hearings, op. cit.*, Part II, p. 394.

disarming of all revolutionary forces; and (5) a guaranty on the part of Haiti to cede no territory to any nation but the United States. The convention is to remain in force ten years, and is to be continued for another ten years if its objects shall not have been satisfactorily accomplished within the briefer period.¹

The convention was proclaimed on May 3, 1916, and is still in force. The results, however, on the whole have been less satisfactory than in the Dominican Republic. The list of grievances of the Haitians is a long one.² The United States is accused of not carrying out the terms of the convention, and of deliberately usurping the powers of civil government which the convention guarantees to the Haitians. It is claimed that no attempt has been made to give the financial aid promised by the United States, and that up to 1920 no attempt was made to pay interest on the foreign debt; there has also been but one payment on the internal debt. The Haitians assert that the United States has backed the unconstitutional methods of President Dartiguenave, has suppressed the Haitian legislature, and has prevented the drawing up of a more liberal constitution. Finally, they accuse the marines of indiscriminate killing of Haitians and of employing cruel and inhuman treatment towards the natives upon numerous occasions, particularly in the establishment of the *corvée* or enforced labor on the roads.

Unquestionably, every one of these accusations has been justified to a certain extent; but, on the other hand, a careful investigation into the voluminous testimony shows that the American intervention has not deserved the bitter criticism that it has sometimes received. The military forces have not always carried out the provisions of the convention as promptly as they should,—Admiral Knapp,

¹ *U. S. Stat. at Large*, Vol. XXXIX, Part II, p. 1654.

² See the memoir of the Union Patriotique d'Haiti, *Hearings*, *op. cit.*, Part I, pp. 5-33.

in his report, concedes this,—but only because of the desire to do the job quickly and well.¹ Some of the officers abused their power,² and there were also unlawful executions of prisoners,³ but the guilty officials were immediately court-martialed and removed from the service. The *corvée* was used for a time as an emergency measure, but was subsequently discontinued.

When evidence of abuses was brought to the attention of the United States government, every effort was made to get at the truth of the situation. In the summer of 1920 Rear-Admiral Knapp was ordered by Secretary Daniels to make a special investigation. General George Barnett, who commanded the marines from June, 1915, to June 30, 1920, was asked to make a complete report, and this was followed by another by General Lejeune, who took over the command. In addition, Secretary Daniels appointed a court of inquiry headed by Rear-Admiral Mayo, and consisting of Rear-Admiral Oliver, Major-General Neville, and Major Dyer of the Marine Corps, to inquire into the alleged indiscriminate killings of Haitians and unjustifiable acts by members of the United States naval service. Finally, there was the Senate investigation under Senator McCormick.

All of these reports show that abuses were the exception rather than the rule; and they indicate that the results of the American occupation have not been wholly bad. For instance, the customs collected for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1920, amounted to almost \$6,500,000, exceeding by more than \$1,000,000 the entire revenue collected in any of the five years before the intervention.⁴ But the improvement in living conditions was perhaps the greatest achievement of the American intervention. The Rev.

¹ Report of Admiral Knapp in *Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1920*, p. 232.

² *Ibid.*, p. 227.

³ Report of General Barnett, *ibid.*, p. 306.

⁴ Report of Admiral Knapp, *ibid.*, p. 228.

Colmore, bishop of Porto Rico and Haiti, writing in 1917, thus characterizes it: "The marines have literally taught the Haitians how to live decently. Before their coming, sanitation, save in the crudest and most unsatisfactory forms, was unknown; fevers and epidemics were as plentiful as revolutions; a press gang was in vogue, and the country was the victim of continuous uprisings engineered by political scoundrels. . . . The entry of the United States marines ended this sorry story. . . . Sanitary systems had been installed, the towns had been cleaned up, former idlers and revolutionists were working happily for living wages, and a new spirit was animating the people. . . ." ¹ Bishop Morris, writing in 1920, after visiting every important city on the island, declared: "The only opposition to Americans in Haiti is political opposition. In the southern part of the island, particularly on the peninsula, the American occupation is regarded as the salvation of the people. I heard this opinion frequently. I had under me twelve native clergymen, and neither from them nor from the many other natives I talked to did I hear one word of condemnation of the acts of the American Marine Corps." ²

Bishop Morris appears to have struck at the very heart of the difficulty—the opposition is chiefly political. But can the United States afford to disregard political opposition? It would be impossible to do so and still adhere to the policy that has been so consistently maintained in our relations with weaker states. Neither can the United States withdraw completely at the present time from the island. In the preliminary Senate report on Haiti, Senator McCormick declared that "the members of the committee are unanimous in the belief that the continual presence of the small American force in Haiti is as necessary to the peace and development of the country as are

¹ Cited in report of Gen. Barnett, *op. cit.*, p. 275.

² *Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1920*, p. 319.

the services to the Haitian government of the American officials appointed under the treaty of 1915. There can be no abrogation of the treaty, and at this time no diminution of the small force of marines.”¹

In these circumstances, the United States should formulate a definite policy in regard to these unwilling and troublesome wards and carry it out in a firm but conciliatory fashion. Military government, although perhaps the most efficient, will not do. The American people have a firmly intrenched belief in the desirability of civil government except in times of real emergency, and they feel that their possessions and protectorates should have the benefit of it. Furthermore, the problem of the United States is not to crush, but to coöperate. Left to themselves, both Haiti and Santo Domingo must either be governed despotically or follow the revolutionary road to bankruptcy. Former experiences have also shown that the first possibility does not necessarily obviate the second. Between the Scylla of foreign intervention and the Charybdis of hostility on the part of the natives, the path of the United States is a difficult one. But the situation must be faced. If *some* policy of regulation is essential, the *best* one should be sought; and, that settled, men should be appointed to the positions of responsibility who are equal to the task. A glance at the British methods in the neighboring islands, and at the type of men employed, would not be without value. Senator McCormick's suggestion that a high commissioner be appointed by the President, in whom should be vested the usual diplomatic powers of an envoy, and to whom both the American officials under the treaties and the officers of the marines should look for direction and guidance, is a proper step towards the centralization of responsibility. If such an official could win the confidence

¹ *New York Times*, Dec. 25, 1921. For Haitian opinion on the investigation see the address of Prof. Pierre Hudicourt in Washington, Feb. 2, 1922, *Cong. Record*, Vol. LXII, p. 7857 (May 19, 1922). The detailed findings and recommendations are found in Sen. Rep. No. 794, 67th Cong., 2nd sess.

of the native authorities to such an extent that they would coöperate with him effectively, a result might be achieved which would be beneficial in the highest degree to both parties. But, whatever the solution of the problem, the present situation clearly imposes a moral duty on the United States to face the facts and realize the responsibilities which they impose.

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CENTRAL AMERICA

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CHAPTER XII

INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN CENTRAL AMERICA

SOUTH of Mexico, stretching some six hundred miles in a southeasterly direction to the Isthmus of Panama, lie the five republics of Central America—Guatemala, Honduras, Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. The combined area of these states is about 175,000 square miles, or virtually that of Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. Their aggregate population is about five and one half millions.¹ The climate varies from that of the humid and suffocating coastal plains on the Atlantic side to that of the comparatively cool regions of the plateaus and mountain valleys, and again to that of the hot, dry, but healthful coast of the Pacific. The population is predominantly Indian, although it varies considerably in the different states. Guatemala, for example, is almost completely Indian, while in Costa Rica the white population predominates. In spite of the fact that the Central American states are for the most part possessed of extremely fertile soil, have considerable mineral resources, and, with the exception of Salvador, have outlets on both oceans, they must still be regarded as among the more backward regions of the western hemisphere. Spain's policy of selfish exploitation kept them in this condition while they were under her control; since they achieved independence, mutual jealousies and revolutions have produced a similar result.

Before taking up the relations of the United States with Central America, it might be well to point out the more

¹ For specific data on the individual states, see *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (1920), p. 838.

noticeable differences among these five republics.¹ Guatemala has the largest population, the greatest foreign trade, and is the most wealthy. This arises partly from its size, partly from the comparative peace that the republic has enjoyed under its autocratic governments. Two of its despots, Carrera and Cabrera, succeeded in maintaining themselves in power for over twenty years. On the other hand, Guatemala has virtually no middle class, and its wealth has been produced by the contract labor of the ignorant and oppressed Indians. It is asserted that the great coffee plantations could not be worked without a system of peonage; but such a confession bodes ill for the future progress of the country.

Costa Rica, although not half so large as Guatemala, is a close second in commerce and wealth, and is the first country in Latin America in its production of bananas. Owing to its homogeneous white population and its isolation from its more turbulent neighbors, its history has been fairly free from revolutions and its prosperity correspondingly great. It justly claims first place among the Central American republics as the most progressive and most efficiently governed, and it is the country's boast that it has more school-teachers than soldiers.

Although the smallest of the twenty-one American republics, El Salvador must in many ways be regarded as the most important member of the Central American group. Its climate and soil are excellent; its coast on the Pacific contains good harbors; its population has more Spanish blood than has that of either Nicaragua or Honduras; and, although its history has been very turbulent, the reason is to be found chiefly in the interference of other countries in its affairs. Salvador is the second country in Central America in population and trade, and is by far the most

¹ For general description concerning these republics see the pamphlets issued by the Pan-American Union under the names of the various countries. The best single book is D. G. Munro, *The Five Republics of Central America* (N. Y., 1918).

densely populated. In contrast with Costa Rica, its army is better organized than its schools, and has been a rather heavy drain on its finances. On the whole, it has been the least friendly towards the United States of all the Central American republics; and it was the only one that did not join in the war against Germany.

Nicaragua is the largest of the five states, and, owing to its canal possibilities, it has received more attention from foreign powers than any of its sister republics. Its political history—in which the United States has played a leading part—has been exceedingly turbulent. Next to Honduras, it is perhaps the most backward state in Central America; its communication facilities are wholly inadequate, and its arrangements for education are primitive in the extreme.

Honduras means “the depths,” and the republic does not belie its name. Its population is, for the most part, densely ignorant; economically it is the most backward; its government has generally been a military despotism; and the state has been the center of virtually every conflict in the isthmus. The result has been a tremendous foreign debt, bankruptcy, and finally American intervention.

Before its declaration of independence on September 15, 1821, the viceroyalty of Guatemala, which included the provinces of Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Costa Rica, had been the connecting link of the great Spanish Empire extending from Mexico to Patagonia. Free from the Spanish yoke, the states into which the viceroyalty disintegrated gravitated towards Mexico; and, although there was considerable opposition, particularly on the part of Costa Rica, a provisional junta decreed that the whole of Central America should be annexed to the Empire of Mexico.¹ The fall of Iturbide came before the plan could be carried into effect, and the states were once more adrift. It

¹ H. H. Bancroft, *History of Central America* (San Francisco, 1886-87), Vol. III, p. 54.

is interesting to note that at this time Salvador, which also opposed annexation to Mexico, passed an act annexing itself to the United States and sent two representatives to negotiate with the authorities at Washington on the subject.¹

The idea of a federal union modeled upon that of the United States had appealed strongly from the beginning, and in 1823 a national constituent assembly was called, which declared the former viceroyalty of Guatemala free and independent and confederated into a nation under the name of *Provincias Unidas del Centro de América*. A constitution was thereupon drafted, after the American model, and ratified on September 1, 1825. Before the year was out the United States recognized the new federal state by signing, on December 5, 1825, a treaty of commerce and friendship, which was proclaimed in effect by the American Secretary of State on October 28, 1826.² This treaty, designated "A General Convention of Peace, Amity, Commerce, and Navigation with the Federation of the Centre of America," consisted of thirty-three articles, which granted equal privileges and rights to citizens coming from either republic into the other, and all the rights granted by one or the other to the most favored nation. It was to remain in force for twelve years. No provision was made for its continuance after that time. But it proved eminently satisfactory to both parties, and shortly before its expiration in 1838, Mr. De Witt, the *chargé d'affaires* at Guatemala, was instructed to obtain a renewal of it. A new treaty was signed on July 14, 1838. But, owing to a delay in the exchange of ratifications, it did not go into effect; and in the summer of 1839 Mr. J. L. Stephens was sent as special agent to bring about the exchange of ratifications.³ In the meantime the confederation had been rapidly weakening; the last federal congress adjourned in 1838, and

¹ H. H. Bancroft, *op. cit.*, p. 64; see also Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 75, 31st Cong., 1st sess., p. 94.

² For text see *Amer. State Papers, For. Rel.*, Vol. VI, pp. 269-276.

³ Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 75, 31st Cong., 1st sess., p. 95.

the last president was expelled in 1840. As a consequence, Mr. Stephens was unable to accomplish the object of his mission.

Various attempts were made to reorganize the federation, but nothing permanent came of them. In 1842 Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua formed a confederation which lasted about two years, and again in 1849 they signed a treaty of confederation which proved equally abortive.¹ Uncertain of the situation, the United States had despatched Mr. W. S. Murphy in 1841, with instructions that if he should find any organized government of a federation of Central America, he should arrange for the ratification of the treaty of commerce. He was obliged to report that there was, at the time, no federal government in Central America entitled to the privileges, or responsible for the duties, of a sovereign power.² Guatemala declared herself definitely free and independent on March 21, 1847, and the United States thereupon despatched Mr. Elijah Hise to propose the adoption of the treaty of 1838 between the United States and Guatemala. He was also authorized to conclude a similar treaty with Salvador; but Secretary Buchanan did not deem it advisable to conclude treaties with either Nicaragua, Honduras, or Costa Rica until the department secured farther authentic information concerning them.³

Undoubtedly a more important reason for sending Mr. Hise was to obtain information about the encroachments of Great Britain upon the territories of Nicaragua, Honduras, and Costa Rica, under the guise of protecting the so-called kingdom of the Mosquito Indians. In fact, on January 1, 1849, a British man-of-war had taken forcible possession of the post of San Juan de Nicaragua; and,

¹ For full account see Bancroft, *op. cit.*, Chap. X; also W. F. Slade, "The Federation of Central America," *Journal of Race Development* (July, 1917), Vol. VIII, p. 79 ff.

² Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 75, 31st Cong., 1st sess., p. 95.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

although the Nicaraguan troops recaptured it on January 9, the British reoccupied it three days later and maintained their hold. Inasmuch as San Juan would be the natural outlet for any isthmian canal through the state of Nicaragua, the interest of the United States was justified. Mr. Hise arrived about the first of November, and lost no time in accomplishing his mission. In a letter to the Secretary of State, dated May 25, 1849, he reported that he had already concluded a treaty with Guatemala, and was then negotiating with the commissioners of Honduras and Nicaragua, with whom he hoped to conclude commercial reciprocity treaties; and he intimated that he also expected "to conclude a special convention with Nicaragua of vast importance to the United States and to the whole commercial world."¹ He was not disappointed, and in a despatch dated September 15, 1849, he announced that he had concluded treaties of amity and commerce with Honduras and Nicaragua, and a special convention with Nicaragua. This convention secured to the United States a perpetual right of way by land or water through Nicaragua, and the right to charter a company which should have exclusive right over the contemplated canals or roads; in return, the United States was to guarantee the sovereignty of Nicaragua over its rightful territories.² Although his instructions had given him no such powers,—in fact, had definitely prohibited conventions with Honduras and Nicaragua,—he justified his acts on the grounds that, on account of the revolutionary condition of the country, he had received no answers to his despatches. He also felt that the cession of Upper California to the United States and the subsequent discovery of gold there made this acquisition doubly valuable. Finally, he was confident of being sustained because he had received authentic in-

¹ Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 75, 31st Cong., 1st sess., p. 103.

² Text *ibid.*, p. 110; for earlier attempts to obtain a canal route across Nicaragua, see Chap. III.

formation that English companies were endeavoring to procure for themselves the privileges that he had received.

Months before this, however, the new administration at Washington had recalled him, and had appointed Mr. E. G. Squier to undertake a similar mission to Nicaragua. In Squier's case, however, authority was given to conclude treaties with all five republics separately in case he should consider that there were no hopes of a new confederacy. In the case of Nicaragua, he was to obtain, if possible, for the citizens of the United States the right of free transit over any canal or railroad that might be constructed between the two oceans. But it was not deemed expedient to give as compensation any guaranty of the independence of the country through which the canal or railroad should pass.¹ The instructions of Secretary Clayton also gave a very complete résumé of the British claims to the Mosquito territory, and concluded with the opinion that they were founded upon repeated usurpations. "The United States," he declared, "would not allow the isthmian passage to be blocked by such pretensions—it desired no monopoly of the right of way for its commerce, nor could it submit to a similar claim on the part of any other country."²

When Mr. Squier arrived at his post, he noticed that a very cordial relationship existed between Honduras, Salvador, and Nicaragua, and upon learning that commissioners had been appointed to arrange for a more complete and efficient union he expressed the hope that the attempt would prove successful. In a note to the Minister of Foreign Relations of the Republic of San Salvador, he declared that "it is the desire of my government that some consolidation of these states may be effected, believing, as it does, that their general interests will thus be

¹ Sen. Doc., *op. cit.*, p. 120.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 121-128. For a more complete discussion of the British claims see Sen. Doc. No. 27, 32nd Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 73-98.

promoted, and that they will be better enabled to resist the encroachments and thwart the designs of foreign and unfriendly powers.”¹ He also noticed that the British appeared to have designs upon Tigre Island in the Gulf of Fonseca, which belonged to Honduras. Believing that its seizure by Great Britain would vitally affect the interests of the United States, he, too, exceeded his instructions, and, despatching a special courier to Honduras, he asked for a speedy treaty between the United States and Honduras which should “authorize the United States in interposing its power against the designs of the English.”² In his despatch to Secretary Clayton he suggested that a feasible method of effecting the objects desired might be to procure the cession of the island to the United States.³ Washington was unwilling to risk this plan; and we have shown in another chapter how the United States attempted to settle the dispute with Great Britain by the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.⁴ Although Mr. Squier succeeded in obtaining a satisfactory treaty with Nicaragua, it was no more productive of results than “the most advantageous treaty that human ingenuity could devise” of his predecessor.

During the next decade Central America was a close competitor with California in furnishing an outlet for the restless energy of adventurous Americans. In fact, the two were very closely linked up, since the most practicable way to California from the eastern seaboard of the United States was by water as far as Panama, and thence, after crossing the isthmus, by way of the Pacific. We have already seen how the Panama Railroad Company had re-

¹ Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 75, 31st Cong., 1st sess., p. 163. It is interesting to note that just three weeks earlier Señor Francisco Castellon, the Nicaraguan minister to London, had asked of Mr. Bancroft, the American minister, whether Honduras, San Salvador, and Nicaragua might be admitted into the North American Union and upon what conditions. If not, could they count upon the United States to defend the integrity of their territory? *Ibid.*, p. 302.

² *Ibid.*, p. 167.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

⁴ See pp. 62-63.

ceived a concession from Colombia in 1850, and had completed the road in 1855.¹ This company was not destined, however, to monopolize the isthmian traffic. In 1849 Colonel Vanderbilt, with several associates, obtained a concession from Nicaragua, authorizing them to construct a canal through Nicaragua, utilizing any lakes or rivers that the engineers should consider feasible in putting through the project. Having become incorporated as the "American Atlantic and Pacific Canal Company," this group proceeded actively with the plan. Soon, however, they found that it was not entirely practicable.² A new charter was then obtained, which gave to the Accessory Transit Company (an offshoot of the older organization) a right of way across the country and the sole privilege of steam navigation on the navigable waters of the state.³ By 1854 a route across the country by river boats, lake steamers, and stage-coaches had been completed and was competing very actively with the Panama route.⁴

It can readily be imagined that the officials of this company would be directly interested in the maintenance of a stable government in Nicaragua strong enough to protect the transport of passengers across the country. But a stable government in Nicaragua at this time seemed quite beyond the bounds of probability. The Conservatives, with Granada as their stronghold, were in perpetual conflict with the Liberals, whose strength was centered at Leon. The other towns divided their allegiance between these two groups. Fifteen presidents during a period of six years makes a record for even Central American republics. In 1854 the Liberals, under Francisco Castellon, who had taken the offensive and were besieging the Legitimists in Granada, found that they were losing ground. To stem

¹ Chap. III.

² For text of the charter see Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 68, 34th Cong., 1st sess., p. 84.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

⁴ L. M. Keasby, *Nicaragua Canal and the Monroe Doctrine* (N. Y., 1896); also E. G. Squier, *Honduras* (London, 1870), p. 241.

the tide, Castellon contracted with Byron Cole, an American, to bring a detachment of Americans to Nicaragua to serve in the Democratic Army.¹ Cole was a friend of William Walker, who had already attained considerable notoriety as a result of the filibustering expedition which he had led to southern California with a view to adding it, together with Sonora, to the territories of the United States. Cole communicated the proposal to Walker, then engaged in newspaper work in California. The adventurer needed little persuasion to organize the expedition. On May 4, 1855, fifty-eight men left San Francisco for Nicaragua under his leadership. In less than six months Walker had captured Granada, signed a treaty with the Legitimist leader, and had himself named commander-in-chief of the military forces of the new Rivas government. The Accessory Transit Company was not slow to appreciate the advantages of enlisting him on its side, and one of its agents offered to finance the new government and immediately made an advance of \$20,000.²

Walker's situation was still so critical that he could not afford to refuse such timely aid; and when the company also agreed to furnish free transportation on its steamers for recruits from New York and San Francisco, thus augmenting his forces by hundreds of valuable followers, he became hopelessly indebted to its agents.³ Their purpose was soon revealed. The New York and San Francisco agents, Morgan and Garrison, had determined to wrest control of the company from Vanderbilt, and Walker was to play a leading rôle in bringing about this result. Nicaragua had certain valid claims against the company, which Walker was to use as a basis for securing the revocation of the charter. He could then issue a new charter to Morgan and Garrison, who by virtue of the concession would be

¹ An interesting and scholarly account of these events is given by Prof. W. O. Scroggs, *Filibusters and Financiers* (N. Y., 1916).

² W. O. Scroggs, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 139.

in a position to take over the property of the old company. Walker became a partner in the scheme, and obtained Rivas' signature to the revocation of the old charter. Morgan and Garrison received the concession. But Walker, by incurring the bitter enmity of Vanderbilt, had committed himself to a course which was to result ultimately in his undoing.

In trying to decide upon a policy regarding the filibusters, the Pierce administration found itself in a quandary. The ministers of Costa Rica, Guatemala, and San Salvador protested against the recruiting, which was going on openly, and thereupon Pierce issued a proclamation warning all American citizens against fitting out or taking part in expeditions to Nicaragua.¹ But, in spite of the proclamation and the Attorney-General's attempts to enforce it, the recruiting went on as merrily as before. When Parker H. French arrived in Washington as the official representative of the Walker-Rivas government, Secretary Marcy refused to receive him, on the ground that those who were instrumental in overthrowing the government of Nicaragua were not citizens of the country, and that the United States would establish diplomatic relations with Nicaragua only after it appeared that the new government had the support of its citizens.² Pierce was accused of catering to Great Britain by refusing to recognize the American government in Nicaragua, and there was even a chance that it would defeat his renomination. Incensed at the treatment accorded French, Walker broke off diplomatic relations with Wheeler, the American minister at Granada.³ A little later, realizing that French was a most unfortunate choice as minister to the United States, Walker chose Father Vijil, the curate of Granada; and when the latter presented his credentials at Washington they were accepted by President

¹ J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. X, p. 388.

² Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 68, 34th Cong., 1st sess., p. 57.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

Pierce, "satisfactory evidence appearing that he represents the *de facto* government."¹

The Costa Rican minister at Washington, Señor Molina, was particularly hostile to the Walker-Rivas government, and protested bitterly to Mr. Marcy on various occasions. In desperation, his state finally took up arms against Nicaragua, whose independence had been destroyed "by the pirates who sailed from the coasts of the United States."² The first engagements were decidedly favorable to the Costa Rican forces, but an epidemic of cholera so decimated the ranks that the campaign had to be abandoned. Elated by his success and by the recognition extended by the American government, Walker now proceeded to have himself elected president. The American minister, Mr. Wheeler, without awaiting instructions, proceeded to recognize the new government.³ He was later censured for his blunder, and when the Walker government's representative reached Washington, he was not received and explanations were refused.⁴

The other republics now became alarmed at Walker's success, and, fearing for their own safety, entered into an alliance for the defense of their sovereignty and independence, recognizing the deposed Rivas as the provisional president of Nicaragua. In spite of the overwhelming superiority of the allies, Walker and his brilliant officer, General Hennington, withstood every attack, and at the end of 1856 the prospects for success were still bright. Vanderbilt now came to the aid of the allies, and, by a clever scheme ably carried out by his agents, caused the collapse of the filibuster régime. A force of Costa Ricans, aided by Spencer, a former engineer on the Transit Company's line, succeeded in surprising Walker's force guarding the steamers on the San Juan and Great Lake, thus

¹ Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 68, 34th Cong., 1st sess., p. 6.

² *Ibid.*, p. 131.

³ W. O. Scroggs, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 215.

cutting off further supplies and reinforcements. The result was now merely a question of time. Commander Davis, in charge of a United States sloop-of-war, seeing the desperate plight of the filibusters, offered his mediation, and the allied general was willing to allow them to surrender to the American commander. "Vanderbilt's man had succeeded in doing what the allied Central American states could not accomplish. It was American capitalists who set up the filibuster régime in Nicaragua, and it was an American capitalist who pulled it down."¹

In September, 1857, the representatives of Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Salvador informed Mr. Cass that a new Walker expedition was being prepared.² When this was brought to the attention of Walker, he indited a letter to Secretary Cass truly remarkable in its diplomatic naïveté. He declared that this self-imposed guardianship over Nicaragua on the part of the representatives of Costa Rica and Guatemala was humiliating in the extreme, and as the rightful and lawful chief executive of Nicaragua he protested against it.³ The United States government investigated, none the less, and finally ordered his arrest. Released on bail for hearing, he immediately set sail for Nicaragua from New Orleans, with very little interference on the part of the port authorities.⁴ He landed at Punta Arenas November 24, but before he could do much mischief the U. S. frigate *Wabash*, under the command of Commodore Paulding, appeared opposite the filibusters' camp and demanded their surrender. Walker was brought back to the United States, and, although Commodore Paulding was censured for violating the sovereignty of Nicaragua, President Buchanan expressed the view in no

¹ W. O. Scroggs, *op. cit.*, p. 285. For a full account of the surrender from the standpoint of the filibuster see House Ex. Doc. No. 24, 35th Cong., 1st sess., p. 15.

² House Doc., *op. cit.*, p. 4.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

uncertain terms that Walker's expedition was a crime, and said that such undertakings interfered at every step with the conduct of foreign affairs with Central American governments.¹

Buchanan had already recognized Señor Yrisarri, who was serving as minister from Guatemala and Salvador, as representative from Nicaragua, and immediately signed a treaty with him providing for open transit through Nicaragua to all nations upon equal terms, and giving the United States the right to employ force, if necessary, to protect the route.² This treaty, however, was never signed by the Nicaraguan president, partly because of the opposition of Vanderbilt, who knew that a rival company had the concession, but principally because of the machinations of a Frenchman, M. Felix Belly, who used the fear of the filibusters as a most effective bogey to frighten the presidents of Costa Rica and Nicaragua. These officials went so far as to issue an elaborate manifesto against the United States, declaring that the United States openly menaced Central America with annexation unless Europe should defend it; and they therefore placed their countries under the protection of England, France, and Sardinia.³ When the United States asked whether this document was genuine, the Nicaraguan government, after considerable prodding, replied that it was signed by the president acting as a private citizen, and therefore was not an official act.⁴

Walker's third and last attempt ended the filibustering expeditions to Central America. Early in 1860 an inhabitant of one of the Bay Islands, which, by a convention signed the previous year between Great Britain and Honduras, had been put back under the sovereignty of Honduras, invited Walker to come to the islanders' aid to resist

¹ J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. V., p. 466.

² Text in Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 194, 47th Cong., 1st sess., p. 117.

³ W. O. Scroggs, *op. cit.*, p. 361.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 364.

the convention's execution. Walker seized the opportunity, and was soon heading another expedition to Central America. Upon arriving, he found the British flag still flying, and after waiting several weeks he became desperate and seized the fortress of Truxillo on the mainland of Honduras. A fortnight later Commander Salmon of H.M.S. *Icarus* sent him a note declaring that the occupation was prejudicial to British interests, and that therefore he must lay down his arms and withdraw. Realizing the hopelessness of his position, Walker first attempted flight, but, being captured, surrendered to the British officer. Contrary to his promise, Salmon turned him over to the authorities of Honduras. This was equivalent to a sentence of death, and on September 12, 1860, a firing squad ended the career of the greatest of the filibusters.¹ In his annual message of December 3, 1860, President Buchanan uttered the pious opinion that "it surely ought to be the prayer of every Christian and patriot that such expeditions may never again receive countenance in our country or depart from our shores."²

During the next decade the relations between the United States and the Central American republics were uneventful. From the beginning of his term, Secretary Seward determined to follow a policy of friendly relations with Central America and to gain, if possible, the inhabitants' good will. In his instructions to Mr. Dickinson, the new minister to Nicaragua, dated June 5, 1861, the Secretary counseled him to assure the Republic of Nicaragua "that the President will deal with that government justly, fairly, and in the most friendly spirit; that he desires only its welfare and prosperity. . . . Let unpleasant memories of past differences be buried and let Nicaragua be encouraged to

¹ W. O. Scroggs, *op. cit.*, Chap. XXIII. General William Walker's account of his expeditions, *The War in Nicaragua* (Mobile and N. Y., 1860), is a well written, accurate, and remarkably unbiased historical narrative.

² J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. V, p. 649.

rely on the sympathy and support of the United States if she shall at any time come to need them.”¹ In 1867 Nicaragua had occasion to remember Seward’s promise and called upon the United States to use her good offices to obtain for Nicaragua a favorable settlement of the problems arising under her treaty of 1860 with Great Britain relative to the Mosquito territory.² The American minister at London, Mr. Charles Francis Adams, approached Lord Stanley on the subject, and received his assurance that the British government had no wish to embarrass Nicaragua, and had already given the Nicaraguan minister satisfactory evidence of the justice of its position.³

The one subject, however, upon which the United States laid greatest stress, in her diplomatic correspondence with the Central American republics during the second half of the nineteenth century, was the project of a Central American confederation. The Central American states realized very clearly the advantages of a closer union, and, after the complete dissolution of the Union in 1840 numerous efforts were made to reestablish the Confederation. In 1842, 1849, and 1852 attempts were made by the three central states; but no permanent result came of them.⁴ In 1871 President Medina, of Honduras, proposed that delegates be sent to Salvador to consider plans for a union. The presidents of Nicaragua and Guatemala seemed favorable to the idea, and it was suggested that Mr. Riotti, the American representative at Leon, should preside over the conference. Secretary Fish was favorably impressed with the idea and intimated that the project was a very

¹ *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, 1861*, p. 419.

² *Ibid.*, 1867, Vol. II, p. 690 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, 1868, Vol. I, p. 151.

⁴ See D. G. Munro, *The Five Republics of Central America*, Chap. VIII, for a concise account of the various attempts; also P. M. Brown, “American Intervention in Central America,” *Journal of Race Development*, Vol. IV, p. 409.

desirable one in the eyes of the United States.¹ The following year a pact of union was signed in Salvador by the representatives of Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, and Salvador, "to preserve and maintain the peace between them, . . . and to guarantee the autonomies of Central America and the integrity of its territory against all aggression and pretensions of foreign powers."² But, within two months of the conference, war broke out between Honduras and Salvador.

On June 24, 1874, Mr. Williamson, the American representative at Guatemala, summed up in a despatch to Secretary Fish what he considered to be the principal obstacles to a union of the Central American states: the debts incurred during the former federal union, local prejudices, a heterogeneous population, no identity of interests, difficulty of intercommunication, and lack of a prominent leader to make a public issue of the question of federation.³ The new president of Guatemala, J. Rufino Barrios, was destined to become such a leader. In 1876 he proposed that Guatemala annex the four other republics, but such a plan could scarcely be expected to meet the approval of the states to be taken in. The United States continued to manifest interest in the scheme, and Secretary Blaine, in a despatch to the American minister at Guatemala City, dated May 7, 1881, declared that "there is nothing which this government more earnestly desires than the prosperity of these states, and our experience has taught us that nothing will so surely develop and guarantee such prosperity as their association under one common government. . . . You can not impress too strongly upon the government to which you are accredited, or upon the public men with whom you associate, the importance which the government of the United States attaches to such a confedera-

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S.*, 1871, pp. 681-683.

² *Ibid.*, 1872, p. 520.

³ *Ibid.*, 1874, p. 172.

tion of the states of Central America as will respond to the wants and wishes of their people.”¹ He repeated these sentiments to Señor Ubico, the representative of Guatemala at Washington,² and to Mr. Morgan, the American minister to Mexico.³

During the year 1882 President Barrios visited the United States, and the results showed that the administration undoubtedly encouraged him in his plans for a union. Upon his return he secured the approval of the presidents of Salvador and Honduras, and to reconcile public opinion he declared, in a public letter to the Liberal Party, that although he was doing all in his power to bring about a federation of the five republics, he had no intention of accepting the presidency.⁴ Unfortunately, the popular opposition was too great, and the scheduled convention did not take place. Barrios now determined to resort to force. On February 28, 1885, he issued a decree declaring himself the supreme military chief of the “Central American Union” and proclaiming the union of Central America into one sole republic.⁵ Honduras accepted immediately, but the president of Salvador, who had previously pledged his support, vacillated and played for time. Nicaragua and Costa Rica rejected the plan unconditionally, and on March 9, together with Salvador, they appealed to the United States and Mexico to intervene against the projects of Barrios.⁶ Mr. Hall, the American representative at Guatemala, was authorized to use his good offices, but the day after he received the despatch news came that President Barrios had been killed in action.⁷ With the death of Barrios, all further immediate efforts to form a confederation under the ægis of Guatemala were dropped. In

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1881*, p. 102.

² *Ibid.*, p. 599.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 816.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1883, p. 49.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1885, p. 75.

⁶ H. H. Bancroft, *History of Central America*, Vol. III, p. 448.

⁷ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1885*, pp. 98-99.

spite of the hostilities engendered by the war, a treaty was signed on September 12, 1885, between Guatemala, Honduras, and Salvador, providing among other things for extradition, commercial reciprocity, and a postal telegraph and monetary union; and Nicaragua and Costa Rica were invited to become parties to it.¹

Although the invitation was not accepted, negotiations continued, and in January, 1887, the delegates of Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica met in Guatemala, and after a month's deliberation, on February 16, 1887, signed a treaty of peace and friendship. This document opened with the statement that it is the mutual desire of the five states to draw closer and "establish appropriate bases for the near advent of the longed-for political union of Central America."² The treaty was ratified by all the states except Nicaragua, who seemed to fear forcible action on the part of Guatemala and raised the issue in Washington. Secretary Bayard hastened to notify Mr. Hall, the American minister at Guatemala, that the United States strongly disapproved of a coercive union of the Central American republics, and suggested that he take an early and discreet occasion to bring these views to the attention of the government of Guatemala.³ Guatemala denied the allegations and continued under the treaty of 1887 to work for a union. But a revolution in Salvador in 1890 brought into power the opponents of the union, thus forcing another postponement.

We have already indicated the interest of Mr. Blaine in Latin-American affairs as shown by his part in the first Pan-American Conference and by his efforts to further a Central American federation. Unfortunately for his popularity in Central America, he was forced to decide a number of close cases in international law against the Cen-

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1887*, p. 85.

² *Ibid.*, p. 101.

³ *Ibid.*, 1888, Part I, p. 131.

tral American republics. Guatemala was the chief offender. In July, 1890, she had seized arms on board the Pacific Mail Steamship Company's steamer *Colima*, contrary to an agreement made with the American minister,¹ and in the following month Guatemalan officials killed General Barrundia, traveling on the same company's steamer *Acapulco*.² For his conduct in the second case, the American minister's acts were disavowed and he was recalled forthwith. With war ever threatening between Guatemala and Salvador, Secretary Blaine's instructions to the new minister were most emphatic that he should make every effort to avert it. "Not only are the good offices of the United States equally ready towards averting possible causes of difference, but it is deemed the friendly duty of this government to do all that it can to prevent strife among its neighbors."³

In 1894 the United States had occasion to enter into negotiations with the British government in regard to the Mosquito kingdom. By the treaty of Managua, dating from 1860, Nicaragua's sovereignty over this region was recognized, but the Indians were given certain rights of self-government. In the course of time many foreigners, principally English and Americans, engaged in business enterprises in Bluefields, the capital, and the region became very prosperous. On November 2, 1893, a Nicaraguan commissioner, with a staff of officers, arrived at Bluefields and established heavy customs upon the export of bananas. When the natives protested, the Nicaraguan officials obtained reinforcements, and finally took over the whole management of the country and proclaimed martial law. On February 25, 1894, H.M.S. *Cleopatra* anchored at Bluefields, and her commander insisted that martial law be raised and the Mosquito flag again hoisted.⁴ The United States was in-

¹ J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. VII, p. 659.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 871.

³ *For. Rel. of the U. S.*, 1891, p. 56.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1894, Appendix I, pp. 261-264; 276-284.

terested, and the American minister to Nicaragua was directed to visit Bluefields and make a report. He found (1) that the present provisional government imposed by the Nicaraguan authorities, coöperating with the British consul, was a bold usurpation; (2) that the Mosquito government existing before Nicaragua became an independent state was overthrown by armed violence on February 11, 1904; (3) that fully 90 per cent. of all the wealth, enterprise, and commerce of the Indian reserve was American; and (4) that the extension of Spanish revolutionary rule over this reserve would inevitably extinguish the whole of this present business prosperity.¹

Although the American minister's sympathies seemed to favor the Mosquito government, the United States from the beginning took a firm stand in behalf of full Nicaraguan sovereignty. Writing to Mr. Bayard, the American minister at London, April 30, 1894, Secretary Gresham declared he was "unable to see that this joint assumption of authority by British and Nicaraguan agents was incompatible with the treaty of Managua."² Again on July 19 he maintained that the sovereignty of Nicaragua over the whole of the national domain was unquestionable. "No matter how conspicuous the American or other alien interests which have grown up under the fiction of Indian self-government, neither the United States nor Great Britain can fairly sanction or uphold this colorable abuse of the sovereignty of Nicaragua."³ Further foreign intervention was eliminated by the Mosquito tribes voluntarily signing a convention, November 20, 1894, permitting the absolute incorporation of their territory into the republic of Nicaragua.⁴

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S.*, 1894, p. 287.

² *Ibid.*, p. 271.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 311.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 361. The relations with Great Britain were finally settled by a new treaty signed at Managua April 19, 1905, in which Great Britain recognized the sovereignty of Nicaragua over the Mosquito Reserve. For text see *For. Rel. of the U. S.*, 1905, p. 703.

The century came to an end with one more attempt on the part of the Central American states to form a federation. Nicaragua, Honduras, and Salvador signed the treaty of Amapala, June 20, 1895, by which they were to form a single political organization for the exercise of their external sovereignty; and the agreement was ratified in September of the following year. The federal powers were to be exercised by a diet consisting of one member and one substitute elected by each congress for a term of three years. Costa Rica and Guatemala were to be invited to join.¹ President Cleveland extended recognition to this Greater Republic of Central America, discerning in the articles of association "a step towards a closer union of Central American States in the interest of their common defense and general welfare," and he welcomed it as "the precursor of other steps to be taken in the same direction, and which it is hoped may eventually result in the consolidation of all the states of Central America as one nation for all the purposes of their foreign relations and intercourse."²

Costa Rica and Guatemala did not join, but in 1898 the other three states adopted a permanent constitution establishing a federal republic and made plans for the election of a president. Before the successful culmination of these plans, however, a revolution in Salvador detached this state from the group, and the other two thereupon resumed their independence of action.³ The close of the century found the five independent republics at peace with the world and with each other, but apparently as far as ever from the union that had so long been the goal of their endeavors.

¹ For full text see *For. Rel. of the U. S.*, 1896, p. 390.

² *Ibid.*, p. 370.

³ *For. Rel. of the U. S.*, 1898, pp. 173-178; also J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. X, p. 178, and W. F. Slade, "Federation of Central America," *Journal of Race Development*, Vol. VIII, pp. 210-218 (Oct., 1917).

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CHAPTER XIII

RECENT RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL AMERICA

THE events outlined in the preceding chapter indicate a fairly continuous policy of friendly coöperation on the part of the United States with the Central American republics, particularly in their efforts to obtain a successful federal system of government. American citizens had been guilty of various audacious attempts to obtain special privileges and autocratic powers in these republics, but the American government never failed to frown upon them, even when a different policy might have redounded to the country's advantage. The war with Spain, however, was destined to place the United States in a new position with regard to the Caribbean region, and a greater interest in Central America and its problems was to be expected.

The first intervention of the United States in the affairs of the Central American republics, except in the collection of a few private claims, occurred in 1906. In July of that year a war broke out between Guatemala and Salvador, and Honduras, as usual, was drawn in, this time on the side of Salvador. The American minister used every effort to avert it; when he failed, President Roosevelt, after securing the coöperation of President Diaz of Mexico, stepped in. He sent identical notes to Presidents Escalon of Salvador and Cabrera of Guatemala urging the immediate cessation of hostilities, and offering the deck of the American war-ship *Marblehead* as a neutral place where terms of an agreement might be drawn up.¹ Both sides accepted, and on board the *Marblehead*, on July 20, 1906, a conven-

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1906, Part I, p. 837.*

tion of peace was signed which provided that within two months a general treaty of peace, amity, and navigation should be arranged for by a meeting, in Costa Rica, of the representatives of the three republics. The convention also provided that new differences should be submitted to arbitration, with the presidents of the United States and Mexico serving as arbitrators.¹ In appreciation of this just and peaceful settlement of the controversy, the Third Pan-American Conference, which was then in session at Rio de Janeiro, passed a resolution of gratification over the successful mediation by the two presidents.²

The meeting in Costa Rica was participated in by representatives of all the Central American republics except Nicaragua. The results were a general treaty of peace and amity, arbitration, extradition, commerce, etc., between the four republics; also two conventions, the first establishing an International Central American Bureau in the city of Guatemala, and the second establishing a Central American Pedagogical Institute in San José, Costa Rica. Copies of these were sent to the United States by Costa Rica "as an act of courtesy to the government of the United States for an equal interest in the welfare of the Central American states."³ Although Nicaragua had not sent representatives to the conference, copies of the treaty and conventions were sent to her, inviting her adherence. Nicaragua replied that she did not care to adhere, inasmuch as the treaty seemed to ratify the treaty of *Marblehead*, whose terms she was not willing to accept. The inference was that President Zelaya of Nicaragua, known to be hostile to the United States, was unwilling to accept the President of the United States as an arbitrator in case a dispute should arise to which Nicaragua was a party.

Hardly had Nicaragua thus announced her attitude be-

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1906, Part I, p. 851.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 852.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 856.

fore a situation arose which demanded arbitration. Honduras claimed that certain revolutionists and disturbers of the peace had fled across the border into Nicaragua, and that in order to suppress them its troops had been forced to cross the line. Nicaragua immediately got its forces in readiness and demanded indemnity for the infringement of its territorial rights. An attempt to settle this dispute by arbitration having failed, President Roosevelt wrote, on February 11, 1907, to the presidents of both states, expressing the strong hope that some means might be found to settle the dispute without resorting to war.¹ Receiving favorable responses from both, President Roosevelt thereupon offered his assistance. President Diaz acted in a similar fashion, but Nicaragua insisted upon reparations as a basis of arbitration, and, when Honduras refused, began operations. Hostilities did not last long, but Salvador was drawn in against Nicaragua, and to avoid complications the United States once more offered its good offices. With the United States minister present during discussions, a treaty of peace was signed at Amapala, April 23, 1907, between Nicaragua and Salvador. The third article of this treaty provided that "any difference that may arise in the future between El Salvador and Nicaragua that might alter their good relations shall be adjusted by means of the obligatory arbitration of the presidents of the United States and of Mexico, conjointly."²

When trouble again threatened, in August of the same year, President Roosevelt, coöperating with President Diaz of Mexico, sent identic notes to each of the five Central American republics,—tendering the good offices of the United States to bring about a peace conference of the representatives of the several states.³ This overture received a very favorable response, and on September 17, 1907, the

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1907, Part II, p. 616.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 633.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 638.

representatives of the five Central American republics at Washington signed a protocol agreeing to a joint conference at Washington, to meet November 1; in the meantime, they agreed to maintain peace and good relations among one another, and not to commit, or allow to be committed, any act that might disturb their mutual tranquillity.¹ In accordance with this protocol, President Roosevelt invited the executives of the five republics to name commissioners, to meet in Washington to discuss measures to be adopted to adjust any existing differences, and to conclude a treaty determining the general relations of their countries.²

The invitations were accepted by all of the republics, and they proposed that both the United States and Mexico should be represented. The conference, which met in Washington November 14, in the Bureau of American Republics began very auspiciously. In his opening address, Secretary Root made a strong plea to the delegates to banish fraternal strife from their land, and to find specific and practical measures whereby they might keep and enforce the agreements entered into.³ The delegates showed their spirit of coöperation and friendly feeling by unanimous declarations at the first regular session that each of their countries had no claims against any of the others. But when, at the second session, Honduras proposed a scheme for the union of the five republics, a difference of opinion was quickly noticeable. Nicaragua was favorable to the proposal, but Guatemala opposed it, and Costa Rica objected to the consideration of the subject. The matter was finally referred to a committee of five, including one representative from each state.

The reports of this committee, which were read at the next session, showed strong divergence of views. The majority report, signed by representatives of Guatemala,

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1907, Part II, p. 644.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 648.

³ Report of W. I. Buchanan, *ibid.*, p. 687.

Salvador, and Costa Rica, conceded that the political union of Central America was the "greatest and noblest aspiration of patriotism," yet gave it as their opinion that conditions were not suitable for attempting it at this time. They said that it was more opportune in the present conference to consider measures tending towards preparing in a stable manner for this union, such as better means of communication, a coasting ship commerce, a unification of customs and tax laws, and the encouragement of further Central American conferences. As definite steps, they supported the idea of a Central American bureau, the Pedagogical Institute, and the creation of a permanent Central American court of international justice. The minority report, signed by Honduras and Nicaragua, declared that union alone would insure stable and efficient peace and order in Central America, and insisted that this was the time to establish it.¹

Fearing lest this question might interfere with the constructive work of the conference, Mr. Buchanan, the American representative, supported by the Mexican representative, proposed that the consideration of both reports be postponed, and that the conference proceed to prepare projects for the several proposed conventions. This course was adopted, and the conference proceeded to frame and adopt a number of important conventions regarding peace and friendship, the establishment of a Central American court of justice and a Central American bureau, extradition, railway communications, and a convention concerning future Central American conferences.²

Undoubtedly the two most important achievements were the general treaty of peace and amity, which was to remain in force ten years, and the convention establishing the Central American Court of Justice. Among other things, the treaty provided that any disposition or measure tending

¹ For text see *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1907*, Part II, pp. 671-673.

² *Ibid.*, p. 673.

to alter the constitutional organization of any of the republics should be deemed a menace to the peace of all; the territory of Honduras was made neutral in conflicts arising between the other four republics, as long as she remained neutral; political refugees and disturbers were not allowed to reside near the frontiers of any of the five republics; and all future disputes were to be decided by the Central American Court of Justice. This tribunal was to consist of five judges, one from each state, appointed for five-year terms. It was given obligatory jurisdiction over all cases arising between two or more of the states, and its decision, given in writing by a majority opinion, was to be final. The court could fix the *status quo* pending the decisions in a case, and the signatory republics bound themselves to carry out faithfully the court's orders.¹

On the whole, the representatives had no reason to feel ashamed of the results of their labors. Although the results were only on paper, and all looked towards the future, the ideas adopted were specific and practical, and they were grounded upon a solid basis of coöperation which alone was bound to be beneficial to all. The Court of Justice naturally received the most attention. One eminent American publicist aptly remarked; "To the powers of Europe, to the great powers of the world who struggled with partial success, for four months at The Hague, to establish a court of arbitral justice, the young republics of Central America may recall the scriptural phrase, 'A little child shall lead them.'"² Señor Luis Anderson, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica, who represented Costa Rica at the conference, was enthusiastic in his belief in the new tribunal's efficacy. "This Court of Justice," he declared, "the first tribunal of its class in the history of civilization, shall be, it is hoped, a strong and durable defense for

¹ For text of the general treaty and the convention see *For. Rel., op. cit.*, pp. 692-711.

² J. B. Scott, *Amer. Jour. of Int. Law*, Vol. II, p. 143 (Jan., 1908).

international peace and fraternity in Central America; it shall be the beacon to attract the hearts and minds of all intelligent Central Americans, causing the five sister republics to advance hand in hand towards the lofty eminence of a higher progress than that to which they have hitherto aspired.”¹

Unfortunately for the future peace of Central America, the court was not to have the success that its advocates had hoped, and the United States, as will be seen later, bulks large in the ultimate cause of its failure. The court was installed with much acclaim in Cartago, Costa Rica, May 25, 1908, representatives from the United States and Mexico participating in the inauguration ceremonies. In his address, Mr. Buchanan, the American representative, while taking a tone of optimism, very clearly pointed out that if success were to crown the effort there must be behind this court and its decisions an elevated patriotic public conscience in each of the republics that would lift and maintain the court in every way above the plane of political purposes or necessities. In conclusion, he read a telegram from Secretary Root saying that he had been authorized by Mr. Andrew Carnegie to offer, as a mark of his good wishes for the peace and progress of Central America, the sum of \$100,000 for the construction in the city of Cartago of a temple of peace for the exclusive use of the court.²

Another result of the Washington conference was the establishment at Guatemala City, in the following year, of the Central American International Bureau. The principal objects of this bureau were: (1) the reorganization of the Central American Union; (2) the introduction of an up-to-date educational system; (3) the development and extension of domestic and foreign trade; (4) the increase and development of agriculture and industries; (5) the

¹ Luis Anderson, “The Peace Conference of Central America,” *ibid.*, p. 145.

² *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1908*; report of W. I. Buchanan, pp. 217-247.

reform of legal institutions; and (6) reforms in customs, the monetary system, credit, weights and measures, and sanitation. This bureau was to consist of one delegate from each republic, who should reside in Guatemala. All future Central American conferences were to be held under its offices, and it was to publish a bulletin, *Centro-América*, as a means of keeping the republics in touch with one another's progress.¹ The Bureau is in many respects modeled upon the Pan-American Union, and, considering its limited resources and facilities, it has been eminently successful. Mr. Dana G. Munro goes so far as to assert that of the institutions provided by the Washington conference this is the only one that has thus far fully justified its creation.²

While these various means were being provided to strengthen friendly relations between the Central American republics, President Zelaya of Nicaragua continued to show his unwillingness to maintain friendly relations with either his neighbors or the United States. President Davila of Honduras was under his thumb; Salvador was constantly threatened by his machinations. A British traveler who had spent much time in Central America declared that "all travelers, foreigners, and natives alike, who happened to be in Central America at this time, were well aware of the provocative part which President Santos Zelaya was playing; for many years he had been acting as the evil genius of this republic, and his misgovernment and brutalities to his own people met with general condemnation."³ The ultimate result was a revolution, which started at Bluefields in October, 1909. At first the United States remained neutral, but when, in November, Zelaya ordered two Americans to be shot because they were serving as officers in the revolutionary army, the United States broke off diplo-

¹ For an account of the bureau's activities see W. F. Slade, "Federation of Central America," *Jour. of Race Development*, Vol. VIII, pp. 234-241 (Oct., 1917).

² *The Five Republics of Central America* (N. Y., 1918), p. 225.

³ P. F. Martin, *Salvador of the Twentieth Century* (London, 1911), p. 67.

matic relations with his government. In his note to the Nicaraguan *chargé* Secretary Knox strongly denounced the Zelayan régime, declaring that it had almost continually kept Central America in tension or turmoil, that it had repeatedly and flagrantly violated the Washington conventions, and that it was a blot on the history of the country.¹

Partly as a result of the American attitude, Zelaya was unable to put down the revolution, and he finally resigned, left the country, and took refuge on a Mexican gunboat. The United States maintained an ostensible neutrality between President Madriz, who received the backing of the Zelaya faction, and Estrada, who headed the revolutionists; but when the Madriz forces wanted to bombard Bluefields, which they declared to be the vital base of the Conservatives, United States cruisers refused to permit it. The reason given was that foreigners would be the chief sufferers. But the result was a decided strengthening of Estrada's position. President Madriz protested both to President Taft and to President Diaz of Mexico; but Secretary Knox replied that the United States had taken only the customary step of prohibiting bombardment or fighting by either faction within the unfortified and ungarrisoned city of Bluefields, thus protecting the preponderating American and other foreign interests.² In August, 1910, Madriz gave up the struggle, and by the middle of the following month Señor Don Juan J. Estrada claimed to be in peaceful and unrestricted possession of the entire republic.

In its first note to the United States the new government promised that a general election would be held within a year and that the national finances would be rehabilitated, and to this end the Department of State at Washington was asked to obtain a loan secured by a percentage of the cus-

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S.*, 1909, p. 455; see also President Taft's Message of December 7, 1909, p. xvii.

² *Ibid.*, 1910, pp. 751-753.

toms revenues, and to send a commission to Nicaragua to arrange the necessary formalities.¹ The United States thereupon appointed Mr. T. C. Dawson as special agent to Nicaragua to deal with the provisional government on these lines. The negotiations were successful, and a number of agreements were entered into which provided that Estrada should remain at the head of the government for two years, after which a free election should be held; that a claims commission, consisting of one Nicaraguan and one American and an umpire named by the American state department, should be appointed to consider all unliquidated claims against the government; and that a loan secured by the customs receipts, be raised in the United States.²

A special loan convention embodied the latter proposal, and President Taft urgently recommended it as contributing to the peace of Central America; but it failed to receive the assent of the United States Senate.³ A loan was none the less negotiated with American bankers, and an American, Mr. Clifford D. Ham, was put in charge of the collection of the customs to guarantee its repayment.⁴ The claims commission was also appointed, and it began work on May 1, 1911. The commission worked steadily for more than three years and passed upon almost eight thousand claims, scaling them down from a total of \$13,750,000 to about \$1,750,000.⁵ The political part of the program, however, was a complete failure, and in less than six months President Estrada had resigned in favor of Vice-President Diaz. The latter soon found out that a reform program in Nicaragua could not be put through unless the president received outside support, and in a confidential letter to the American *chargé d'affaires*, written December

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S.*, 1910, p. 762.

² *Ibid.*, 1911, p. 625 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, 1912, pp. 1071-1078.

⁴ For an excellent summary of the events of this period, embracing particularly the financial arrangements, see D. G. Munro, *The Five Republics of Central America*, Chap. XI.

⁵ Otto Schoenrich, *Amer. Jour. of Int. Law*, Vol. IX, p. 958 (Oct., 1915).

21, 1911, he confessed the need of more direct and efficient assistance from the United States. He proposed that the Nicaraguan constitution be so amended as to permit the United States to intervene in Nicaraguan internal affairs in order to maintain peace and the existence of a lawful government.¹

Practical evidences of this need were soon given. On July 29, 1912, General Luis Mena, the Minister of War, engineered a *coup d'état* against the Diaz government with a view to seizing the executive power. Failing in his original attempt, he left the capital and organized an open rebellion against the government. Fearing that he would be unable to protect the property and lives of American citizens, President Diaz asked that "the United States guarantee with its forces security for the property of American citizens in Nicaragua and that it extend its protection to all the inhabitants of the republic."² President Taft thereupon ordered a small detachment of marines to be landed at Managua.

When the president of Salvador expressed the fear of serious complications if American troops should enter Nicaraguan territory, the state department, in a note to the American minister at Managua, dated September 4, 1912, laid down the American policy in no uncertain language. "The policy of the government of the United States in the present Nicaraguan disturbances is to take the necessary measures for an adequate legation guard at Managua, to keep open communications, and to protect American life and property. In discountenancing Zelaya, whose régime of barbarity and corruption was ended by the Nicaraguan nation after a bloody war, the government of the United States opposed not only the individual but the system, and this government could not countenance any movement to restore the same destructive régime. The

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1911, p. 670.*

² *Ibid., 1912, p. 1032.*

government of the United States will, therefore, discountenance any revival of Zelayaism, and will lend its strong moral support to the cause of legally constituted good government for the benefit of the people of Nicaragua, whom it has long sought to aid in their just aspiration towards peace and prosperity under constitutional and orderly government.”¹

The revolution that followed proved more serious than was at first expected, owing to the uprising of the Liberals of Leon, who threw in their fortunes with General Mena. The United States, however, could not afford to allow the Zelaya faction to triumph, and American marines were landed at Corinto, Granada, and Leon; they even went so far as to storm the position overlooking Masaya. The revolutionists could hardly hope to hold out against the government as thus aided by the United States, and with the seizure of General Mena, and his internment in Panama, the uprising collapsed. President Diaz was reëlected for a four-year term to begin January 1, 1913. Although order had been completely restored and the Diaz government was in full control, a detachment of one hundred American marines was left in Managua, at the urgent request of the American minister, to act as a stabilizing influence.

On account of the Senate's failure to approve the loan convention, the financial situation was in even worse shape than before. American bankers had made a loan of \$1,500,000 for the establishment of the National Bank of Nicaragua, the reform of the currency, and the establishment of the claims commission; but the hoped-for loan of \$15,000,000 was dependent upon the ratification of the convention.² As a solution of the difficulty, Nicaragua proposed, in December, 1912, to sell to the United States, for the sum of

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1912*, p. 1043.

² See the memorandum on Nicaraguan finances prepared for the Secretary of State, *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1913*, p. 1040.

\$3,000,000, the sole right to construct a canal through her territory. As an additional inducement to the United States, the right was given to construct a naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca and one on Corn Island.¹ When the Wilson administration came in, this treaty was modified so as to prevent Nicaragua from declaring war, from making treaties with foreign governments affecting her independence or territorial integrity, and from contracting public debts beyond her ability to pay; and it was also changed so as to grant the United States the right to intervene in her affairs, with a view to maintaining her independence and protecting life and property in her domain. The Senate refused to accept this full protectorate, and a new treaty without these provisions was signed on August 5, 1914. Again the Senate raised objections; but these were met, and the treaty was ratified on February 18, 1916, and proclaimed on June 24, following.

The treaty as finally approved makes the following provisions: (1) the government of Nicaragua grants in perpetuity to the government of the United States, free from taxation, the exclusive rights necessary for the construction and operation of a canal by way of the San Juan River and the Great Lake or by any other route; (2) to protect American interests, Nicaragua leases to the United States for ninety-nine years the Great Corn and Little Corn Islands, and also grants the right to establish a naval base on such Nicaraguan territory bordering upon the Gulf of Fonseca as the United States shall select, with a right to obtain renewal of the grants for a similar period; (3) in consideration of these stipulations the United States agrees to pay the sum of \$3,000,000 in gold; and (4) the following proviso is inserted: "Whereas Costa Rica, Salvador, and Honduras have protested against the ratification of the

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1913*, p. 1021. Mr. Weitsel, the American minister to Nicaragua 1912-13, and one of the signatories of this agreement, in a memorandum on the convention gives an excellent résumé of American relations with Nicaragua; see Sen. Doc. No. 334, 64th Cong., 1st sess.

said convention, in the fear or belief that said convention might in some respect impair existing rights of said States; therefore it is declared by the Senate that in advising and consenting to the ratification of the said convention as amended, such advice and consent are given with the understanding, to be expressed as a part of the instrument of ratification, that nothing in said convention is intended to affect any existing right of any of the said named States.”¹

Despite this proviso, Costa Rica and Salvador continued to protest, and finally they attempted to enjoin Nicaragua from carrying out the provisions of the treaty through the Central American Court of Justice. Costa Rica based her case upon a treaty of limits between herself and Nicaragua, signed April 15, 1858, giving Costa Rica rights in the San Juan River and agreeing that she should be consulted before any contract should be entered into for the construction of a canal. This treaty had been held valid by President Cleveland in 1888. Costa Rica therefore argued that the present treaty would infringe her rights under the treaty of 1858.² Salvador claimed an equal right with Honduras and Nicaragua in the Bay of Fonseca, and therefore asserted that Nicaragua had no right to alienate territory clearly jeopardizing and menacing her interests without her consent. Furthermore, the Washington conference of 1907 had proclaimed the neutrality of Honduras, including its rights in the Gulf of Fonseca; therefore, it was urged, this projected agreement for the establishment of a naval base there “is an attempt to violate, in a manner both flagrant and evident, the principle of the neutrality of Honduras, and to throw overboard the legal system instituted by the conference of Washington.”³

Nicaragua denied the court’s jurisdiction in the cases

¹ *U. S. Stat. at Large*, Vol. XXXIX, Part II, p. 1661.

² Complaint of the Republic of Costa Rica before the Central American Court of Justice (Washington, 1916), Appendices G and N.

³ Complaint of the Republic of El Salvador before the Central American Court of Justice (Wash., 1917), Appendices A and I.

of both Costa Rica and Salvador, but the court declared itself competent to take cognizance of them. The decision in the case of Costa Rica was handed down on September 30, 1916; that in the case of Salvador on March 2, 1917. In both cases the court held that Nicaragua, by signing the Bryan-Chamorro treaty of August 5, 1914, had violated the rights of Costa Rica and Salvador, that she had also violated the treaty of peace and amity signed at Washington in 1907, and that she was under obligation to reëstablish and maintain the legal status existing prior to the Bryan-Chamorro treaty. In both cases, however, the court admitted that it was without competence to declare the Bryan-Chamorro treaty null and void, since its jurisdictional power extended only to establishing the legal relations among the "high parties litigant."¹

The refusal of the United States, as well as of Nicaragua, to accept the decision of the court has had a very bad effect on the standing of the United States with the other Central American countries. If the United States refuses to back the very agency for settling disputes to whose establishment it had given such hearty encouragement, simply because the decision interfered with her own selfish interests, how can the Latin-American republics feel much confidence in American expressions of friendly coöperation? When the question of renewing the convention to continue the court's existence came up, nothing could be done, owing to Nicaragua's withdrawal; and on March 17, 1918, the court was formally dissolved. The Bryan-Chamorro treaty thus indirectly caused the downfall of the Central American court, thereby weakening the trend towards a closer relationship among these states which it has been the avowed policy of the United States to foster. In fact, when another attempt at federation was made in 1920, and a "treaty of union" was signed January 19, 1921, by representatives of Guate-

¹ Opinion and decision of the court—the Republic of El Salvador against the Republic of Nicaragua (Wash., 1917).

mala, Honduras, Salvador, and Costa Rica, Nicaragua refused to enter because of her fears lest her rights under the Bryan-Chamorro treaty should be in some way jeopardized.¹

Having established the Conservatives in control in Nicaragua in 1912, the United States was forced to intervene again in 1916 to maintain them in power. The Liberals, who were unquestionably the stronger party, nominated Dr. Julián Irías, a close follower and friend of Zelaya; while the Conservatives chose Emiliano Chamorro, who had served in a most acceptable fashion as Nicaraguan minister at Washington. Unwilling to see any one connected with Zelaya returned to power, the United States actively supported the candidacy of General Chamorro, who consequently was elected. Except in the eyes of his political opponents, he has proved a most able and efficient executive; and he was reëlected in 1920. A small detachment of American marines remains in Managua, and their presence, even if not relished by the Nicaraguans, has been a potent counter-irritant to revolutionary symptoms.

It will be remembered that one of the principal results of the conference of Washington in 1907 was to establish the perpetual neutrality of Honduras. But Honduras needed a strong government to maintain its neutrality, and before this could even be hoped for, its disorganized financial condition had to be remedied. By reason of a series of loans negotiated in Europe between 1867 and 1870, to the amount of about \$27,000,000, upon which virtually no interest had been paid, the state found itself indebted to the stupendous sum of \$125,000,000. In 1908 the Council of Foreign Bondholders proposed a refunding scheme whose terms Honduras considered too onerous; accordingly, she turned towards the United States. Secretary Knox immediately sought to interest American bankers in a project

¹ See the article by Dr. Ruben Rivera on the Central American Union in the *New York Times*, April 24, 1921.

for refunding the debt, and J. P. Morgan and Co. agreed to attempt it. They found that the debt could be adjusted for about fifteen per cent. of its face value without interest; therefore by the issuance of \$10,000,000 in 5 per cent. bonds Honduras could wipe out both her external and internal debt, pay all claims, acquire and extend the inter-oceanic railway, and still have a balance of \$2,500,000 for future internal development. Before making such a loan, however, the bankers demanded that the United States sign a loan convention with Honduras affording the necessary security to the bondholders.

Such a convention was signed January 10, 1911, by Secretary Knox for the United States and Señor Juan Paredes for Honduras. The two governments promised to consult in case of any difficulties, with a view to the faithful execution of the provisions of the contract. The loan was to be secured upon the Honduran customs, which were not to be changed during the existence of the contract without consent of the United States. The government of Honduras farther agreed to appoint a collector of customs, who should be approved by the President of the United States, from a list of names submitted by the fiscal agent of the loan.¹ President Taft earnestly urged the Senate to assent to the convention, and Secretary Knox, in a statement before the foreign relations committee, May 24, 1911, laid down the basis of his policy as follows: "Shall the government of the United States make American capital an instrumentality to secure financial stability, and hence prosperity and peace, to the more backward republics in the neighborhood of the Panama Canal? And in order to give that measure of security which alone would induce capital to be such an instrumentality without imposing too great a burden upon the countries concerned, shall this government assume towards the customs collec-

¹ Text in *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1912*, p. 560.

tions a relationship only great enough for this purpose—a relationship, however, the moral effect and potentialities of which result in preventing the customs revenues of such republic from being seized as the means of carrying on devastating and unprincipled revolutions?”¹

Despite this persuasive presentation of the advantages of dollar diplomacy, the Senate failed to agree to the convention; and the bankers refused to proceed farther. The Honduran congress also refused to ratify the convention, principally upon constitutional grounds. Although the original loan was unquestionably tainted with fraud, the lien exists, and Honduras will never establish herself upon a sound financial basis until some readjustment is made. The Morgan proposal, which was approved by a neutral expert whose services were sought by the state department, seemed to offer an excellent opportunity for Honduras to make a new start. Yet the United States showed wisdom in refusing to urge the convention when the Honduran congress evidenced its overwhelming opposition.

In its other diplomatic relations with Honduras during the year 1911 the United States was more successful. In January of that year General Manuel Bonilla staged a revolution against President Davila, and the latter, no longer having the assistance of Zelaya, asked the United States to intervene as arbitrator, and promised to deliver the presidency to any third party named or approved by the United States.² President Taft accepted the proposal and named Mr. T. C. Dawson as the special commissioner of the United States. A peace conference was held in February at Puerto Cortes on board the U. S. S. *Tacoma*, with Mr. Dawson presiding. A provisional government was organized, and Dr. Francisco Bertrand was named as provisional president. Peace was restored, and President Taft received a vote of thanks “for his friendly medi-

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1912, p. 589.*

² *Ibid., 1911, p. 297.*

ation towards the reëstablishment of peace in the Republic of Honduras.”¹

The entrance of the United States into the European War stirred the Central American republics to enthusiastic manifestations of coöperation. All of these states, including Panama, declared war on Germany except Salvador; and she went so far as to declare a benevolent neutrality which permitted the use of her territorial ports and waters by the war-ships of the United States and the Allies. In the declarations of war the United States was usually expressly mentioned: “Guatemala assumes the same belligerent attitude as the United States”; “Nicaragua makes common cause with the United States”; even Salvador, in announcing its attitude, declared that “El Salvador as an American nation could not fail to recognize, in the conflict between the United States and Germany, the solidarity which binds it to the great Republic of the North, . . . and that its condition of neutrality could not lead it to the point of considering the United States as a belligerent subject to the ordinary rules of international law.”² During the peace negotiations the Central American republics boldly accepted the idealistic principles of President Wilson and entered the League of Nations, fearing not a jot lest they be thereby drawn into the broils of Europe.

The recent relations between the United States and the Central American states (with the exception of Panama, which we shall consider later) have been comparatively uneventful. When, in 1917, Costa Rica broke her long and excellent record of domestic peace by a bloodless *coup d'état*, the United States refused to recognize the Tinoco government which engineered the movement. In spite of this attitude towards President Tinoco, the United States upon several occasions protested vigorously against the

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1911*, p. 304.

² John Barrett, *Latin America and the War* (Wash., 1919), p. 28; see also P. A. Martin, *Latin America and the War*, League of Nations, Vol. II, No. 4.

raising of armed forces in Nicaragua and Honduras against this *de facto* government of Costa Rica¹ Tinoco fell from power in 1919, and the succeeding Acosta government, being legally organized, was duly recognized by the United States on August 2, 1920.

In 1920 the Cabrera régime in Guatemala, which had originally been put in power in 1898, was overthrown. Cabrera stoutly opposed the plan of a federal union which had once again become popular, and arrested many of its chief Guatemalan adherents. The Unionists seized Guatemala City, and, in spite of a serious bombardment by government forces in which hundreds were killed, they held out and finally deposed Cabrera. The United States asked that the deposed president's life be spared, and upon receiving satisfactory assurances recognized the new Herrera government. This administration worked strenuously in behalf of the new federation, and on September 15, 1921, the constitution of the Federation of Central America was signed by representatives of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. On October 10 the separate governments ceased to function and the Provisional Federal Council of the new state took over the executive powers. The dream of a century seemed at last to be fulfilled. Once more, however, hope was doomed to disappointment. The Herrera government was overthrown in December, 1921, and it dragged in its wake the new federation before it had been given an opportunity to prove its value. However, the advantages of union are so manifest, and the desire for it so strong and persistent, that this last failure should prove merely another temporary obstacle on the road to its ultimate success.

On account of interference of the United States in a boundary dispute between Panama and Costa Rica, the relations between the United States and Panama during 1921 became exceedingly strained. The trouble was of long

¹ Sen. Doc. No. 77, 66th Cong., 1st sess.

standing, and the disputed area included sections on both the Pacific and Atlantic sides of the Cordillera. In 1900 the two states had submitted the dispute to President Loubet of France, who fixed a line running from Mona Point on the Atlantic to Burica Point on the Pacific, giving to Costa Rica the Coto region on the Pacific, which had been in Panama's possession for many years, and giving Panama a strip of land on the Atlantic side bordering the Sixaola River.¹ As shown by Article I of the Porras-Anderson treaty, signed through the mediation of the United States at Washington on March 17, 1910, the award on the Pacific side was accepted by both parties. But in regard to the rest there was a disagreement, and by the terms of this same treaty both parties agreed to submit the interpretation to the Chief Justice of the United States and bound themselves to abide by his decision. Article VII specifically states that "the boundary line between the two republics as finally fixed by the arbitrator shall be deemed the true line and his determination of the same shall be found conclusive and without appeal."²

Chief Justice White announced his award on September 12, 1914, after a commission of American engineers, chosen in accordance with the terms of the convention, had made a prolonged and careful survey. The award gave to Costa Rica a portion of the territory claimed by Panama and to Panama a portion of the territory claimed by Costa Rica.³ Panama, however, refused to accept the award, on the ground that the Chief Justice had exceeded his jurisdiction as arbitrator. Nothing was done to carry out the award until February 21, 1921, when Costa Rica invaded and seized the Coto region given to her by the Loubet award and conceded to her by Panama in the Porras-Anderson

¹ For a complete summary of the dispute from 1825 to 1909, including the text of the Loubet award, see *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1910*, pp. 785-791.

² *Ibid.*, p. 820.

³ For text of the award see *British and Foreign State Papers, 1914*, Part II, pp. 429-465.

treaty. Panama speedily recaptured the region; but Costa Rica mustered an army and threatened war. Secretary Colby immediately protested against the use of force; and on the day after he entered office, Secretary Hughes was compelled to give consideration to the question. In a reply to a note from Panama, dated March 4, 1921, and requesting a declaration of the manner in which the United States understood its obligation to maintain the independence of Panama in the light of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty, the new Secretary of State sent identic notes to Panama and Costa Rica, calling upon both countries to suspend hostilities until the United States could consider the question and propose a peaceful solution.

Secretary Hughes studied the matter carefully, and on March 15, in a long note to the American minister in Panama, he made clear the position of the United States. After reviewing the background of the case and the successive steps towards settlement, he reported that he could find no basis for the contention that the arbitrator had exceeded his powers; the award, therefore, by the terms of the Porras-Anderson treaty, became, he declared, "a perfect and compulsory treaty between the high contracting parties." Under these circumstances, he continued, "the government of the United States feels compelled to urge upon the government of Panama, in the most friendly but most earnest manner, that it conclude without delay arrangements with the government of Costa Rica for the appointment of the Commission of Engineers provided for by the terms of Article VII of the Porras-Anderson treaty, in order that the boundary line laid down by the decision of Chief Justice White may be physically laid down in a permanent manner and in accordance with the findings of the award."¹

President Porras refused to accept Secretary Hughes' decision and appealed directly to President Harding. When

¹ *New York Times*, March 18, 1921.

the latter sustained his Secretary of State, President Porras called a special session of congress, which backed him in defying the United States. Costa Rica, on the other hand, expressed gratitude for the prompt and efficacious mediation on the part of the United States. Early in May, Secretary Hughes despatched another note to Panama, saying that, unless she settled the boundary dispute promptly in accordance with the White-Loubet award, the United States would take necessary steps to give effect to the physical establishment of the boundary line. The United States realized that it was bound by treaty to protect the independence and territorial integrity of Panama, but could hardly guarantee the integrity of a country whose boundary shifted according to the caprice of the government.

Panama, still protesting, sent a special mission to Washington and finally proposed that the White award be submitted to the Hague Tribunal to see if it was within the terms of the arbitration. Secretary Hughes refused, and on August 18, 1921, he sent a note declaring there was no reason why Costa Rica should delay in taking possession. American marines were despatched to maintain the peace, and Panama, under protest, ordered her civil authorities to leave. Chief Justice Taft appointed two engineers to work with two to be appointed by Costa Rica and Panama to delimit the boundaries; but Panama refused to name her member of the commission. On September 9 the state department announced that Costa Rica had taken possession of the disputed region.

Inasmuch as the term "dollar diplomacy" seems to have originated, and to have a special significance, in relation to the Caribbean region, it is worth while to look briefly into the figures showing the value of products and trade of the Central American republics. All of these states are essentially agricultural and limited in their range of products. In fact, the raising of coffee and bananas

has proved to be so suited to their soil and climate that these two crops have come to be grown almost exclusively. In 1921 the United States imported from Central America about 28,000,000 bunches of bananas valued at approximately \$11,000,000, and about 118,000,000 pounds of coffee, valued at over \$12,000,000.¹ Honduras is almost entirely sustained by the banana industry; while Salvador is almost equally dependent upon her production of coffee. Guatemala and Costa Rica raise great quantities of each, while Nicaragua receives as much income from her export of coffee as from all her other exports combined. Considering the fact that the banana industry has been developed by the enterprise of United States citizens and has been built up and supported by their capital, and that a large amount of American capital is also invested in the Central American coffee plantations, it is evident that the American government can not wholly ignore the investment interests of its citizens in this quarter.²

Furthermore, the United States is by far the greatest customer of the Central American states, particularly since the war. The percentage of the exports of the six Central American republics coming to the United States in the fiscal year 1919 was as follows: Costa Rica, 55 per cent.; Guatemala, 60 per cent.; Honduras, 92 per cent.; Nicaragua, 62 per cent.; Panama, 93 per cent.; and Salvador, 50 per cent. Summarized, this means that the United States consumed about two thirds of all of the Central American exports. On the other hand, in the same year the United States furnished Central America more than three fourths of its imported goods.³ The following tables show at a glance the trade of these states with the United States, as compared with their trade with the principal countries of Europe both before and after the war:

¹ *Monthly Summary of Foreign Commerce of the U. S.*, Dec., 1921, Part I.

² For an interesting account of the banana industry as developed by the United States Company, see F. U. Adams, *Conquest of the Tropics* (N. Y., 1914).

³ *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1920, p. 838.

CENTRAL AMERICAN EXPORTS¹

	TO UNITED KINGDOM		TO GERMANY		TO UNITED STATES	
	1913	1920	1913	1920	1913	1920
Costa Rica	\$4,364,436	\$3,103,434	\$ 509,804	\$ 32,295	\$5,297,146	\$10,615,020
Guatemala	1,600,029	600,000	7,653,557	150,000	3,923,354	14,500,000
Honduras	13,467		176,112		2,869,188	6,665,675
Nicaragua	998,564	306,491	1,887,698	2,378	2,722,385	9,294,809
Panama	65,024	254,037	216,939	32,784	4,801,608	3,210,615
Salvador	705,607	180,000	1,699,694	100,000	2,823,851	20,000,000
Total	\$7,747,127	\$4,443,962	\$12,143,804	\$317,457	\$22,437,532	\$64,286,119

CENTRAL AMERICAN IMPORTS

	FROM UNITED KINGDOM		FROM GERMANY		FROM UNITED STATES	
	1913	1920	1913	1920	1913	1920
Costa Rica	\$1,303,187	\$3,179,228	\$1,355,417	\$3,001,912	\$4,515,871	\$11,657,757
Guatemala	1,650,387	3,852,337	2,043,329	20,000	5,053,060	11,740,456
Honduras		800,000	558,327	18,000	3,457,074	11,246,758
Nicaragua	1,150,611	1,634,624	619,213	145,014	3,244,008	11,247,589
Panama	2,465,431	1,574,543	1,078,167	106,829	6,378,702	12,995,409
Salvador	1,603,846	2,100,000	713,855		2,491,146	13,200,000
Total	\$8,173,462	\$13,140,732	\$6,368,308	\$3,291,689	\$25,139,861	\$72,087,969

¹ The figures for 1913 are compiled from the *Report of the Second Pan-American Commercial Conference, Washington, 1919*, pp. 400-401; those for 1920 from the *Bulletin of the Pan-American Union*, Jan., 1922, pp. 48-49.

Compared with the total commerce of the United States, these figures may seem insignificant. But it must be remembered that, with perhaps the exception of El Salvador, the Central American countries are comparatively undeveloped. Gold and silver are found in all of the republics, and there are large undeveloped deposits of copper, iron, lead, and zinc in certain sections. The raising of sugar and cacao has been very successful, and there are great possibilities for both of these crops. All of the countries need better transportation facilities, and they should furnish increasingly an excellent market for agricultural machinery. By geographical location the United States is ideally placed to do business with them. By chance or predilection, the people of the United States are the greatest consumers of coffee, bananas, sugar, and cacao, the leading products of their soil. By industrial development, the United States is best fitted to supply these countries with cotton goods and manufactured goods of iron and steel. Having constructed the Panama Canal, the United States must obviously take more than a passing interest in their diplomatic relations. Must a nation be necessarily imperialistic if it faces the facts as they exist and assumes the responsibilities that are thrust upon it?

Central America needs and desires the financial support of the United States, but it wants no interference politically. Capital, however, can not be obtained at fair rates without reasonable guaranties. The United States has always stood staunchly for the territorial integrity and political independence of its Latin-American neighbors, and it is to be hoped that it will always do so. But it is equally obligated to protect the rights of its nationals who have legitimately invested their capital in adjacent lands—oftentimes at the invitation of the government in power—when that government is no longer able to afford them protection. The Monroe Doctrine imposes an additional burden upon the United States, and Central Americans have usually con-

ceded its value. A Central American statesman has aptly summed up the situation: "The United States is already responsible in the eyes of the world for things and events in Central America. The Monroe Doctrine, linked with the Knox note, has placed the great republic in this situation, and in order to comply with its duty there is no middle term—the only course is intervention, not more or less hesitatingly, but open and determined, based upon high ideals of justice and humanity."¹

But justice and humanity, in the eyes of these republics, do not mean arbitrary interference with their institutions, even though based upon unselfish motives. The United States, therefore, should formulate a policy for the Caribbean, as it has finally succeeded in doing for the Far East, whereby all may know that its ultimate aim is to enable its weaker neighbors to work out their own problems in their own way. Interventions must be only temporary; they must be employed only as a last resort; and they must be carried out in such a way that they will be regarded as an act of beneficial coöperation rather than of brutal force. With its motives understood and accepted with confidence, and its methods carefully devised to accomplish the end in view, the United States could aid the republics of Central America immeasurably in their struggle towards democratic stability.

¹J. M. Moncada, *Social and Political Influence of the United States in Central America* (N. Y., 1911); translated by A. C. Gahan, p. 30.

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CHAPTER XIV

ARGENTINA—THE MAKING OF A NATION

IN the fifty-year period extending from 1775 to 1825, there occurred three of the greatest revolutions in the world's history—the American Revolution, the French Revolution, and the revolt of the Spanish-American colonies. The revolution of the thirteen North American colonies against British control brought into existence a new system of government based on principles which have now come to dominate practically the whole earth; the French Revolution established similar principles in the Old World, and foreshadowed the end of dynastic absolutism; the revolt of the Spanish-American colonies separated once for all the New World from the Old, and sounded the knell of empires built upon colonial exploitation. It is difficult to say just how much effect the American and French revolutions had upon the colonies of Spanish America, but no territorial limits could contain the democratic impulse born of such travail, and Spanish America speedily gave evidence of the potential influence of the new movement.

Francisco de Miranda, of Venezuela, first felt its power, and, answering its call, served in both the American and French armies of freedom. But this service was only a prelude to his real purpose, which was nothing less than to bring about a complete separation of his own country from the control of Spain. He tried to interest various governments in his schemes, and in 1798 it seemed quite possible that the United States would join with Great Britain in an attempt to foment revolutions in the Spanish colonies in the New World. Rufus King, the American



minister at London, enthusiastically supported the plan, and succeeded in obtaining the backing of Hamilton.¹ Neither the British cabinet nor Secretary Pickering, however, was willing to countenance the project, and Miranda finally gave up hopes of obtaining the support of Great Britain. He thereupon visited the United States and tried to obtain help from Jefferson and Madison; but, although both personally wished him well, they were unwilling to engage the United States in an enterprise of such a nature. He was forced to content himself with organizing a small filibustering expedition in New York, without aid, but also without interference, from the United States government. This expedition, which set sail early in 1806, was a complete failure, as were Miranda's later attempts; but he deserves credit for being the first great leader in the struggle for Spanish-American independence.²

The real fight for independence may be said to have begun on May 25, 1810, when Buenos Aires deposed its viceroy and set up a *junta gubernativa*. Quito, in New Granada, had made a similar attempt the previous year, but this movement had been quickly suppressed. Valparaíso, Santiago, and Bogotá followed in quick succession, and on July 5, 1811, the congress of Venezuela adopted the first declaration of independence from Spain.³ These revolutionary movements did not pass unnoticed in the United States, and in June, 1810, Joel R. Poinsett was appointed "agent for seamen and commerce" in Buenos Aires. His instructions show a keen appreciation on the part of the government of the United States of the possibilities of the situa-

¹ C. R. King, *The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King* (N. Y., 1907), Vol. II, p. 250 ff.

² For a complete account of Miranda's efforts see W. S. Robertson, *Rise of Spanish-American Republics* (N. Y., 1918), pp. 26-72; also "Francisco de Miranda and the Revolutionizing of Spanish America," by the same writer, in the *Annual Report of the American Historical Assoc.*, 1907, Vol. I, pp. 189-539.

³ For an excellent survey of the early diplomatic relations between the United States and Venezuela see W. S. Robertson, *Essays in American History* (N. Y., 1910), pp. 231-267.

tion: "As a crisis is approaching which must produce great changes in the situation of Spanish America, and may dissolve altogether its colonial relations to Europe; and as the geographical position of the United States and other obvious considerations give them an intimate interest in whatever may affect the destiny of that part of the American continent, it is our duty to turn our attention to this important subject, and to take such steps not incompatible with the neutral character and honest policy of the United States, as the occasion renders proper. . . . You will make it your object, whenever it may be proper, to diffuse the impression that the United States cherish the sincerest good will towards the people of South America as neighbors, as belonging to the same portion of the globe, and as having a mutual interest in cultivating friendly intercourse; that this disposition will exist whatever may be their internal system on European relations, with respect to which no interference of any sort is pretended; and that in the event of a political separation from the parent country and of the establishment of an independent system of national government, it will coincide with the sentiments and policy of the United States to promote the most friendly relations and the most liberal intercourse between the inhabitants of this hemisphere, as having all a common interest, and as lying under a common obligation to maintain that system of peace, justice, and good will which is the only source of happiness for nations."¹

In the following year Poinsett was made consul-general and proceeded to Chile, a vice-consul taking over the duties at Buenos Aires and the ports on the River Plate. Similar representation was provided for at about the same time at Caracas, Venezuela. In spite of the fact that these were regularly accredited agents, there seems to have been no intention on the part of the United States to recognize the

¹ House Report No. 72, 20th Cong., 2nd sess.: also cited in F. L. Paxson, *The Independence of the South American Republics* (Phil., 1916), p. 110.

governments to which they were sent. This is not surprising when we remember that none of the revolting colonies except Venezuela had declared its independence. They simply refused to recognize the Napoleonic régime in Spain. In fact, most of the colonies that had deposed their Spanish governors and had set up *juntas* claimed to be acting in the name of Ferdinand VII. Under these anomalous conditions, the question of recognition did not arise; nor did the American agents make any effort to maintain a neutral attitude. Poinsett did all in his power to aid the Chileans, giving them counsel and encouragement and supplying the names and addresses of manufacturers and merchants in the United States who would willingly supply them with military supplies.¹ Yet, upon his return to the United States, he was congratulated by President Monroe for the ability, zeal, and success with which he had conducted his delicate mission.²

Ferdinand was restored in 1814. Far from granting concessions to his colonies, he determined to bring them back into their former position of complete dependence. This meant a war of reconquest, and the king did not hesitate. Within a year his armies had reduced to a sullen allegiance all of the revolting colonies except Buenos Aires. It was in this state that a new and successful campaign was to originate. José de San Martín, a native of La Plata, who had served for many years in the Continental Army of Spain, had returned to give his services in the war for independence. He was given command of one of the northern Argentinian armies. Instead of using it to attack the Spaniards in Peru, he gave up the command for the governorship of the small province of Cuyo at the edge of the Andes. Here he spent two years in organizing and training a small army, with the intention of crossing the Andes and striking at the Spanish power in Chile and then march-

¹ J. B. Lockey, *Pan-Americanism: Its Beginnings* (N. Y., 1920), p. 144.

² F. L. Paxson, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

ing north into Peru. It is not within our province to describe his desperate crossing of the Andes by the famous Uspallata Pass, and his victory over the Spanish army at Chacabuco, thereby opening up the road to Santiago. It is sufficient to note that he followed out his plan of freeing Chile, and when this was accomplished by the battle of Maipú, on April 5, 1818, he returned to Buenos Aires to organize a new force to carry the struggle into Peru. After two more years of preparation, he again crossed into Chile, and embarked his army upon the new Chilean fleet at Valparaiso. Aided by the brilliant strategy of Lord Cochrane, the commander of the Chilean fleet, and even more by his appeals to the Peruvians to arise and throw off the Spanish yoke, he finally, by Fabian tactics, forced the Spaniards to withdraw from Peru.¹

While San Martín was slowly emancipating the great territories of the south and west from Spanish rule, another patriot was accomplishing the same result for the north. Simón Bolívar, a native of Venezuela, after a series of unsuccessful attempts to liberate his native state, crossed over into New Granada and defeated the Spaniards in the decisive battle of Boyacá, April 7, 1819. This province was then induced to join with Venezuela, forming the Republic of Colombia. The Spaniards sought and obtained a truce during the following year; but, with the goal of complete independence clearly in the view, Bolívar saw the un wisdom of parleying, and by a final blow in the summer of 1821 the north was completely freed. The Liberator now turned his attention towards the last stronghold of the Spanish forces in the highlands of what is now Ecuador, and, after a series of engagements, entered Guayaquil triumphantly on July 11, 1822. San Martín, now Protector of Peru, entered the city shortly afterwards, and the two

¹ The standard and most exhaustive treatment of this period is Bartolomé Mitre, *Historia de San Martín y de la Emancipación Sud Americana*, 6 vols. Buenos Aires, 1907.

great patriots celebrated the emancipation of South America together. Two such powerful characters, however,—one striving for a union of South America under the hegemony of Colombia, and the other insisting upon the individuality of the states,—could not agree; and, rather than force a struggle, San Martín decided to exile himself from the country he had so valiantly helped to free. To the end he remained true to his famous motto: *Serás lo que debes ser, y si no, no serás nada* (“Be what you ought to be or else be nothing”).

Although the struggle for independence did not definitely end till 1824, the question of recognition by foreign powers had been raised long before. Early in 1816 Buenos Aires had sent a Colonel Martin Thompson to Washington to represent its interests; but, inasmuch as no proclamation of independence had yet issued, this envoy was not invested by his government with a public character.¹ The following year, however, the provinces of La Plata declared their independence and forthwith despatched Don Manuel H. de Aguirre “as agent of this government near that of the United States of North America”²; and shortly afterwards Supreme Director Pueyrredón, in a letter to the President of the United States, asked that he be granted “all the protection and consideration required by his diplomatic rank and the actual state of our relations.”³ President Monroe received him confidentially, but informed him that, although he sympathized with his cause, the recognition of independence could come only after a public deliberation of Congress.⁴

In his first official note to President Monroe, dated October 29, 1817, Aguirre gave notice of the declaration of

¹ *American State Papers, For. Rel.*, Vol. IV, p. 174.

² *Ibid.*, p. 175.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

⁴ B. Mitre, *Historia de Belgrano* (Buenos Aires, 1902), Vol. III, p. 98. For a full account of the Aguirre mission, see A. Palomeque, *Orígenes de la Diplomacia Argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1905), Vol. I, pp. 39-66.

independence of the United Provinces, and in his second communication, dated December 16, he asked for recognition.¹ President Monroe had already, on April 25, 1817, written a note to Joel R. Poinsett asking him to go once more to Buenos Aires to report on the progress of the revolution; and when Poinsett declined, he had appointed a commission of three. But, as these commissioners were not ready to sail until December, the President did not feel justified in extending recognition without obtaining "in a manner more comprehensive than has heretofore been done correct information of the actual state of affairs in those colonies."² His attitude was shown by his message of December 2, 1817, in which, while expressing sympathy and good will for the revolutionists, he reiterated his policy of neutrality.³

President Monroe was undoubtedly influenced considerably by his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, who from the very beginning opposed recognition until independence had been clearly established. But Henry Clay had already "mounted his South American great horse," and in the House did all in his power to force the hand of the President. On March 25, 1818, he made a brilliant speech urging recognition and the immediate appointment of a minister to Buenos Aires.⁴ But apparently Congress preferred to back the President, particularly since the Florida question had already brought strained relations between the United States and Spain, and the motion was defeated by a substantial majority. Before sending his annual message of November 17, 1818, President Monroe had received the reports of his commissioners. But, inasmuch as their reports showed that the situation was still very uncertain, he declared himself satisfied with the course hitherto pur-

¹ *Amer. State Papers*, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-180.

² F. L. Paxson, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

³ J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. II, p. 13.

⁴ T. H. Benton, *Abridgment of the Debates of Congress*, Vol. VI, pp. 138-145.

sued and considered it good policy to adhere to it.¹ In his message of the following year, in spite of Adams' advice to the contrary, President Monroe gave decided encouragement to the struggling patriots. "The steadiness, consistency, and success with which they have pursued their objects, as evidenced more particularly by the undisturbed sovereignty which Buenos Aires has so long enjoyed, evidently gave them a strong claim to the favorable consideration of other nations."² However, in spite of the President's evident friendliness, and the continued efforts of Clay, it was not until 1822 that recognition was finally accorded, and by that time the result of the contest was "manifestly settled." Incidentally the Florida treaty of 1819 had now been ratified by Spain, thereby freeing the administration of farther trouble from that source.

Manuel Torres, the *chargé d'affaires* from Colombia, had the honor of being the first diplomatic agent from a Spanish-American state to be received by the United States, and he was deeply affected by it. He said that Colombia realized the importance of this recognition and that Bolívar would be extraordinarily gratified by it.³ Mr. de Forest, the agent of Buenos Aires, laid claim to priority of recognition, but his commission was found to be inadmissible and he was required to obtain a new one. In a note to him on May 23, 1822, Secretary Adams said that in the recognition of the independence of the South American governments it was not the President's intention, by discriminating between them with regard to time, to admit any claim to prior recognition in favor of any one over the other.⁴ The recognition of Buenos Aires came the following year, when Cæsar Rodney, former commissioner to the South American states, was accredited as minister to that country. As was

¹ *Amer. State Papers, For. Rel.*, Vol. IV, p. 215, for reports of the commissioners, *ibid.*, pp. 217-348.

² *Ibid.*, p. 628.

³ J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs* (Phil., 1874), Vol. VI, p. 23.

⁴ J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. I, p. 90, note a.

to be expected, Spain protested vehemently against recognition, asserting that it could in no way invalidate Spain's right to her provinces or to employ any means in her power to reunite them to her dominions. In his reply Adams declared that it was the mere acknowledgment of existing facts, and that the United States expected the European countries and Spain herself soon to follow her example.¹

Recognition did not come any too soon, inasmuch as the European powers at Verona were already planning to assist Spain to recover her colonies. Fortunately for the United States, such a plan did not fit in well with British ideas, and we have already shown how Canning approached Rush with a view to concerted action to prevent it. President Monroe's message of December 2, 1823, settled the question as far as the United States was concerned, and all South America seemed to approve of the settlement. At Buenos Aires, Las Heras, the new governor, in a message to the congress of la Plata provinces dated December 16, 1824, declared: "We are under a large obligation towards the United States of North America. That republic, which since its formation has presided over the civilization of the New World, has solemnly recognized our independence. At the same time it has made an appeal to our national honor by supposing us capable of struggling single-handed with the power of Spain, but it has constituted itself guardian of the field of battle in order that no foreign power may interfere to give aid to our rival."²

The government of Buenos Aires soon had occasion to seek a definite interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. In 1826 the United Provinces of la Plata, with Rivadavia at their head, became involved in a war with Brazil, on account of an attempt of the Banda Oriental, now known as Uruguay, to unite itself with Buenos Aires. In this connection

¹ *Amer. State Papers, For. Rel.*, Vol. IV, p. 845.

² Quoted by W. S. Robertson, *South America and the Monroe Doctrine*, *Pol. Science Quar.*, Vol. XXX, p. 100 (March, 1915); cf. J. B. Lockey, *Pan-Americanism*, pp. 255-260.

Rivadavia's Minister of Foreign Affairs asked the American minister, first, whether President Monroe's declaration would apply in case a European power should assist the Emperor of Brazil in his war against the United Provinces; and, second, whether "such declaration is equally applicable in a case in which the Emperor of Brazil, as King of Portugal, may attempt to draw from that kingdom . . . any kind of aid for sustaining said war."¹ After considerable delay, Secretary Clay returned his answer to these queries. Pointing out that the declaration conveyed neither pledge nor obligation, he declared that in the war between the Argentine Republic and the Emperor of Brazil there was not the remotest analogy to the case that President Monroe's message deprecated. The war was strictly American in its origin and object; the European allies had taken no part; and under these conditions the policy of the United States was one of strict and impartial neutrality.²

In consequence of the bloody struggle between the unionists and the federalists, the next few years were very difficult for the Buenos Aires republic. By 1829 the federalist leader, Juan Manuel Rosas, was in full control of Buenos Aires and the nominal head of Argentina. He was a dominating personality, and he succeeded in remaining dictator of the province of Buenos Aires for the next twenty years.

During the early part of his régime an interesting diplomatic conflict took place between his government and the United States.³ In 1829 the government of Buenos Aires issued a decree claiming as the successor of Spain the Malvinas, or Falkland Islands, and announcing that a governor would be appointed to reside there and regulate the seal fisheries on the coast.⁴ In November, 1831, the

¹ W. S. Robertson, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

² *Ibid.*, p. 103.

³ The whole incident is well summarized from the Argentinian standpoint by Adolfo Saldías, *Historia de la Confederación Argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1892), Vol. II, Chap. XIX.

⁴ *British and Foreign State Papers*, Vol. XX, p. 314, note.

appointee, Luis Vernet, seized certain American schooners engaged in fishing off the coasts of these islands, imprisoned their officers and crews, and sent the ships to Buenos Aires as prizes. The United States consul at Buenos Aires protested, and at the same time the U.S.S. *Lexington* proceeded to the Falkland Islands to protect American citizens engaged in the fisheries. Upon investigation, Captain Duncan of the *Lexington* found that Governor Vernet had plundered the American schooner *Harriet* of almost everything on board. Captain Duncan thereupon asked that Vernet be delivered up to the United States on charges of piracy or robbery, or that he be arrested and punished by Buenos Aires.¹ Apparently the American officer did more than protest, for on February 14, 1832, the government of Buenos Aires published a proclamation stating, among other things, that "the Commander of the U.S.S. *Lexington* has invaded in a time of the most profound peace, that, our infant Colony; destroyed with rancorous fury the public property, and carried off the effects legally deposited there at the disposal of our Magistrates."² On the same day the government of Buenos Aires notified the American consul that, in view of his aberration of ideas and irregularity of language, it had decided to suspend official intercourse with him.³

The situation began to be serious, and in its instructions to the new *chargé d'affaires*, Mr. Baylies, who had been hastily despatched to Buenos Aires in January, 1832, to fill the position made vacant by the death of the former American *chargé*, the United States outlined the policy that it intended to follow. The Washington government first demanded for United States citizens freedom of fishing in these regions—a right which they had held for more than fifty years at the time of Vernet's appointment. This right

¹ *British and Foreign State Papers*, Vol. XX, p. 319.

² *Ibid.*, p. 327.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 326.

was now to be embodied in a treaty. With respect to the vessels seized by Vernet, their restitution was to be demanded unless they had already been recaptured. If the government disavowed his acts, the American squadron was to break up the settlement and bring him to Buenos Aires for trial.¹ Upon arriving at his post, Mr. Baylies, in a series of notes to the Argentinian Minister of Foreign Affairs, protested vigorously against the harsh and illegal treatment visited upon American whalers and sealers in this region of the Atlantic and demanded full indemnity for it. He furthermore denied the right of Buenos Aires to interfere with vessels or citizens of the United States fishing in the waters or on the shores of the Falkland Islands, Tierra del Fuego, Cape Horn, or any of the adjacent islands in the Atlantic.²

The Argentine government not only refused indemnity for Vernet's acts, but warmly defended him, declaring all irregularity, injustice, insult, and violence to have been the work of the American consul and Captain Duncan. It therefore demanded from the government of the United States "the most prompt and ample satisfaction for such outrages and full redress and reparation to the Argentine Republic . . . for all damages and losses in consequence of the aggressions committed by Captain Duncan."³ Unwilling to continue a discussion in which it was evident that the Argentine government had no intention of conceding that it was in the wrong, but insisted on considering itself the injured party, the American *chargé* asked for his passports. In the circumstances this action seemed rather abrupt, and the Argentine minister protested against it and suggested arbitration by a third power.⁴ Mr. Baylies, however, remained firm, and diplomatic relations were broken off. In the following year Great Britain cut the Gordian

¹ J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. I, pp. 876-883.

² *British and Foreign State Papers*, Vol. XX, pp. 330-355.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 364. For Vernet's report, see *ibid.*, pp. 369-436.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 437-440.

knot by sending a war-ship, which seized the Falkland Islands, on the ground that Spain had conceded her right to them fifty years before Buenos Aires had achieved her independence.¹ In spite of this effective answer to Argentinian pretensions, the Argentine Republic continued to press its claim against the United States for the acts of Captain Duncan. In a note dated December 4, 1841, Secretary Webster refused to consider the claim until the controversy between Great Britain and the Argentine Republic should be settled.² When the Argentine Republic invoked the Monroe Doctrine as against the British action, the United States refused to see its application to the case. The controversy was closed by the clear-cut statement of President Cleveland, in his annual message of December 8, 1885, that, "in view of the ample justification for the act of the *Lexington* and the derelict condition of the islands before and after their alleged occupation by Argentine colonists, this government considers the claim as wholly groundless."³

The historian Saldías, in his excellent work on Rosas and his times, opens his third volume with the statement that "the year 1838 began under fatal auspices for the government of Rosas." At the very time when the dictator was forced to carry on war against Bolivia in the north, and resist a new uprising of the Unitary party at home, the French government broke off diplomatic relations and followed with a blockade of Buenos Aires and the adjoining littoral.⁴ The blockade created a commercial and economic crisis which Rosas met with the greatest difficulty, but he refused to admit the French pretensions. Realizing the

¹ J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. I, p. 888.

² *Ibid.*, p. 890.

³ J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. VIII, p. 324; see also note of Mr. Bayard to Mr. Quesnada, March 18, 1886, J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. I, p. 889.

⁴ Saldías, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 17; see also House Doc. No. 211, 25th Cong., 3d sess., p. 33.

difficult predicament of the Argentine government, Captain Nicolson, in command of the U.S.S. *Fairfield*, offered his good offices to Governor Rosas on April 4, 1839, and outlined a basis of settlement which he thought the French would accept. Rosas received the proposal in the gracious spirit in which it was offered, but insisted upon such a radical modification that the French refused to parley farther and the negotiations were broken off.¹ The United States, however, had given an indication of its amicable disposition, and the sorely pressed dictator showed his appreciation.

In the war which the Argentine republic carried on against Montevideo, the United States again had occasion to show its friendly attitude towards the government of Buenos Aires. Rosas had declared a blockade of Montevideo in 1842 in order to assist General Oribe in his attempt to regain the presidency of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, whence he had been driven by a revolution. In March, 1844, Captain Voorhees was despatched in the frigate *Congress* to Montevideo to protect the interests of the United States, but also with instructions to maintain a strict and unqualified neutrality. Instead of carrying out these instructions, the American officer, on the ground that one of General Oribe's schooners had fired upon a Montevidean fishing-boat which had sought refuge beside an American bark, declared that the act constituted piracy, in which the commander of the Argentine squadron had, by approving and adopting it, made himself an accomplice. He thereupon not only seized the offending schooner, but compelled the Argentinian squadron to surrender, and released all the Montevidean prisoners on board. He also refused to consider the port blockaded for American ships. His acts were warmly applauded by the commanding officers of the English, French, and Brazilian squadrons, but the Secretary of the Navy interpreted the law of neutrality in

¹ *British and Foreign State Papers*, Vol. XXXI, pp. 790-801.

a different sense. Captain Voorhees was charged with disobedience on five counts, court-martialed, and sentenced to be reprimanded and suspended from the service for three years. A copy of the reprimand and sentence was communicated to the Argentine minister, with an expression of the hope that his government would see in it a satisfactory proof of the disposition of the United States to respect the rights of Buenos Aires.¹

In the following year the United States gave another signal instance of its appreciation of the belligerent rights of weaker states. The Argentinian squadron had been maintaining a modified blockade of Montevideo for over a year, but when an attempt was made to change it into a strict blockade, the French admiral refused to observe it. The American commander was thereupon forced to decide whether he would insist upon the same privileges for American shipping as the French illegally obtained, or whether he should recognize the strict blockade proclaimed and enforced by the Argentinian fleet. After carefully considering the situation, the American *chargé d'affaires*, Mr. William Brent, Jr., decided that the French admiral by his act had in reality become a belligerent, and that the United States could not put itself in the same attitude and still maintain a strictly neutral course.² In spite of this recommendation, Commander Pendergrast decided to claim for the commerce of the United States the same immunities and advantages enjoyed by the commerce of any other country, and notified the Argentinian admiral that he would maintain this position. When the correspondence was placed before the Secretary of the Navy, he declared that Commander Pendergrast was wrong, that the failure on the part of the Argentine republic to maintain her belligerent rights against the opposition of the French naval force did not justify him in refusing to conform to the strict blockade,

¹ J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. I, pp. 178-182.

² House Doc No. 212, 29th Cong., 1st sess., p. 10.

and that the President would have been pleased if he had conformed to the advice of the United States' representative at Buenos Aires, at least until the sense of his government could be known.¹

At the same time the French and British ministers were threatening the Argentinian government with a joint blockade by their squadrons unless it stopped trying to control Uruguay through its support of the Oribe faction. The American *chargé*, Mr. Brent, offered his good offices, but, although they were at first accepted by both parties, and preliminary bases of a compromise were laid down, the mediation fell through, owing to the exigencies of the French plenipotentiary.² The two powers made good their promise, and on September 18, 1845, they issued a joint declaration of blockade of the ports and coasts of Buenos Aires.³ Mr. Brent's note to the British minister shows the American attitude: "I do not acknowledge such decision of these plenipotentiaries as having any validity whatever, as far as the United States and their citizens are concerned . . . Nor, sir, do I acknowledge the right of the commanders of the combined squadron of England and France to enforce any such blockade in consequence of such decision, found necessary by the English and French plenipotentiaries. . . . I therefore, sir, for the United States of America hereby protest against this so-called and misnamed blockade."⁴

The revolutions of 1848 in Europe caused both France and Great Britain to pause in their dictatorial policy towards Rosas, and by 1850 both nations had signed treaties with him. Despite his autocratic acts and often brutal methods, the United States was obliged to recognize that throughout his long tenure of power, he was a constant and powerful check upon European infringement of American sovereignty. As such, he was supported upon every occasion

¹ House Doc. No. 212, 29th Cong., 1st sess., p. 39.

² Saldías, *Historia de la Confederación Argentina*, Vol. IV, p. 178.

³ *British and Foreign State Papers*, Vol. XXXIV, p. 1266.

⁴ House Doc. No. 212, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

when the United States could consistently do so. His downfall, which came in 1851, was produced, not by the machinations of foreign powers, but by a triple alliance between his chief lieutenant, General Urquiza, governor of the rich province of Entre Rios, the Empire of Brazil, and the faction of Uruguay which had always opposed him. The historian Calderón thus summarizes the work of the great Argentinian tyrant: "His authoritative character of a Spanish patrician made him the *paterfamilias* of the Argentine democracy. . . . In the twenty-four years, 1829 to 1852, Rosas made federal unity a reality. . . . He defended the country against the territorial aggression of foreign coalitions, and his own power against conspiracy and revolt; he dominated the capital city and moderated provincialism; he painfully founded the Confederation. . . . His cruelty was effectual, his barbarism patriotic."¹

With the end of the Rosas régime comes a new epoch in the history of the Argentine republic. General Urquiza, who was now in control, determined to establish a real federal republic with the least possible delay. To that end, a constitutional convention was called, which met on November 20, 1852, in Santa Fé. Every province was represented except Buenos Aires, whose attitude from the beginning was strongly antagonistic to the idea. In drawing up a constitution for a federal republic, it was but natural that the constitution of the United States should have a considerable influence, and in fact in submitting the constitution to the convention the chairman of the committee on constitutional affairs declared that "the draft of the committee has been cast in the mold of the constitution of the United States, the only model now existing for a real federation."² The constitution was signed May 1, 1853, and on May 25 was proclaimed the supreme law of the land.

¹ F. García Calderón, *Latin America* (N. Y., 1913), Chap. V.

² L. S. Rowe, *The Federal System of the Argentine Republic* (Wash., 1921), p. 43.

An attempt was immediately made to obtain the acceptance of the constitution by Buenos Aires, thus bringing her into the new federation; but it was not successful. The central government could not hope to become stable and strong as long as one third of the population and one fourth of the country's wealth remained outside, particularly since Buenos Aires controlled the sole important port of entry, the principal source of revenue. Various attempts to bring about a satisfactory arrangement were made—the most important, perhaps, being the effort of Colonel Yancy, the American *chargé d'affaires*, in 1858. At this time Buenos Aires agreed to enter the confederation, provided that the city of Buenos Aires should not be the federal capital, and that General Urquiza should retire and occupy no public office in the new government. Colonel Yancy, representing General Urquiza, indignantly refused these conditions, and the negotiations came to an end.¹ When this last attempt failed, actual warfare broke out, resulting in a complete victory for the federal forces. Threatened by invasion and the capture of its capital, Buenos Aires became more reasonable and agreed to enter the confederation, provided that certain amendments were made to the national constitution.

A constitutional convention of the province of Buenos Aires was opened on January 5, 1860, and it proposed a number of amendments to the federal constitution. Again the influence of the constitution of the United States was apparent. The chairman of the committee on constitutional amendments said in the report submitted to the convention: "The committee has been guided in its recommendations by the provisions of a similar constitution, recognized as the most perfect, *viz.*, that of the United States. The provisions of this constitution are most readily applicable to Argentine conditions, having served as the basis for the formation of the Argentine Confederation. . . . It would therefore be

¹ Mariano Pelliza, *Historia de la Organizacion Nacional* (Buenos Aires, 1899), p. 244.

both presumptuous and a proof of ignorance were we to attempt any innovations in constitutional organization, thus ignoring the lessons of experience and the manifest truths accepted by the human conscience.”¹ The amendments proposed were accepted and were then laid before another national convention called for the purpose. The amendments were again ratified, September 25, 1860, thus definitely establishing the Argentine republic as a federal state with Buenos Aires included.

Once a part of the federal republic, Buenos Aires determined to dominate it. The provincial government interpreted several clauses of the constitution differently from the national government, and when the congress put the province under martial law, war again broke out. This time General Bartolomé Mitre decisively defeated the federal forces, thereupon taking over the supreme power until the national government could be reorganized. Elections of senators and deputies took place in April, 1862, and the presidential election in October made General Mitre president for a period of six years. The new president showed himself a truly great leader. Generous and conciliatory in his methods, he succeeded in placing the federation on a basis of friendly coöperation between the national and provincial governments.

In 1865 the Argentine republic was drawn into the war against Paraguay which Brazil and Uruguay were then waging. When the question was raised regarding the good offices of the United States to settle the dispute, Seward wrote our minister to the effect that, “although we have never been eager to interfere in controversies abroad which lead to wars, or in accepting the part of mediator for the purpose of arresting hostilities, we have a natural desire, as an American power, that peace should prevail in this hemisphere. . . . If, therefore, all or either of them shall ask for our good offices, they will be bestowed with a full apprecia-

¹ L. S. Rowe, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

tion of the delicacy and responsibility of the trust, and with a single desire to render impartial justice and to terminate the ravages of war.”¹ The differences, however, were too serious to be settled by mediation, and the war ended only with the utter destruction of Paraguay.²

Article V of the treaty of limits between the Argentine republic and Paraguay, signed February 3, 1876, provided that the President of the United States should be asked to arbitrate the right of sovereignty over the territory between the River Verde and the main branch of the Pilcomayo.³ The documents were accordingly submitted to President Hayes in March, 1878. The award was rendered in November of the same year, and it stated that Paraguay was legally and justly entitled to the disputed territory.⁴ Both sides thanked the President for the service which he had rendered, and as a token of recognition the Paraguayan congress voted to change the name of the principal town in the region to Villa Hayes.

With the conclusion of the Paraguayan war in 1870, the Argentine republic entered upon a period of remarkable growth and commercial progress. The American *chargé* at Buenos Aires, writing February 12, 1873, notes the fact that real estate in Buenos Aires and vicinity had tripled in value within the past three years, and that there had been a tremendous increase in foreign trade. A treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation had been signed between the United States and the Argentine Confederation in 1853; but increase of North American trade with the Argentine was hindered by the lack of direct steam communication.⁵ Early in 1887 the Argentine government offered to subsidize an American line to the extent of \$100,000 annually.⁶

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1866, Part II, p. 286.*

² *Infra*, p. 374.

³ J. B. Moore, *History and Digest of Int. Arbitrations* (Wash, 1898), Vol. V, p. 4783.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 1943.

⁵ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1873, Part I, p. 35.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1887, p. 6.

But when certain objections and delays ensued a British firm seized the opportunity and received the concession.¹

The United States showed lack of foresight in another matter. The most important of the early exports from Argentina were hides and wool. There was no reason why the United States should not become a large customer for Argentine wool, except for a ridiculous tariff which discriminated against this wool because in its unwashed state it was heavier with grease than the Australian or New Zealand product. The discrimination was unintentional, but some time, let us hope, our tariff will be revised in accordance with the recommendations of a commission of experts rather than at the dictation of self-seeking politicians. The American minister at Buenos Aires made every effort to bring the matter to the attention of the American government, but with little apparent result. Not only was the advantage of this trade lost, but the Argentinians turned more and more to the production of cereals, thus becoming a formidable rival to the United States instead of a profitable customer. In fact, the export of wheat jumped from 109,611 kilos in 1878 to 237,865,925 kilos in 1887, while maize increased from 19,064,044 kilos to 361,456,705 during the same period.² While the value of trade between the United States and Argentina had increased during these same years from \$5,500,000 to about \$17,000,000, or 205 per cent., Great Britain had increased hers from \$15,500,000 to \$51,750,000, or 234 per cent., and Germany had increased hers from \$3,000,000 to about \$22,000,000, or 580 per cent.³

Following the excellent start made by Bartolomé Mitre, the Argentine republic was fortunate in her choice of presidents. Both Sarmiento (1868-74) and Avellaneda (1874-80) aided remarkably in promoting the growth of the republic, and both were able to avoid any serious internal political

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1888, Part I, p. 2.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 10.

³ *Ibid.*, 1889, p. 4.

troubles. The elections of 1880, however, brought on a bloody contest between Dr. Tejedor, the candidate of Buenos Aires, and General Roca, the candidate of the federal government and the provinces. The situation became so bad that Mr. Osborn, the minister of the United States, offered his good offices to prevent a further sacrifice of life and property.¹ However, the national forces soon gained control, and General Roca was duly inaugurated as president. To prevent further uprisings of a similar character, the city of Buenos Aires was detached from the province and federalized; in return for its surrender of provincial autonomy, it became the capital of the federal state.

A treaty signed between the Argentine republic and Brazil, September 7, 1889, again called in the United States to settle a boundary dispute. The territory in question was the so-called Misiones, lying between the Uruguay and Yguazu rivers. Various unsuccessful attempts had been made to settle the question—the last one in 1890, when there was an attempt at division. This effort having failed, the case was turned over to President Harrison in 1892, according to the terms of the treaty. Owing, however, to the delay necessary to prepare the cases, President Cleveland was called upon to make the award, which was delivered to the contending parties on February 6, 1895. The decision gave Brazil the whole territory under dispute, without assigning the reason for the judgment; but the fact that by the census of 1890 all but 30 of the 5,793 inhabitants of the contested region were Brazilians (and of the 30 not one was an Argentinian) probably had something to do with the verdict. Both sides accepted the award, and the Baron de Rio Branco, head of the Brazilian special mission, declared: "I am sure that the award of the illustrious American, who, animated by an equal regard for both nations, has so carefully and conscientiously exercised his functions as arbiter,

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1880, p. 27.*

has been received with satisfaction in the Argentine republic, and that this happy and honorable event will tend, as all Brazilians desire, to tighten the bonds of friendship which unite us to our former allies of Caseros and Paraguay." ¹

A more serious dispute over boundary claims came up in 1898 between the Argentine republic and Chile. Ever since the two governments were established, the exact boundary line had been disputed; but in 1884 a protocol had established the frontier where the highest peaks of the Andes divide the watershed. The Argentinians interpreted this to mean a line drawn from highest peak to highest peak, while the Chileans claimed that the highest peaks meant the highest points in the watershed. In 1895 the situation became very strained, and both sides began preparations for war. An arrangement was finally made to continue the surveys, but in 1898 a violent dispute arose regarding the northern boundary in the district known as the Puno de Atacama. Once more the situation became critical, and in August the Chilean government sent an ultimatum demanding arbitration. Fortunately for Argentina, General Roca, whose services as president in his term from 1880 to 1886, and as secretary of interior from 1890-1892, were so eminently valuable to his country, had just been reëlected. He accepted arbitration for not only the northern section, but also the longer and more important boundary in the south. For the Atacama region a commission of three was chosen, consisting of one Argentinian, one Chilean, and Mr. Buchanan, the American minister. Mr. Buchanan thereupon sketched the line that he considered fair according to the evidence, and divided it into sections. Possessing the deciding vote, he suggested that the commission vote on each section separately. The result was that where he favored the Argentine claims he voted with the Argentine commission, and where he thought Chile had the advantage, he

¹ J. B. Moore, *Hist. and Digest of Int. Arbitrations*, Vol. II, pp. 1969-2026.

sided with the Chilean representative. By this means the whole question was settled in three days, and, although the justice of the course was questioned, both sides accepted the award.¹ The more difficult boundary on the south was not settled until 1902, and then only after a war scare brought both nations to the realization of the dangerous possibilities of farther delays.

In his message to Congress dated May 2, 1899, President Roca paid a high tribute to the efforts of the United States to bring about a peaceful solution of the boundary question. After pointing out that the delineation of the Puño de Atacama had a far greater importance than the value of the territory in dispute, since it closed the long period of uneasiness and inquietude which had been the cause of so many sacrifices on the part of Argentina and Chile, he went on to say: "The participation taken in the solution of the difficulties of which I speak by Mr. Buchanan, the American minister, has also been a motive for particular gratification. To that solution he chiefly contributed, and thus rendered both republics an eminent service. This is not the first occasion upon which it has fallen to the lot of a minister of the great confederation of the north to decisively intervene in our boundary disputes in the interest of international peace. Nor will this ever be forgotten by the two peoples whose destinies have been at stake on one or the other side of the mountain."²

Having finally settled its boundary disputes with Chile in 1902, the Argentine republic was able to turn its attention to the European intervention in the affairs of Venezuela. In December of that year Great Britain, Germany, and Italy established a blockade of Venezuelan ports with a view to forcing the payment of debts. The United States minister to Venezuela immediately proposed arbitration, and although the Kaiser held back, President Roosevelt was able

¹ C. E. Akers, *A History of South America, 1854-1904* (N. Y., 1904), p. 113.

² *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1899*, p. 7.

to exert sufficient pressure to force him to terms.¹ Argentina, although not aware of the efforts of the United States at the time, came to her aid in a strong letter of protest against the European intervention. In a long letter to the state department, Señor Luis M. Drago, Argentine Minister of Foreign Relations, thus summed up the views of his government in regard to armed intervention for the purpose of collecting the private claims of its nationals against another state: "The only principle which the Argentine republic maintains, and which it would with great satisfaction see adopted, in view of the events in Venezuela, by a nation that enjoys such great authority and prestige as the United States, is the principle already accepted, that there can be no territorial expansion in America on the part of Europe, nor any oppression of the peoples of this continent because an unfortunate financial situation may compel some one of them to postpone the fulfilment of its promises. In a word, the principle which she would like to see recognized is that the public debt can not occasion armed intervention, nor even the actual occupation of the territory of American nations by a European power."² Although Secretary Hay was not willing to subscribe *in toto* to this sentiment, the American delegate to the second Hague conference introduced a somewhat similar proposal, and the result was a resolution whereby the contracting powers agreed not to have recourse to armed force to recover debts due its nationals unless the debtor nation refused arbitration, or, having accepted arbitration, failed to submit to the award.³

On his trip to South America in 1906 in connection with the Pan-American Congress at Rio de Janeiro, Secretary Root was enthusiastically received at Buenos Aires, and he took advantage of the opportunity to express clearly and

¹ For this very interesting episode in Roosevelt's dealings with the Kaiser, see W. R. Thayer, *Life and Letters of John Hay* (Boston, 1915), Vol. II, pp. 286-288.

² *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1903*, p. 4.

³ W. M. Malloy, *Treaties, Conventions, etc.*, Vol. II, p. 2254.

forcefully the United States' acceptance of the Drago doctrine. In reply to a speech in which the eminent Argentinian authority on international law declared his doctrine to be a principle of American diplomacy based upon the sentiment of common defense, just as is the traditional policy of the United States, Mr. Root answered as follows: "I am glad to be able to declare myself in hearty and unreserved sympathy with you. . . . We deem the use of force for the collection of ordinary contract debts to be an invitation to abuses in their necessary results far worse, far more baneful to humanity, than that the debts contracted by any nation should go unpaid. We consider that the use of the army and navy of a great power to compel a weaker power to answer to a contract with a private individual is both an invitation to speculation upon the necessities of weak and struggling countries and an infringement upon the sovereignty of those countries, and we are now, as we always have been, opposed to it."¹ The Monroe and Drago doctrines were seen to be in complete accord, and a better foundation for mutual understanding and appreciation between the Argentine republic and the United States was the beneficial result.

The friendly relations between the two countries were cemented the more firmly by the active participation of the United States in the Fourth Pan-American Congress, held at Buenos Aires in 1910—a conference which, in the words of President Taft, had a "special meaning to the hearts of all Americans because around its date are clustered the anniversaries of the independence of so many of the American republics."² Three years later, in celebration of the centenary of Argentine independence, the American citizens resident in Buenos Aires presented to the Argentine republic a fine statue of Washington. The same cordial relations continued to exist between the two countries until 1917, when the United States entered the World War.

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1906, Part I, p. 29.*

² *Ibid.*, 1910, p. 14.

Until Germany declared her intention of waging unrestricted submarine warfare, the Argentine republic had no more reason for joining the Allies than did the United States. In fact, during the first three years of the war Argentina profited greatly from her neutrality through the increased value of her exports of grain and frozen meats. But when the United States refused to concede Germany's right to sink neutral vessels on the high seas and severed diplomatic relations with her, President Wilson expressed the belief that the remaining neutral states would undoubtedly follow our example. The Argentine republic, however, contented itself with a statement of regret that his Imperial Majesty had thought necessary to adopt such extreme measures, and by insisting that its conduct would be adjusted, as formerly, to the fundamental rules and principles of international law.¹ When, on April 2, 1917, the United States declared war upon Germany, Argentine public opinion rallied to its support, and *La Nacion* published a series of articles demanding that Argentina enter the war. The government, however, determined to remain neutral, and in a note to the United States it merely recognized the justice of the causes that moved the United States to declare war.² In a statement published in *La Razon* on April 10, Señor Luis Drago, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, protested against Argentina's neutral attitude, on the ground that the war between Germany and America was a struggle of democracy versus absolutism in which no American nation could remain neutral without denying its past and comprising its future.³ But the government not only remained firm, but even passed an embargo on the export of grain, which was a decided blow to the Allies. About the middle of May the Washington government intimated that such a policy was not Pan-American, and that if continued,

¹ John Barrett, *Latin America and the War* (Wash., 1919), p. 4.

² *Ibid.*, p. 5.

³ G. Gaillard, *Amérique Latine et Europe Occidentale* (Paris, 1918), p. 130.

it would force the United States to suspend all shipments of coal to Argentine ports.¹

The United States precipitated a crisis in the relations between the Argentine republic and Germany by the publication, on September 8, 1917, of a series of despatches sent by Count von Luxburg, the German *chargé* at Buenos Aires, to his government through the medium of the Swedish minister. These messages urged that certain small Argentine steamers either be spared or be sunk without a trace (*spurlos versenkt*). Incidentally, in one of the despatches the Argentinian Minister of Foreign Affairs was referred to as a notorious ass.² This brazen violation of the first principles of neutrality and hospitality provoked an immediate demand for a declaration of war against Germany. Count von Luxburg was given his passports, and both the Senate and Chamber passed resolutions authorizing the president to sever diplomatic relations with Germany. President Irigoyen, however, refused to depart from his policy of strict neutrality, declaring that Berlin's prompt disavowal of Luxburg's actions and the expression of regret accompanying it were entirely satisfactory. Various suggestions have been made to account for President Irigoyen's persistent refusal to break with Germany in the face of the almost overwhelming pressure of public opinion,³ but in the absence of facts such speculation is futile. Whatever the cause, the president had sufficient power to maintain Argentina's neutrality to the end.

After the war Argentina was one of the fifteen Latin-American states that joined the League of Nations. At the first assembly, which met at Geneva, November 15, 1920, Señor Puyrerredon led the fight for the admission of all states to the League, including Germany. To accomplish

¹ G. Gaillard, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

² For text of these messages see P. A. Martin, *Latin America and the War, League of Nations*, Vol. II, No. 4, p. 253.

³ As a protest the Argentinian ambassador at Washington, Señor Romolo Naon, sent in his resignation.

this, it would have been necessary to amend the covenant; so the Argentinian delegates urged the consideration of four amendments which they regarded as essential if the League was to be established upon a broad and democratic basis. These amendments included compulsory arbitration by the International Court of Justice, the election of members of the Council by the Assembly, and the admission of all sovereign states unless they voluntarily decided to stay outside. When the Assembly refused to consider any amendments at its first session, the Argentinian delegation refused to coöperate farther and withdrew. Although still nominally a member, the republic has not participated in any of the subsequent meetings.¹

Recent relations between the United States and Argentina, although officially friendly, have lacked cordiality. On his visit to South America late in 1920, Secretary Colby was received with very little popular enthusiasm in Buenos Aires. A strong pro-German sentiment still exists in the Argentine; and our recent imperialistic policy in the Caribbean has engendered suspicion. But the chief antagonism is unquestionably traceable to the Fordney tariff bill, which, it is declared, will almost prohibit the importation of Argentine products into the United States. The *Epoca* of Buenos Aires lays much stress on the inconsistency of our policy in talking loudly in favor of the "open door" as a means of eliminating unjust privileges, and yet at the same time adopting an emergency tariff, in protection of our producers, which constitutes a severe blow to Argentine exportation. It goes without saying that such a tariff measure must react in a most unfavorable manner upon American exports to Argentina. In a carefully written article entitled "Argentina and Our Tariff," Mr. W. W. Davies, correspondent of *La Nacion*, comes to this conclusion: "By en-

¹ *Current History*, Vol. XIII, Part II, p. 7 (Jan., 1921); also *A League of Nations*, Vol. IV, No. 1, p. 60. Argentina on May 12, 1921, sent an official communication to the League Secretariat indicating that she still considered herself a member.

acting a higher tariff the United States would indirectly, but none the less effectively, deal two blows at her own interests. She would curtail the avenues for the satisfactory employment of her merchant marine, and at the same time play definitely into the hands of her European trade competitors.”¹

An unfortunate impression prevails in the United States that the Argentine republic, since its principal exports are meat and grain, has no market for its products in the United States, and that therefore hopes of a substantial trade between the two countries are vain. It is true that before the war (in 1913) Argentina did 70 per cent. of her foreign trading with Europe, but even then the United States imported considerable quantities of hides and wool, and sold in return agricultural implements, oils, and lumber. In certain special articles, such as linseed and quebracho, the United States has always been an excellent customer; in fact, in the latter we are Argentina's best customer. The war produced an abnormal situation which still exists. But, in spite of this fact, certain deductions can be drawn from the phenomenal increases in our commercial relations with Argentina. The table on page 320 shows that before the war the United States did not obtain a share of Argentina's trade commensurate with the possibilities, while since the war she has maintained a greater percentage than was at first expected.

However, whether the United States can continue to hold her own depends to a large extent upon the real effort which is made to meet foreign competition upon its own ground. Better transportation and banking facilities would aid materially; a careful consideration of the results of tariffs and other laws of a similar character would be beneficial; but, most of all, the United States and its citizens must more fully appreciate that the Argentine republic is already one of the world's great nations, even though its development

¹ *New York Times*, Feb. 6, 1921.

FOREIGN TRADE OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC¹

	UNITED KINGDOM		GERMANY		UNITED STATES	
	1913	1920	1913	1920	1913	1920
Argentine exports to....	\$116,756,777	\$283,000,000	\$56,178,368	\$17,000,000	\$22,207,965	\$180,000,000
Argentine imports from.	\$126,959,989	200,000,000	69,172,279	21,000,000	60,171,867	322,000,000
Total trade.....	\$242,716,766	\$483,000,000	\$125,350,647	\$38,000,000	\$82,379,832	\$502,000,000

¹ The figures for 1913 are from *Report of the Second Pan-Amer. Commercial Conf.*, pp. 400-401; the 1920 figures are from the *Bulletin of the Pan-American Union*, Vol. LIV, pp. 48-49 (Jan., 1922).

has but scarcely begun. A country with an area of 1,153,418 square miles—that is, equal to the United States east of the Mississippi—about two thirds of which is suitable either for agriculture or grazing, with a population of 8,500,000, largely homogeneous,—a country which has a foreign trade amounting to almost \$2,000,000,000 annually,—is not, as a noted financial authority has pertinently declared, “a coming nation; it is already here.”

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CHAPTER XV

CHILE AND THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC

THE early history of Chile is a continuous record of strife and bloodshed. From the time of its discovery in the sixteenth century until the wars of independence, the Spanish conquerors of the land and their descendants were almost constantly waging offensive or defensive wars against the Auracanian Indians—the most warlike native tribes of the South American continent. Even throughout the period when the Chileans were striving valiantly to throw off the Spanish yoke their internal strife did not cease, and during the dictatorship of Carrera and his brothers, from 1811 to 1813, conspiracies and counter-revolutions followed with monotonous regularity. The factional bitterness between the Carreras and Bernardo O'Higgins, son of the old Irish captain-general and the acknowledged leader of the radical faction, became so great that the people could not unite effectively against the common foe. The result was the decisive victory of the royalist army at Rancagua, October 1, 1814, which almost annihilated the patriot hopes. Fortunately for Chile, it was shortly after this disaster that San Martín began organizing his famous army at Mendoza, and he warmly welcomed O'Higgins and the few officers who had escaped with him across the Andes.

The relations of the United States with Chile began in the troubled times of the Carreras. Joel R. Poinsett was commissioned by President Madison to visit the principal countries of South America and "to diffuse the impression that the United States cherish the sincerest good will

towards the people of South America as neighbors, . . . and that in the event of a political separation from the parent country and of the establishment of an independent system of national government, it will coincide with the sentiments and policy of the United States to promote the most friendly relations and the most liberal intercourse between the inhabitants of this hemisphere.”¹ Poinsett first went to Buenos Aires and then into Chile, where he arrived in December, 1811. Don José Miguel Carrera, president of the *junta gubernativa*, welcomed him enthusiastically, assuring him of the sympathy and friendship of Chile for the United States and promising close commercial relations in the future. In his reply Poinsett expressed his pleasure at being “the first to have the honorable privilege of establishing relations between the two generous nations which ought to unite as friends and natural allies.”² Poinsett quickly became an ardent supporter of the patriot cause. The Chilean historian, Barros Arana, declares that in all of his conversations the emissary let it be known that the government and people of the United States had a keen interest in the success of the Spanish-American revolution. He also assured them that supplies and munitions could be obtained in the United States, and gave the names and addresses of various merchants and manufacturers who would be most likely to furnish them.³ He went so far as to participate more or less directly in almost all of the public affairs of Chile, and even accompanied Carrera in his first campaigns against the Spaniards.⁴ The outbreak of the War of 1812 with Great Britain, however, destroyed all immediate hope of American assistance, and early in 1814 Poinsett returned to the United States, where, in spite of his unneutral efforts in behalf of Chile,

¹ F. L. Paxson, *The Independence of South American Republics* (Phil., 1916), p. 111.

² Diego Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de Chile* (Santiago, 1887), Vol. VIII, p. 566.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 567.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 566, note 7.

he was warmly congratulated by Secretary Monroe for the ability and success with which he had conducted his delicate mission.

The results of the Poinsett mission were seen in the attitude of more than benevolent neutrality shown by Chile towards the United States in the War of 1812. American cruisers in the southern Pacific were allowed to dispose of their prizes in Chilean ports, and the Chilean government even seriously considered purchasing some of them as a nucleus of a new navy.¹ Captain David Porter, who cruised in these waters in the U. S. frigate *Essex*, in his journal gives a picturesque account of the hospitality of the Chileans at Valparaíso. He was fêted and entertained most lavishly and given every accommodation. He confesses that it was generally believed that he had brought from the United States proposals for a friendly alliance with Chile and assurances of assistance in their struggle for independence; nor did it suit his purpose to disabuse the people of this idea.²

Poinsett's suggestion that war equipment be purchased in the United States did not fall on deaf ears. Early in 1816 Señor José Miguel Carrera landed in the United States with a view to purchasing supplies and obtaining the moral support of the United States, and he immediately looked up the two Americans whom he had formerly befriended, Poinsett and Porter. Commodore Porter, who was then living in Washington, received him cordially and introduced him to President Madison. "I was received," Carrera later wrote to his brother Luis, "as a man working for the same cause as they." Despite his friendly reception, Carrera soon perceived, however, that he could hope for no real support from the United States government. Proceeding to New York, he succeeded in interesting a

¹ Diego Barros Arana, *op. cit.*, Vol. IX, p. 220; also J. B. Lockey, *Pan-Americanism: Its Beginnings* (N. Y., 1920), p. 205.

² David Porter, *Journal of a Cruise to the Pacific* (Phila., 1815), Vol. I, pp. 102-112.

number of American and French citizens in organizing an expedition; but, owing to a lack of funds and to rather uncertain security, he found great difficulty in purchasing ships and supplies. His friend Poinsett came to his aid, and he was finally able to purchase several indifferently armed ships; and, in spite of the efforts of the Spanish agents to have him arrested, he left the United States in one of his vessels, the *Clifton*, on December 3, 1816.¹

Another attempt to obtain ships was made in the following year, when Manuel H. de Aguirre was commissioned as a private agent of Chile to obtain six war vessels in the United States, in addition to his commission as a representative of the government of Buenos Aires to obtain the recognition of the independence of the Argentine republic. After many trials he succeeded in having two sloops-of-war constructed; but before they could sail they were attached for debts at the instigation of the Spanish consul at New York. In desperation, Aguirre turned to President Monroe, asking him to purchase the vessels. Secretary Adams replied that this was impossible under the laws of the United States. He pointed out that, although Aguirre had built, equipped, and fitted for sea two vessels suitable for war purposes, yet on the ground that no proof was adduced that he had armed them he had been acquitted by the Supreme Court. "But," he concluded, "the government of the United States can no more countenance or participate in any expedient to evade the intention of the laws than it can dispense with their operation."² Aguirre finally settled the financial obligations and the vessels got away without further governmental interference.

During the later part of the war of independence the relations between the United States and Chile were not so cordial as might have been expected, considering the

¹ Diego Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de Chile*, Vol. XI, pp. 89-97.

² J. Q. Adams, *Writings*, ed. by W. C. Ford (N. Y., 1913), Vol. VI, p. 450.

excellent impression made by Poinsett. There were various reasons. Mr. Theoderic Bland, one of the commission of three sent by President Monroe, December 4, 1817, to investigate conditions in South America, and the only one who visited Chile, seems in some way to have become embroiled in the internal disputes between O'Higgins and the Carreras,¹ and his views, on the whole, were none too favorable to the patriots. Captain Eliphalet Smith, captain of the American brig *Macedonian*, got into difficulties upon several occasions with Lord Cochrane, the new commander of the Chilean naval forces, and the result was a series of claims filed against the Chilean government.² Captain Biddle, of the American sloop-of-war *Ontario*, also ran afoul Admiral Cochrane over the question of salutes. In 1819, when Lord Cochrane declared the whole coast of Peru to be in a state of formal blockade, the United States pronounced the blockade ineffective, and therefore not binding. As a consequence, a number of unfortunate disagreements arose between American merchants and ships and the blockading squadron.³ With the final defeat of the Spaniards, this cause of friction was removed; and the independence of Chile was formally recognized by the United States on January 27, 1823, by the appointment of Mr. Heman Allen as minister plenipotentiary to Santiago.⁴

Mr. Allen did not enter upon the duties of his mission until April, 1824—the same month in which the papers of Santiago carried a report of the historic message of President Monroe. His reception was most cordial; all the highest functionaries of the state were present; and he was saluted with salvos of artillery. In reply to his speech,

¹ Barros Arana, *op. cit.*, Vol. XI, p. 546 (note). In the report that Judge Bland made to the President several sentences seem to indicate that he regarded Supreme Director O'Higgins as a despot who could not hear the loud call of the people for a Congress. See American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. IV, p. 309.

² *Infra*, p. 329.

³ J. B. Lockey, *Pan-Americanism: Its Beginnings* (N. Y., 1920), p. 210.

⁴ J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. I, p. 91.

in which he assured the newly recognized government that no alliances or coalitions need henceforth be feared, the Chilean spokesman expressed his government's gratitude for the recognition of the independence of the new republics, and for the recent declaration of President Monroe which protected them from the proposed coalitions of the European sovereigns.¹ In spite of her appreciation of the promptness of the United States in despatching a diplomatic representative, Chile was unable, owing to internal difficulties and the emptiness of the treasury, to return the favor until 1827.²

Don Joaquin Campina, the first Chilean diplomatic envoy to the United States, was not entirely successful in his mission. One of the principal duties laid upon him was the negotiation of a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation. Another was the settlement of sundry outstanding claims. In neither of these tasks was he successful, owing to his belief that the arrangements proposed were far more favorable to the United States than to Chile. In 1830 he was transferred to Mexico. Two years later the American *chargé* at Santiago, Mr. John Hamm, succeeded in concluding a convention of peace, amity, commerce, and navigation with Chile, in which each side mutually engaged not to grant any particular favor to other nations respecting commerce and navigation which should not immediately become common to the other party. An explanatory convention was drawn up in the following year, and both treaties were ratified and proclaimed on April 29, 1834.³ These treaties remained in force until January 20, 1850, when they were terminated on notice given by the Chilean government.

Before continuing the narrative of the relations of the

¹ Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de Chile*, Vol. XIV, p. 368. An excellent sketch of the causes and steps leading up to the enunciation of the doctrine is given by the same author, *ibid.*, pp. 469-487.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. XV, p. 204.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. XVI, pp. 173-176. For text of the conventions see Sen. Doc. No. 47, 48th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 131.

United States with Chile, certain aspects of the latter's internal history must be noted. From 1823 to 1830 the country was given over to revolution and disorder. García Calderón gives a brief but vivid picture of the prevailing conditions: "The national life was chaotic—vandalism in the country, commerce paralyzed, industry at a standstill, finance in disorder, credit vanished, and politics revolutionary. . . . The political orgy continued until 1830, the Chilean people went from liberty to license, and from license to barbarism. At last the demogogy was checked by a man of superior powers, Diego Portales, founder of the Araucanian nation."¹ Portales was a man of strong mind and of practical ideas, and one who had the rare quality of being willing that others should hold the highest positions and reap the rewards, provided that he could direct the policy of the state along the road that would lead to peace and prosperity. As minister under President Prieto, his organizing genius was given full sway—"Prieto played not illy the rôle of a Washington to Portales' Hamilton."² He brought about internal peace, built highways and railroads, reorganized the national finances, established schools, and, as a final legacy, gave to Chile the aristocratic constitution of 1833.³

This constitution, which with few changes has remained the fundamental law of the country up to the present time, has made Chile the stablest of the South American republics. The half-dozen constitutions that preceded it were unsatisfactory, chiefly because of their liberality, and it was determined that there should be no criticism of this constitution because of the weakness of the government for which it provided. Although the government was vested in a president and a bicameral legislature, in actual practice it

¹ *Latin America: Its Rise and Progress* (N. Y., 1913), p. 164.

² T. C. Dawson, *The South American Republics* (N. Y., 1904), Vol. II, p. 196.

³ Text in present form in W. F. Dodd, *Modern Constitutions* (Chicago, 1909), Vol. I. An exhaustive treatment of the Prieto régime (1841-51) is Ramon S. Valde's *Historia de Chile*, 4 vols. (Santiago, 1900).

was an oligarchy, with the president wielding almost despotic powers. The presidential term was fixed at five years; but, as the constitution permitted reëlection, every president until 1871, when an amendment prohibited a second term, served for a ten-year period. During periods of domestic trouble the president was given the power to suspend the constitutional guaranties. As a result, Presidents Prieto, Bulnes, and Montt checked all uprisings with an iron hand, and were dictators in all but name. Until 1861 Chile had peace, it is true, but at the cost of almost all civil and political liberty. However, the serious uprisings during President Montt's second term showed the strength of the reaction against the despotic methods of the government. The new president, Señor José Joaquín Pérez, elected in 1861, adopted a policy that was both liberal and effective, and not once during his ten-year term did he ask for the extraordinary powers which his predecessors had found so necessary.

The diplomatic relations between the United States and Chile throughout this period were confined almost exclusively to the prosecution of claims resulting from the seizure by Admiral Cochrane of certain sums of money belonging to American citizens. The first claim was for \$140,000 taken from Captain Smith of the brig *Macedonian* in 1819. This the government of Chile finally agreed to settle by the payment of \$104,000 with interest.¹ The second claim was for a sum of \$70,400, which was taken from Captain Smith in 1821 by a force of armed soldiers in the service of the Republic of Chile. This money was later turned over to Lord Cochrane, and distributed by him as prize-money or to discharge arrears of pay due to the officers and men in the service of Chile.² No claim for this sum was filed by the government of the United States against Chile

¹ Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 58, 35th Cong., 1st sess., p. 4. See also Barros Arana, *Un Decenio de la Historia de Chile* (Santiago, 1913), Vol. I, p. 411.

² Sen. Doc., *op. cit.*, p. 5.

until some twenty years later (May 19, 1841), when the American *chargé*, Mr. Pollard, brought it to the attention of the Chilean government.¹ After another delay of two years, during which the American *chargé* at Santiago continued to press the claim, the Chilean minister for foreign affairs replied that, due to the period of time that the interested parties had allowed to elapse, the claim was outlawed by prescription.² This brought a long and caustic rejoinder from Mr. Pendleton, who was now acting as American *chargé d'affaires*.³ The interchanges finally became so heated that the Chilean minister threatened to put an end to all further correspondence. This would have been just as well, because after six months of bickering, which served only to embitter both parties, the dispute remained exactly where it started. Mr. Pendleton was finally recalled, and his successor, Mr. Crump, was instructed to press the claim, but in a courteous and respectful manner; for, as the American government conceded, the previous correspondence had been conducted "in a tone little calculated to secure an amicable adjustment of the matter in controversy."⁴

In 1846 Chile sent Señor Carvallo to Washington, with a mass of documentary evidence to prove that the property seized in the territory of the enemy was Spanish and therefore subject to capture as enemy property.⁵ The documents were turned over to Mr. R. H. Gillett, solicitor of the Treasury, who, after careful consideration of the evidence given on both sides, decided that the goods belonged to American citizens. He further ruled that there had been no violation of neutrality, since the goods had been landed in an open port in Peru when that country was still under

¹ Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 58, 35th Cong., 1st sess., p. 30.

² *Ibid.*, p. 34.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 36-46.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 109. For a characterization of Pendleton and his methods from the Chilean point of view see Barros Arana, *Un Decenio de la Historia de Chile*, Vol. II, p. 582, note 6.

⁵ Sen. Doc., *op. cit.*, pp. 126-173.

the government of Spain, and before Chile or Peru had been recognized by the United States.¹ Mr. Gillett's reply was made on May 29, 1848, and President Buchanan, accepting it as conclusive, once more asked for a settlement. Señor Carvallo thereupon prepared another long answer, invoking, among other arguments, the rule of 1756 prohibiting neutrals in time of war from engaging in traffic forbidden to them in time of peace.² No answer was made to this until May 24, 1852, when Mr. Hunter, acting Secretary of State, stated that the United States had always denied the validity of the rule of 1756, and that, even admitting the legality of the rule, the seizure of American property by Chilean soldiers on Peruvian soil would not be justified by it.³ Since no solution by diplomatic means seemed possible, Señor Carvallo suggested arbitration, and the King of Belgium was finally agreed upon. Even then, six years elapsed before a convention of arbitration was signed, on November 10, 1858.

Each of the contracting parties now agreed to submit to the King of Belgium the following questions: (1) whether the claim was just in whole or part? (2) if just, what amount should be paid by Chile as indemnity for the capture? (3) whether interest should be paid, and if so, at what rate and from what date? The question of prescription was excluded. The designated arbitrator accepted the case and handed down an award on May 15, 1863. He found the claim well founded, but that of the amount seized only three fifths belonged to citizens of the United States. He also granted interest at 6 per cent. on this sum (\$42,400), but only from 1841, when the United States filed the claim, to 1848, when arbitration was agreed upon.⁴ A few other claims were still pending against

¹ Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 58, 35th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 173-333.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 334-393.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 393-409.

⁴ For summary of evidence and text of award see J. B. Moore, *History and Digest of International Arbitrations*, Vol. II, p. 1449.

the Chilean government, but they were for smaller sums and all were ultimately settled by diplomatic means.¹

In 1865 Chile became engaged in a war with Spain in consequence of the high-handed methods of that power in dealing with Peru. Spain had seized the Chincha Islands, and Chile feared that unless the South American states stood together she would attempt to regain her authority over them. Public feeling ran high, and a riot occurred in front of the Spanish legation at Santiago. This, together with a series of other incidents which manifested an un-neutral attitude on the part of Chile, brought a Spanish fleet into Valparaiso Bay, and its admiral gave the Chileans four days in which to apologize and salute the Spanish flag.² When this was refused, the Spanish squadron proceeded to blockade the Chilean coast. Upon several occasions the United States offered her good offices, both to Spain and to Chile, but without success. The American minister at Santiago, Mr. Thomas H. Nelson, although maintaining a correct and neutral attitude, showed clearly in his despatches that he, as well as the other members of the diplomatic corps, felt that Spain was the aggressor and that the war was both useless and unnecessary. He even went so far as to suggest to Secretary Seward that "a peaceful solution of the controversy would be much more probable if, in addition to the tender of good offices, the United States would remonstrate with Spain upon her unjust and aggressive policy toward Chile. The *moral* intervention, at least, of our government to protect the integrity of one of the American republics from unjustifiable attack on the part of a European power was never more urgently needed nor upon firmer grounds of right and justice."³

When, in March, 1866, news came to General Kilpatrick,

¹ J. B. Moore, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 1449, note 1.

² For a complete account of the causes of the war from the Chilean point of view see *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1866*, Part 2, pp. 349-362.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 369.

who had succeeded Mr. Nelson as minister at Santiago, that the Spaniards intended to bombard Valparaiso, an unfortified town, he used every effort to prevent it. He first unofficially visited the Chilean foreign minister and tried to obtain his terms of peace, and then made a similar visit to the Spanish admiral. When this failed, he attempted to obtain the support of the British and French diplomatic representatives in asking that the United States squadron give protection to foreign property in the port and prevent the bombardment by force if necessary. As they were unwilling to interfere, the American minister did not feel justified in taking further responsibility in the matter. The bombardment took place on March 31, and the damage done to property and goods was estimated at from fifteen to twenty million dollars.¹ As a result of the failure of the United States to intervene when a squadron under Commodore Rodgers was at the very scene of action, the feeling of the Chileans towards the United States became very bitter. As General Kilpatrick phrased it: "Chile looked upon the United States as her best friend, and that friend had failed to assist her in her hour of need."² Secretary Seward, however, upheld the American minister's conduct and pointed out that peace was the constant interest and unwavering policy of the United States. The United States would resist any effort to assail wantonly the republican principle in the western hemisphere, but it had no armies for aggressive warfare, nor ambition for the character of a regulator. The policy of non-intervention began with Washington and still endured.³ In spite of this statement of policy, Seward again made a very earnest effort early in 1867 to induce both parties to arbitrate their quarrel; but Chile was still so bitter towards Spain because of her bombardment of Valparaiso that her conditions of settlement

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1866, Part 2, p. 386.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 408.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 413.

were uncompromising in the extreme. An armistice was finally arranged in 1868, which was just as good as peace, because, as the Chilean foreign minister declared, Spain could not and Chile would not resume the offensive.¹

One important result of the war with Spain was Chile's realization of her need of a strong navy to protect her exposed sea-coast; in fact, Chile's tendency to become a militaristic nation dates from this period. Another result of the war was a temporary agreement between Chile and Bolivia in regard to the disputed boundary between the two countries in the desert of Atacama. When the two countries secured their independence from Spain, little attention was paid to this region because of its supposed worthlessness; but when, in 1841, guano was discovered, a sudden interest in the Atacama desert was manifested by both parties. In 1842 the Chilean congress passed a resolution by which all the guano in the province of Coquimbo in the littoral of Atacama, and in the adjacent islands, was thereby declared national property.² Hardly had the bill become law when the Bolivian representative in Chile asked that the measure, which thus extended Chile's frontiers to the prejudice of Bolivia, be revoked. Revindications continued on both sides, Bolivia insisting that her southern boundary was the twenty-seventh degree of latitude, *i. e.*, inclusive of the desert of Atacama, while Chile maintained that her territory extended north to the twenty-third degree of latitude. Inasmuch as Chile's various constitutions from 1822 to 1833 indicated Atacama as Chile's northern boundary, the Bolivian claim seemed well founded.³ Chile, however, continued to hunt guano in the region, and in 1857 seized Mejillones and ousted the Bolivians. Bolivia protested vehemently, and when, in 1864, protests proved unavailing, she

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1868, Part 2, p. 322.*

² Maurtua, V. M. (Pezet's trans.), *The Question of the Pacific* (Phila., 1901), p. 11.

³ Maurtua, *op. cit.*, p. 7. See also E. M. Borchard, *Question of the Pacific* (Washington, 1920), p. 6.

broke off diplomatic relations. Before war broke out, however, the trouble with Spain brought the two nations together in a common cause, and by a treaty signed in 1866 the boundary line was fixed at the twenty-fourth parallel. The treaty farther provided that the zone lying between the twenty-third and twenty-fifth parallels should be subject to a joint jurisdiction of both governments for the exploitation of the guano and mineral deposits, and that all products of the territory between the twenty-third and the twenty-fifth and exported from Mejillones should be free of duty.¹

Various difficulties arose under this condominium arrangement, the Chileans claiming that Bolivia failed to carry out the terms of the treaty, and the Bolivians asserting that Chile was extending its terms out of all reason. The American minister to Bolivia, writing to Secretary Fish on January 31, 1872, pointed out the increasing possibilities of trouble between the two states owing to the recently discovered silver mines in the region under joint control.² Bolivia, apparently fearing farther Chilean encroachments, signed an alliance with Peru in 1873 under which the two parties agreed mutually to guarantee their independence and sovereignty and the integrity of their respective territories.³ Although essentially a defensive alliance, the terms were kept secret. However, there is little doubt that Chile was fully cognizant of the treaty. In 1873 Mr. Logan, the American minister at Santiago, was asked by the Chilean foreign minister to act as arbitrator in the boundary dispute with Bolivia;⁴ and when this fell through a direct settlement was obtained by the two

¹ Maurtua, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17. For a recent discussion from the Chilean point of view see Don Gonzalo Bulnes, *Chile and Peru* (Santiago, 1920), pp. 8-15.

² *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1872*, p. 64. Nitrate also had been discovered in this region in 1866 by a Chilean explorer.

³ Maurtua, *op. cit.*, p. 28. Bulnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-66. For text see *The War in South America*, Sen. Ex. Doc. 79, 47th Cong., 1st sess., p. 85.

⁴ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1874*, p. 197.

powers by a new treaty signed in 1874 abrogating the treaty of 1866.

The treaty of 1874 fixed the twenty-fourth parallel as the boundary between the two republics, but provided that such guano as was left between that parallel and the twenty-third should be equally divided. The clause that brought about war between the two countries provided that for twenty-five years the export duties levied on the minerals within the zone between the twenty-third and twenty-fourth parallels should not be raised.¹

From Melgarejo, a Bolivian dictator, a Chilean company had obtained important concessions for exploiting the nitrate in this Bolivian zone. In 1878 the Bolivian congress, with the apparent purpose of regaining a small part of the wealth given away by a former executive, demanded, as a basis of renewing the contract, 10 per cent. of the profits of the company—though it later changed this to read ten cents per quintal of nitrate exported. This was a clear violation of the treaty of 1874, and Chile protested and threatened to annul the former treaty. Bolivia persisted in her intentions and ordered the tax to be collected. Thereupon, on February 12, 1879, the Chilean minister demanded his passports, and two days later Chilean forces seized the disputed territory. Mr. Osborn, minister of the United States at Santiago, declared that Chile's movement was an exceedingly popular one, and that it was doubtful whether if the administration had taken any other course it could have sustained itself.²

Bolivia declared war on Chile on March 1, 1879, and from the beginning it was feared by Chile that Peru would take sides against her. Mr. Gibbs, the American minister at Lima, testified that public opinion in Peru was very hostile towards Chile, and the press demanded that the govern-

¹ Maurtua, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-21.

² *War in South America, op. cit.*, p. 74. For the causes of the war from the Chilean side see pp. 78-83.

ment declare war or resign.¹ The Peruvian government, however, seemed desirous of averting a war if possible, and sent a special mission, headed by Don José Antonio Lavalle, to propose arbitration. This mission was received with marked hostility by the Chilean populace, and when its proposals were laid before the Chilean government the latter immediately demanded an explanation of the secret alliance between Bolivia and Peru. Lavalle was unable to reply with complete frankness, and the Chileans, claiming that the mission was merely a ruse to gain time, refused to continue the negotiations unless Peru would abrogate the treaty of 1873, cease all military preparations, and promise to remain neutral. The Peruvian plenipotentiary could not accept these terms, and Chile declared war on Peru April 5, 1879.² Neutral opinion seems to place the burden of responsibility for the failure to find a peaceful solution upon Chile. Sir Clements Markham, the English historian, declares that Chile sought a pretext for a war against Peru to gain her nitrate wealth, and Professor E. M. Borchard, the American publicist, in a recent opinion finds that Peru was sincerely desirous of avoiding war.³

Although the United States took no official action to prevent the outbreak of the war, Mr. S. N. Pettis, the American minister to Bolivia, made a special visit in August, 1879, to both Lima and Santiago in the interests of peace. This mission, undertaken without the direction or knowledge of the Washington government, was designed to acquaint each of the warring governments with the views of the other and thus to obtain a direct settlement. The United States government showed itself entirely in sympathy with his efforts by stating that, "unauthorized and even rash as

¹ *War in South America*, op. cit., p. 98.

² For the Chilean side see Bulnes, *Chile and Peru*, pp. 124-160; Rafael Egana, *The Tacna and Arica Question* (Santiago, 1900), pp. 32-40; for the Peruvian side see Maurtua, *The Question of the Pacific*, pp. 43-51.

³ C. R. Markham, *The War Between Peru and Chile* (London, 1882); Edwin M. Borchard, *Opinion on the Question of the Pacific* (Washington, 1920).

Mr. Pettis' experiment might appear, the United States could not but rejoice at the result should the knowledge thus gained by the belligerents of each other's views conduce to an eventual settlement."¹ Although his mission did not succeed, Judge Pettis continued to strive for peace, and in a note to Mr. Seward, dated September 30, 1879, he urged that the United States offer to mediate, inasmuch as all the belligerents were expecting it and wondered at our delay.² The ministers in Bolivia and Chile were not so optimistic, and Mr. Osborn at Santiago felt that it would be most unwise for the United States to suggest mediation, since the war spirit was very strong in Chile and there seemed to be absolute confidence that Chile would conquer her enemies.³

Chile soon proved that she was far better prepared for war than either of her opponents, and was victorious in virtually all of the engagements on land and sea, although she was severely criticized for the cruel and harsh methods employed, for shelling unfortified towns, and for utterly disregarding the rights of non-combatants. By July, 1880, it was evident that she had won the war and that further operations would entail useless bloodshed. Therefore, on July 29, 1880, Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State at Washington, directed the American ministers in Santiago and Lima to press upon the Chilean and Peruvian governments the desire of the United States that peace be made on honorable terms.⁴ Mr. Osborn thereupon offered the good offices of the United States, and Chile agreed to accept them, provided the other powers would also accept. It was finally agreed that each of the belligerents should send its representative to meet with the three American ministers accredited to the belligerent states on the U. S. S. *Lackawanna* in the Bay of Arica.

¹ J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. VI, p. 35.

² *War in South America*, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

The conference convened on October 22, and Mr. Osborn, the dean of the American representatives, acted as chairman. At the first meeting Chile presented a memorandum outlining the bases upon which she would make peace. The principal provision, and the one that eliminated all chance of a settlement, was the demand on her part that the province of Tarapaca be ceded to her as payment for the costs of the war. As this was territory never claimed by Chile in her most extreme boundary demands, and possessed an almost boundless store of the valuable nitrates, it was not to be expected that the allies would yield it. The Bolivian delegate proposed that Chile hold the territory until a suitable indemnity had been paid, and the Peruvian delegate proposed that the United States be given full power to arbitrate the question. Bolivia heartily agreed to arbitration, but Chile declared that, while arbitration was a satisfactory method before the outbreak of war, under the changed circumstances "there was no reason whatever why she should deliver up to other hands, honorable and secure as they may be, the decision of her destinies."¹ Mr. Christianity, the American minister to Peru, felt that the terms proposed by Chile were meant to be so extreme that the allies could not accept them; while Mr. Adams, the American minister to Bolivia, also reported that the Chilean government was not very much in earnest in its desires for peace. He declared that the main object of the Chileans was to break up the alliance between Peru and Bolivia and engage the latter republic in an alliance with themselves.² Both ministers thought it strange that Mr. Osborn should have let it be understood that the United States did not desire to act as arbiter on the question. Secretary Evarts was also curious on this score, and in a despatch dated December 27, 1880, he informed Osborn: "If it was

¹ The report and protocols in full are found in *War in South America*, *op. cit.*, pp. 405-418.

² *Ibid.*, p. 51.

your purpose to convey the impression that we would not cheerfully assume any labor and trouble incidental to arbitration in the interests of peace and in the service of justice, you have not correctly interpreted the views and ideas of this government.¹

After the failure of the conference Chile prosecuted the war still more vigorously, and in January, 1881, she gained possession of Lima. Secretary Evarts, again desirous of putting an end to the conflict, urged the American ministers in both Lima and Santiago to use every effort in the direction of peace. Mr. Christiancy, however, informed him that the Chilean authorities in Lima declared that they would not accept the good offices of any neutral government nor those of any diplomatic official in Lima, but would treat only with the Peruvian government.² Owing to internal troubles in Peru, Chile refused to treat with either faction, thus remaining in control of Lima and its valuable custom-houses; and Mr. Christiancy was of the opinion that Chile did not intend to make peace with Peru at all unless driven to do so by outside pressure.³

In 1881 the Garfield administration came into power, and James G. Blaine was made Secretary of State. The President immediately appointed General Kilpatrick minister to Chile and General Hurlbut to Peru. Both soon gave evidence that they were better soldiers than diplomats. The instructions to both, dated June 15, 1881, were very similar, indicating a strong opposition on the part of the United States to a transfer of territory as a basis of peace. To Mr. Kilpatrick Secretary Blaine wrote: "At the conclusion of a war avowedly not of conquest, but for the solution of differences which diplomacy had failed to settle, to make acquisition of territory a *sine qua non* of peace is calculated to cast suspicion on the professions

¹ *War in South America, op. cit.*, p. 147.

² *Ibid.*, p. 448.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 467.

with which war was originally declared"; and to Mr. Hurlbut: "As far as the influence of the United States will go in Chile, it will be exerted to induce the Chilean government to consent that the question of the cession of territory should be the subject of negotiation and not the condition precedent upon which alone negotiation shall commence."¹

The two representatives interpreted their instructions in an entirely different manner. Shortly after his arrival at Lima, Mr. Hurlbut notified his colleague at Santiago that his instructions indicated that the United States wished peace, on fair and honorable terms, to be arranged as speedily as possible, but so that the integrity of Peruvian territory would be maintained. Chile, he thought, should be satisfied with a fair and reasonable indemnity for the expenses of the war.² To make his position clear he forwarded, on August 25, to General Lynch, commander-in-chief at Lima, a memorandum in which he thus laid down the position of the United States: "I wish to state further, that while the United States recognize all rights which the conqueror gains under the laws of civilized war, they do not approve of war for the purpose of territorial aggrandizement, nor of the violent dismemberment of a nation except as a last resort in extreme emergencies."³ Mr. Hurlbut's statement was by no means agreeable to General Lynch, who, in a telegram to the Chilean government, asserted that the American minister's "no annexation" declaration "complicates and endangers our occupation."⁴ Thereupon the Chilean minister of foreign affairs interrogated Mr. Kilpatrick upon the forceful declarations of his colleague in Lima. Instead of taking the matter up with Mr. Hurlbut, Mr. Kilpatrick immediately disclaimed the statements as unauthorized by the government of the United

¹ *War in South America*, *op. cit.*, pp. 157, 500.

² *Ibid.*, p. 513.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 516.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

States and criticized his colleague for making them.¹ Mr. Blaine censured Mr. Kilpatrick strongly for his undiplomatic methods; nor was he entirely pleased with Mr. Hurlbut's emphatic partizanship. Inasmuch as no further friendly coöperation between the two American representatives could now be hoped for, Mr. Blaine decided to send a special envoy furnished with full powers to the three belligerent states.²

Mr. William H. Trescot, of South Carolina, was chosen for the task—which, indeed, had steadily become more difficult, owing to the openly manifested hostility of Chile to any interference of the United States. One evidence of this was Chile's treatment of the Calderon government in Peru. This government had been recognized by the United States in June, 1881, and in the following month the Chilean foreign minister had assured Mr. Kilpatrick that every effort would be made by Chile to strengthen it. Nevertheless, in September the Calderon government was suppressed by the Chilean authorities, and in November Señor Calderon was arrested and deported. Mr. Hurlbut interpreted this act as an attempt to continue the state of anarchy and confusion as a ground for Chilean occupation, and also as the reply of Chile to the known support of this government by the United States.³ Mr. Blaine was inclined to accept the latter interpretation, and in his instructions to Mr. Trescot he authorized him to say to the Chilean government that if such a purpose was avowed it would be regarded by the United States as an act of such unfriendly import as to require the immediate suspension of all diplomatic intercourse.⁴ His instructions further stated: "If our good offices are rejected, and this policy of the absorption of an independent state be persisted in, this government . . . will hold itself free to ap-

¹ *War in South America*, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

² *Ibid.*, p. 168.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 561.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

peal to the other republics of this continent to join it in an effort to avert consequences which can not be confined to Chile and Peru, but which threaten with extremest danger the political institutions, the peaceful progress, and the liberal civilization of all America.”¹

On the other hand, if Chile should receive in a friendly spirit the representations of the United States, Mr. Trescot was authorized, first, to concert such measures as would enable Peru to establish a regular government and initiate negotiations; second, to induce Chile to consent to such negotiations without cession of territory as a condition precedent; and, third, to impress upon Chile that she ought to allow Peru a fair opportunity to provide for a reasonable indemnity, letting it be understood that the United States would consider the imposition of an extravagant indemnity, making the cession of territory necessary, as more than was justified by the actual cost of the war, and as a solution threatening renewed difficulty between the two countries.² The envoy was further intrusted with the delicate task of inviting Chile to the conference of all the American republics, which Mr. Blaine was so anxious to hold in Washington.

Mr. Trescot arrived in Santiago January 7, 1882. But in the meantime President Garfield had been shot, Vice-President Arthur had been sworn in, and Mr. Frelinghuysen had succeeded Mr. Blaine as Secretary of State. Owing to the complete change in policy that followed, this change in the administration had a most unfortunate result on the mission. President Arthur decided to follow a hands-off policy in regard to the merits of the controversy, the indemnity, change of boundaries, and the personnel of the government of Peru. The clause in Mr. Trescot's instructions that contemplated the severance of diplomatic relations under certain contingencies was re-

¹ *War in South America*, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

² *Ibid.*, p. 178.

voked entirely.¹ Before the revised orders were received by Mr. Trescot, he had obtained an assurance of the Chilean government that no offense was meant by the removal of Calderón, and also an acceptance of the good offices of the United States. An offer of peace was made upon the basis of the cession of Tarapaca and an indemnity of twenty million pesos payable in ten years, Arica to be occupied until payment was made.² However, in an interview about a week later, what was Mr. Trescot's surprise and chagrin to learn from Mr. Balmaceda, the Chilean minister of foreign affairs, that his original instructions from Mr. Blaine had been published, that new instructions had been issued, and that these were then in the hands of the Chilean government. Farther parleys were, for the time at least, useless; for, as Mr. Trescot remarked, "a diplomatist of ordinary experience would conclude, when he learns that his instructions have been communicated to the government with which he is negotiating before he receives them himself, that it is time for him to be silent until he does receive them."³ However, Mr. Trescot was finally prevailed upon to sign a protocol on February 11, 1882, in which the bases of peace were the cession of Tarapaca, an indemnity of 20,000,000 pesos, and the retention of Tacna and Arica until payment should be made.⁴

The United States thereupon refused to be a party to peace on these terms and urged that Chile show herself more magnanimous. Mr. Trescot, however, knew that his mission had failed; for Chile would not consider any modification of her terms. Shortly afterwards he returned to Washington. From there, in a letter to Mr. Frelinghuysen dated June 5, 1882, he frankly pointed out the unfortunate consequences of the vacillating policy of the United States: "If the United States intend to intervene effectively to

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1882, p. 57.*

² *Ibid., p. 61.*

³ *Ibid., p. 67.*

⁴ *Ibid., p. 83.*

prevent the disintegration of Peru, the time has come when that intention should be avowed. If it does not, still more urgent is the necessity that Chile and Peru should understand exactly where the action of the United States ends. It would be entirely beyond my duty to discuss the character or the consequences of either line of conduct, but I trust that you will not deem that I am going beyond that duty in impressing upon the government that the present position of the United States is an embarrassment to all the belligerents, and that it should be terminated as promptly as possible."¹

Mr. Frelinghuysen apparently did not realize that his ill-advised and futile efforts to obtain a peace through the moral influence of the United States was bringing his government into contempt in the eyes of all South America. Accordingly, although the United States stated in advance that under no conditions would it go beyond the tendering of its good offices, he persisted in intervening when Chile was firmly decided to make peace only upon the terms that her victory made possible. Under instructions dated June 25, 1882, Mr. Cornelius A. Logan, the new minister to Chile, was "to continue the efforts of your government to induce Chile to settle the difficulty by such moderation in her demands as you may be able to bring about, taking care to impress upon that government that any substantial concession which it may now make will be regarded as a direct and graceful recognition of the disinterested counsels of the United States." Incidentally, Mr. Frelinghuysen no longer seemed to object to the cession of Peruvian territory; for, after noting the fact that Chile was in possession of Tarapaca, Tacna, and Arica, he vouchsafed the supposition that no contingency could happen that would bring about the permanent occupation and annexation by Chile of any larger part of Peru than this.² It is not strange

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1882, p. 103.*

² *Ibid., 1883, p. 76.*

that a Peruvian publicist was forced to admit that "this third attempt at mediation was still more disastrous in its results for Peru, as it was still more dishonorable for the credit and prestige of the Great Republic of the North. . . . It was no longer the glorious eagle, the emblem of the might and greatness of the United States, that came from Washington to the Pacific to compel the belligerents to lay down their arms and put an end to an iniquitous war of conquest; but the innocent and timid dove, the messenger of peace, sent by the Northern Colossus to beg the cessation of hostilities in the name of American fraternity."¹

Mr. Logan soon showed a decided partiality for the Chilean point of view, while his colleague at Lima, Mr. J. R. Partridge, became an equally ardent supporter of the Peruvian claims. Although still a prisoner, President Calderon finally refused to negotiate farther with Mr. Logan as mediator, on the ground of his over-friendliness towards Chile; and Mr. Partridge upheld him in the stand.² The latter even went so far as to propose common action to the representatives of Great Britain, France, and Italy; but this unauthorized proposal was immediately disavowed by Mr. Frelinghuysen, and as a result of it Mr. Partridge was recalled. Meanwhile a faction in northern Peru under the leadership of General Iglesias was corresponding directly with the Chilean government, and in return for recognition it agreed to sign a peace upon Chilean terms. Mr. Logan strongly urged that the United States recognize the government of Iglesias.³ A protocol of peace was signed in May, 1883, and its terms were incorporated in the treaty of Ancon signed by the representatives of Chile and Peru, October 20, 1883. The third intervention of the United States had failed quite as completely as the other two in preventing the territorial dismemberment of Peru. As

¹ Alejandro Garland, *South American Conflicts and the United States* (Lima, 1900), p. xiii.

² *Ibid.*, p. xv.

³ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1883*, p. 103.

Mr. Alejandro Garland puts it: "This is the sad history, in as far as Peru is concerned, of the amicable intervention of the United States; . . . its unfortunate, vacillating, and contradictory policy only defeated its own ends."¹

By the terms of the treaty of Ancon, Tarapaca was ceded in perpetuity to Chile, while the provinces of Tacna and Arica were to be held by Chile for ten years, and at the expiration of that period a plebiscite was to determine whether they should remain under Chilean sovereignty or be returned to Peru. The country then receiving the two provinces was to pay the other country \$10,000,000.² This plebiscite, which should have been held on March 28, 1894, ten years after the ratification of the treaty, has not yet been held, and it is this question that has been called "the Alsace-Lorraine question of South America." There have been continuous recriminations on both sides for the failure to settle the issue, and numerous proposals; but inasmuch as no satisfactory method of holding the plebiscite has yet been found, Chile still holds the territory. The most recent attempt at settlement was President Harding's invitation to both powers to send representatives to Washington April 21, 1922, to thresh out the question under the auspices of the United States. The invitation was accepted, and the conference was opened by Secretary Hughes, May 15, in the Hall of the Americas of the Pan-American Building. He congratulated the delegates upon the noble and conciliatory attitude animating both governments, and pointed out that this was "an auspicious time to heal old wounds and to end whatever differences may exist in Latin America," and said that there could be no more agreeable harbinger of a better day and a lasting peace upon this hemisphere than the convening of this conference of the representatives of the republics of Chile

¹ *South American Conflicts and the United States*, p. xvi.

² For full text see *British and Foreign State Papers*, Vol. LXXIV, p. 349.

and Peru.¹ Bolivia protested vigorously at not being allowed to participate in the conference; but both Chile and Peru were unwilling to extend the scope of the conference to include Bolivian claims. After arduous sessions for two months, a protocol was signed July 21, 1922, whereby Chile and Peru agreed to arbitration of the controversy by the President of the United States; and Secretary Hughes informed the plenipotentiaries that President Harding was ready to act as mediator.²

It is not within the scope of this work to discuss the merits of the question, but it is interesting to note that Señor Augustin Ross, an eminent Chilean, concedes that the plebiscite has not taken place because Chile prevented it by opposing all sorts of difficulties and dilatory expedients;³ while Professor Borchard, after a judicial consideration of the facts, gives as his opinion that "Peru has now, and has had since March 28, 1894, an unassailable claim to unconditional sovereignty over the provinces of Tacna and Arica."⁴

The United States again became seriously involved in Chilean affairs in 1891, in connection with the civil war between President Balmaceda and the Congressionalists. Owing to his autocratic methods, President Balmaceda, who had been elected in 1886, was in constant conflict with Congress during his five-year term. His declared intention to dictate the choice of a successor, and an illegal decree of January 5, 1891, continuing in force the estimates of the preceding Congress, brought about an armed revolt.⁵ Mr. Blaine was again Secretary of State in the Harrison

¹ *New York Times*, May 16, 1922.

² *Ibid.*, July 22, 1922.

³ *The Question of the Pacific* (Paris, 1919), p. 12.

⁴ *Opinion on the Question of the Pacific* (Wash., 1920), p. 37. For a presentation of the case from the Chilean side see Rafael Egaña, *The Tacna and Arica Question* (Santiago, 1900); for the Peruvian side, Maurtua and Pezet, *The Question of the Pacific* (Phila., 1901). *The Rose Book of Chile*, Washington, 1918, gives the negotiations from 1905-08. Professor Borchard's *Opinion* brings the question up to 1920.

⁵ President Balmaceda's story of the causes is found in *For. Rel. of the U. S.*, 1891, p. 94.

administration, and Mr. Patrick Egan was the American minister to Chile. After a number of serious clashes, Mr. Egan, together with the representatives of France and Brazil, offered their good offices, and both the government and the revolutionists accepted them. While the conferences were being held, bombs were thrown at several of the government ministers while returning from the Senate; and this so exasperated the government that negotiations were abruptly discontinued.¹ About a month later Mr. Egan again proposed mediation on the part of the United States; but, although the Balmaceda government was willing, the revolutionists refused.²

During the course of the revolution an incident took place that tended to arouse public opinion on the side of the revolutionists against the United States. They had despatched the *Itata* to San Diego, California, to obtain a cargo of arms and ammunition; but the Balmacedists, learning of it warned the United States government, which immediately placed on board a United States marshal to see that the neutrality laws were respected. However, when the captain of the *Itata* learned that the cargo was ready on a schooner off San Clemente Island, he set sail without clearance, taking the United States official with him. The American agent was afterwards put ashore, but the *Itata* took on its cargo and carried it to Chile.³ There, however, Admiral MacCann refused to allow the cargo to be landed and insisted that the boat and its cargo be returned to San Diego under a United States convoy. The Congressionalist government conceded the justice of the act, but the rebels bitterly resented the loss of the cargo and looked upon the United States as aiding the Balmaceda faction.

By the end of August the Congressionalist forces were completely victorious. Balmaceda resigned, and, fearing

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1891*, pp. 123-130.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 135, 140, 145.

³ J. B. Scott, *Cases on International Law* (Boston, 1902), p. 732.

mob violence, sought refuge in the Argentine legation. His family and a large number of the government officials sought asylum in the American legation. The Chilean government protested against Mr. Egan's protection of the refugees, and various acts of disrespect were committed showing the hostility towards the American minister. Mr. Egan, however, refused to surrender the fugitives unless they be given safe conducts, and he was ultimately successful in carrying out his purpose.¹

The constant friction between the American legation and the Chilean authorities, the rumor which had been given wide circulation that Admiral Brown had sent secret information to President Balmaceda regarding the movements of the Congressionalists, the *Itata* affair, and the protection afforded by the United States representatives to the defeated faction, all served to stir up bitter animosity towards everything Yankee. As a result, when, on October 15, 1891, Captain Schley of the U. S. S. *Baltimore* gave shore leave to 116 petty officers and men, a concerted attack was made upon them on the Valparaíso water-front. One petty officer was killed, one sailor later died of his wounds, and seven or eight others came out of the mêlée with from two to eighteen stab-wounds. Thirty-six of the sailors were arrested, and while being taken to prison were cruelly beaten and maltreated. An investigation made by Captain Schley showed that the police made little effort to protect the Americans and in some cases joined in the attack.² When apprised of the affair, the authorities offered no expression of regret, and a little later the Chilean minister of foreign relations sent a most offensive note to the Chilean minister at Washington, declaring that there was no exactness nor sincerity in what was said at Washington.³

¹ J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. II, pp. 791-798.

² *Relations with Chile*, House Ex. Doc. No. 91, 52nd Cong., 1st sess., pp. 115-118.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

This brought matters to a head, and on January 21, 1892, after an exhaustive investigation had been held at Mare Island directly upon the return of the *Baltimore*,¹ Secretary Blaine notified Mr. Egan that President Harrison had come to the following conclusions: First, that the attack was upon the uniform of the United States Navy, having its origin and motive in a feeling of hostility to this government and not in any act of the sailors. Second, that the public authorities of Valparaiso flagrantly failed in their duty to protect our men, and that some of the police and of the Chilean soldiers and sailors were themselves guilty of unprovoked assaults upon our sailors before and after arrest. Third, that suitable apology and adequate reparation should be demanded for the injury done to this government. Mr. Egan was further instructed to say that the expressions imputing untruth and insincerity to the President and to the Secretary of the Navy in their official communications to the congress of the United States were in the highest degree offensive to this government, and that if the offensive parts were not at once withdrawn and a suitable apology offered, the President would have no other course except to terminate diplomatic relations with the government of Chile.² Four days later, before a reply to this note was received, President Harrison laid the whole matter before Congress in a special message.³

The new government that had in the meantime come into existence in Chile was more favorably disposed towards the United States, and the new minister of foreign relations returned a very courteous reply to the demands of our government. Sincere expressions of regret were offered for both the assault and the unfortunate despatch; and in regard to reparations, although the court at Valparaiso had not yet finished its investigation, Chile offered to sub-

¹ *Relations with Chile, op. cit.*, pp. 341-607.

² *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. iii-xiv.

mit to the Supreme Court at Washington the question of whether there were any grounds for reparation and in what shape it should be made.¹ This reply was entirely satisfactory to the United States, and Mr. Egan was directed to state that the President was ready to meet the friendly overtures of the Chilean government in the most generous spirit, and that, as for reparations, he had no doubt that the whole matter would soon be settled in a just and honorable fashion by diplomatic means.² The hope was justified; for in July of the same year Chile offered \$75,000 in gold, to be distributed among the families of the sailors injured and killed in the *Baltimore* affair. The United States immediately accepted it.³ The same year the two nations signed a claims convention whereby all other claims were to be settled by arbitration by a commission sitting at Washington.⁴ The commission sat from October 9, 1893, to April 19, 1894, and awarded \$240,564.35 to meet the claims of citizens of the United States.⁵

Following this period of difficulties and misunderstandings, the relations between the United States and Chile have become very friendly. During his visit to Chile in 1906 Mr. Root expressed the belief that the difficulties of the past arose primarily out of the lack of mutual acquaintance, and declared that the completion of the Panama Canal was bound to bring about more intimate relations, and that this was the time to say that these relations should be those of friendship.⁶ Friendlier feelings have subsequently been shown in many ways. President Montt was cordially welcomed on his passage through Panama in 1910 en route to Europe.⁷ In 1911 the long-standing Alsop claim was set-

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1891*, p. 309.

² *Ibid.*, p. 312.

³ *Ibid.*, 1892, p. 62.

⁴ *U. S. Stats.*, Vol. XXVII, p. 965.

⁵ *Compilation of Treaties in Force* (Wash., 1904), p. 127.

⁶ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1906*, Part I, p. 153.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1910, pp. 130-132.

tled by arbitration,¹ and in 1914 a treaty for the advancement of general peace was signed, which provided that all disputes not settled by diplomatic means should be submitted for investigation and report to an International Commission.²

Chile remained neutral during the World War; and, considering the fact that her outlook was on the Pacific, and that she was so far removed from the seat of hostilities, her attitude was logical. Señor Beltran Mathieu, Chilean ambassador to the United States, thus explains his country's neutrality: "Chile was neither solicited nor compelled, because she was not involved in the political causes of the war nor in its sphere of action, and because no one considered that a nation so far removed from the theater of hostilities might be useful as a military or financial entity, while she was so as a factor of production, for which peace was essential."³ At the outset, however, owing to German propaganda and German instructors in the army and the schools, there was a noticeable friendliness towards the German cause. As the war progressed, the attitude changed, and when the United States entered the conflict, Chilean sentiment was overwhelmingly pro-Ally. *El Mercurio* seemed to express the common feeling: "The nations of South America, bound to the United States by historic bonds and by the intellectual relations which are being daily perfected, are to-day more than ever obliged to sustain the cause which President Wilson defends."⁴ Throughout the war the country's vast stores of nitrate were entirely at the Allies' disposal, and the importance of this assistance can not be overestimated. After the war Chile joined the League of Nations, but with the ex-

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S.*, 1911, pp. 38-53.

² *U. S. Stat. at Large*, Vol. XXXIX, Part II, p. 1645.

³ *Amer. Jour. of Int. Law*, Vol. XIV, p. 333 (Apr., 1920).

⁴ P. A. Martin, "Latin America and the War," *League of Nations* (Boston, 1919), Vol. II, No. 4, p. 257. See also C. S. Vildósola, *Chile and the War* (P. H. Goldsmith trans.), Carnegie Endowment for Int. Peace (Wash., 1917).

press reservation that the treaty of Ancon would not be submitted to the League.

The commercial relations of the United States with Chile before the war were comparatively unimportant. Of the South American countries, both Brazil and Argentina had a greater volume of trade with the United States, and our business with Mexico was three times as great as our trade with Chile. Both Great Britain and Germany surpassed us in 1914, even with the advantage that the Panama Canal gave us. The total trade of the United States and Chile in 1900 was only about \$10,000,000; nor was there any noticeable improvement until after the construction of the canal. But, since the opening of the canal coincided so nearly with the outbreak of the war in Europe, it is difficult to determine precisely how much advantage the canal has given to the United States over its European competitors. At any rate, a comparison of Chile's trade with the United States, Great Britain, and Germany in 1913 and 1920 as shown by the table on page 355 is interesting, even if too much importance should not be attached to it.

In considering commercial relations with Chile it must be remembered that the republic is at present primarily a mineral-producing country, and that its greatest export is nitrates. In 1918, for example, its exports were valued at almost twice as much as its imports, and of these exports more than one half consisted of nitrate and its by-product iodine. But this condition is primarily due to the recent great demand for nitrates, and to the fact that Chile possesses almost a world monopoly of this valuable mineral. But Chile also has great stores of other minerals, including iron and coal; it has vast regions in the south heavily timbered or suitable for grazing; its famous Central Valley has been called one of the garden spots of nature. Hence the country has tremendous possibilities for the investment of capital and in the future will undoubtedly become the greatest industrial state of South America.

FOREIGN TRADE OF CHILE¹

	UNITED KINGDOM		GERMANY		UNITED STATES	
	1913	1920	1913	1920	1913	1920
Chilean exports.....	\$55,548,341	\$60,014,824	\$30,772,743	\$2,730,508	\$30,413,386	\$126,174,920
Chilean imports.....	36,109,211	42,400,699	29,578,138	7,692,151	20,089,158	51,198,793
Total trade.....	\$91,657,552	\$102,415,523	\$60,350,881	\$10,422,659	\$50,502,544	\$177,373,713

¹ The figures for 1913 are from *Report of the Second Pan-Amer. Commercial Conf.*, pp. 400-401; the 1920 figures are from the *Bulletin of the Pan-American Union*, Vol. LIV, pp. 48-49 (Jan., 1922).

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CHAPTER XVI

THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL

THE United States of Brazil is the giant of Latin-American countries. In fact, it is about a quarter of a million square miles larger than the United States, exclusive of Alaska, Hawaii, and Porto Rico. It is also an extremely sparsely settled country, averaging only about nine persons to the square mile, as compared with thirty to the square mile in the United States. Nevertheless, because of its size it contains as many people within its borders as all the rest of South America combined. As one writer has put it, if Brazil were as densely populated as Belgium at the outbreak of the World War, its territory would hold more human beings than exist at present on the entire face of the earth.¹ When speaking of Brazil one is almost compelled to use superlatives. It has the greatest river system in the world; it has the longest unbroken coast-line of any country in the world; its vast tropical forests and jungles have never yet been completely explored; its mineral wealth is as yet untapped; its agricultural possibilities are boundless.

In considering the Latin-American republics, Brazil must be placed in a class by itself for other reasons than its size. Its population is primarily of Portuguese stock, whereas all the rest of Latin America is Spanish. Its history, too, has been cast in an entirely different mold from that of its neighbors. Discovered by a Portuguese navigator in 1500, its early settlements were made by noble adventurers who were given vast tracts of land, or captaincies, where their

¹ C. S. Cooper, *The Brazilians and Their Country* (N. Y., 1917), p. 97.

powers were practically supreme. Later on it was unified into a single viceroyalty. But the strong, sturdy characteristics of these feudal lords and their followers have left a strong imprint upon the country's history.

Napoleon Bonaparte, whose influence on the New World, although indirect, has had momentous consequences, might almost be called the founder of modern Brazil. For it was his treacherous invasion of Portugal in 1807 that caused the royal Braganza family to flee to Brazil, transferring with it to Rio the seat of its government. Thus, at a period when all the rest of South America was straining at the bonds of royal sovereignty, Brazil was binding herself even more closely with imperial trappings. The immediate result, however, of Dom John's rule was to open Brazilian ports to the commerce of the world, to introduce the latest inventions of European genius, to repeal laws impeding progress and advancement, and to give the western kingdom the advantage of a government under the direction of a cultivated and enlightened, though rather weak-minded, ruler.¹

In the meantime a regency was governing in Lisbon. But in 1820 a revolution took place in Portugal, and the result was the formation of a *junta* which was resolved upon a constitutional government, retaining the Braganza dynasty. The revolution spread to Brazil, and Dom John wisely decided to accept the proposed constitution. Shortly afterwards he sailed for Portugal, leaving his son Dom Pedro as regent of Brazil. In parting he foretold the separation of Brazil from the mother country and urged his son to seize the crown rather than allow it to pass to some adventurer.² His prediction was speedily verified. In the same year the Cortes at Lisbon passed decrees recalling Prince Pedro and reducing Brazil to a provincial status.

¹ The standard history of this period is M. de Oliveira Lima, *Dom João VI no Brazil*, 2 vols. (Rio de Janeiro, 1911).

² F. G. Calderón, *Latin America: Its Rise and Progress* (N. Y., 1913), p. 182.

The protest from Brazil was quick and decisive. Provisional *juntas* urged Pedro to remain, and he agreed to do so. When the Cortes threatened violence he called a constituent assembly, assumed the title of "Perpetual Defender and Protector of Brazil," and on October 12, 1822, was crowned "Constitutional Emperor of Brazil." The revolution was almost bloodless, and in less than a year after the declaration of independence every Portuguese garrison was driven from Brazilian soil.

The early relations of the United States with Brazil were not so friendly as they have become to-day. At the beginning of the nineteenth century privateering was unquestionably a profitable source of income to many American ship-owners. Baltimore's reputation as a rendezvous of privateers became so notorious that at the conference of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 the Portuguese government submitted a memorial on the subject, and the powers agreed to take up the question in a friendly fashion with the United States.¹ Undoubtedly Brazil was back of the Portuguese protest, because it was Brazil that had suffered particularly through this practice. The Banda Oriental, now the Republic of Uruguay, had been seized by the Portuguese in 1816 from Artigas and his Argentinian forces. Artigas, however, could not afford to lose Montevideo; hence he engaged a number of privateers to prey upon Portuguese commerce. The Abbé Correa, the Portuguese minister to the United States, asserted that the greater part of these privateers were fitted out and manned in the ports of the United States. Adams conceded not only that this abomination had spread over a large portion of the merchants and population of Baltimore, but that it had infected almost every officer of the United States in the place.² He also realized that Brazil had very good cause for complaint; in fact, the situation was so serious that if the positions

¹ J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs* (Phila., 1874-77), Vol. IV, p. 317.

² *Ibid.*, p. 318.

were reversed the United States would have considered the injuries sufficient for a declaration of war.¹ The Abbé Correa was exceedingly pessimistic over the outlook and declared that "these things had produced such a temper both in Portugal and Brazil against the people and government of the United States that . . . they were now those whom they most hated, and if the government [of Portugal] had considered the peace as at an end, they would have been supported in the declaration by the hearty concurrence of the people."²

Fortunately, by 1820 the power of Artigas was completely broken. In 1821 the Banda Oriental was incorporated into the Portuguese dominions of Brazil, and when the independence of the Brazilian Empire was proclaimed in 1822 this Cisplatine province was regarded as a part of it. A more friendly relationship between the United States and Brazil now ensued, and it was confirmed in 1824, when President Monroe became the first to recognize the independence of the new empire. At the cabinet meeting where the question was brought up Mr. Wirt opposed recognition on the ground that the government was monarchical and not republican; but both Calhoun and Adams favored recognition on the basis of independence alone, leaving aside all consideration of internal government.³

When the Brazilian *chargé*, José Rebello, was received by President Monroe, May 26, 1824, he suggested a concert of American powers to sustain the general system of American independence, and in the following year he proposed a definite offensive and defensive alliance between the United States and Brazil against European intervention.⁴ Monroe declined the proposal in private to Adams; but no official reply was made until Adams became President,

¹ J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, Vol. V, p. 177.

² J. Q. Adams, *Writings* (Ford ed., N. Y., 1913), Vol. VII, p. 70.

³ J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, Vol. VI, p. 281.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 358, 475, 484; also J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. VI, p. 437.

when Clay declared that the prospect of a speedy peace between Portugal and Brazil seemed to make such an alliance unnecessary.¹

At the close of 1825 a war broke out between Brazil and Buenos Aires over the possession of the Banda Oriental, which once more brought about strained relations between Brazil and the United States. Brazil had declared a blockade on all Argentine ports, and the American *chargé*, Mr. Condry Raguet, had protested on the ground that Brazil would not be able to make such a blockade effective. In the second place, he warned Brazil that the United States "have always denied the doctrine of general and diplomatic notifications of blockades as binding upon their citizens," and therefore no vessel could be seized as a prize for running the blockade unless it had been specifically warned.² Brazil, however, paid little attention to Mr. Raguet's protests, and even gave him further grounds for recriminations by impressing American seamen into the Brazilian navy. The constant infringement of American rights infuriated Raguet to such a point that his notes to the Brazilian government were not always couched in the most diplomatic language. A crisis was reached on March 4, 1827, when an American vessel, the *Spark*, which had cleared regularly from Rio for Montevideo, was seized just outside of the harbor by a Brazilian war-ship and brought back as a prize, and its crew treated almost as pirates.³ Mr. Raguet despatched a brief note to the Brazilian minister of foreign affairs asking for an explanation. The latter replied that the brig had increased her crew in Rio, that it had a warlike equipment with no license for it, and that therefore it was seized on the suspicion of being a privateer. The American *chargé* answered that if the

¹ See W. S. Robertson, "South America and the Monroe Doctrine," *Polit. Science Quar.*, Vol. XXX, pp. 82-105 (March, 1915); also *For. Rel. of the U. S.*, 1906, Part I, pp. 116-121.

² House Ex. Doc. No. 281, 20th Cong., 1st sess., p. 9.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

government had thought proper to communicate its suspicions to him before the *Spark* had cleared, he would have cheerfully lent his aid in causing the suspicions to be removed. As it was, he declined to give any explanations. The next day he asked for his passports, and the Emperor, although "surprised at this precipitate request, couched in abrupt and vague language," ordered them to be delivered, but with the notice that the American representative would be answerable to his government for the consequences which might result.¹

Before the break in diplomatic relations came, both Clay and Adams became convinced that Mr. Raguet's language and conduct were not so reserved as they should have been, and in a note dated January 20, 1827, Clay wrote Raguet that the President would have been better satisfied if he had abstained from some of the language employed.² When news of the rupture reached Washington, Adams wrote in his diary: "He appears to have been too hasty in his proceedings and has made us much trouble, from which we can derive neither credit nor profit"; and later, after conferring with Clay, it was decided not to sustain him.³ On May 31, in a note to Mr. Rebello, the Brazilian *chargé*, Clay, although sustaining Mr. Raguet's protests, informed him that the latter's demand for his passports was without orders, and that, although there was an interruption of diplomatic relations at Rio de Janeiro, none existed at Washington. The secretary also promised to procure the appointment of a successor immediately, provided assurances were given that satisfaction would be rendered for the injuries inflicted upon American persons and property.⁴ Mr. Rebello promptly accepted the con-

¹ House Ex. Doc. No. 281, 20th Cong. 1st sess., pp. 104-108.

² *Ibid.*, p. 108.

³ J. Q. Adams, *op. cit.*, Vol. VII, pp. 270, 272.

⁴ *American State Papers, For. Rel.*, Vol. VI, p. 824.

ditions, and Mr. William Tudor, a merchant at Lima, was named as *chargé* at Rio.¹

This appointment proved excellent in every way. By his tact, good judgment, and diplomatic handling of the many serious cases that came up, Mr. Tudor placed the relations between the two nations upon a firm basis of friendly understanding. This was doubly fortunate because throughout the period of the war the actions of the Brazilian naval officials were constantly provoking fresh complaints, and some of these, as in the case of the schooner *Hero*, were so harsh and uncalled for that Secretary Clay characterized the circumstances of the outrage as almost incredible.² Yet at the same time the commerce of the United States with Brazil was increasing at such a rate that Clay was very desirous of concluding a treaty of commerce and amity with her on favorable terms to the United States. Mr. Tudor was successful both in settling the claims and in negotiating the treaty. Virtually all of the claims were settled on the terms of the claimants and by diplomatic action alone; while the French, who sent a squadron of eleven ships, obtained only a third as much, and the British, who threatened direct reprisals, made no progress at all.³ The treaty of commerce and navigation that Mr. Tudor concluded on December 12, 1828, was modeled upon the treaty concluded between the United States and Central America in 1825. The most-favored-nation clause was included, except for the relations between Brazil and Portugal, and the question of blockade was settled by declaring that only an effective blockade should be recognized. The treaty was to be in force for twelve years, and afterwards until notice of abrogation should be given by

¹ For a full and well documented account of these events see W. R. Manning, "An Early Diplomatic Controversy between the United States and Brazil," *Amer. Jour. of Int. Law*, Vol. XII, pp. 291-311 (April, 1918).

² House Ex. Doc. No. 32, 25th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 13, 66.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 152-221, 250.

either party. The clauses regarding commerce and navigation were terminated in 1841, but those providing for peace and friendship still hold.¹

Some impression of the satisfactory services of Mr. Tudor in increasing the friendly attitude of the Brazilian government towards the United States may be obtained from the Emperor's appreciation of them. In a special audience with Mr. Tudor, which Pedro I himself suggested, the Emperor declared that he had high respect for the United States, and the most sincere desire to cultivate and forever maintain the most friendly relations with them, and that the United States might be assured that such were his real feelings and such would be his conduct.²

Emperor Pedro's assurances were never put to the test. His popularity was already on the wane, and early in 1831 he was virtually forced to abdicate in favor of his infant son. Various causes contributed—the expensive and unsuccessful war with Buenos Aires, which resulted in the loss of the Banda Oriental; Pedro's constant efforts to support his daughter's claims to the throne of Portugal against his brother Miguel; his harsh and unfair treatment of his wife; his struggles against constitutional government and continuous opposition to the Chamber; and, finally, the fact that at heart he was Portuguese rather than Brazilian. The period that followed was the stormiest in Brazilian history. The government under the regency was in continual conflict with the provinces. Finally, factions striving for control at Rio agreed to declare the young Pedro of age in spite of his fifteen and a half years. Accordingly, on July 23, 1840, Congress unanimously declared that the young Emperor had reached his majority, and Dom Pedro II entered upon his imperial functions.

During this period the relations of the United States with

¹ For text see Malloy, *Treaties, Conventions, etc.*, Vol. I, p. 133; for termination, Moore, *Digest*, Vol. V, p. 403.

² House Ex. Doc. No. 32, p. 222.

Brazil continued to be most friendly. In their annual messages, both Van Buren and Tyler gave evidence of the fact, and in 1844 President Tyler noted that "the commercial intercourse between that growing Empire and the United States is becoming daily of greater importance to both, and it is to the interest of both that the firmest relations of amity and good will should continue to be cultivated between them."¹ But in 1846 an incident occurred which, although trivial in itself, developed into a complete breach of friendly relations between the two countries for a short period.

On October 31, 1846, Lieutenant Alonzo B. Davis of the U. S. frigate *Saratoga*, while on shore at Rio in pursuit of two deserters, found a sailor attached to his boat in a drunken brawl with two other American sailors. Davis interfered, disarmed the man, and was taking him back to the boat when a Brazilian guard came up, seized the three American sailors, and, after beating them severely, marched them off. Lieutenant Davis, having protested in vain, followed the patrol to the palace with a view to securing the sailors' release. However, upon entering the palace he also was seized and disarmed, and was kept in prison for two days. As soon as the American minister, Mr. Wise, learned of the occurrence, he protested vigorously to the Brazilian government, demanding the release of the imprisoned Americans, the disavowal of the outrage, and the punishment of the officer and soldiers of the Brazilian guard.² The Brazilian government freed Lieutenant Davis, but held the three seamen for farther investigation, at the same time justifying both the conduct of the patrol and the arrest of Lieutenant Davis.

A long and acrimonious exchange of notes followed between Mr. Wise and the Brazilian foreign minister. The American minister insisted that inasmuch as Lieutenant

¹ J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. IV, p. 340.

² Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 29, 30th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 5-16.

Davis was in command of the sailor and was taking him back to the boat, and since no Brazilians were involved, the interference of the Brazilian patrol, its cruel treatment of the American seamen, and its subsequent arrest of the American officer were a direct insult to the American flag. The Brazilian government claimed that Lieutenant Davis had endeavored to interfere with the guard in its duty of preserving the peace within the sovereign jurisdiction of Brazil, and that therefore the Brazilian government was not only justified in its action, but had only surrendered the American officer as a proof of distinguished consideration for the United States.¹ The estrangement was increased by the action of Commodore Rousseau, commanding the U. S. squadron at Rio, who, indignant at the Brazilian stand, refused to salute on either the occasion of the baptism of the imperial princess or the celebration of his Majesty's birthday. All intercourse between the American minister and the Brazilian government thereupon ceased, Mr. Wise awaiting "calmly the first favorable and tangible occasion to come to explanations with them without danger of causing a more violent or open rupture, and not resenting their abuse in the newspapers, or their petty slights of not inviting me to a court, where the only reward for going and waiting for hours on a hot day in a hot uniform, is to make three bows forwards and three bows backwards, and then bob out of the imperial presence."²

An opportunity to resume friendly relations seemed to present itself in February of the following year, when Mr. Wise received despatches from Washington instructing him to request an audience from the Emperor to deliver in person the original of the answer of the President to a letter from him announcing the birth of a princess. Mr. Wise requested the audience, but was informed that, inasmuch as his acts were offensive in the respect due both to

¹ Sen. Ex. Doc., *op. cit.*, pp. 20-42.

² *Ibid.*, p. 45.

the Emperor and to the dignity of the nation, he could not be received till the Davis affair was settled. As a concession, however, the minister of foreign affairs offered to receive the President's letter and see that it reached "its high destination."¹

In a reply couched in terms hardly conducive to more friendly relations, Mr. Wise informed the Brazilian minister that he was accredited minister to his Majesty the Emperor himself, and not as *chargé* to a minister of foreign affairs, and either he would present the President's note in person or it would never reach "its high destination."

In the meantime Mr. Lisboa, the Brazilian minister at Washington, had taken the matter up with Secretary Buchanan, but in a much more amicable fashion. He assured Mr. Buchanan that "the Brazilian government, animated always with feelings of good understanding and perfect friendship towards the United States of America, has regretted extremely this disagreeable occurrence and will adopt the means proper to prevent similar occurrences hereafter."² In his reply Mr. Buchanan declared that the President was entirely satisfied with this frank and honorable explanation and that the whole occurrence, as far as the United States was concerned, would henceforth be buried in oblivion.³ The Brazilian government, however, now insisted upon the recall of Mr. Wise, which it had suggested before, but which the United States had refused to consider. It was convinced that friendship and harmony were always in danger while so excitable a gentleman as Mr. Wise continued to be minister. Furthermore, the Emperor had determined that this particular gentleman should never again be invited to court. As a matter of fact, Mr. Wise himself had already realized the futility of remaining at Rio and had already asked to be recalled, but in such a

¹ Sen. Ex. Doc., *op. cit.*, p. 52.

² *Ibid.*, p. 134.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 135, 136. See also J. B. Moore, *The Works of James Buchanan* (Phila., 1909), Vol. VII, p. 209.

way that his acts would appear to be approved in the fullest degree by the United States. Mr. Buchanan had agreed to this, and he informed Mr. Lisboa that Mr. Wise would soon return, but at his own request and not because the United States did not approve of his conduct.¹ As a result, the Brazilian government opened the case by disapproving the *amende honorable* of Mr. Lisboa and recalling him.²

The authorities at Washington received unofficial advice of this action before Mr. Tod, the newly appointed minister to Brazil, left the United States; and in his instructions Mr. Tod was advised that the President would not recede from his ground, and that the recall of Mr. Lisboa would be regarded as unjust to him as well as disagreeable to the president.³ Mr. Buchanan at the same time gave to Mr. Tod a sealed letter from the President of the United States to the Emperor of Brazil, to be delivered by Mr. Wise, and announcing the termination of his mission. Mr. Wise, however, was given the option of not asking for the audience if he was sure that it would not be granted.⁴ Mr. Tod arrived at Rio August 7, 1847, and immediately got into touch with Mr. Wise. The latter, who had in the meantime made a further effort to renew negotiations and had been curtly repulsed, advised against seeking an audience, on the ground that the recall and disapproval of Lisboa and the refusal to receive Mr. Wise, who had been sustained and approved by the United States, constituted an additional insult to the American government.⁵ After giving the advice due consideration, Mr. Tod felt that such action was contrary to the spirit of his instructions and decided to ask an audience of the Emperor to present his credentials. The audience was granted, and he was duly

¹ Sen. Ex. Doc., *op. cit.*, p. 139.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 108, 109.

³ J. B. Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 328.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 333.

⁵ Sen. Ex. Doc., *op. cit.*, pp. 114-131.

presented at court on August 28. Mr. Wise thereupon wrote a note to the Brazilian foreign minister, informing him that he had a sealed letter from the President to the Emperor, but as it had been written before the President knew of the recent insults to the American minister for acts that the President had fully approved, he felt it wholly incompatible with either the honor of his government or his own self-respect to ask an audience to present the letter; he therefore peremptorily demanded passports for himself and family.¹

At approximately the same time that Mr. Tod arrived at Rio, despatches reached the Brazilian *chargé* at Washington, Mr. Leal, informing him that Brazil had taken serious offense at the acts committed by Lieutenant Davis, for which it required ample reparation. He was also to demand from the government of the United States a categorical declaration that it had disapproved the conduct of its envoy, Mr. Henry A. Wise, and that it ordered his recall as a mark of reparation due to Brazil. If the government of the United States refused, but suggested arbitration, the imperial government would agree to that expedient. Finally, if Mr. Tod had already left the United States, Mr. Leal was to inform Mr. Buchanan that the imperial government would not receive him in his official character until satisfaction had been given.²

Mr. Buchanan's reply to these demands, dated August 30, 1847, showed that, although the United States was anxious to do everything possible to prevent a break between the two powers, it was determined to stand by its former statements. After once more carefully outlining all the facts of the Davis case, he declared that the United States would not grant reparation to Brazil for the acts committed by Lieutenant Davis, since reparation was clearly due from Brazil to the United States. The demand

¹ Sen. Ex. Doc., *op. cit.*, p. 132.

² Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 35, 30th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 2-11.

that Wise be disapproved and recalled he considered most extraordinary, inasmuch as the President had already publicly sustained his acts and had already recalled him at his own request. The present attitude of the Brazilian government following the amicable and honorable adjustment made by their former representative, and the refusal to receive the American minister, appeared to indicate that she intended an open rupture. Yet, as this seemed inconceivable, the President would take no decisive step until he learned that the government of Brazil actually refused to receive the American minister.¹ The following day Secretary Buchanan wrote to Mr. Tod advising him that if the Brazilian government refused to receive him without making the desired apology he was to return to the United States.²

As we have already seen, the Brazilian government did not carry out its threat to refuse an audience to the American minister. In a note to Mr. Leal, dated November 17, Mr. Buchanan expressed his gratification to learn that Mr. Tod had been kindly and courteously received by his Imperial Majesty, and was also pleased to learn that a new minister from Brazil would shortly be appointed to the United States. But in regard to the differences between the two governments he had nothing to add except to say that the President's views remained unchanged.³ The same sentiments were indicated by Secretary Buchanan in his next despatch to Mr. Tod, with the further injunction that he should press the settlement of certain claims of American citizens which had long been outstanding against the Brazilian government.⁴

The interest of the American government now shifted from the settlement of these diplomatic difficulties to the settlement of claims, and when Secretary Buchanan found

¹ Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 35, 30th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 28-41.

² J. B. Moore [ed.], *The Works of James Buchanan*, Vol. VII, p. 404.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 461.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 462.

that the Brazilian government apparently intended to allow the Davis affair to remain suspended, he urged Mr. Tod to press more vigorously on the claims.¹ Mr. Tod followed instructions, and on January 27, 1849, a claims convention was concluded between the two countries, whereby the Brazilian government agreed to place at the disposal of the United States 530,000 milreis (about \$300,000) to comprehend all the reclamations.² The same year Mr. Sergio Texeira de Macedo was accredited envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the United States and duly accepted. The following exchange of compliments between Mr. Clayton, the new Secretary of State, and Mr. Buchanan throw some light on the outcome: "If I go to the devil it will be because I am here daily engaged in covering up and defending all your outrageous acts. . . . The Brazilian Macedo laboured hard to revive your haughty discussion about Lieut. Davis and the drunken seamen in Rio. I refused to revive it, assumed you were altogether right (God assoilzie me for that) and dismissed him with compliments." Mr. Buchanan's reply to this was that "the Brazilian quarrel, which gave fair promise at one time of producing a tempest in a teapot, was virtually settled by your predecessor in the only effectual manner by assuming a just and lofty attitude in support of the lamblike Wise."³

The diplomatic relations between the United States and Brazil thenceforth became increasingly friendly. During the Civil War, Brazil gave numerous examples of a friendly disposition towards the Northern government. Upon one occasion, when the *Alabama* captured some half-dozen American whalers in Brazilian territorial waters, and in the meantime lay in the port of the island of Fernando

¹ J. B. Moore, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, p. 60.

² House Ex. Doc. No. 19, 31st Cong., 1st sess., p. 1. For terms of distribution see J. B. Moore, *Hist. and Digest of Int. Arbitrations*, Vol. V, pp. 4609-4626.

³ J. B. Moore [ed.], *The Works of James Buchanan*, Vol. VIII, p. 359.

de Noronha (also under Brazilian sovereignty), Mr. Webb, the American minister, raised a vigorous protest. The Brazilian government immediately investigated the case, and when it learned that the commanding officer of the island had been over-friendly to the captain of the *Alabama* he was forthwith dismissed and proceedings begun against him. At the same time, the president of the province of Pernambuco gave the captain of the *Alabama* notice to leave the territorial waters of the empire within twenty-four hours.¹ On a later occasion information was again brought to Mr. Webb that the Confederate cruisers *Alabama*, *Florida*, and *Georgia* were obtaining coal and provisions in the ports of Pernambuco and Bahia in order to continue their destruction of the commerce of the United States.² Upon receiving Mr. Webb's protest, the Brazilian foreign minister again gave assurances that his Majesty the Emperor was firmly resolved to maintain, and cause to be respected, the neutrality of Brazil.³

The Confederate States, however, were not alone in violating the neutral territory of Brazil. On October 4, 1863, the *Florida* arrived at Bahia and was given forty-eight hours by the authorities to repair her boilers and obtain provisions and coal. The U. S. S. *Wachusett* happened to be in the harbor at the time, but the American consul was said to have given a pledge for the observance of neutrality by the vessel's commander. In spite of this, the *Wachusett* approached the *Florida* on the morning of October 7, and opened fire upon her. The commander of the Brazilian naval division intervened, and the firing ceased; but shortly afterwards it was seen that the *Wachusett* was towing the *Florida* out to sea. The Brazilian commander pursued but could not overtake her, and the *Florida* was brought to Hampton Roads. The Brazilian government

¹ *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, 1863*, Part II, pp. 1164-1169.

² *Ibid.*, p. 1171.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 1177.

thereupon demanded (1) a public expression on the part of the Union government that this action was regretted and condemned; (2) the immediate dismissal of the United States commander, followed by the commencement of proper process; and (3) a salute of twenty-one guns, to be given in the port of the capital of Bahia by some vessel of war of the United States, having hoisted at her masthead during the salute the Brazilian flag. In a note to the Brazilian government dated December 26, 1864, Mr. Seward replied that the President disavowed and regretted the proceedings at Bahia; that he would suspend the commander of the *Wachusett* and direct him to appear before a court martial; that the consul, who admitted having advised and incited the commander, would be dismissed; and that the flag of Brazil would receive from the United States Navy the honor customary in the intercourse of friendly maritime powers. This would be done on the ground that the capture of the *Florida* was an unauthorized, unlawful, and indefensible exercise of the naval force of the United States within a foreign country, in defiance of its established and duly recognized government."¹ The salute was fired by Commander F. B. Blake in the harbor of Bahia on July 23, 1866, and the *Diario da Bahia* thus characterized the event: "It is thus that a great and spirited people give, in the face of the civilized world, a public and solemn proof of the sincerity of its professions of the sacred principles of justice."²

Just as the Civil War was coming to an end in the United States, Brazil was forced to enter a war which, although successful, imposed a heavy burden upon her people. The Paraguayan dictator, Francisco Lopez, had been much incensed at Brazil's interference in a factional struggle in Uruguay in 1863. It was also rumored that Dom Pedro II had refused to entertain the dictator's proposals for his

¹ J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. VII, p. 1090.

² *Diplomatic Correspondence, 1866*, Part II, p. 317.

daughter's hand. At any rate, in the fall of 1864 Lopez seized a Brazilian steamer on its regular trip up the Paraguayan River to Matto Grosso. He followed this up with an expedition against the southern settlements of Matto Grosso, which were wholly unable to resist his well disciplined troops. Brazil accepted the challenge, although she was by no means equipped to combat the wonderfully trained army that Lopez had been preparing for years. Argentina, although in sympathy with Brazil, declared her neutrality. Lopez, however, confident of his power, deliberately invaded Argentinian territory at the Parana River in order to strike at the heart of Brazil. The result was a coalition against him on the part of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, a formal alliance being signed May 1, 1865.¹

The war lasted five years and resulted in the death of Lopez and the almost complete extermination of the Paraguayan people. "The heroism of Paraguay overcame numbers, destiny, and death," but to no avail. Out of a million and a quarter people living in Paraguay before the war, more than a million had perished, and of the less than a quarter of a million who survived more than five sixths were women and children. Brazil played the leading part in the war and her losses were correspondingly great. It was estimated that the war cost her more than 50,000 lives and \$300,000,000. Considering her sacrifices, Brazil deserves all the more credit for making no effort to extend her territory at the expense of her vanquished and helpless neighbor. By a preliminary agreement of peace, signed June 20, 1870, the allies' demands were limited to the establishment of complete freedom of navigation for the warships and merchant-vessels of the allies upon the Upper Parana and the Paraguay.² A definitive treaty of peace

¹ For text see *Dip. Corr. of the U. S., 1866*, Part II, p. 476; for a fair summary of causes of the war see *Dip. Corr., 1867*, Part II, pp. 248-250; the Paraguayan side is given in pp. 722-725.

² *British and Foreign State Papers*, Vol. LXIII, p. 322. For a survey of the operations and results of the war see C. E. Akers, *A History of South America, 1854-1904* (N. Y., 1904), pp. 130-188.

was signed between Brazil and Paraguay, January 9, 1872, whereby Brazil promised to respect perpetually Paraguay's independence, sovereignty, and integrity. The rivers Paraguay, Parana, and Uruguay were declared free to the commerce of all nations, and the boundaries between Brazil and Paraguay were to be settled by a special convention.¹

During the progress of the Paraguayan war a number of diplomatic incidents occurred in which the United States was interested. Early in 1866 Mr. Charles A. Washburn, the minister of the United States to Paraguay, informed his government that he was being prevented by the allies from passing up the Parana River to Asuncion; although it appears from his despatches that an equal source of delay was the failure of Admiral Godon, in command of the American fleet, to furnish a boat with which to run the blockade. Secretary Seward protested vigorously, both to Brazil and to Argentina; and they finally gave the necessary orders, although under protest. Even then, Mr. Washburn was delayed considerably through Admiral Godon's lack of coöperation, and it was not until a year after he had tried to return that the American minister finally arrived at his post.² An even more serious diplomatic controversy occurred the following year, when Rear-Admiral Davis sent the U. S. S. *Wasp* up the Parana to convey Mr. Washburn and his family back to the United States. Permission was again refused by the Marquis de Caxias, and it was only when Mr. Webb, the American minister at Rio, threatened to ask for his passports that the *Wasp* was enabled to carry out the mission.³

All efforts on the part of the United States to use its good offices to settle the Paraguayan struggle were refused unconditionally by Brazil. In fact, Brazil appeared less inclined than Argentina to accept mediation.⁴ An attempt

¹ *British and Foreign State Papers*, Vol. 62, p. 277.

² *Diplomatic Correspondence, 1866*, Part II, pp. 548-616, 307-326.

³ *Ibid.*, 1868, pp. 273-299.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1867, Part II, p. 253.

on the part of Mr. Washburn to secure a similar result by a personal visit to the Marquis de Caxias, the Brazilian commander-in-chief, was equally unsuccessful.¹

Perhaps the most satisfactory occurrence of this period to the United States was the decree of the Emperor of Brazil, dated January 22, 1866, opening up the Amazon, San Francisco, and other rivers to the merchant-ships of all nations. Ever since 1850 the United States had been sedulously striving to accomplish this result, on the ground that "this restricted policy which it is understood Brazil still persists in maintaining in regard to the navigable rivers passing through her territories is the relic of an age less enlightened than the present," and the merchant-vessels of the United States had the right to use these natural avenues of trade, not because of treaty stipulations, but because "it is a natural one—as much so as that to navigate the ocean—the common highway of nations."²

During the period following the war with Paraguay, Dom Pedro II was seen at his best. His upright and conservative character inspired confidence, and Brazil had little difficulty in obtaining the loans necessary to effect a financial rehabilitation. Nor did his success make him more autocratic or blind him to the need of progressive ideas. By visits to both Europe and the United States he broadened his point of view, and Brazil profited exceedingly by the statesmanlike policy of her enlightened ruler. Nevertheless, a growing sentiment in favor of republicanism was everywhere manifest. The general disposition seemed to be to allow the monarchical system to continue during the lifetime of the Emperor, but to assume that when the Princess Izabel and her unpopular consort, the Comte d'Eu, should take over the government it would be time to consider

¹ *Dip. Corr.*, 1867, Part II, p. 714.

² Mr. Marcy to the American minister to Brazil, Aug. 8, 1853; J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. I, pp. 640-645.

the wisdom of retaining a monarchical system in an otherwise republican continent.

The crisis came sooner than was expected. While the Emperor was traveling in Europe in 1887 for the betterment of his health, Princess Izabel, acting as regent, determined to abolish slavery. Laws had already been passed granting freedom to all children of slaves born after 1871, and to all slaves attaining the age of sixty years, but this process was considered too slow. The Princess insisted that a decree of immediate emancipation for all slaves in the empire be passed; and on May 15, 1888, the measure became law. Although there was no immediate outbreak on the part of the wealthy slave-owners and the landed aristocracy, the monarchical party, through this decree, lost its strongest prop. Republican propaganda and revolutionary agitation spread rapidly, and the situation of the government became critical. Dom Pedro's return in August, 1888, stemmed the tide temporarily, but in the following year the military element threw in its lot with the republicans and decided upon an immediate *coup d'état*. The plans were made carefully and were carried out without a hitch. Early in the morning of November 15, 1889, the imperial palace was surrounded and the Emperor and his family were arrested. A proclamation announced the deposition of the Emperor and the establishment of a republican form of government with a provisional president at the head. There was neither bloodshed nor confusion, and a few days later the Emperor and his family were sent back to Portugal.¹

It was to be expected that the United States would look with favor upon the new convert to republican institutions, and on February 19, 1890, the Senate and House of Representatives passed a joint resolution congratulating the peo-

¹ See the scholarly article by Professor P. A. Martin, "Causes of the Collapse of the Brazilian Empire," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. IV, No. 1, pp. 1-48 (Feb., 1921).

ple of the United States of Brazil on their adoption of a republican form of government.¹ Meanwhile the American minister had been instructed to maintain diplomatic relations with the provisional government and to give it a formal and cordial recognition "so soon as a majority of the people of Brazil should have signified their assent to the establishment and maintenance of the Republic."²

General Deodora da Fonseca, the provisional president, summoned a national congress, which met at Rio de Janeiro on November 15, 1890, to consider a draft of a constitution submitted by the provisional government. As finally adopted on February 24, 1891, the "Law of Constitution" established a federal system of government modeled very closely upon that of the United States. A president and vice-president elected directly for a four-year term, assisted by six secretaries of state appointed by the president, constitute the executive authority. The legislature consists of a Senate of sixty-three members, three from each state and three from the federal district, elected for a nine-year term, and a Chamber of Deputies, in the proportion of not more than one for each 70,000 inhabitants, elected directly for a three-year term. The judicial power is vested in a supreme federal court of fifteen members. The states are given almost complete autonomy, except for matters that are purely national in scope. In theory Brazil now had a perfect type of representative republican government, although an arduous struggle and considerable bloodshed were required to put the theory into practice.³

Before the end of 1891 President Fonseca had brought on a series of revolutionary outbreaks through his arbitrary methods, and when the navy joined in the opposition he decided "in the interests of the nation" to resign. Vice-President Peixoto, who took over the presidency, governed

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1890*, p. 21.

² J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. I, p. 160.

³ For text of the constitution see W. F. Dodd, *Modern Constitutions* (Chicago, 1909), Vol. I.

for a short time in accordance with constitutional prerogatives. But military training and an autocratic disposition soon overcame his newly acquired constitutional inhibitions, and he became even more despotic than his predecessor. A revolt that started in Rio Grande do Sul spread rapidly, and in the autumn Admiral de Mello and Admiral de Gama, who were in command of the naval forces and of the naval school at Rio de Janeiro, threw in their lot with the revolutionists.¹ The struggle quickly developed into a real civil war, and the question came up as to the recognition of the insurgents as belligerents.

On October 24, 1893, the American legation at Rio de Janeiro received notice from Admiral de Mello that a provisional government had been established at Desterro and requesting recognition by the United States as belligerents. When the request was brought to his attention, Secretary Gresham replied that, since the insurgents had not yet established and maintained a political organization justifying recognition, such an act would be unfriendly to Brazil and a gratuitous demonstration of moral support to the rebellion. The American minister was therefore instructed to remain an indifferent spectator.² Commodore O. F. Stanton, in command of the United States naval forces at the South Atlantic Naval Station, happened to arrive at Rio de Janeiro in his flagship just after the revolt had occurred. On entering, he saluted the Brazilian flag with twenty-one guns, and a government fort returned the salute. Subsequently, however, he saluted Admiral Mello with thirteen guns; the salute was returned, and the next day he made an official call upon the insurgent admiral. The Brazilian government protested, and the commodore was thereupon detached from his command and ordered home. After hearing his explanation, the Navy Department decreed that

¹ For a short résumé of the causes see *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1893*, pp. 68-70, or C. E. Akers, *op. cit.*, pp. 250-266.

² *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1893*, p. 63.

he had committed "a grave error of judgment," since it was known that the United States had not recognized Admiral Mello and his forces as entitled to belligerent rights.¹

The question of recognition of belligerency brought up a conflict between Admiral Benham, who now commanded the American squadron, and Admiral de Gama of the insurgent fleet. Inasmuch as belligerent rights of the insurgents were not recognized, the naval commanders of the neutral squadrons refused to allow the insurgent forces to interfere with commercial operations except in the actual lines of fire. However, with the progress of the revolution the insurgents became inclined to interfere with neutral shipping, especially where the articles might be regarded as contraband of war. The British admiral and his European colleagues were inclined to submit to such interference. But Admiral Benham refused categorically and notified Admiral de Gama that he would use force, if necessary, to maintain American rights. An opportunity was given when several American vessels attempted to land their goods. When a shot from one of the insurgent vessels stopped the operation, the U. S. S. *Detroit* returned the fire, and the insurgents were notified that their boat would be sunk if she fired again. The threat was effectual and neutral commerce was not again interfered with. It might be noted, however, that Admiral Benham's *dicta* that the forcible seizure of contraband by the insurgents from neutrals who were engaged in supplying it to the belligerent government would be an act of piracy has hardly received the sanction of international law.²

With the resources of the country behind him, President Peixoto was enabled to purchase vessels in Europe and the United States, and the insurgents finally realized that further resistance was useless. Furthermore, on March 1,

¹ J. B. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, Vol. I, p. 240.

² *For. Rel. of the U. S.*, 1893, pp. 115-117; also J. B. Moore, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 1113-1120.

1894, a civilian, Dr. Prudente de Moraes Barros, was elected president, which not only proved that President Peixoto intended to abide by the constitution but also that a more liberal régime could be expected. By summer the rebellion was completely checked, and on November 15, 1894, Dr. Moraes took over the government. The neutral attitude adopted by Admiral Benham, which had prevented a blockade of Rio de Janeiro, naturally aroused feelings of more cordial friendship towards the United States, and on the same day that the new president was inaugurated the cornerstone of a monument to the memory of President Monroe was laid in Rio.¹

The withdrawal of President Peixoto from public life marked the end of pretorian government in Brazil. President Moraes granted full amnesty to the majority of those who participated in the revolution, and then proceeded to eliminate all military influence in the control of the government. His administration was so successful that his chosen successor, Dr. Manuel Campos Salles, another civilian, had little difficulty in securing the election. President Salles continued the liberal and statesmanlike policies of his predecessor, governing strictly in accordance with the terms of the constitution. He was particularly successful in his financial policy, restoring Brazilian credit, which had been sorely tried by the costs of wars and uprisings and by the extravagant methods of the inexperienced republican officials. The next two presidents were also civilians, but in 1910 a soldier, Marshal Fonseca, formerly minister of war, was elected. Any doubts as to whether he would not attempt to govern after the fashion of his military predecessors were soon set at rest, and his administration was no less constitutional than those of the civilians who preceded him. However, in 1914 the country once more turned to a civilian, Dr. Braz, who had served as vice-president with President Fonseca; and the present president, Dr. Epitacio da Silva

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1895, Part I, p. 48.*

Pessoa, was also drawn from civilian ranks.¹ Republican government in accordance with constitutional limitations has been firmly established in Brazil.

Since the founding of the republic the relations between the United States and Brazil have unquestionably been more cordial than between the United States and any other South American country. In 1904 the Brazilian government built a beautiful palace of marble and granite for its exhibit at the St. Louis Exposition, and later it had the structure sent back to Rio de Janeiro for use as a meeting-place for international conferences and similar gatherings. It was in this building that Secretary Root made his memorable address while acting as honorary president of the Third Pan-American Conference at Rio de Janeiro, July 31, 1906; and at the close the minister for foreign affairs of Brazil, Baron do Rio Branco, announced that henceforth the palace would be known as the Monroe Palace. It is interesting to note that to-day this palace stands at the head of the most beautiful street in Rio de Janeiro—the Brazilians say the most beautiful street in the world—and that this street now bears the name *Avenida do Rio Branco*, in memory of Brazil's most illustrious foreign minister.

The visit of Secretary Root not only enhanced the cordial feelings of friendship that bound the two nations together, but had a very practical result in improving commercial relations. The very next month a bill was introduced in the Chamber of Deputies which provided for a 20 per cent. reduction of the tariff in favor of all countries importing more than 4,000,000 sacks of coffee annually free of duty. Inasmuch as the United States was the only country coming within this category, the advantage was obvious.² This preferential tariff was renewed annually by presidential decree until 1911, when the reduction on flour was increased

¹ There is still some dispute as to whether the elections of April, 1922, have resulted in favor of Dr. Bernardes or former President Pecanha.

² *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1906, Part I, p. 135.*

to 30 per cent. This advantage aroused the fears of the Argentine government, and the Argentine minister at Washington was instructed to threaten an increase of its tariff on American petroleum, lumber, and other staples if the United States attempted to secure any further concessions from Brazil. The United States immediately denied any intention of seeking further preferential treatment and promised Argentina a notice of six months in case unforeseen circumstances should change this situation.¹

It was in this same year that a slight difficulty arose between the United States and Brazil through the so-called valorization of coffee. As far back as 1885 Brazil produced more than one half of the world's coffee, and by 1900 it was producing more than two thirds. In 1901 the production was tremendously increased, particularly in the state of São Paulo, the total crop amounting to more than 16,000,000 sacks of 60 kilos (132 pounds). This was more than four fifths of the world's production and several hundred million pounds more than the world was consuming at that time. Steps were immediately taken to prevent further planting, and, although prices fell sharply, a fall in the Brazilian rate of exchange prevented ruin. In 1906, however, another unprecedented crop was harvested in Brazil, amounting to more than 20,000,000 million sacks. The world's annual consumption was then estimated at about 17,000,000 bags; there were already on hand in the warehouses of the world about 11,000,000 bags; and the Caribbean region was producing almost 3,000,000 bags annually. The state of São Paulo faced utter financial ruin unless something radical was done. The valorization plan was the solution. Huge loans were floated in the United States and Europe, and São Paulo bought more than 8,000,000 bags and stored it in various countries. A super-tax of three francs per bag on exports enabled the state to meet the interest charges, and

¹ *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1911, p. 30 ff.*

diminishing crops and an increasing market in the following years enabled the state to market its stores at a profit.¹

In September, 1911, a report by W. T. Chantland, special assistant to the Attorney-General, who had been detailed to investigate the valorization scheme in so far as it concerned the United States, stated that the plan violated Section 76 of the Wilson Act, identical with Section 6 of the Sherman Act, which gave the United States the right to seize and condemn property imported into the United States and held in restraint of trade. It was further claimed that the United States consumed 40 per cent. of the entire world's output of coffee, or about 950,000,000 pounds of coffee per year. Therefore a mere rise of six cents per pound in the cost of coffee meant \$57,000,000 a year to the people of the United States; and the valorization scheme had brought about a rise in excess of six cents.² The result of this report was a suit instituted by the Attorney-General in the District Court of New York against the Committee on Coffee Valorization of the State of São Paulo. The Brazilian ambassador immediately protested, and in his message to the state congress, July 14, 1912, the president of São Paulo declared that the action jeopardized in a very strange fashion the legal status of Brazilian coffee stored in New York.³ After a series of notes the United States promised to drop the suit upon a promise of the Brazilian government that all of the stores of valorized coffee in New York would be sold in the open market before April 1, 1913.⁴

One of the results of the controversy was the temporary suspension on the part of Brazil of the preferential tariff on American goods. This entailed heavy losses for American exporters, and with the dropping of the suit the tariff concessions to the United States were revived. But, in order

¹ For a complete account see P. Denis, *Brazil* (N. Y., 1911), pp. 235-266.

² *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1913*, pp. 39-52.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 59-67.

to cement the renewed friendly relations, the American government extended an invitation to Dr. Lauro Müller, the Brazilian minister for foreign affairs, to visit the United States to repay the visit made by Secretary Root to Brazil in 1906. Dr. Müller accepted the invitation and was enthusiastically received. He remained in the United States more than a month, visiting and traveling from New York to San Francisco. A new link of appreciation and understanding was thereby forged.

At the beginning of the World War it was rather difficult to envisage what might be the attitude of Brazil. The large number of German colonists in southern Brazil, estimated at anywhere from 350,000 to 500,000, might have been expected to exert considerable influence towards a pro-German policy. The Brazilian government and the Brazilian people, however, soon gave clear indications that their sympathies were overwhelmingly on the side of the Allies. Within a week after the outbreak of the war the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies passed a motion recording its opposition to the violation of treaties and to acts violating the established principles of international law.¹ Less than a year later (in March, 1915), an organization was founded under the presidency of the eminent Brazilian statesman, Ruy Barbosa, known as the Brazilian League for the Allies. Its program included educational conferences, petitions of protest against Germany's war methods, and the raising of funds for the Brazilian Red Cross. It was at one of the meetings held by this organization, to raise funds for the establishment of a Brazilian hospital in Paris for the French wounded, that President Barbosa expressed regret that the United States had not seized the opportunity to assure itself first place among the nations by grouping about itself all the peoples of the American continent in protest against the invasion of Belgium and entering into

¹ P. A. Martin, "Latin America and the War," *League of Nations*, Vol. II, No. 4, p. 233.

the struggle to protect the validity of international engagements.¹

Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare, which soon became a deadly menace to Brazil's extensive merchant marine, and the entrance of the United States into the World War, both tended to bring Brazil into the war on the side of the Allies. On April 11, 1917, immediately following the sinking of the Brazilian steamer *Parana* off the coast of France, diplomatic relations with Germany were severed. On May 22 President Braz urged Congress to revoke Brazil's neutrality in favor of the United States. In his speech he pointed out that "the Brazilian nation, through its legislative organ, can without warlike intentions, but with determination, adopt the attitude that one of the belligerents forms an integral part of the American continent, and that to this belligerent we are bound by a traditional friendship and by a similarity of political opinion in the defense of the vital interests of America and the principles accepted by international law."²

The decree of neutrality was annulled on June 1, and in the circular note to foreign governments announcing the fact, the Brazilian government thus indicated its union of interests with the United States: "Brazil could not remain indifferent to it when the United States were drawn into the struggle without any interest therein but in the name alone of respect for international law, and when Germany extended indiscriminately to ourselves and other neutrals the most violent acts of war. If hitherto the relative lack of reciprocity on the part of the American Republics has withdrawn from the Monroe Doctrine its true character, permitting a scarcely well founded interpretation of the prerogatives of their sovereignty, the present events, by placing Brazil, even now, at the side of the United States,

¹ Gaston Gaillard, *Amérique Latine et Europe Occidentale* (Paris, 1918), p. 44.

² *Brazilian Green Book*, authorized English version (London, 1918), p. 40. For expression of opinion in Brazil see G. Gaillard, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-90.

in the critical moment of the world's history, continue to give our foreign policy a practical form of continental solidarity—a policy indeed which was that of the old régime on every occasion on which any of the other friendly sister nations of the American continent were in jeopardy.”¹

The final break came on October 26, 1917, when a resolution recognizing a state of war was passed unanimously by the Senate and with only one vote against it in the lower house. Compulsory military service was reinstated, a mission was sent to the United States to purchase equipment and to arrange for military coöperation, a fleet of light cruisers was sent to coöperate with the British, aviators and physicians were sent to the western front, and every effort was made to increase the exportation of foodstuffs to the Allies.² From the point of view of the United States, the entrance of Brazil into the war was particularly important, even on purely moral grounds. The conclusion that the war was essentially just and necessary was enormously strengthened when the two greatest states of the western hemisphere, putting aside all feelings of rivalry and petty jealousy, decided to stand shoulder to shoulder in a struggle for that democracy which has ever been the ideal of the two Americas.

In the settlement following the war it must be conceded that Brazil was more steadfast in supporting the ideals for which she fought than was the United States. Brazil accepted the noble purposes of the League of Nations as worthy of at least a fair trial, and was deservedly honored by being elected to membership in the League Council. In his address to Secretary Colby on the occasion of the latter's visit to Rio de Janeiro in December, 1920, President Pessoa expressed regret that the United States had failed to ratify the treaty of Versailles. “Brazil,” he declared, “is naturally very much interested in the beneficial purpose of the

¹ *Brazilian Green Book*, p. 49.

² P. A. Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

League of Nations. Therefore it is a matter of regret that the United States, which took the lead in that great project, has not retained it."¹ When the votes were cast for the judges of the League's Court of International Justice, Brazil showed her continued confidence in the United States by choosing as one of her candidates the American statesman whose Pan-American policy received the hearty support of all Latin America, Mr. Elihu Root. When the court was finally constituted, Brazil found herself again honored by being represented on this body by her eminent statesman and publicist, Ruy Barbosa.

In sketching the relations between the United States and Brazil, perhaps even more stress than in the case of either Argentina or Chile should be laid on the commercial side. Long before the establishment of the republic, Brazil's trade with the United States surpassed that of all the Spanish South American republics combined. For example, in 1870 Brazil's trade with the United States was valued at approximately \$31,000,000, while that of the Spanish South American countries amounted to about \$29,000,000.² However, it must be noted that the United States imported from Brazil about four times as much as she sent in return. And this situation was due principally to the fondness of the people of the United States for Brazilian coffee. The first boat that inaugurated regular monthly steamship transport between the United States and Brazil arrived at Rio on June 7, 1878, and took back a cargo of 37,000 sacks of coffee, the largest and most valuable single cargo that had ever been shipped from the country.³ In 1890 the total trade between the United States and Argentina was valued at approximately \$14,200,000, the trade with Chile at \$6,400,000, while that with Brazil amounted to more than \$71,000,000.⁴ At the outbreak of the World War Brazil still held

¹ *The Independent*, Vol. CV, p. 49 (Jan. 8, 1921).

² *For. Rel. of the U. S., 1870*, pp. 283-287.

³ *Ibid.*, 1878, p. 67.

⁴ *Statistical Abstract of the U. S., 1890*, p. 75.

first place in United States trade with South America, with a total value of about \$154,000,000, although Argentina, with a total value of about \$72,000,000, had gained more proportionately.¹ The figures for 1920 show Brazil still in the lead. But the margin is small, the value of Brazil's trade with the United States being \$445,000,000 and that of Argentina \$407,000,000. The most noticeable fact here is the tremendous increases with both countries as a result of the war.²

A comparison of Brazil's trade with the United States and the European countries before and after the war as shown by the table on page 390 indicates still more clearly the enviable position which the United States has obtained in its commercial relations with Brazil.

A mere glance at Brazil's principal commodities of export shows that the United States is a natural customer. Brazil's two principal resources are coffee and rubber, and the United States is by far the world's greatest consumer of both these products. In 1913 the United States imported about 625,000,000 pounds of Brazilian coffee, almost three times as much as it imported from all other sources, and more than was imported by France, Germany, and Great Britain combined. In 1917 the United States imported about 880,000,000 pounds from Brazil, or almost twice as much as all the rest of the world. In 1913 the United States imported about 16,000 long tons of rubber out of Brazil's total production of 35,000 tons. In 1917 the United States took about 20,000 tons out of about 33,000. During the war the United States took virtually all of Brazil's manganese, the amount being increased from about 40,000 tons in 1913 to more than 500,000 in 1917. Diamonds, Brazil woods, and Brazil nuts also find a ready market in the United States. Considering the vast unexploited wealth

¹ *Statistical Abstract of the U. S., 1914*, p. 688.

² *Ibid.*, 1920, p. 838. These figures are for calendar years.

FOREIGN COMMERCE OF BRAZIL¹

	UNITED KINGDOM		GERMANY		UNITED STATES	
	1913	1920	1913	1920	1913	1920
Brazilian exports to.....	\$41,701,815	\$30,805,280	\$44,392,410	\$24,706,220	\$102,562,923	\$259,541,580
Brazilian imports from...	79,881,008	99,670,780	57,043,754	23,069,640	51,289,682	193,652,140
Total trade.....	\$121,582,823	\$130,476,060	\$101,436,164	\$47,775,860	\$153,852,605	\$453,193,720

¹ Figures for 1913 from *Report of Second Pan-Amer. Commercial Conf.* (Wash., 1919), pp. 400-401, for 1920 from *Bulletin of the Pan-Amer. Union*, Vol. LIV, pp. 48-49 (Jan., 1922).

of Brazil and the character of her resources, the United States should long remain her best customer.

In these circumstances the United States has unlimited opportunities, not only to obtain a large share of Brazil's import trade, but to help increase that trade far beyond its present figures. When it is realized that in 1913 Brazil's imports *per capita* amounted to only \$13, as compared with \$55 for Argentina and \$56 for Cuba, the possibilities are obvious.¹ Brazil needs capital, and the United States can supply it. Transportation both by land and by water must be developed by outside resources, and the United States possesses both the financial and technical means. In the words of Senhor de Menezes, commercial agent in the United States of the Brazilian ministry of agriculture, industry, and commerce: "The period of German exploitation in Brazil is over, never to return. We are looking to the United States for men and money, and we stand ready to give value for value received."² Brazil's attitude well expresses the attitude of all Latin America: it stands ready to give value for value received. The United States must decide whether it will meet the requirements.

¹ *Report of Second Pan-Amer. Commercial Conf.* (Wash., 1919), p. 125.

² *Ibid.*, p. 117.

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